tonnage limitation on the ground that it might give the United States Government a veto power which it did not want. On the basis of the figures available at that time, Great Britain reported a maximum of 16.2 million gross tons which, with the additional four countries with one million tons or more, would give a total of approximately 20 million gross tons.

At the final session of the full committee the discussion indicated that the 25 million gross register tons recommended by the eight other members of the Implications Committee would, in effect, give the United States veto power, and following discussion in which our government spokesman opposed the 25-million-tonnage limitation, the full committee reduced that figure to 15 million gross tons. This figure, in effect, will require that either the United States or Great Britain ratify the convention before it can go into effect. (Article 26)

IMPLEMENTATION BY COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

The proposal submitted by the International Labor Office differed from the tentative proposals considered at the preparatory conference in Copenhagen because it was found that those proposals raised serious "constitutional and practical difficulties". It was therefore necessary that a clear distinction be drawn between the process of ratification and the application or implementation of the convention.

The simultaneous use of the terms ratification by laws and regulations and ratification by collective agreements raised the question whether countries would be permitted to use the collective-bargaining agreements as a form of ratification and thereby avoid the formal obligations normally involved in the ratification procedure. It was made clear that the formal act of ratification, by which a state enters into a treaty with other states, can be effected only by that state in accordance with its own constitutional procedures and that the Conference in a convention could not alter the nature and consequences of the act of ratification. A convention can deal only with the method or methods of applying or implementing a convention after it has been ratified.

Heretofore, conventions have been applied by means of laws and regulations. It was the intention of the amendment introduced in the convention to permit the use of collective agreements as a method of application.

The United States government group, when it formulated its position, supported the use of the collective agreements as a method of implementing the ratification on the following grounds:

(1) We should encourage the ratification of conventions (provided the terms were agreeable).

74901647-3

(2) As long as terms and conditions of employment as good as or better than those set forth in the convention are actually in effect, we should make possible early ratifications by those countries, particularly Great Britain and the Netherlands, which had indicated in the Conference that they would be unable to ratify the convention if they had to apply the convention by the passage of national laws and regulations. The delegations from those countries indicated that they were opposed to legislating on questions of wages and hours as a matter of national policy.

Moreover, some American labor organizations have indicated opposition to the establishment by law of a minimum wage, particularly one which was substantially below the existing wages. They have argued that the minimum tends to become the maximum, and would probably oppose the passage of a law which established an industry minimum substantially below the going rates in effect in this country. On the other hand, there can be no objection to indicating that the collective agreements in effect in this country are at or above the minimum. The use of the collective agreement would serve the basic purpose of the convention, namely, the application of the terms and conditions of the convention to the workers.

It was suggested that the same enforcement procedure be applied as was applicable to laws and regulations. The United States government delegation opposed this on the ground that we did not want to assume responsibility for enforcing the terms and conditions of agreements. It has been the general practice for parties, through free collective bargaining, to provide for the enforcement of agreements as part of the contract provisions, generally through the use of arbitration. Where the contract makes no specific provision for its enforcement, there is procedure for enforcement through the normal processes of litigation in the courts. Moreover, the existence of labor courts in a number of European countries in effect serves the purpose of an enforcement procedure.

The text as finally adopted was our amendment (D-38), which. reads as follows:

"Effect may be given to this Convention by (a) laws or regulations; (b) collective agreements between shipowners and seafarers (except as regards paragraph 2 of Article 20); or (c) a combination of laws or regulations and collective agreements between shipowners and seafarers. Except as may be otherwise provided herein, the provisions of this Convention shall be made applicable to every vessel registered in the territory of the ratifying Member and to every person engaged on such vessel."

There was some discussion by the United States delegation as to the desirability of the special tripartite committee set up to examine the measures taken by the countries to give effect to the convention. This committee would examine the information submitted by countries which ratified the convention and use the collective agreement as a method of implementing the ratification. It was felt by some of the delegation that information on collective agreements should not be supplied to such a committee unless specific charges were filed that the particular country was not living up to its obligation. The United States government position on this was that proper examination should be made of the measures taken by those countries which have ratified the convention. The articles, as finally adopted, are set forth in part V of the convention, articles 21 and 22.

