around the same; but such rules and regulations cannot be adopted at a special town meeting. The People, ex rel. Averill v. Works, 7 Wend. 486.

TRESPASS.

For entering plaintiff's house under pretence of searching for stolen goods, injury to reputation may be proved. Anonymous, 1 Minor, 52.

TRIAL AND ITS INCIDENTS.

1. An exception to a charge of a judge, after a jury have withdrawn, will not be received. Life and Fire v. Mechanic Ins. Co. 7 Wend. 31.

2. Where a count in a declaration contains an admission of a fact bearing upon the right of action, and a nolle prosequi is entered as to such count on the trial, it is considered as stricken out of the declaration, except so far as it is referred to in other counts. Brown v. Feeter, 7 Wend. 301.

3. A court in the exercise of sound discretion may require counsel to state the substance of evidence offered to be given, so as to enable them to judge of its materiality and relevancy, and a court of review will not control an inferior tribunal in the exercise of such discretion. Roy v. Targee, 7 Wend. 359.

TROVER.

1. Trover will lie by a son entitled to succeed to the possession of personal estate on the decease of his father, where it does not appear that administration has been granted; especially where the right of the plaintiff to the property claimed has been admitted. Hyde v. Stone, 7 Wend. 354.

2. Trover will lie by one tenant in common against another, for the loss or destruction of personal property while in his possession.

Ib.

3. Interest may be given by way of damages in trover; and where the suit is by an infant, the time is not limited to six years. 1b. 4. Trover will not lie by one tenant in common of a chattel against another, simply because the latter claims to be the exclusive owner, and locks up the property—a loss, destruction or sale must be shown. Gilbert v. Dickerson, 7 Wend. 449.

USURY.

Discounting a business note in New York at more than seven per

cent. interest, is not a usurious transaction; a note valid in its inception may be bought and sold as a chattel, at its value, real or supposed. Kent v. Walton, 7 Wend. 256; and Cram v. Hendricks, 569.

See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 16.

VARIANCE.

1. A record of a judgment stating a recovery in trespass for $102 64, cannot be given in evidence in support of an averment in an action for breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment, that the recovery was $600. Webb v. Alexander, 7 Wend. 281. 2. Declaration for money had and received, sustained by proof that the plaintiff, a public officer, by mistake gave receipt for money: Smith v. Seaton, 1 Minor, 75.

3. On a note of defendant, is sustained by proof of note in her name as executrix, and signed by an agent. Baldwin v. Steb

bins, 1 Minor, 180.

4. On a promissory note, or insimul computassent, is sustaind by a due bill. Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Minor, 263.

5. On a promissory note, acknowledging money due to the plaintiff, and promising to pay to C. is sustained by a note to the plaintiff, to pay C. a sheriff, to satisfy an attachment. Bowie's adm'r. v. Foster, 1 Minor, 264.

6. Material variances. — Declaration that the defendant, by his note in writing, promised to pay the plaintiff, is not supported by a letter from the defendant to F. D. stating that he has agreed to pay the plaintiff $78, and requesting F. D. to pay it. McGoffin v. Westbrook, 1 Minor, 58.

7. Note of Philip Taylor declared on; note signed Pilip Taylor may be given in evidence. Taylor v. Rogers, 1 Minor, 197. VENDOR AND VENDEE.

1. A vendor of land, who has covenanted to convey by a day certain, is not in default until the party who is to receive the conveyance, being entitled thereto, has demanded it, and having waited a reasonable time to have it drawn and executed, has made a second demand. The purchaser may, it seems, avoid the necessity of a second demand, by tendering on the first demand a deed prepared for execution. Connelly v. Pierce, 7 Wend. 129.

2. A vendor, bound to give a deed by a day certain, must be at the expense of having it drawn, but is not obliged to have it prepared until it is demanded.

WILL.

Ib.

