1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 20 intelligence activities in lieu of having separate committees in each House of Congress, or of establishing procedures under which separate committees on intelligence activities of the two Houses of Congress would receive joint briefings from the intelligence agencies and coordinate their policies with respect to the safeguarding of sensitive intelligence information; (8) the authorization of funds for the intelligence activities of the Government and whether disclosure of any of the amounts of such funds is in the public interest; and (9) the development of a uniform set of definitions for terms to be used in policies or guidelines which may be adopted by the executive or legislative branches to govern, clarify, and strengthen the operation of intelligence activities. (b) The select committee may, in its discretion, omit 18 from the special study required by this section any matter 19 it determines has been adequately studied by the Select Com20 mittee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to 21 Intelligence Activities, established by Senate Resolution 21, 22 Ninety-fourth Congress. 23 (c) The select committee shall report the results of the 24 study provided for by this section to the Senate, together 25 with any recommendations for legislative or other actions it 21 1 deems appropriate, no later than July 1, 1977, and from 2 time to time thereafter as it deems appropriate. 3 SEC. 14. (a) As used in this resolution, the term "intel4 ligence activities" includes (1) the collection, analysis, pro5 duction, dissemination, or use of information which relates to 6 any foreign country, or any government, political group, 7 party, military force, movement, or other association in such 8 foreign country, and which relates to the defense, foreign 9 policy, national security, or related policies of the United 10 States, and other activity which is in support of such activi11 ties; (2) activities taken to counter similar activities directed 12 against the United States; (3) covert or clandestine activi13 ties affecting the relations of the United States with any 14 foreign government, political group, party, military force, 15 movement or other association; (4) the collection, analysis, 16 production, dissemination, or use of information about activi17 ties of persons within the United States, its territories and 18 possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose 19 political and related activities pose, or may be considered 20 by any department, agency, bureau, office, division, instru21 mentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat 22 to the internal security of the United States, and covert or clandestine activities directed against such persons. Such 24 term does not include tactical foreign military intelligence 25 serving no national policymaking function. 23 1 2 10 22 (b) As used in this resolution, the term "department or agency" includes any organization, committee, council, 3 establishment, or office within the Federal Government. 4 (c) For purposes of this resolution, reference to any 5 department, agency, bureau, or subdivision shall include a 6 reference to any successor department, agency, bureau, or 7 subdivision to the extent that such successor engages in 8 intelligence activities now conducted by the department, 9 agency, bureau, or subdivision referred to in this resolution.. SEC. 15. For the period from the date this resolution 11 is agreed to through February 28, 1977, the expenses of 12 the select committee under this resolution shall not exceed 13 $275,000, of which amount not to exceed $30,000 shall 14 be available for the procurement of the services of individual 15 consultants, or organizations thereof, as authorized by sec16 tion 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. expenses of the select committee under this resolution shall 18 be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon 19 vouchers approved by the chairman of the select committee, 17 except that vouchers shall not be required for the disburse ment of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate. 23 1 SEC. 16. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed 2 as constituting acquiescence by the Senate in any practice, 3 or in the conduct of any activity, not otherwise authorized 4 by law. Attest: FRANCIS R. VALEO, Secretary. Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing held by your Subcommittee on Friday, 16 September 1977, my colleague, Mr. Anthony Lapham, and I promised to provide you with the answers to certain questions and with certain materials which were not available at that time. Subsequent to the hearing, Subcommittee staff have informally requested additional information. The enclosures to this letter contain some of the information requested. We hope to provide the remainder within the next week. With respect to certain classified affidavits made in two court cases, I propose to provide this material to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence where it will be available for the use of your Subcommittee members. This will obviate the need for any special arrangements for the protection of this material. I hope this arrangement will be acceptable to you and other members of your Subcommittee. I am also at this time returning a corrected copy of the portion of the transcript containing the testimony of Mr. Lapham and me. In this respect there is one matter which I believe needs further elaboration. In the course of my appearance before your Subcommittee you asked for my definition of a "blind memo" and when and how it might be used. My testimony accurately describes my understanding of the use of the term. Nevertheless, I believe the record should show that there is no commonly accepted definition of this art form. It can and does mean different things to different people. For example: a. An analyst might prepare a blind memo recording his analysis of an event which could subsequently be forwarded by him or his superior under a covering memorandum to various addresses. b. An operations officer might review an operational file and summarize in a blind memo the significant facts and status of the operation as of a given date. In most cases, this would be routinely reviewed by a supervisor, and then simply inserted in the file. Normally, a routing slip would show who originated the memo and who reviewed it. These are but a few illustrations of situations in which CIA-prepared papers might be referred to as blind memos. It is quite possible-in fact not unlikely— that such papers on occasion end up in Agency files without markings or attachments identifying the originators or intended recipients. The point which I made during my testimony, however, remains valid. It is not accepted practice in CIA, nor does the Agency condone the use of blind memos as a means of avoiding responsibility on the part of the originator. In the course of the inquiries I have conducted subsequent to my testimony, I have found no one who is aware that such practices exist today or have existed in the past. On a related matter, your s aff has requested the Inspector General's report concerning the allegations made by John Stockwell. It has been a long standing CIA practice to protect the confidentiality of the relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA Inspector General in order to insure that the Inspector General has both the freedom and the objectivity to investigate and make judgments on important matters affecting Agency personnel and practices. I know the Director feels strongly about this matter. Therefore, in lieu of the |