general reduction in force in the Department of State has roughly averaged 1 percent for each department but I am told that 25 of the 144 people in the Security Office are to be separated. This figure excludes stenographers and clerks and the separation applies in GS-9 to GS-15 grades.

I hope an immediate review will be made of this situation as I do not feel it is in the best interest of the Department of State or the Federal Government to radically reduce such an important office. I see no reason why this Office should be so drastically affected as compared to other divisions. In fact, in this sensitive agency, I would think it appropriate that the Office of Security would be increased rather than decreased. It is my understanding that the workload in the Security Office is such that an increase is needed and a reduction would create an even greater problem. I am told nine men have been brought in from your branch office to help with the Washington area backlog. This means that the branch office work will suffer and further, the Federal Government must bear the cost of $16 per day extra expense while those branch office men are working away from their regular location. It would appear far more logical to avoid the proposed reduction and save the expense and resulting difficulty in transferring men here from your branch offices.

Obviously, from your normal turnover, the future workload in your security work will continue to be heavy. It is not possible to accomplish this workload with the staff remaining after the proposed reduction. If your plan is to turn over some of the investigations to the Civil Service Commission, I do not believe it is a good plan. I believe records will show that your Security Office can make these investigations at a substantial savings over what your agency would pay to the Commission for the same service. Further, the Commission investigations cannot be specialized to your particular needs as is now done within your organization. Further, to pay out funds to the Civil Service Commission in lieu of salaries to your staff would not result in any true savings.

I would also like to point out that under reduction-in-force procedures the Veterans' Preference Act would cause you to lose many employees with the greatest experience and training. These are valuable people and it would be impossible to replace them at a later date. It takes many years to train an investigator. The work they perform at the beginning of their appointment can not help but be imperfect. If your investigations are turned over to the Civil Service Commission, the Commission would be forced to hire new employees to accomplish the additional work. Consequently, this transfer of investigations would result in some measure of having your work performed by people of lesser ability and experience. Surely in a sensitive agency this factor would be considered of utmost importance. Similarly your announced intention of using untrained Foreign Service officers to help in various divisions would be to the detriment of your organization if any are intended for use in the division of investigations.

In view of the above and in view of the tremendous hardship employees who are downgraded or separated must suffer, I urgently request that this decision be reversed. I would personally appreciate your assistance in this regard as I am deeply concerned over the welfare of our Nation and the employees affected in this case.

DEAR MR. BROYHILL: The Secretary has asked me to thank you for your letter of November 15. The Department will be glad, whenever convenient to you, to go extensively into the questions you have raised. In the meanwhile, may I comment on them?

Twenty-five positions are being abolished in the Office of Security out of a total of 273 domestic positions. Eighteen of the twenty-five reductions are in anticipation of a falling off in workload. The reduction of 25 positions in the Office of Security is part of a larger reduction affecting every bureau and office in the Department of State. The Department-wide reduction is necessary if the Department is to live within its appropriations. The Office of Security is bear

ing an equitable and not an undue share of the overall reduction of 500 filled positions throughout the Department of State. It is losing 25 officers: 140 officers supported by 108 clerical employees will remain to carry on the important and vital security work of the Department. The fact is that the security of the Department's offices abroad is being strengthened by the addition of 35 positions to its oversea security force an increase of almost 50 percent, and a net increase of 10 positions in the overall strength of the security force.

Of the 25 domestic positions to be eliminated, as mentioned above, 18 relate to the investigation and evaluation of applicants for employment with the Department. This decision was predicated upon a sharp curtailment in the recruitment program of the Department of the remainder of this fiscal year, coupled with plans with respect to fiscal year 1963 which do not contemplate any overall expansion of our personnel. Thus, the investigative evaluation workload which lies ahead for the next 18 months is going to be less than the workload of the past few years. The reductions have been geared to this situation.

You refer to the presence in Washington of nine men who have been brought in on temporary detail from various of our field offices throughout the country. The Department's investigative workload is not of such a nature that it results in a steady volume of work throughout the year at each of our 19 field offices. On the contrary, there are peaks and valleys. Over the years we have found it more efficient and less expensive to detail officers temporarily from the less heavily to the more heavily burdened field offices. Surely, this is preferable to maintaining permanently at all of these offices staffs geared to peak workloads but who would be underemployed for extended periods at other times during the year.

You point out that under reduction-in-force procedures the Veterans Preference Act would cause the Department to lose many employees with the greatest experience and training. This is only partially true. For example, 5 of the 16 investigators we will lose have been with us less than 1 year. We retain the services of over 70 investigators who have been with us for periods ranging up to 19 years.

With regard to the incumbents of the 25 positions being eliminated, 5 are eligible for retirement, 3 are to be reassigned elsewhere in the Department or Foreign Service, 6 have already obtained employment. The Department is endeavoring and I am confident will be successful in obtaining offers of employment for the remaining 11 prior to the termination of their services with the Department.

In summary, and also in connection with the other points raised in your letter, I would like to assure you that there has been no change whatsoever in the Department's determination to provide itself with the most effective security possible. We have a good security staff, but it would be foolish not to remain continuously aware of possibilities for improvement, in techniques, organization, and the general quality of our security personnel. This will be the basis for any future plans and programs undertaken by the Department. Lastly, I would like to express my conviction that the reduction in the Office of Security will not adversely affect the quality of the work of that Office nor will they endanger the welfare or security of the Nation.

