whether or not by a certain definition of a soft file, it is a file into which information is put which people would just as soon not have divulged. In having that discussion with the chairman, I mentioned as an example as how this does not work. When this Agency itself found certain of that material-and some, I hasten to add, was found while processing under FOIA-we came forward the moment we located it.

The difficulty we had then and, to a certain degree, the difficulty we have now is to how the file structure has been created in the Agency through the years. We have had some difficulty in locating the totality of information which is now available. But, as our individuals have found this material, the record shows, sir, we have marched forward with it.

Senator ABOUREZK. Under your existing filing system, if what you would describe as a file of convenience is held at somebody's desk or in a safe outside of the main filing system, and there was a request from the Congress or under an FOIA action and you went into the main files-I assume they are computerized

Mr. BLAKE. Not all of them, no, sir.

Senator ABOUREZK. If you went into the main files, what, if anything, do you have in the main files that would show there are files being kept elsewhere?

Mr. BLAKE. In the main file, to the degree that it is a complete index, we would have a centralized index. Let's assume the subject matter is potatoes in East Germany. If the matter is properly structured, you would have a cross-reference, "Potatoes in East Germany." That central index should show you what official files are maintained in the headquarters establishment, what files are in our records center, what files are in our archives.

May I return, sir, to your

Senator ABOUREZK. And would it also show what files are being kept in somebody's desk?

Mr. BLAKE. No, sir, it would not.

We are back to the soft files, Mr. Chairman. They are not indexed in the central index; they are not, sir.

Senator ABOUREZK. So, they are not released under an FOIA request then?

Mr. BLAKE. No, sir, I am sorry. I commented on that earlier, too. Let's stick with the example, if I may, on potatoes in East Germany as a hypothetical thing to continue. If an FOIA request comes in today, "Please let me have all records you have pertaining to potatoes in East Germany," under the FOIA procedures we have, that request would go to the logical elements in the organization that should hold information on potatoes in East Germany. The individual who receives that request is under obligation to look at all file material they know that exists to see if there are any relevant documents on potatoes in East Germany.

Now, if I am the local expert on potatoes in East Germany, I would go to the central index, see what files are available there. If I am working on that project, I might have soft files-again, sir, by my defini

1 See p. 534 of the appendix.

21-656-78- -7

tion, files of convenience-where there may be material that I have been working on on potatoes in East Germany. That material would come up in processing the FOIA request.

Senator ABOUREZK. So, the existence of so-called soft files, even if they are soft files of convenience then, would not, in every case, be divulged under an FOIA request or a request from an authorized committee of the Congress? There are instances where you could not find those files. Is that correct?

Mr. BLAKE. Well, I am not sure now if I understand the question. If I understand the question previously, I understood it to mean: Can a guarantee be given that the contents of all soft files would be looked at in searching an FOIA request? Is this the question?

Senator ABOUREZK. That is right.

Mr. BLAKE. I cannot give that guarantee, sir, for the reason I mentioned earlier. The soft file is not indexed in the central index. Without that, I cannot give a guarantee that an individual working this potatoes in East Germany project would be aware. A fellow analyst working on the same project may have a soft file.

Senator ABOUREZK. Suppose then, Mr. Blake, that the CIA, under the direction of the Secretary of State or somebody in the administration, was conducting an operation somewhere not authorized by Congress. Would the person in charge of that project in the Agency keep a soft file on that particular activity?

Mr. BLAKE. I would assume so, yes, sir.

Senator ABOUREZK. Let's say that there was nothing in a central file on that activity. In that case, if a committee of the Congress attempted to find out any information about that particular operation, it could not do so under the system you describe.

Mr. BLAKE. Well, I think, sir, there may be two different things involved here.

The previous example was a request for the processes used under FOIA. Now, the FOIA request comes into the Agency in writing. It goes to a designated point. That point makes the determination where the information should be available. A written request goes down to those people to process.

On the example you just hypothecated, a Member of the Congress is interested in this matter. I would assume, under those conditions, the Member of the Congress or a staff representative of the Member would ask to talk to Mr. Smith, the responsible officer for the particular project. Either the Representative of the Congress or the staff member would say, "Mr. Smith, I would like to be aware of everything pertaining to project X." Mr. Smith, if he was keeping that soft file, and was a man in charge of project X, would know he had that information in that soft file and certainly would bring it up for discussion with the Congressman or the Representative of the Congress.

