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"It is all agreed with you that it is not anything we would like to get into." Mrs. Graham is reported as saying. In what appeared to be a qualification of her assurances the publisher then told Colby, "It can be that things are starting that have not gotten here."

Seemingly appreciative, Colby responded, "It is a great tribute to our journalists. You are very kind." To which Mrs. Graham reiterated, "It is totally agreed with you that it would not be anything, we have no problem with not doing it," according to the transcript.

Three minutes later, Colby called Carl Duckett, then a CIA deputy director, with the good news, "[Mrs. Graham] called and said not to worry about it, they did not know of anything but they fully agreed they would not do anything."

But, according to the transcript, the CIA director began worrying aloud about how far the agency was spreading the story in its effort to suppress publication. He told Ducket, "We are going to be in a funny position of every newsman in town knowing about it."

At this point, the CIA operatives' meetings with news executives began to reveal signs of frustration and a gnawing competitive urge.

Thomas, according to a CIA "memcom" (memo of conversation), contended that Nelson "will go along with his (Thomas') decision to suppress future reports of (Glomar)," but added that Nelson was unhappy because other papers were pursuing the story.

(Thomas said last night he had little inclination to quibble with the interpretation given to his discussions with the CIA by the agents writing the memos, adding, "There's no way I could remember all of it anyway." But he said the "gist" of his assurances to the agency during this period was that "I promised them, in effect, that I would indeed sit on the story" as long as it appeared it would compromise national security. He noted that other editors followed suit.

(In the meantime he said, he encouraged his staff to pursue the story, sending reporters to Texas and Hawaii to find new details, and assigning six or eight staffers to look at aspects in the Los Angeles area. Of the CIA references to his describing the sources of the original Times story, Thomas said that was done in the context of trying to find out from the CIA representatives what "higher sources" filtered down Glomar information to the sources the Times reporters had talked with.)

According to the documents, Thomas conveyed to the CIA the mistaken impression that The Washington Post had five reporters on the Glomar case. He also suggested to agency officials that Washington Post editors would be just as "responsive" to requests that the story be suppressed as the Los Angeles Times. He offered to assist CIA in dealing with The Post, the internal memoranda showed.

Both Thomas and Shearer expressed a strong concern that they might be scooped on the Glomar story after agreeing to withhold it.

One memorandum described Thomas as saying The New York Times had no justification for thinking the Los Angeles Times would prematurely break the story. It quoted Thomas as saying: "For Christ sakes have Abe Rosenthal call me and I'll tell him so."

Another CIA representative reported in an internal memo after meeting with Shearer at his Los Angeles home that "he [Shearer] feels every time he agrees to hold a story, he gets shafted."

Shearer, according to the memo, had agreed not to publish the Glomar story before anyone else but he demanded three weeks notification of release to accommodate his magazine's printing schedule.

Another subject of the CIA's efforts was New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh. The Glomar press memos state that Hersh had been in touch with CIA officials early in 1974 to discuss Project Jennifer and was gathering details about the program which he regarded as "wasteful and perhaps ineffective."

The Monday after the Los Angeles Times story first appeared, Hersh called the CIA again with a message for Colby. The New York Timesman wanted someone from the CIA to sit down with him and, Hersh said, “I make it as good as I can. It is a positive story. Or else I am in a position of writing what I know, which is more than he thinks I know about our ladyfriend program."

Colby called Hersh in less than an hour.

"You have been first class about this thing for a long time," the CIA director told him. "You remember I came down and talked to you about it one time. You have been damn good."

Hersh replied, "It is not a question of being good. I am a citizen too." The discussion ended on an inconclusive note. Evidently speaking of the story he might write, Hersh said, "I am going to buck it upstairs."

Any fears Colby had about the New York Times were presumably put to rest on March 3, when the newspaper sent a formal letter to Colby agreeing to withhold the story providing it would be promptly informed if another publication planned to use it.

The letter writer, whose name was deleted, said the CIA had obtained suppression agreements from The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and Parade. "Secretary Kissinger has already volunteered an oral assurance on that point," the Times letter, which was written on the stationery of the newspaper's Washington bureau stated. The writer prefaced the message by noting that it had been composed at the request of New York Times managing editor A. M. Rosenthal.

