Mr. LOUGHTON. I don't know. I have no official knowledge of the board's function at all. Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know that the project was any different from what Otepka was engaged in? Mr. LOUGHTON. I say this only because I know Mr. Otepka had many other responsibilities at that time in supervising the Evaluations Division. Mr. SOURWINE. I meant with respect to these 175 cases only, when I asked that question. Mr. LOUGHTON. I cannot give you an informative answer to that question. Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, you don't know just what was being done by this special board with which Mr. Belisle was connected? Mr. LOUGHTON. No, sir; I heard only rumors. Mr. SOURWINE. With respect to these 175 cases? Mr. LOUGHTON. I heard only rumors. Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have any reports that the board was examining these cases from the standpoint of determining how bad they were or what explanation might be given with respect to them if the Department was called upon? Mr. LOUGHTON. No, sir; I really don't. I only understood that their action was reactionary, from the criticism that had been made of these cases laying dormant so long. Mr. SOURWINE. In other words, the matter had been pulled out into the light again because of the activities of this committee and some newspaper comment? Mr. LOUGHTON. Yes, sir. WEAKNESS IN THE OFFICE OF SECURITY The subcommittee's 1962 report on State Department Security traced the abolition of the position of Deputy Director of the Office of Security, which was held by Otto F. Otepka until January 1962. The subcommittee reported its hope that as a minimum, Mr. Otepka (would) be restored to his former position of Deputy Director of the Office of Security, where his expertise, born of many years of highly responsible experience as a security officer will be of inestimable value to the Department of State and, not less importantly, to the security of this country." 1 Two of the conclusions of the 1962 report were necessities for the Department of State to: "1. Assure continuity under professionals in State Department security operations, particularly in the Evaluation Division which appraises security files and reports" and "2. Assure a high standard of professional competence, particularly in evaluation***") 2 Grave concern must be voiced over the Department's continuing disregard of these recommendations. The subcommittee cannot, of course, tell the Secretary of State how to run his Department. But certainly it is not amiss for the subcommittee to insist on the best possible security of personnel in Government employment. The Department's action in reinstituting the position of Deputy Director in the Office of Security under other pseudonyms has not gone without notice. The present pseudonym is the title of Assistant Director for Personnel Security. The incumbent is Henri G. Grignon.3 Mr. Grignon is directly responsible for staff supervision of the Division of Investigations and the Division of Evaluations in the Office of Security. OFFICE CALLED A SECURITY SIEVE 4 In testimony on January 28, 1964, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, William J. Crockett, complained the Office of Security "belies its name of security. It is the most insecure sieve in the Department." Mr. Crockett was relating these comments to certain stories which had appeared in the press. However, Mr. Crockett's statements appear valid in a general sense now, after a study of Mr. Grignon's testimony before the subcommittee. Concern was well stated by the subcommittee's Chief Counsel during Mr. Grignon's testimony concerning his implementation of the basic Government security program, Executive Order 10450: Mr. SOURWINE. Do you feel your testimony on this point is clear now? Are you satisfied with it? Mr. GRIGNON. I believe so. 1 SISS 1962 report, p. 17. 2 Ibid., p. 193. 3 State Department Security hearings, pt. 18, p. 1526; pt. 19, p. 1642 (organizational chart). Ibid., pt. 12, p. 944. Mr. SOURWINE. What you have described, if the record reads as I heard your testimony, is contrary to every conception of good security and contrary to the protected rights of the employees of the Department of State." LACK OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTINUITY IN EVALUATIONS On June 27, 1963, Frederick W. Traband, Jr., became acting chief of the Division of Evaluations. He had been assigned as an evaluator only since June 1962. Before then, Mr. Traband performed investigative duties. As acting chief, Mr. Traband reported to David I. Belisle who was performing the duties of Deputy Director under the title of Special Assistant for Personnel Security and who "took over as Chief of the Division of Evaluations." 6 Mr. Belisle was detailed out of the Office of Security on December 9, 1963, which was after his veracity under oath had been challenged by the SISS. It was not until May 4, 1964, that Mr. Belisle's responsibilities for the operations of the Division of Evaluations were assumed by Henri G. Grignon upon his transfer from the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Traband described Mr. Grignon as a "deputy" to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security. 689 MR. GRIGNON'S ABSENCE OF EXPERIENCE AS AN EVALUATOR Mr. Grignon conceded that his only experience as an evaluator was for a period of about 4 months in 1952 when he was assigned the duties of an investigative supervisor. He did not write any evaluations. He does agree, however, that it takes "substantial experience and training to make a good evaluator, a competent evaluator": Mr. SOURWINE. You have, yourself, had experience in evaluation work? Mr. SOURWINE. And what was your background in that? Mr. GRIGNON. I was, before my appointment with the Department of State, of course, with the Central Intelligence Agency and I was with them for 13 years in the Office of Security. Mr. SOURWINE. How much of that time did you spend doing evaluation, in the sense of personnel evaluation rather than evaluation of intelligence? Mr. GRIGNON. The only period that I could state that would fall in that category would be a period when I was a desk supervisor handling applicant investigations. However, I did not actually write up the evaluations themselves. Mr. SOURWINE. You didn't do the work yourself? Mr. GRIGNON. No; I did not. Mr. SOURWINE. For how long a period were you in that evaluation supervisor's desk? Mr. GRIGNON. This was approximately May of 1952 to September of 1952.10 MR. GRIGNON'S UTILIZATION OF INVESTIGATORS AS EVALUATORS Mr. Grignon did not know from his own personal knowledge if two investigators performing evaluations of personnel investigations were competent to do so, nor was he aware how many members of the investigative staff of the Office of Security were competent evaluators. These were his words of testimony on August 6, 1964, at the time when those evaluators associated with Otto Otepka were isolated and not. performing any useful functions: Mr. SOURWINE. Do you have any men on detail to supplement the positions authorized for the Office? Mr. GRIGNON. Not from outside of the Office of Security. Just recently, I did detail two men from the field to come into headquarters to assist on the workload at headquarters. Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Grignon, were these men assigned to do evaluation work? Mr. GRIGNON. That is correct. Mr. SOURWINE. Were these men, in your judgment, competent evaluators? Mr. GRIGNON. One of the gentlemen that was brought in was an experienced evaluator and he had worked in that particular position before. The other man showed qualifications in that direction, and actually he is in a training period right now. Mr. SOURWINE. Who are those two men? Mr. SOURWINE. Which is the qualified security evaluator, John or Richard? Mr. SOURWINE. What was John's experience? Was he an investigator? Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, do you consider investigators competent to perform security evaluations? Mr. GRIGNON. Well, my understanding on that, sir, is that according to Civil Service Commission regulations, it is possible to assign an investigator to an evaluator's position. The converse, however, is not true. Regardless, though, if any investigator were to be assigned to the position of evaluator, his background and experience would have to be looked into to make sure that although he has performed as an investigator, he would be suitable to perform the duties of an evaluator. Mr. SOURWINE. Does it take substantial training and experience to make a good evaluator, a competent evaluator? Mr. GRIGNON. I would say so; yes, sir.12 Would you be able to tell us how many or approximately how many investigators in the Division of Investigations today are competent evaluators? Mr. GRIGNON. No; I would not. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any? Mr. GRIGNON. I'm familiar with Mr. Clemmons' situation. Mr. SOURWINE. He is not in the Division of Evaluations today; is he? Mr. GRIGNON. He is the one we brought in on temporary duty. Mr. SOURWINE. He is now in Evaluations? Mr. GRIGNON. Yes, on temporary duty. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you consider him a competent evaluator? Mr. GRIGNON. According to the record and the word I have received from his former supervisor, I would. Mr. SOURWINE. Has he had any experience in evaluations before you detailed him into Evaluations? Mr. GRIGNON. Yes, sir; that is the story that was given to me by the Deputy Chief.13 MR. GRIGNON AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 9835 Mr. Grignon's short experience claimed as an evaluator occurred in 1952 when Executive Order 9835 comprised the basic Government security program.14 (It was supplanted by Executive Order 10450 on 11 Ibid., pt. 11, pp. 785, 786. 12 Ibid., p. 787. 13 Ibid., p. 788. 14 Ibid., p. 797. May 28, 1953.) Executive Order 9835 was directly and solely concerned with the "loyalty" of Government employees. From its effective date of March 21, 1947, until its amendment on April 28, 1951. nonacceptability under its standards was limited to actual proof of disloyalty. The amendment, still relating only to loyalty, established the standard that refusal or termination of employment must be made on a finding of reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person in question. Public Law 733 (Act of Aug. 26, 1950) was also in effect during Mr. Grignon's 4-month duty as an evaluator. This law authorized the head of certain departments or agencies to suspend summarily without pay and subsequently terminate the employment of an individual when deemed necessary in the interest of national security. The agency head's determination was conclusive and final. Public Law 733 also required certain procedures to be followed, to safeguard the rights of an employee in question, and these procedures had to be followed between suspension and termination. The procedures leading to termination of employment are specifically incorporated into Executive Order 10450. Mr. Grignon related his experience in administering Executive Order 9835 and Public Law 733:15 Mr. SOURWINE. You are the top official in the Department directly concerned with the administration of 10450? Mr. GRIGNON. Yes, sir. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know when Executive Order 10450 was promulgated? Mr. GRIGNON. In 1953. Mr. SOURWINE. And all the time since 1953 have you been engaged in security work which involved the administration of this order or the execution of duties based on this Executive order? Mr. GRIGNON. In that context I could not say "Yes." Mr. SOURWINE. How much of that time have you been dealing with matters which involved the administration of this Executive order? Mr. GRIGNON. I have been closely allied to it through my security work during that period, but I never had the responsibility for discharging the responsibilities under the Executive order. Mr. SOURWINE. Were you ever a security evaluator? Mr. GRIGNON. In my previous testimony I indicated that as a desk supervisor, I did handle applicant cases. However, I did not write the evaluations themselves. Mr. SOURWINE. No. But didn't you, in that position, have to know and understand the contents of Executive Order 10450? Mr. GRIGNON. Yes, sir. But more this was in 1952. This was before 10450. MR. GRIGNON V. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450 Executive Order 10450 became effective May 28, 1953. Mr. Grignon admitted no experience in its implementation until assuming his present position and duties in the Department of State's Office of Security. Perhaps this may account for, though it does not excuse, his statements evidencing a lack of knowledge of the import, extent and application of Executive Order 10450 during his testimony on August 14, 1964.16 In order for someone who is not a professional security officer to understand the complete incredibility of these statements made by Mr. Grignon, a few background facts concerning the Executive order are necessary. Executive Order 10450 extended the provisions of Public Law 733 to all departments and agencies within the Executive branch. It |