I think we are talking about two different processes here, if I may, sir.

Senator ABOUREZK. The Health Subcommittee has just recently obtained the files on the MKULTRA project. Two years ago when they tried, they could not get them.

So, your example fails right there.

Mr. BLAKE. Sir, may I comment on that?

Senator ABOUREZK. Yes.

Mr. BLAKE. I am not prepared to agree that it failed for this reason. I think it redounds to the credit of the organization.

If one traces back the history, as first developed by the Church committee in 1975 in drug experimentation, the Church committee has reported that, at one point in time, a given individual destroyed records pertaining to drug experimentation. That is contained in the Church committee report.

Now, if the individual who wanted to destroy the records on drug experimentation wanted to, you know, destroy them all, it seems to me he would have gone to the ultimate to get all of them destroyed. The fact of the matter was, certainly, he did not find them all.

Now, in a particular case in MKULTRA, I could tell you the circumstances under which those documents were found. Individuals who had previously searched had searched in every particular title they thought might bring back, in a retrieval sense, any documents on drug experimentation. They used what we call cryptonyms, MKULTRA. They used the name of the drugs. They used the name of people. They used everything they possibly could think of.

In this recent MKULTRA file, another individual searching the records decided to look at financial records not related to any given activity, but financial records from a unit of organization. It was out of that exercise of initiative of that individual that those records were found. The moment they were reported, it was further reported to the Congress that they were.

Senator ABOUREZK. Were all the records that you eventually found on the MKULTRA project part of the official filing system?

Mr. BLAKE. I am not sure if I can factually respond to that question, Mr. Chairman, because I have not always been in a position where I would have known the factual answer.

To the degree that I possess knowledge, I believe my answer is yes. But I cannot speak with certitude for the entire number of records. I have just not had those kinds of responsibilities.

Senator ABOUREZK. Would you supply that information?

Mr. BLAKE. Yes, sir.

Senator ABOUREZK. Specifically the subcommittee would like to know whether all of the files that were recently found were part of the official system or whether any were in soft files.

[The CIA provided the following supplemental information September 28, 1977.]

[Exhibit 48]

The Agency has a recordkeeping system which was designed or has grown to meet the needs of the Agency. The circumstances and needs this system must accommodate are historical/archival, decentralization of facilities, security compartmentation, and the convenience/efficiency of all working components.

The person assigned responsibility for a project (the project engineer or project monitor in the R&D elements) is responsible for establishing and maintaining the Record Copy File of that project. Persons working with him on the project generally keep working files (sometimes called soft files) on their portion of the project. The Record File is usually maintained by the office clerical staff. The project engineer works either from the Record File or from his own complete working (soft) file. Support officers, personnel, finance, etc. usually keep their own files, which both for efficiency and compartmentation, are typically restricted

to those documents required for their particular function. These are specialty working files and are not part of the record system since all documents in these files are also in the Record File. To prevent the proliferation of unnecessary records, the holders of working files were, until 1975, encouraged to destroy them as soon as they had served their purpose. Record Files are permanently retained. Thus, the Record File should contain a copy of all documents pertinent to that file and should be the complete history of that activity. The working files are generally incomplete and are intended to serve only for a temporary time period and then be destroyed.

The Record Copy File of the Agency's drug activity (MKULTRA) was, contrary to normal procedure, retrieved from our record system and destroyed in 1973. MKSEARCH Record Files and related activities funded by grants which, at that time had not been retired to archives, were also destroyed as were all working files which were known to exist. This destruction was ordered by Dr. Gottlieb, then Chief of the Technical Services Division, reportedly with the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Helms.

In order to accommodate the many investigations of this activity, and because the Record Files had been destroyed, the Agency conducted an extensive search for all working files that might exist related to drug activity. Since the working files are not part of the permanent record system, they are not indexed and there is no efficient way to locate such files.

By a quirk of fate, the working files maintained on MKULTRA by the Budget and Fiscal Branch (B&F) of the Technical Services Division were not destroyed when the project was terminated.