The CIA subsequently called Shearer and Thomas about The New York Times letter, to which Thomas is said to have replied, "That's great," and Shearer is said to have said, "That's good news."

However, on March 17 in an "eyes only" message, Shearer was said to have called an agency official to say, "This thing is really traveling," and that the story was "all over" the National Press Building in Washington, D.C.

The monthly journalism review "More," had been asking a number of papers if they had killed the story and the American Civil Liberties Union was making inquiries, Shearer was quoted as saying.

"He also indicated that, from the sounds of things, he would estimate that the chances of the press holddown remaining tight are becoming less and less every day and that within the next two weeks he would expect to see the story broken," the unidentified official said of Shearer.

On March 18, the day syndicated columnist Jack Anderson broke the story on his radio show, Colby and two assistants visited the offices of National Public Radio and CBS to solicit cooperation from their news executives. The NPR reporter who had learned about the Glomar operation was not invited to attend that meeting, a CIA memo states.

By evening, it was clear that the suppression plan was coming unstuck, and Colby advised editors of The New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times that Anderson had the story and that he was not sure Anderson would agree to withhold it. Anderson subsequently told Post Executive Editor Benjamin C. Bradlee that he was going to disclose the story on the basis that it would get out in a couple of days anyway.

Anderson said the CIA was trying to suppress the story "not because the operation was a secret, but because it was a $350 million failure."

He broadcast the story on the Mutual Radio Network at 9 p.m. and a second time just after 9:30, and the three newspapers immediately followed suit. Later, the columnist and commentator reflected, that since Watergate "a lot of editors and a lot of reporters are wearing a hairshirt-sackcloth and ashes and they're overdoing it a little bit, trying to prove too hard how patriotic and responsible we are."

The heavily censored CIA documents were released in connection with a U.S. District Court lawsuit brought by journalist Harriet Ann Phillippi, then a reporter for Rolling Stone magazine and now with an Atlanta television station. Her lawyer was Mark H. Lynch, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union and for Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litigation Group.

[Exhibit 74d]

C.I.A. PLAN DISCLOSED IN GLOMAR INCIDENT

[From New York Times, October 26, 1977]

AGENCY THOUGHT OF CITING ARTICLES ON SUBMARINE-RAISING MISSION TO GET TOUGH SECRECY LAWS

Washington, Oct. 25-Officials of the Central Intelligence Agency once considered capitalizing on the publication of details of the secret mission of the Glomar Explorer, a submarine-retrieval ship, to show why Congress should toughen secrecy laws, according to agency documents.

This suggestion was included in an internal option paper prepared as the former director of the agency, William E. Colby, was telling publishers and editorial officials of nearly a dozen major news organizations that disclosure of any details would result in grave damage to the national security.

"A disclosure of this sort would serve no useful purpose in the international arena; it would on the other hand provide the director with a case in point for his attempts to assure an adequately strong act of Congress, in order that valid intelligence operations might be protected in the future," the paper said. "It would recognize that this program, of itself, is no longer useful, as it is only as a covert program that valuable information can be obtained.

FUTURE BENEFITS CITED

"The nation would therefore be cutting its losses on this one program, with an aim of overall future benefits."

The option was opposed by contractors working with the C.I.A., presumably including Howard R. Hughes's Summa Corporation, the Global Marine Company and Lockheed Inc., the document said. The option was not adopted.

This memorandum, dated Feb. 26, 1975, was one of several hundred documents obtained from the C.I.A. under the Freedom of Information Act in a lawsuit brought by Harriet Ann Phillippi, a former reporter for Rolling Stone magazine who is now with an Atlanta television station. Miss Phillippi is represented by Mark H. Lynch, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union.

The heavily censored documents trace efforts by the C.I.A. to halt publication of articles about the Glomar's effort to recover a Soviet submarine sunk in 16,000 feet of water 700 miles northwest of Hawaii. Although officials have never publicly stated why the United States sought to recover a 15-year-old Soviet submarine, top intelligence officials have said privately that it provided cryptographic secrets, design information and a chance to study Soviet missile equipment that made it a valuable prize.