There was discussion in the committee of a United Kingdom proposal that, where ratification was implemented by the use of collective agreements, the collective agreements should cover 90 percent of the workers involved. Opposition was raised by the Portuguese employer and worker groups and the Netherlands workers' delegate, who maintained that the principle of "the extension of collective agreements to cover an entire industry" was in use in many European countries and therefore should be extended to all governments. The position of the United States employers' delegate was that "all workers must be covered, whether it is by collective agreements or legislation, or both". The United States government position was that we do not extend the provisions of collective agreements to an entire industry—that in most industries there are more than one trade union and more than one agreement in effect, and it would be difficult, in the absence of a master agreement covering the entire industry, to decide which terms of employment to extend. We pointed out that we favor free collective bargaining without government intervention. With regard to the question before the committee, we favor complete coverage of all workers. However, if only 90 percent of them in this country were covered by collective agreements, we would have difficulty in extending the provisions of the agreement to the remaining 10 percent.

The United Kingdom member withdrew his amendment and there is no specific provision in the convention at the present time which indicates what would constitute compliance where collective agreements. are used. This matter will probably be handled by the tripartite committee which will examine the methods used by the various countries to give effect to the ratification.

MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS

It has been the general practice in international labor conferences to provide that nothing in the specific convention shall affect any law,

award, custom, or agreement between organizations of employers and workers which insure conditions more favorable than those provided for by the convention. The worker group was seriously concerned lest the minimum conditions established in the convention might prove embarrassing to them in subsequent collective-bargaining negotiations. As a result, the suggestion was made that each major article in the convention contain the safeguard on more favorable conditions. We submitted an amendment which was adopted by the Conference which placed the more-favorable-conditions clause as article 1 of the convention, and amended the language to read as follows:

"Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to prejudice any provision concerning wages, hours of work on board ship, or manning by law, award, custom or agreement between shipowners and seafarers, which ensures the seafarers conditions more favourable than those provided for by this Convention."

SCOPE

There was full discussion on the question of scope both as to type of ships and kind of person covered by the convention. Our position was that coverage should be as wide as possible, both as to the type of vessel and the personnel. There were no major difficulties on these articles (articles 2 and 3).

DEFINITIONS

There was general discussion covering the terms used in the convention, and our delegation submitted a number of changes in the draft language. There was no serious modification with the exception of the definition of "basic wages". We submitted an amendment defining the basic wage rate as the "monthly remuneration of a master, officer, or rating (including certificated seamen) in cash, as set forth in the articles or contract of employment agreed to mutually at the time of employment, exclusive of any other payments in cash or in kind". A similar proposal was submitted by the Netherlands Government, and after full discussion the committee indicated that either text was agreeable and they suggested that both amendments be sent to the drafting committee for final incorporation into the text. Since the issue on the establishment of a minimum wage had not yet been discussed, it was our feeling that it would be desirable to dispose of the definitions before the actual minimum was considered. As a result, we withdrew our amendment in favor of the Netherlands proposal.

HOURS OF WORK

The most difficult and serious discussions in the Wages, Hours, and Manning Committee and in the plenary sessions were on our proposal to establish the eight-hour day on near-trade ships. Our proposal was originally approved by the full committee. Our greatest efforts were directed toward establishing the principle of the eight-hour day on distant- as well as near-trade ships. Our proposal would have established substantial uniformity of hours of work on near-trade and distant-trade ships, and would have provided for overtime payment after eight hours of work per day. Although we obtained numerous declarations by the other governments to the effect that they favored the principle of the eight-hour day, they were nevertheless unwilling to provide specifically for the eight-hour day in the draft convention. As a result, the entire worker delegation, with the exception of the United States workers' delegate, withdrew its support on the final vote of the Wages, Hours, and Manning Committee and defeated our proposal to retain the eight-hour day as adopted by the full committee during the early sessions of the Conference. This action was taken in spite of the fact that we had indicated our willingness to provide adequate language modifications in the text to meet specific difficulties raised on the floor by various delegates.

Our efforts were not totally unrewarded, however, since the draft convention, as finally adopted, gave an implied recognition of the eight-hour day. (An eight-hour day averaged over a period of two consecutive weeks with overtime after 112 hours of work.) This in effect means an eight-hour day, seven-day week, two-week period. The draft convention provides that when the total number of hours worked in a period of two consecutive weeks exclusive of hours regarded as overtime, exceeds 112, the officer or rating shall be compensated by time off in port or otherwise, as may be determined by collective agreement between the organizations of shipowners and the seafarers. Overtime pay in excess of 24 hours in any period of two consecutive days (the two-watch system) shall be regarded as overtime and be compensated in accordance with the provisions of article 17, which provides for not less than one and one-fourth times the basic pay or wages per hour. (Article 12)

On distant-trade ships, there was no serious problem. The eighthour day was established as the normal period of work, with overtime. pay in excess of the daily limitations compensated in accordance with the overtime provisions of the convention. There is a further proviso that hours worked in a period of one week, exclusive of hours regarded as overtime, exceeding 48, be compensated by time off in port or otherwise. (Article 13)