tary of the treasury and the secretary of war; and it was in But it cannot be said, how- the right as opposed to both. ever, that it had acted wisely. this wrangle gave Jackson the first impulse to his declaration of war against it, this much is certain, that the arrogant tone in which Biddle repelled all guardianship of the administration, except that expressly granted it by law, hit him on his sorest spot. But Ingham was right in his view, that the bank very much over-estimated its power, it mattered not how great that power might be, if it supposed it could withstand a struggle with the administration. Nothing was known of these differences in wider circles, or else no attention was paid to them. The declaration of the first annual message, that the president could "not too soon present to the deliberate consideration of the legislature and the people," the petition which was to be expected, asking for a renewal of the charter of the bank, was a surprise to the general public. By what spirit the presenting of this declaration to the people was dictated, is shown by the concluding sentence of the short paragraph: "Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating this bank are questioned by a large portion of our fellow citizens, and it must be admitted by all, that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency." If the meaning of this was that Jackson himself considered the bank unconstitutional, still this was true only of this bank and not of a bank in general. The disguised attack on the existing bank he followed with the conditional proposition to substitute for it "a national one, founded upon the credit of the government and its revenues." Whether it was intended to place such an instrument in the hand of the president in case the new system governing the bestowal of office should be continued, is a question, the answer to which must BLUNDER OF THE BANK. 37 be sought in the history of Jackson's administration, and especially in that of the bank controversy. If any doubt whatever could have existed that Jackson had desired to declare war on the bank, it must have been removed by the repetition of that recommendation in the two following annual messages.1 But no one yet dreamt of a struggle for life or death. It came to this only through a blunder made by the bank. In one point, Jackson was apparently trne to the programme which he had drawn up on the occasion of his resignation as a senator of the United States. In his first message, he recommended that the reëligibility of the president should be done away with by an amendment to the constitution; and he repeated the recommendation in all his succeeding messages. But the politicians rightly assumed that that would not prevent himself from accepting a second election. And it would have been a hard thing for them to find a person more accept 1Ibid., II, pp. 849, 861. In his second annual message he says still more definitely that he objected to the bank only "as at present organized," and that "the advantages afforded by the present bank" might be secured by a government bank, which was only a "branch of the treasury department." * Webster writes, April 18, 1830, to Clay: "The president means to be re-elected. He has meant so all along. Seeing this, Van Buren was endeavoring to make a merit of persuading him to do so, on the ground of its being necessary to keep the party together." Priv. Corresp. of H. Clay, p. 259. As early as the 27th of February, 1830, he had written to Mason that Calhoun and Van Buren overlooked "the probability that General Jackson will run again, and that that is his present purpose I am quite sure." Priv. Corresp. of D. Webster, I, p. 488. Adams shared this view, but as to the rest, saw better. He writes, March 28, 1828, in his diary: "The vices of his administration are not such as affect the popular feeling. He will lose none of his popularity, unless he should do something to raise a blister upon popular sentiment; and of that there is no present prospect. If he lives, therefore, and nothing external should happen to rouse new parties, he may be re-elected, not only once, but twice or thrice." Mem. of J. Q. Adams, VIII, p. 210. able to them, or one whom there was a better prospect of electing. In the latter respect, indeed, the leaders of the national republicans were of a very different mind. They confidently hoped for victory to the last,' partly because they assumed that the masses were of their own way of thinking politically, whereas they (the masses) were guided entirely by their political instincts; partly because they under-estimated the influence which the professional politicians had already secured for themselves, by skillful management, in the determination of questions of this kind, precisely. In the place of the dethroned "King Caucus," another machine had to be put, one which, by making known the "people's will," exempted the electors from their constitutional duty to elect the man president who, in their judg ment, was the fittest for the position. From the "Kitchen Cabinet" seems to have come the first proposition to make the "national conventions," which are customary even to the present day—that is, assemblages made up of party delegates, chosen without any