Despite the C.I.A.'s efforts, articles about the Glomar were published by several news organizations on the night of March 18, 1975.

Before that, the documents disclosed that the C.I.A.:

Apparently dug into the background of two unnamed West Coast reporters, describing one as having a "drinking problem" and quoting a source who called the reporter a "journalistic prostitute." It speculated that the other reporter would hold the article if given a background briefing.

Suggested to its officials that there was a "fine difference" between reacting to Congressional inquiries and questions from the press. It ruled out giving the press "falsehoods" but said that the agency did not have to tell the press "all the truth."

Obtained conditional agreements not to publish the article from editors or publishers of The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, Newsweek magazine, Time magazine, CBS, Parade magazine and several other news agencies.

A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

One of the first reporters known to have obtained hints of the Glomar mission was Seymour M. Hersh of The New York Times, who was investigating whether the program, which later was estimated to have cost $250 million, was wasteful or inefficient.

In 1974, Mr. Hersh was dissuaded by New York Times editors from pressing on with the investigation.

About a year later, after The Los Angeles Times published part of the story and Mr. Hersh informed Mr. Colby that he was resuming his pursuit of it. Mr. Colby told him by telephone: "You have been first class about this thing for a long time. You remember I came down and talked to you about it one time. You have been damned good."

"It is not a question of being good," Mr. Hersh replied. “I am a citizen, too.” But he continued to press the agency to make the material public either as a "positive" article favorable to its reputation or in recognition that the information was leaking out.

At the same time, both Mr. Colby and Henry A. Kissinger, then Secretary of State, were pressing editors of The New York Times to withhold publication. The documents also indicate that Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, publisher of The New York Times, was briefed on the matter.

[Exhibit 74e]

THE SECRECY DISEASE

[From New York Times, October 31, 1977]

(By Anthony Lewis)

Boston, Oct. 30-For 39 days in the winter of 1975 the C.I.A. kept the lid on the story of the Glomar Explorer: the operation to raise a sunken Soviet submarine. A number of newspapers, magazines and broadcasters had the story, or parts of it, but they were persuaded by William E. Colby and other agency officials to suppress it on national security grounds. The C.I.A.'s campaign of media persuasion is detailed in some documents just obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, and a fascinating tale they tell. After these papers, it will be harder for journalists to believe in their self-image as a tough, skeptical lot, immune to government cajolery. One hopes it will also be harder for anyone to. believe official claims, so often made, that the sky will fall in if some secret document is disclosed.

The 1975 campaign to silence the press was itself treated as a grave national security secret. When Harriet Phillippi of Rolling Stone asked for records of the. effort, the C.I.A. refused even to confirm that there had been one- -though the. fact of Mr. Colby's approaches to editors had been widely reported.

Government lawyers, resisting a suit for the records, said it would be danger-. ous even to say whether or not any existed. An affidavit by Brent Scowcroft, President Ford's Assistant For Security Affairs, said any further disclosures. about the Glomar affair "could in my judgment severely damage the foreign relations and the national defense of the United States." That extreme legal position won in the trial court was rejected, by a 2-to-1 vote, in the United States. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The majority said the government must at least explain why confirming that there were contacts between the C.I.A. and the press would endanger the national security. The court said the govern-. ment might abandon the position if forced to explain it, and something like that evidently happened.

Last April government lawyers admitted for the first time that the C.I.A. had tried to suppress the Glomar story and that records of the attempt existed. After blanking out many names and other passages, the government then turned over64 documents: stenographic transcripts of Mr. Colby's telephone conversations with some press people, reports to him on meetings with others, comments on their weaknesses and so on.

The papers picture Mr. Colby in increasingly frantic efforts to keep the Glomar story from appearing. By the end, as word of it spread through the press, one wonders what he had time to do except talk to editors.

Mr. Colby's actions were hardly surprising, or blameworthy. It was natural for an intelligence chief to try any way he could to keep the Glomar operation secret. What was surprising was that the establishment media-the leading newspapers, the news magazines, the television networks-without exception went. along with him.