In March of this year, these highly specialized, quite incomplete, B&F MKULTRA working files were located. The existence of these files led to the discovery in August of about six inches of MKSEARCH B&F working files.

In summary, Record Files are indexed, retrievable and permanent. Soft files are not indexed, not efficiently retrievable and are not intended for permanent retention. Once the individual responsible for a soft file is no longer available, such files can be located only by a folder by folder search. Even then, such a search would be fruitful only if the folders were labeled in some anticipated manner. Thus, it is not possible to be certain that every working file containing drug material has been uncovered.

[Also see CIA correspondence with subcommittee at p. 529 of the appendix.]

Senator ABOUREZK. I understand that some documents from the MKULTRA file were destroyed. Is that correct?

Mr. BLAKE. I would not say, sir, that there were documents destroyed out of that file. What I do say and what I understand to be the fact, at a given point in time-I am sorry I cannot recall what year it was an individual who was responsible for the conduct of the drug experimentation program destroyed generically files pertaining to drug experiment.

Senator ABOURÉZK. Well, in the subcommittee hearings of 1975, on page 300-I do not know if you have a copy of that.1

Mr. BLAKE. No, sir, we do not.

Senator ABOUREZK. I would like to read a memo. It looks like a blind memo. It is a photocopy of an Agency memo.2

Memorandum for the Acting Director; subject, MKULTRA files; per instructions from Dr. Blank-that is deleted-former chief DDP TSD; all MKULTRA files, branch files and those retrieved from archives were destroyed on January 31, 1973, see attached.

To the best of my recollection, the MKULTRA projects were terminated in 1966 or 1967. I have no knowledge of the ULTRA type materials having been used operationally against U.S. citizens.

1 Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1975, joint hearings before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Sept. 10, 12, and Nov. 7, 1975.

2 See exhibit 49, p. 458 of the appendix for complete copy of the memo.

This document was declassified in March of 1976.

So, a number of files-all the MKULTRA files, branch files and those retrieved from the archives-were destroyed.

The irony of this whole thing is that here is an agency whose purpose is essentially the gathering of information and the analysis of it. Apparently, the director of the MKULTRA project, who was ordered by the Agency to destroy all files, could not find all the files to destroy.

Mr. BLAKE. That is a true statement, sir.

Senator ABOUREZK. That's right. And that's why the subcommittee finally wound up with them today.

I am curious to know, first of all, have new procedures been instituted to insure that all files can be located?

Mr. BLAKE. Sir, we are trying to do as much as we possibly can. I think it stands in the record; I do not have to admit it. The filing systems of the organization were not the best designed, from an overall efficiency point of view, when the organization first commenced.

But we have another problem. That is the problem of the business we are in. In the nature of the intelligence business, there is something called "compartmentation." There is something called "need to know." Certain types of information are made available only to those individuals who have a need professionally to work on it.

So, we do not have the same kind of a consolidated filing system that one would logically look for and find somewhere else.

Again, sir, I stand on the previous statement made. I do not believe it can be sustained whatsoever-if there is an endeavor to sustainthat there is anything nefarious because in 1975 certain documents, MKULTRA, were not located but they have been located in 1977. The proof of the pudding is: Our people located them, our people had the knowledge of it, and we were the ones who said, "You know, embarrassing as it is, we couldn't find it 2 years ago, we found it now, and here, sir, it is."

It is an inefficiency, if you will, sir, and mislaying of the files. But, if there is an inference of nefariousness.

Senator ABOUREZK. How long will it take you to provide the information that we requested that you did not have with you? Can we have an estimate?

Mr. BLAKE. Could I possibly try to give you an answer to that this afternoon? Frankly, I do not know.

Senator ABOUREZK. Would you just call?

Mr. BLAKE. We will endeavor to have a call placed this afternoon. Senator ABOUREZK. Thank you.1

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blake follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN BLAKE

Mr. Chairman, the procedures followed by the Central Intelligence Agency in processing freedom of information requests are not unique to the agency. However, I would like to briefly recount them for the purpose of demonstrating some of the practical problems which we have encountered.

As distinct from the privacy act which provides for access to individually identifiable records by U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens, the Freedom of Information Act provides that records which are reasonably described shall

1 See pp. 525-532 of the appendix for additional material supplied by CIA.