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Mr. SOURWINE. What I was trying to get at with the earlier question is whether there is now any policy or order in the State Department under which every employee of the Department, or every employee above some particular rate or rank, is subjected to periodic investigations, reinvestigations, and having his security clearance renewed as a result of that investigation?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir; there is. There is an existing order and we have alerted all our people by public notice. We have sent letters to certain people saying, "Your security clearance is in the process of being updated, and this is a routine thing," to allay any fright or uncertainty about the whole thing.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is that a new order, sir?

Mr. CROCKETT. I think we put it out in the last 6 weeks.

Mr. SOURWINE. That was your order?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Otepka detractors have hastened to say that he approved clearances for many of those involved in the revelation of the 800 derogatory cases and that he had testified that he knew of "no known Communists" on the State Department payroll. Of course he didn't, his answers made clear, for if he had had any proof he would have asked for action by his superiors. Again, it is clear that as to the 800-odd cases with derogatory material in their files-especially those with the more serious data-his repeated recommendation was that a continuing watch be maintained.1

The State Department faced a heavy problem when ordered to set up a full-scale personnel security system 20 years ago, under Executive Order 10450-greatly broadening the earlier loyalty system and requiring full field investigations for all sensitive positions.

The Department accomplished much despite the mountainous task of checking out some 11,000 employees. Some of the doubtful or problem cases may have been left, as appears to have been the fact, for review and later updating; or, as Mr. Otepka put it, for continued watchfulness in cases where a cleared employee might go bad and become a security risk, subject to blackmail due to such matters as alcoholism or sex abberation.

In more recent years, unfortunately, there are evidences in our record of these hearings of a tendency by the State Department to use shortcuts--such as waivers of security rules in connection with some appointments and to invoke the safeguards for the individual employee (proper in themselves) in the 1947 Presidential order to shield fundamental data from scrutiny by congressional committees.

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BRIEF ACCOUNT ON DEROGATORY CASES

A brief account (presented hereafter) of what happened to that group of 800 cases flagged with derogatory material was taken from the published hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee. As a backdrop to this analysis and paraphrasing of the testimony, we find the Department refusing any added data on certain worldknown cases of subversives.

William J. Crockett, then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Administration, was testifying May 4, 1965:

Mr. SOURWINE. With respect to the material furnished by Otepka in May 1961 to Roger Jones, the Department has declined to furnish to the subcommittee the material included under tab c(4) on the ground that it is covered by the

4 Ibid., pt. 10, p. 705.

Ibid., pt. 10, p. 590.

Ibid., pt. 2, pp. 70-71.

Presidential directive. This material consisted of a digest of significant cases of treason, espionage, and subversion in the United States and foreign governments. The subcommittee's information is that most of the cases included under this tab were prepared from public records, including published hearings of the Internal Security Subcommittee. To the extent that this is true, of course, these cases are not covered by the Presidential directive. Please furnish from the material included under tab c(4) of the Otepka submission copies of all those cases which do not have a classification stamp. Cases which could have been documented from the public record, and probably were, include those of Carl Marzani, Arthur R. Roddy, Alger Hiss, Judith Coplon, and William Remington (United States); Klaus Fuchs, Guy F. Burgess and Donald MacLean, George Blake, and Henry F. Houghton (Great Britain), and Israel Beer (Israel).

Mr. CROCKETT. I have reviewed the material under tab c(4) as requested by you and while it is true that a digest was compiled in part from public sources and from information drawn from the Internal Security Subcommittee hearings, a great deal of the information in the digest comes from FBI and other agency sources. The writeups are so integrated that it is impossible to separate the classified from the unclassified and, therefore, I must decline the request to declassify this document so that it can be published.

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The issue over the latent 800 derogatory cases had deep roots. Mr. Otepka, in his testimony of August 17, 1964, revealed that he had submitted to Administrator Scott McLeod of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, in December 1955, a detailed report on the security problems and in this he stressed the need for "continuing security. He said: 7

My study was captioned "The Employee Security Program of the Department of State" and subcaptioned "The Need for Continuing Security." My study discussed the necessity for continuing_security in the Department by suggesting certain measures to supplement the Department's personnel security program. Up to this time the Department had cleared all of its incumbent personnel under the standard of Executive Order 10450. I stressed that a current security clearance did not eliminate the potential danger of subversion or defection on the part of the State Department employee. To support this concern, I recited known case histories of employees of U.S. and foreign governments noting that such persons defected to communism or committed treason after their employment and clearances. Derogatory information in those cases, I said, was not sufficient in scope and degree to dismiss the employees. The great mistake, I pointed out, was to have permitted the transgressors to progress and to occupy highly sensitive positions which, in the final outcome, contributed to the damage that those persons caused to their respective countries.

Along with my study I also transmitted a list of 858 cases of Department employees who had been processed and cleared under the new employees security program. I explained that in these cases derogatory information in varying degrees of significance had been developed through investigations prescribed by the program. I highlighted the nature of the information revealed in a separate summary for each case. I recommended measures whereby such employees would especially be kept under continuing surveillance. If the information was potentially serious the individual, though retained, would not be assigned to a critically sensitive position. My recommendations were concurred in by Dennis Flinn.