legal control whatever, the ex 66 'Clay, who, it was well known, was the candidate of the national republicans, writes, April 24, 1830, to Fr. Brooke: The whole case presents one encouraging view. Jackson has lost, is losing, and must continue to lose;" and on the 23d of July, 1830, to J. S. Johnston: "I think we are authorized, from all that is now before us, to anticipate confidently General Jackson's defeat;" and again, on the 21st of February, to Fr. Brooke: "Everything is going on well. Van Buren, old Hickory, and the whole crew, will, I think, in due time, be gotten rid of." Priv. Corresp. of H. Clay, pp. 264, 307, 326. In the address of the national republican convention of Baltimore we read: "Without meaning to encourage an undue confidence, which would only generate inactivity, we believe that, with proper exertion, the success of the good cause is beyond the possibility of doubt. The present administration has for some time past been justly discredited in public opinion — General Jackson has been gradually losing, ever since the commencement of his official term, the popularity with which he entered it." Niles, XLI, p. 312. THE NATIONAL REPUBLICANS. 39 What prospects the ponents of the "will of the people." 1 army of office holders and office seekers, who were ever ready for fight, had to influence the election to this convention, and how powerful a pressure the "nominations" of the conventions would necessarily exert on the party, or on the electors chosen by the party, we need not enter into any minute discussion of here.2 Jackson, indeed, would have needed no artificial help towards being again proposed; but, as it was offered, his opponents should have been doubly cautious in going to work prepare their programme. Instead of confining themselves to a watchful defensive, however, and permitting him to run the risks of taking the initiative, they suddenly took the offensive, misled by an over-estimation of their own strength. and by the impatience of Clay's ambition. In the beginning of December, 1831, that is, nearly a year before the choice of electors, the national republicans opened the electoral campaign with a national convention held at Baltimore. Clay was unanimously nominated their presidential candidate. An address to the people furnished, in the negative form of a criticism of the then administration, the party's programme. Much might have been added to it; much that was said might have found more severe expression and the criticism still have been justified; but polit 'See the letter of Major Lewis to Amos Kendall, of the 25th of May, 1831, reproduced in Parton's Life of A. Jackson, III, pp. 382, 383. In July of the same year, a "convention" of the republican members of the legislature of New Hampshire, at the suggestion of Kendall and of J. Hill, made the formal proposition that a national convention should be held, with the further proposition that each state should send as many delegates to it as it was entitled to electoral votes. "The bank, admitting all that is said to be true, has not, in our opinion, expended so much money in defending herself, as has been expended at the late election held in the city of New York, alone, by persons holding offices there, that the 'spoils of victory' may be made to remain with them." April, 1834. Niles, XLVI, p. 97. ical wisdom demanded a more moderate tone. The peculiar manner in which the masses considered Jackson their direct representative, caused them to look upon the personal attacks on him as an animadversion on themselves, and they seized. with satisfaction the opportunity to demonstrate their "sovereignty" once more, and in a more striking manner. In reference to the bank, the address assumed a much more decided position than was absolutely called for by the steps which Jackson had thus far taken against it. Extravagant praise was showered on the bank, and it was denied that the attacks of the president had even the least semblance of reason. Between the lines people could read that the explanation of the address was to be found in Jackson's own bank-project, which amounted to a paper-money machine for the government. Certain it was, however, that the annihilation of the bank, if Jackson was elected again, was a matter resolved upon and settled. The conclusion was easily drawn: whoever wishes to save the bank must vote for Clay. The national republicans, therefore, chose as their watchword for the campaign: "The bank or Jackson!" and they endeavored to force the president to adopt the same, by inducing the bank to petition now for the renewal of its charter. When experience had taught them the folly of this step, they denied all design and pretended that, without any mental reservation, they only obeyed the summons contained in the first annual message. Since they, by this means, succeeded in making the obscurity which prevailed in the public judgment on the dark course of the struggle greater, the allusion to the address of the Baltimore convention, which was for the most part overlooked, seemed necessary. Together with many others, Clay himself has borne witness to the fact, Niles, XLI, p. 310. The petition was laid before the senate on the 9th of January, 1832, by Dallas. Deb. of Congr., XI, pp. 357, 358. |