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C-28.

C-29.

C-30.

MEMO FROM INSPECTOR GENERAL TO DIRECTOR OF CIA INVESTIGATING
CIA NEW YORK MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM; June 4, 1976; 11 pages.
Colby's affidavit in an FOIA case stating that all mail covers
operated by the CIA's New York Intercept Program (HTLINGUAL)
on US-USSR mail were indexed, sparked an investigation on
the entire project by the Inspector General. The report
examines the history of the project, its mail interception
procedures, and analyzes how many and what kind of letters
were photographed, opened, and indexed.

CIA ACTIVITIES IN LAOS: MEMO FROM CIA GENERAL COUNSEL TO
DIRECTOR; October 30, 1969; 2 pages.

The memo resulted from Senator Fulbright's assertion that
the CIA is "waging war" in Laos. The general counsel proceeded
to inform the Director what the CIA was doing in Laos
assisting the native population to prevent military takeover
and where the CIA obtained the authority to do it.

PROJECT MUDHEN

GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS OF JACK ANDERSON;

1972; 39 pages. (with dleltions).

While the documents on Anderson are comparatively few, there
is a copy of the complaint Anderson filed against Nixon,
Kissinger, Helms, and several others which explains the story
of the government's harassment of the journalist. Also
included is a paper, "Chronology of a conspiracy," a
summarization of the government's investigation of Anderson in
@hronological sequence and a series of five memos detailing
certain aspects of Project MUDHEN including operations,
logs, and photos.

C-31. COVERT ACTION IN CHILE: 1963-1973; September 1970; 13 pages. (with deletions).

C-32.

These documents include additional CIA data on control of the
Chilean mass communications media, development in Chile
during the week of September 20, and finally a detailed
biographical account of Salvador Allende Gossens.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES; 1946-1976;
285 pages. (with deletions).

The directives are procedural memos from DCIs over a period of
twenty years which cover intelligence-related issues, among
them being procedures for the Intelligence Advisory Committee,
control of dissemination of foreign intelligence, security
policy guidelines on liason relationships with foreign intelligence
organizations, recognition of exceptional service to the
Agency, and exploitation of foreign language publications.
Also included are directives relating to coordination of
overt collection abroad, domestic exploitation of non-
governmental organizations, and production of atomic energy
intelligence.

C-33. CIA DOCUMENTS ON THE PROFESSOR RIHA DISAPPEARANCE; April 1969-August 1975; 230 pages.

The disappearance of Dr. Thomas Riha, professor of history
at the University of Col., in April 1969 caused considerable
concern among faculty members and also prompted a CIA
investigation. The documents explain the strange disappearance

9

C-34.

C-35.

C-36.

C-37.

of Riha outlining the subsequent involvement of University
of Col. President Joseph Smiley, local new reporters, and
the CIA in investigations of the matter. Correspondence from
William Colby to the Senate Intelligence Committee explains
the limited role of the CIA in an affair that "was a domestic
concern and beyond the jurisdiction and responsibility" of
the Agency. Complete documentation of news coverage concerning
the disappearance is included.

CIA DOSSIER ON PETER CAMEJO AND OPERATION CHAOS FILES ON
THE SOCIALIST WOKERS PARTY; 1968-1974; 228 pages. (with

deletions).

These files include an incomplete CIA dossier on Peter Camejo,
the presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers Party.
The Agency released 47 of the 108 extant documents on
Camejo which describe his political and militant activities.
Also included are Operation CHAOS files that add new details to
the general description provided by the Rockefeller Commission
Report about domestic spying by the CIA. The documents
reveal the Agency's use of agent provaceteurs and the wide-
spread monitoring of the SWP leaders.

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER NOMINATION STATEMENT; February
1977; 36 pages.

Conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
the hearing on the Admiral's nomination to be Director of
Central Intelligence includes statements from John D. Marks,
Rep. Daniel Inouye, David Cohen and Stansfield Turner.

CIA MAIL OPENINGS; 1971-1973; 18 pages. (with deletions).