In keeping with the authority and discretion delegated to me, and the limitation of the Department's security principles, I granted clearances to the majority of the 858 individuals. However, a substantial number of these cases, specifically those which had been investigated and adjudicated under the standard prescribed in the previous "loyalty" program (i.e., from 1947 through 1952), were sent to Mr. McLeod for review and final decision as to clearance or nonclearance. Still others were cleared by Mr. Flinn in accordance with the established procedures. It is necessary for me to stress that among the 858 cases there also was a large number of employees who I recommended be dismissed as security risks. Except in one or two cases, Mr. Flinn and Mr. McLeod concurred in my recommendations. The final decision to clear the employees in such cases was made by higher authority, in many instances after charges, suspension of the 7 Ibid., pt. 10, pp. 693–694.

employee, and a hearing before a security hearing board. As in the cases where I had granted the clearances, I was not foreclosed from carrying out my responsibility for taking proper and timely precautions to protect the Department from the still potentially grave risk presented by the retention of these employees. Many could advance to a position other than the one occupied at the time of clearance in which he or she would have information of greater sensitivity.

Asked about this matter, Mr. Otepka testified there were 545 cases evaluated under loyalty provisions of Executive Order 10450 between May 28, 1953, and December 31, 1956. Of these, 254 were cleared but were flagged as part of the 858 cases. Of 1,398 evaluated under section 5 of Executive Order 10450, 958 were favorably resolved.

OTEPKA RÉSUMÉ EXCERPT PRESENTED

The subcommittee included as part of its record of the hearing the full text of a résumé Mr. Otepka had drafted April 29, 1957, for Mr. McLeod. It was entitled "Résumé of Security Determinations Made in the Department of State, Federal Employees Security Program.” (Period covered: May 28, 1953, through Dec. 31, 1956.)

An excerpt from that résumé follows: 8

Total cases processed

There were received for security determination a total of 9,759 cases including (a) 545 which had been investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under Executive Order 9835 because of a loyalty question and required reconsideration under section 4 of Executive Order 10450; (b) 1,398 cases which also contained some form of derogatory information requiring adjudication under section 5 of the order.

Actions in derogatory cases

Of the 545 cases, 254 resulted in favorable findings while 287 persons left either by resignation, transfer to other agencies, or for some other reason except dismissal, prior to a final determination in their cases; 4 persons in this group were removed for cause as security risks after charges and hearings prescribed by Public Law 733, 81st Congress.

Of the 1,398 cases, 958 resulted in favorable findings while 435 persons left either by resignation, transfer to other agencies, or for some other reason except dismissal, prior to a final security determination in their cases; 5 persons in this group were removed for cause after charges and proceedings under the Department's personnel suitability procedures, but because of information of a security nature in their records. Since these individuals were removed under personnel regulations, the Department has not tabbed them as "security risks."

Actions in nonderogatory cases

In the nonderogatory cases, 8,361 resulted in favorable final security determinations while 76 persons left the Department prior to the completion of final action in their cases.

Some details regarding this 1957 Otepka résumé of the security determinations were given as follows, in testimony August 12, 1963:

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, this report states that of the 545 cases, 254 resulted in favorable findings while 287 persons left either by resignation, transfer to other agencies, or for some other reason except dismissal prior to a final determination of their cases. And four were removed for cause as security risks after charges and hearings.

I find something of a discrepancy in these figures. You had 545 seriously derogatory cases, 254 favorable findings, 287 left and 4-only 4 were removed.

Now, were any of the 287 who left made the subject of removal proceedings? Mr. OTEPKA. There may have been some, Mr. Sourwine, against whom action was contemplated under the security order but they were separated for various other reasons than removal, before the adverse processing took place.

Ibid., pt. 10, pp. 588-599.

Ibid., pt. 10, p. 592.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you had 1,398 derogatory cases of a lesser order?
Mr. OTEPKA. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And your report indicated that 958 of those were resolved by favorable findings, 435 left by resignation, transfer, and so forth, prior to final security determination, and only 5 were removed for cause after charges and proceedings, and those under the personnel suitability procedures-not because of information of a security nature in their records.

Mr. OTEPKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. So, that out of a total of derogatory cases of nearly 1,9501,943-just 9 individuals were removed?

Mr. ÖTEPKA. By adverse proceedings.

Mr. SOURWINE. By adverse proceedings.
Mr. OTEPKA. Yes.

Further discussion of the studies of cases with serious derogatory data disclosed that neither of Mr. Otepka's eventual immediate superiors, Mr. Belisle and Mr. Reilly, inquired, as new head of the Office of Security, as to background data on facets of personnel security cases handled in the past. Mr. Otepka said he was prepared to supply them with the data on the basis of the study he had made. They would have had to get the information from him, he added, because he was the one who maintained these records.10

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Reilly or Mr. Belisle or anyone else in Mr. Reilly's office ask you in how many of those cases before the Division of Evaluations there was information respecting Communist connections?

