ment would force officials to go through a rational decision-making process and offer guidance to other government officials and to the Judicial Branch as to why information has been classified.

To accomplish this purpose, Section 2(g) should be amended to add, "and (vi), which criteria of Section 2(b) apply and why the criteria of Section 2(a) have been met." In addition, no official should be able to obtain a "waiver" of the marking requirements specified in Section 2(g) (2) of the draft Order.

6. Classify information when it is originated

Information must be subjected to a decision to classify upon its origination. For obvious reasons, "post hoc" classification is suspect and must be avoided. particularly since it can be used to bar the release of previously unclassified documents after they are requested under the Freedom of Information Act. The present Executive Order and the procedure outlined in the current NSC Implementing Directive require classification decisions at the time a document originates. We see no reason for the departure for this procedure permitted by the draft Order.

The introductory sentence of Section 2(g) (1) should be amended to restate existing policy.

7. Reduce the number of officials permitted to classify

The number of agencies and officials authorized to classify_government documents must be reduced substantially. By some estimates over 17,000 officials today wield classification stamps. The obvious result is over-classification of information and a system that defies monitoring. The draft Order does not begin to address this problem. For example, the Department of Agriculture loses its power to classify secrets but the Department of Labor is granted such power. Certain officials are designated to classify documents "Top Secret" but the President can add to that list at will, simply by publishing a notice in the Federal Register. Unlike the present Executive Order, the draft permits some officials to delegate and even redelegate their authority to classify.

The number of classifiers should be finite. Agencies like the Department of Labor should be stricken from the list and expected to follow the "exceptional cases" provisions of Section 2(e). The President should specify which officials may classify in the Executive Order and not in the Federal Register. The authority to "redelegate" must be narrowly and carefully circumscribed.

8. A time definite for declassification or review

We approve the language in Section 2(f) (1) which reduces the period of time documents may generally be classified from 10 years to 6. Unfortunately, this policy is negated in the very next section, 2(f)(2), which permits certain officials to designate documents for 20 year classification. On its face the section appears to permit officials to classify whole categories of documents for such periods. This represents a significant retreat from the Nixon Administration Order which permits extensions beyond 10 years only or a case-by-case basis and only in four categories of information.

Except in exceptional circumstances, we believe that documents should be automatically declassified after 6 years. In exceptional cases, officials should only be permitted to classify for 10 years and on a document-by-document basis. Moreover, a much higher standard for such exceptionally long classification should be required.

9. The use of secrecy agreements

We strongly oppose Section 6(b), which authorizes agency heads to require employees to sign secrecy agreements. This section puts the government on record as favoring a system of prior restraints over its employees which is abhorrent to the First Amendment. Officials may be punished in other ways for disclosing information, but there must be a clear policy against prior restraint. We urge the deletion of Section 6(b). Further we recommend the addition of a section which prohibits the use of any form of secrecy agreement to suppress freedom of speech. The Order must also specify that no federal employee shall be punished for disclosing information which has been classified in violation of any of the prohibitions set fourth in Section 2(c), particularly Section 2(c)(2) which provides that "no information may be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiency or administrative error . . ." On the other hand, the Order should set forth administrative penalties for officials who classify information in violation of such prohibitions.

Government secrecy is a dangerous threat to democracy, as has been graphically illustrated by our recent history. If this Administration is serious about its pledge to reduce secrecy, we submit that it must reconsider the assumptions underlying its proposed approach to the classification issue. We have limited our comments to what we believe are the main issues raised by the proposed draft Order. While some of us have other or more detailed comments to make, we wanted to emphasize here our shared belief that fundamental changes must be made in the draft Order if major reform is to be achieved. On the basis of these comments, we urge that a new draft Order be prepared and widely circulated for public comment. We of course welcome the opportunity to meet with those responsible for considering proposed revisions to discuss these matters further.

Yours sincerely,

I. DOCUMENTS RELEASED AS A RESULT OF REQUESTS FROM THE PROJECT ON NATIONAL
SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES*

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

A-I.

A-2.

A-3.

A-4.

A-6.