The documents include two meetings conducted by CIA Director
Helms on HTLINGUAL, the Agency's mail opening project, as
well as a statement by Director Colby in 1973 concerning
termination of the project. The Helm's memoranda explain the
Agency's collaboration with the Postal Service and the FBI;
participants in the meeting decided to continue the program
despite reservations over possible adverse publicity and
embarrassment should the mail opening scheme surface. The
"memorandum for the record" signed by Colby expresses his
desire to transfer the operation to the FBI and that "the
project be suspended until appropriate resolution of the
problems involved. "

CIA JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AGREEMENT REGARDING INVESTIGATION OF
POSSIBLE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES ARISING OUT OF CIA ACTIVITIES;
19 pages.

The memorandum from Justice Department Counsel L. S. Houston
to the Director of Central Intelligence explains the "balancing
of interest between the duty to enforce the law . . . and
the Director's responsibility for protecting intelligence
sources and methods." Included is a brief summary of twenty
cases in which violations of criminal statutes were reported
to the Department of Justice between 1954 and 1975. A
detailed examination of circumstances involved in the drug
prosecution of Mr. Puttaporn Khramkhruan, former CIA employee,
is also included.

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D.

C-38. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT; July 8, 1975. 70 pages.

C-39.

C-40.

C-41.

C-42.

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the approval of
the President released "the Director's report of 24 December
1974 to the President, including the annexes, covering matters
related to the New York Times article of 22 December alleging
CIA involvement in a massive illegal domestic intelligence
effort. This release is a follow-up to the decision to
release the Rockefeller Commission report in view of the
public interest in this matter." The breadth of the CHAOS
operation is disclosed in the series of memoranda and briefing
papers included in these documents.

CIA CONTRACTS WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF CALFORNIA-SAN DIEGO;
1966-1976; 121 pages. (with deletions).

Copies of negotiated contract between the CIA and U of Cal.
San Diego, describe completion dates, scope of work,
location where research will be conducted, deliverable items,
and costs. The CIA contracts were for research in the field
of image processing, a review of Soviet Geochemical Literature,
and a study of Agriculture in Communist China.

PERSONAL FILES CIA AND FBI.

Contents as follows:

(1) Bernard Frenoterwald, Jr.; 1967-1975; 102 pages. (with
deletions).

(2) John D. Marks; 1973; 14 pages. (with deletions).

(3) Stewart R. Mott; 1969-1970; 11 pages. (with deletions).
(4) Katrina L. Dulbe; 1971; 16 pages. (with deletions).
(5) Abdeen M. Jabara; 1975; 4 pages. (with deletions).
(6) Courtland Cox; 1967-1969; 30 pages. (with deletions).
(7) Jonathan A. Mirsky; 1967-1968; 12 pages. (with deletions).

CIA CRITIQUE OF BAR ASSOCIATION
44 pages.

REPORT; October 29, 1975;

In response to a pamphlet, "The Central Intelligence Agency:
Oversight and Accountability," prepared by a Committee of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the CIA
issued "a careful critique of the report,

together with

a short summary." As the Agency explained, "This paper is not
a brief in opposition; it is designed to question the validity
of some of the research and thus raise legitimate questions
as to some of the statements and conclusions." It includes
sections on factual errors and misconceptions, misquotations,

and material taken out of context.

STATEMENTS OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.

A compilation of testimony given by the DCI before Con-
gressional Committee.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

D-1.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES; 1947-
1972; 87 pages. (with deletions).

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D-2.

D-3.

D-10.

D-12.

The NSCID's form the basis of the intelligence agencies' "secret
charter." They assign the operational duties and responsibilities
not explicitly authorized in the 1947 National Security Act.
NSCID titles included are "Domestic Exploitation," "Coordination of
Intelligence Production," "Signals Intelligence," and "United
States Espionage and Counter-Intelligence Activities Abroad."

"UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY,"
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, BY JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, (NSC-68); April 14, 1950; 66 pages.

The report provides a background to the present world tensions,
a discussion of the purpose of the United States and the Kremlin
in dealing with these tensions, and their "intentions and capa-
bilities--actual and potential." The final chapter proposes
possible courses of action--negotiation, isolation, war or "a
rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength in
the free world."