Mr. OTEPKA. No.

HOW MANY STILL EMPLOYED?

How many of those 800 cases with serious derogatory data in their files were still employed by the State Department? Mr. Otepka was asked the question during his testimony on August 16, 1963: 11

Mr. OTEPKA. I do not know precisely at this time. I would say that a substantial number of that 800 is still on the rolls.

Mr. SOURWINE. A half, a third, a quarter—400, 300, 200? Could you-I don't want to force you-but could you give us an estimate?

Mr. OTEPKA. Yes; I would estimate about 500.

Mr. SOURWINE. About 500 of the 800 are still there?

Mr. OTEPKA. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have they all been subject to security procedures and have all had favorable determinations?

Mr. OTEPKA. They have had favorable security determinations in keeping with the standards of Executive Order 10450; yes.

Subcommittee counsel then asked if it wasn't true that the standard of Executive Order 10450 was that employment or continued employment in the Department was to be clearly in the interests of the United States. Mr. Otepka agreed with this, but cited difficulties in the Department of State in establishing that an employee is a security risk.12

Mr. SOURWINE. *** It has been determined in the cases of some 800 persons, of whom 500 are still employed in the Department, that the individuals, although there is serious derogatory information in their files of a security nature, are nevertheless employable; that is, their employment is clearly in the interests of the Government of the United States. Is that the purport of your testimony?

Mr. OTEPKA. Well, Mr. Sourwine, you must understand, and I know you do, that it is very difficult to prove, under the standards of Executive Order 10450, that a person is a security risk.

10 Ibid., pt. 9, p. 495. 11 Ibid., pt. 10, p. 594. "Ibid., pt. 10, p. 594.

Mr. SOURWINE. Why is this, if the standard is whether the individual's employment is clearly in the interests of the Government?

Mr. OTEPKA. Although we are not required to observe legal rules of evidence, nevertheless it is the policy of the Department to assure that there is substantial evidence indicative that a person is a security risk and that the Department would be successful in pursuing an adverse course of action under Public Law 733.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you saying, Mr. Otepka, that in order to find that an employee is a security risk it is necessary, firstly, that there be not merely evidence which is convincing or which casts substantial and reasonable doubt, but that there be evidence which may be established by the testimony of witnesses in open court or the production of documents in open court?

Mr. OTEPKA. It would be along those lines; yes, sir.

Mr. Crockett was perhaps a little more explicit in renouncing the Department's application of Public Law 733, which vested the final and unappealable decision in the head of the department or agency.13

Mr. CROCKETT. *** Another thing that we are doing in this regard is fairly basic. Maybe I shouldn't even mention it, perhaps, and take your time, but one of the things I have been concerned about is any equivocation, any rationalization on employment. This is a time to get your cleanest possible guy, when you are employing a person. That is the time to look at everything and not make any compromises.

Now, after you get an employee and he has been on the rolls for a while and he gets into this trouble or that trouble, maybe, then we owe him something and he owes us something. You have to take many things into consideration. But when he is just an applicant, you don't owe him anything.

Mr. SOURWINE. A man has no rights to Government employment.

Mr. CROCKETT. That is right.

Mr. SOURWINE. Once he is on the roll, as you pointed out so well, it is a problem to get rid of him. He then has rights.

Harris H. Huston, a former Acting Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, also was questioned about the seriously derogatory cases. He, too, said some of those so listed were still on the State Department rolls after 10 years.14

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know anything about a list of 800 cases or any other number, or 200 cases or any other number, which you compiled or had compiled in 1957?

Mr. HUSTON. No, but I do know--and I think maybe this is what your question is aimed toward-that, when I came over in 1957, I did recognize the fact that there were some names still there. Some of the people were still in the Department. Mr. SOURWINE. People whom you, 10 years earlier, had found to be security risks?

Mr. HUSTON. A few of those that were still on that list; yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. All right. Now, go specifically to the compilation which Mr. Otepka prepared. Did you recognize in that any-that was in 1961, wasn't it? Mr. HUSTON. That was.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you recognize in that compilation any of the names of the individuals whom you had in 1947 found to be security risks?

Mr. HUSTON. I cannot answer with certainty, but I would say the probability is fairly great that there were a few. I cannot-I would be at a loss, without looking at such a list, to say so definitely, but I would say in all probability there were.

A special list of some 200 seriously derogatory cases was compiled out of the list of 800-presumably the worst 200 of the lot, testimony indicated. Some State Department officials were under the misconception that Mr. Otepka had compiled this list.15

Mr. Otepka assured the subcommittee there was such a list, that he had seen it, coming to him through official channels, but that he had not prepared it. He said it had been compiled-not in the Office of Security-but in the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs-in

13 Ibid., pt. 13, p. 1022.

14 Ibid., pt. 10, p. 617.
15 Ibid., pt. 10, pp. 639, 695.

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