NEGOTIATING VOLUMES OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS, VOLS. VI.C. 1-4,
"SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT," VIETMAN TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; March 10, 1975; c. 700 pages. (with deletions).
The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers were not available
to the New York Times and are not included in any of the published
versions of the Papers (Bantam, Beacon, or Government Printing
Office). The volumes contain documents and cables from 1965-1968
reporting on various negotiating tracks. There is some summary and
analysis.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ANNUAL POSTURE STATEMENT SECTION REGARDING
SOVIET AND CHINESE STRATEGIC CAPABILITY (DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND
BUDGETS); 1963-1967; 195 pages. (with deletions).

relate

The previously classified sections of the posture statements
to the nuclear strike capability of China and the Soviet Union
vis à vis the United States and her allies. Statistics, charts and
graphs are provided indicating American strategic capability (i.e.
in terms of IBMS, bombers, MIRV, etc.) and assessemtns are given
of the opponent's present and future capabilities.

THE 1958 TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS: A DOCUMETNED HISTORY BY MORTON
H. HALPERIN, MEMORANDUM RM-4900 ISA; December 1966; 619 pages.
(with deletions).

An in-depth study of the Taiwan Straits crisis with an emphasis on
the decision-making process in Washington and by the American military
in the field.

AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM: FACTORS IMPACTING ON A PRODUCTION
DECISION; Feb. 20, 1975; 47 pages. (with deletions).

Produced by the Government Accounting Office at the request of
the Armed Services and Appropriation Committees of both houses
of Congress, this report examines the test program and studies
of the AWACS system made during 1974. The purpose of the study
is to ascertain through a cost-benefit analysis whether uncertainties
and technological risks involved with the system have been "reduced
to a point where production might be warranted." The GAO report con-
cludes that "justification for inmediate production of the AWACS
is still questionable" because the system's capability in a high
density operational setting has not been demonstrated.

EXPENDITURES- NSA FY74 AND BUDGET AUTHORITY IN FY76; 1 page.

*The letter designations of these documents (e.g., A-1) are those assigned by the Project on National Security and Civil Liberties for its own use.

A-3. FEE WAIVER REQUESTS

A-9.

A-10.

A-11(a).

REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ON THE SITUATION
IN VIETMAN AND MACV FORCE REQUIREMENTS, (a.k.a. THE WHEELER REPORT);
February 27, 1968; 82 pages. (with deletions).

Report of General Earle Wheeler on his trip to Vietnam following the TET offensive of 1968. Includes General Westmoreland's recommendation for 206,000 additional troops.

DELIMITATION AGREEMENT, INCLUDING SUPPLEMENTS TO DATE; February 23,
1949; (8 pages).

This agreement spells out the boundaries of investigative responsibilities
of the F.B.I., The Office of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence
Division of The Army, and the Office of Special Investigation,
Inspector General, U.S. Air Force over "espionage, counter-espionage,
subversion and sabotage." The documents specify how these agencies
should coordinate their efforts.

BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE; July 1, 1970; 47 pages. (with deletions).

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, composed of 16 private individuals,
completed the first broad scale study of the Defense Department
since the Hoover administration. The Panel's primary observations
are that the DOD collects more information than it can ever process
and this information is used only for the intelligence community
and not used by senior officials. As a result, they recommend a
clearer chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense
to DOD intelligence units.

A-11(b). REPORT TO THE DEFENSE PANEL ON INTELLIGENCE; 66 pages. (with deletions).

A-11(d).

A-12.

The Report contains the recommendations from 10 individuals outside
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to the Secretary of Defense
concerning the improvement of both DIA support to the Secretary of
Defense and professionalism of DIA analysts. The panel further
investigated the size and scope of the DIA, and the interrelation-
ship between intelligence information on the one hand and the
effective management of it to the Department of Defense on the other.
One of the panelists aptly summarized the Report, "the system
produces the information, but it's so damn big and cumbersome and
uncoordinated, that you can't get the information properly assessed
and to the right people."

CARROLL REPORT ON SECURITY REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE DUNLAP
ESPIONAGE CASE: February 12, 1964; 11 pages. (with deletions).
After Dunlap had "circumvented National Security procedures "by
stealing government property for the personal use of Army officers,
several discrepancies were found in an Army Security Agency inves-
tigation of Dunlap before he was transferred to NSA. As a result,
the Carroll Report reviews the purpose and the responsibility
between the NSA and the ASA and examines the operational procedures
for exchange of information between the two agencies.

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL LAWS AND PROCEDURES, OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, ON S. 1566 THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT;
June 14, 1977; 10 pages.