"SKYBOLT AND NASSAU: AMERICAN POLICY MAKING AND ANGLO-AMERICAN
RELATIONS," RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT; November
15, 1963; 132 pages. (with deletions).

The top secret report is a discussion of the breakdown in relations
between the United States and Britain centering on the American
decision to cancel the Skybolt missile project. Neustadt blames
the breakdown of communication on a failure "to seek and obtain
feedback"; specifically, on "the failure to assure that Britain's
defense posture and Anglo-American cooperation rested on a rationate
which could be justified on technical and military terms. ..
as well as in implicit terms of domestic and diplomatic politics."
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM 40," RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
CONDUCT, SUPERVISION AND COORDINATION OF COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS;"
February, 1970; 2 pages. (with deletions).

A memo written by President Nixon orders the continuation of
"covert action operations" by the U.S. intelligence agencies.
The
memo clarifies the delegated responsibilities of the agency heads
as well as the role of the 40 Committee which is responsible for
approving "all major and/or politically sensitive covert action
programs."

A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, BY SIDNEY W. SOUERS,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, "COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES,
December 9, 1947; 6 pages.

"

The report (NSC 4) defines the problem as a need to find ways "to
strengthen and coordinate all foreign information measures of the U.S.
government." To counter Soviet anti-American propaganda, the
report says that the U.S. government should create a new position--
an Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs--to accomplish
the aforementioned.

D-13. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMORANDUM 10/2; June 18, 1948; 4 pages.

This memo, one of the crucial components of the intelligence community's "secret charter," directs the CIA to establish an Office of Special Projects "to plan and conduct covert operation." The document established the principle of "plausible denial" by which the government can disclaim responsibility for uncovered covert activities.

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D-14.

D-15.

"RESPONSIBILITY FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS." NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 57; June 28, 1961; 2 pages.

This memo, drawn up by National Security Advisor Modicnoge
Bundy and approved by President Kennedy, sought to define the
purpose of and responsibility for conducting paramilitary operations
"with maximam effectiveness and flexibility within the context
of the Cold War."

"THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE," THE DULLES-JACKSON-CORREA REPORT OF 1949; 193 pages.

This report was commissioned by President Truman and the National
Security Council as a "comprehensive
study of the organization,
activities, and personnel of the CIA," then in its second year of the
operation. The report, which is critical in tone, concludes that
the crucial task assigned to theCIA to coordinate and "nationalize"
U.S. intelligence activities had not been accomplished. It finds

a failure to "develop coordinated national intelligence which
would supercede independent departmental efforts to produce overall
intelligence, "and that the agency's national intelligence function
"is largely diffused and dispersed . . ."

D-16. NSC DIRECTIVE TO DIRECTOR OF CIA: NSC DIRECTIVE ON COVERT

OPERA

TIONS, NSC MEMO #124 ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL GROUP (COUNTER -
INSURGENCY), NSC REPORT #2 RELATIONS BETWEEN SECRET OPERATIONS AND
SECRET INTELLIGENCE; up to January 18, 1962; 13 pages. (with
deletions).

Two NSC directives, one memo, and one report cover the purpose, content, and meaning of covert operations. The purpose of covert activity is to counteract Soviet-related activities that discredit U.S. policy of world peace and security. The content of covert activity ranges from exploiting troublesome problems between communist countries to developing underground guerilla operations.

D-17. INTERIM REPORT #1: DULLES/JACKSON/CORREA COMMISSION; May 1948.

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E-3.

A REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, WITH APPENDIX ENTITLED,
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN REORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES; March 10, 1971; 58 pages. (with deletions).

The Office of Management and Budget report proposes reorganization
of the intelligence community because of its increasing size, cost,
and need of better management and analysis of its information to
Executive leadership. The proposals suggest the pro's and con's
involved if certain intelligence community decision-making bodies
and procedures are changed. Nevertheless, the priority of the
suggested reorganization is to strengthen leadership rather than
size or cost, "it should be noted that economy and organizational
tidiness, without concomitant strengthening of community leader-
ship, might be achieved at the cost of creating even more powerful
vested interests

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