both points; and if the court does not grant the greater, then it prays for the lesser relief. The most important appeal-case in the history of the Church illustrates some of the principles here involved. A member of an Annual Conference was, for cause which seemed to his brethren good and just, "suspended" until the next session, or until he should give to the Episcopacy assurance of his compliance with certain conditions. He appealed to the General Conference of 1844, and was represented before that supreme judicatory by one of the ablest constitutional expounders of the Church. The appellant's counsel opened and closed the argument. He concluded his remarks by asking the General Conference to "sustain the appeal, and release" the appellant " from the act" of his Conference "by which he stands suspended from the ministry. But if, after all, you should feel yourselves still in difficulty on any one point of argument or testimony out of which the foregoing conclusions arise, then let it be remembered that the reading of the Journal shows a manifest informality, while the face of the indictment itself is without all due form of law or usage, and well calculated to embarrass the decision. In view of this fact, the least the appellant has a right to expect is, that you should return him for a new trial.” The subject came up with the right presentation. John Early moved "That the act" of the Conference by which appellant "was suspended from his ministerial functions be, and the same is hereby reversed." The motion was lost by 56 to 117. "The chair decided that this vote virtually affirmed the action" of the Annual Conference. "W. Capers took an appeal from The decision of the chair the decision of the chair." was sustained by 111 to 53. on the first appeal, and the same majority that settled it, was hardly in condition for an impartial vote on the appeal from the chair. The parliamentary rule stands, nevertheless, and the ruling of the chair was according to it, in the absence of another motion. But notice of it had been given. W. A. Smith, the counsel for the appellant, thereupon asked the privilege of spreading his protest on the pages of the Journal, for there were members on the floor, who, to his own knowledge, voted against the resolution of Mr. Early, because they thought the matter ought to go back to the Annual Conference. By the ruling sustained, the appellant had been cut off even from an application for this lawful remedy. (General Conference Debates, pp. 18, 51, 52; Journal, p. 34.) 19. The decision or action of an Annual Conference may not be appealed from by a member, unless he is under censure by its adverse judg ment; nor can he claim the right to arraign his Conference before the General Conference and be heard as appellant. Neverthelesss, all the actions and decisions of Annual Conferences come before the General Conference as a court of general review. Their journals must be submitted to the General Conference, which has a standing committee to examine them, and has power to correct errors and irregularities, maintain uniformity, and censure any omissions or delinquencies in these subordinate tribunals. CHAPTER VII. CANONS OF TESTIMONY. SEC. I.-OF WITNESSES. 1. THE laws of evidence, by which a matter of fact is established, have been deduced from the wisdom and experience of ages. They are applicable to ecclesiastical as well as to civil courts. The administrator of discipline will therefore find them useful in judging righteous judgment, and he should have some knowledge of their general principles. All rules of evidence are adopted for practical purposes in the administration of justice and equity, and must be so applied as to promote the ends for which they were designed. 2. All persons of proper age and intelligence are competent witnesses, except atheists and such as do not believe in a future state of rewards and punishments. A civil tribunal would deem those incompetent witnesses who have been made infamous by perjury and other flagrant crimes; nor should they be listened to in an ecclesiastical court, unless their statements are corroborated by collateral facts, or their characters have been reformed. 3. Either party has a right to challenge a witness whom he believes incompetent. The presiding officer determines his competency, but it belongs to the jury to judge of the degree of credibility to be attached to all testimony. 4. No relationship disqualifies a person from testifying for or against another. The court will not lose sight of character and circumstances in any case, in determining what weight should be given to evidence. 5. Leading questions are not allowed by a party in the examination of his own witness— a leading question is one which suggests to the witness the desired answer. As, Did you not see A in B- on Christmas-day? But leading questions are allowable in cross-examination, and in the direct examination where the witness is evidently unfriendly to the party introducing him. This rule is designed to guard truth and fairness from collusion between a party and his witness. Influenced by friendship or other considerations, a witness may, possibly, consent to lend himself to make up such a case as is wanted by those in whose favor he is called. A hint as to the answer that would be agree able, may unconsciously influence him more than his recollection of the facts. Guided by leading questions, a willing and pliant witness, skillfully handled, might furnish, or contribute to, a system of evidence very different from that which would be furnished by his independent, unprompted statement. But between this witness and the opposite party a mutual understanding is not presumed to exist, and he is allowed in crossexamination to get at the truth as best he may. The same holds good when a witness turns out to be unfavorable, not in his testimony, but in his spirit and temper, to the party that introduced him. 6. The age at which children may be allowed to testify, cannot be arbitrarily fixed. Much depends on natural intelligence, education, and mental development, and sensibility of moral obligations. At the age of fourteen it is presumed that every person is competent, until the opposite is shown. Some have been admitted as early as five years old to testify in civil courts. 7. Every witness in an ecclesiastical court is under the strongest moral engagement to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, according to the best of his knowledge, in the matter concerning which he is called; but he ought not to be put on oath: it can do no good. Such oaths are extrajudicial. To swear falsely before a court not authorized to administer an oath, is not, in legal technicality, perjury. |