1. The testator's will was as follows: the will of B. G. contained the following clause: also, I give to my wife Elizabeth Goodwin, all my personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever, and of what nature, kind and quality soever, after payment of my debts, legacies and funeral expenses, which personal estate I give and bequeath unto my said wife, Elizabeth Goodwin, to and for her

own use and disposal absolutely: the remainder after her decease to be for the use of the said Jesse Goodwin,' the son of the testator. Jesse Goodwin took a vested remainder in the personal estate, which came into possession after the death of Elizabeth Goodwin. Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters, 68.

2. In the construction of ambiguous expressions, the situation of the parties may very properly be taken into view. The ties which connect the testator with his legatees, the affection subsisting between them, the motives which may reasonably be supposed to operate with him, and to influence him in the disposition of his property, are all entitled to consideration in expounding doubtful words, and ascertaining the meaning in which the testator used them.

lb.

3. It is stated in many cases that where there are two intents, inconsistent with each other, that which is primary will control that which is secondary. lb.

WITNESS.

1. When, on the examination of a witness in chief, it is discovered that he is interested in the event of the cause, his interest may be removed by a release; after which he may be re-examined. Tallman v. Dutcher, 7 Wend. 180.

2. A witness is not permitted, unless under special circumstances, to refresh memory by examining entries which the plaintiff has made in his books. Beddo v. Smith, 1 Minor, 397.

WRIT OF RIGHT.

1. A writ of right cannot be sustained by a devisee upon the seisin of his testator; and accordingly a count by a devisee claiming the premises upon the seisin of the devisor was adjudged upon demurrer to be bad. Williams v. Woodard, 7

Wend. 250.

2. Leave to amend, however, was given upon the usual terms. Ib.

Rules and Orders of the Supreme Court of the United States.

RULE NO. 38.

It is ordered by the Court that hereafter the judges of the circuit and district courts do not allow any bill of exceptions, which shall contain the charge of the court at large to the jury, in trials at common law, upon any general exception to the whole of such charge; but that the party excepting be required to state distinctly the several matters of law in such charge to which he excepts; and that such matters of law, and those only, be inserted in the bill of exceptions, and allowed by the court.

RULE NO. 39.

Mr. Jones, in behalf of himself and other members of this bar, inquired of the court whether the rule of this court, of January term, 1831, would not supersede the necessity of a compliance with the requisites of Rule No. 29, of February term, 1821, of this court; and whether it would be necessary for counsel to furnish the court with printed briefs or abstracts: in reply to which, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall informed Mr. Jones and the bar, that the court still considered a compliance with the requisites of Rule No. 29 necessary; and that the court expected to be furnished, by counsel, with printed briefs or abstracts under said rule.

The Digest of recent English decisions is omitted in the present number for want of room. This omission will be supplied in the next number.

LEGISLATION.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

The legislature of New Hampshire, at its June session, in 1831, passed seventy-one acts and sixteen resolutions. Of the acts, twenty-eight are public acts.

Ch. 40.-Equity. An act was passed, giving further remedies in equity. It provides that, in all cases where any personal property, deeds, bonds, notes, bills, &c. shall be withheld from the owner so that they cannot be ' come at to be replevied,' the justices of the superior court, on application by bill, petition, &c. may order the same to be given up, or compel such disclosures, and make such orders, &c. as equity shall, in such cases, seem to require. They are also authorized to determine in equity'all disputes between copartners, joint-tenants, and tenants in common, and their legal representatives,' in cases where there is no adequate remedy at law, and are vested with the powers necessary for this purpose.

Ch. 30.-Poor Debtors. The limits of jail-yards are extended to the limits of the respective counties, in which such jails are situated; no person hereafter committed to prison, on execution founded on contract, is to be permitted to have the liberty of the jail-yard longer than one year from the time of such commitment; if he shall not within that time, take the benefit of the poor debtor's oath, or pay the debt, or be otherwise legally discharged, he shall be liable to go into close confinement.' Any person arrested upon execution shall, on giving bond in the same manner as if he were actually committed to jail on the execution, be discharged from the arrest, and shall have the same liberty of the jail-yard, and other privileges, as if he had actually been committed and given bond as now provided by law. No female shall be arrested either on mesne process or on execution founded upon contract.'

Ch. 47.-Highway. When any new highway is to be laid out, the court of common pleas, if they shall be of opinion that the