Some of the press executives, as reflected in these pages, seemed embarrassingly easy to convince. One from The New York Times wrote a letter to Mr. Colby formally undertaking "to withhold publication" on condition that others did. One from The Washington Post told Mr. Colby, "it is all agreed with you that it is not anything we would like to get into." One from The Los Angeles Times gave C.I.A. officials broad hints who his reporters' sources on the story

were.

Not everyone in the press was so uncritical. Seymour Hersh of The New York Times kept relentlessly after the story, and Mr. Colby and others worried a lot about him. In the end Jack Anderson refused to withhold it. But on the whole the Glomar affair suggests-as The Washington Post's press critic, Charles B. Seib, put it-that "The press, at least at its upper reaches, is easy to con.”

Because the press criticizes others so freely, its performance in the case of the Glomar Explorer is bound to get a certain amount of wry attention. But I think the more important moral of the tale lies elsewhere, in what it says about the whole question of official secrecy.

When a defense or intelligence agency says that something must be kept secret, it starts with a great advantage. The rest of us are likely to be unfamiliar with

the subject, and we defer to the supposed experts. "National security" is a worrying phrase; who would want to risk that?

But bitter and recent experience teaches that "national security" is often a cover for a desire to avoid awkward questions. The most extravagant claims of risk turn out to be hollow. For years officials resisted disclosure of Presidential directives to intelligence agencies, saying they would put individual lives in jeopardy. When published, they turned out to have nothing to do with individuals. It is not the press alone that should be skeptical of demands for official secrecy. Judges are very often too trusting of such claims, as the Glomar case itself shows. Many would benefit from reading this curious story of William Colby and the press and remembering that its publication was said to threaten the national existence.

[Exhibit 75]

COLBY CALLED GLOMAR CASE "WEIRDEST CONSPIRACY"
[From Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1977]

(By William Claiborne and George Lardner Jr.)

At the height of his efforts to suppress the Glomar Explorer story in 1975, Central Intelligence Agency then Director William E. Colby described the effort to a White House official as "the weirdest conspiracy in town. . . an American conspiracy."

The official with whom Colby was speaking, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, then deputy director of the National Security Council, was clearly impressed.

"Do you really think you could do that? . . . It sort of takes my breath away," Scowcroft told the CIO director.

The telephone dialogue within the upper reaches of the government's intelligence directorate was recorded by a stenographer just four days before publication of some of the details of a secret CIA mission to pluck portions of a sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific Ocean floor.

That stenographic account and other documents that portray a comprehensive CIA cosmetic operation to suppress the Glomar Explorer story-code named Project Jennifer-are included in additional papers obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

They were made public as a result of a U.S. District Court lawsuit brought by Mark H. Lynch, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union and for Ralph Nadar's Public Citizen Litigation Group.

As previously released Glomar papers have done, the new documents depict a determined effort by Colby and his assistants to persuade some of the nation's most influential editors and broadcast executives to keep the lid on the Glomar story for "national security" reasons.

Most of the new documents cover the period between March 12, 1975, when a self-imposed censorship of the press began to crumble, to March 18, when syndicated columnist Jack Anderson broke the story on a Mutual Radio Network show. Up until then, editors and publishers of the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Time, Newsweek and Parade magazine had assured Colby that they would withhold the story as long as the pact was not broken by one of the participants.

In some conversations with his CIA subordinates, Colby seems to marvel at his own successes, such as after a transcribed telephone conversation he had on March 13 with an unidentified news executive whose publication is not named but which becomes apparent in a follow-up call four minutes later.

"I would hope you could agree to sit on it. I have a deal with two or three other journals to do this, and I have a corresponding obligation to call each of them if the thing does explode. And I would propose to make the same arrangement with you," Colby said.

"That is fine," the news executive said.

"If you could hold it, I would appreciate it. I do not often ask this, but this one is rather important."

The news executive answered, simply, "I agree.”

Moments later, according to the transcripts, Colby telephoned Carl Duckett, one of his high-ranking deputies and said, "Times agrees."

Duckett responded, apparently facetiously. "Great. There are only 93 more that I can think of."

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