Sincerely yours,

HERMAN POLLACK, Acting Assistant Secretary for Administration.

THE OTEPKA CASE

THE CHARGES

On September 23, 1963, Otto Otepka received a letter from Secretary Rusk, advising him of the Department's proposal to remove him from his appointment as supervisory personnel security specialist. Secretary Rusk, in his testimony, summarized the charges as follows: 1

There are three main groups of charges. The first is that Mr. Otepka furnished to Mr. Jay Sourwine, chief counsel to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, classified information concerning the loyalty of prospective State Department appointees. The letter of charges states that this conduct violated a Presidential directive issued on March 13, 1948, of which Mr. Otepka was aware.

A second group of charges is that, in two cases, Mr. Otepka furnished a detailed series of questions for the use of Mr. Sourwine in his interrogation of Mr. Otepka's superiors.

The third group of charges is that Mr. Otepka was responsible for cutting off the classification indicators from a number of classified documents, and that he thereby declassified the documents in violation of the Department's procedures, although the information contained in the documents remained classified. By the same act, it is charged, he mutilated the documents in violation of a criminal statute.

On October 14, 1963, Otepka replied to the charges in a letter to John Ordway, Chief, Personnel Operations Division, Department of State. Secretary Rusk summarized Mr. Otepka's reply:

Mr. Otepka was afforded the opportunity to reply to the charges, which he has now done. In substance he admits having done the acts alleged in the first two groups of charges summarized above, but denies that this violated any applicable standard of conduct. As to the third group, he denies having done the acts charged.

Mr. Otepka's assertion that doing the acts alleged in the first two groups of charges did not violate any applicable standard of conduct was the subject of comment by the committee. Senator Hruska put it this way:

Yet, as I understand it, when he [Otepka] asked for specifics, there are not any standards set, it is whatever the standards are in the mind of the accuser of Mr. Otepka.

During the appearance of William J. Grockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, reference was made to his recent testimony before another congressional committee in which he stated that the Department was trying very hard not to punish officers who are proven wrong by hindsight, and that he (Crockett) would watch out so that people are not punished for exercising the right of dissent. Whether this gesture of fair play was meant to apply to Mr. Otepka is not clear in view of Mr. Crockett's subsequent comment about Mr. Otepka taking the law and regulations into his own hands. Mr. Crockett further observed that when people dissent they are running a risk, and he agreed that Mr. Otepka is paying a very heavy price

1 State Department Security hearings, pt. 5, p. 268. State Department Security hearings, pt. 5, p. 276.

because of the method he employed in his dissent. Here is the testimony referred to above:

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, there was some interest in your testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations of the Committee on Government Operations on November 21 of last year.*

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. It is noted that at page 294 of that record, after describing yourself on the previous page as a nonconformist, you said: "We are trying very hard not to punish officers who are proven wrong by hindsight."

A little later on the same page, you promised Senator Jackson unqualifiedly that you "will really watch out so that people are not punished for exercising the right of dissent, the willingness not to conform."

Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Sourwine, I think that it is inherent that responsible officers have to object whenever they find that they cannot agree with the policies and programs of their superiors or the Department. Certainly it is the responsibility of an officer to bring forth or to explain his personal feelings and his objections to a policy. It is certainly the responsibility of an officer to expose wrongdoing and evil.

On the other hand, I think that it is certainly the responsibility of every person to fully explore and use every available avenue provided by the regulations and by the law before he resorts to taking the law or the regulations into his own hands. I think this is the basic difference in the Otepka case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Otepka took the law and the regulations into his own hands?

Mr. CROCKETT. I have not rendered judgment, but this is what the charges so state. And it seems to me that—to go one step further-certainly there isn't any question that the loyalty to the United States comes first. This is paramount. We must preserve this.

On the other hand, there isn't anything that would be more devastating to orderly government than to permit a million employees of the Federal Government to each decide, individually, which regulation they would break.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is it your point that this right of dissent is to be maintained but that it is to be confined entirely to confidential channels within the Department?

Mr. CROCKETT. Not necessarily within the confidential channels. Certainly there may be other channels, but I think that the right to dissent in other channels is always risky and that when people dissent in that manner they are running a risk. Now we are trying very hard to insure that there are channels for dissent; that, if a policy decision is made, officers involved in it have an opportunity to voice their own opinions. But, certainly, I think that once policies are made, once a decision has been made by responsible officials, you can't have the policy tried in the press or questioned by the very people that are charged with carrying it out. Mr. SOURWINE. The right of dissent is circumscribed in that respect? Mr. CROCKETT. To some extent, surely.

Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Otepka is paying and will pay a very heavy price for his dissent; right?

Mr. CROCKETT. I would say not for his dissent, but for his method of employing his dissent. He did not avail himself of any channel within the Department to my knowledge. He never asked to see me, never asked to see my predecessor, never asked to see the Secretary. So far as I know, he did not avail himself of any of the normal channels of procedures that were available to an employee of the Department.

Mr. SOURWINE. And in that respect you consider that he was culpable?
Senator DODD. Was what?

Mr. SOURWINE. In that respect you consider he was culpable?
Mr. CROCKETT. At least this is what the charges state.

Secretary Rusk commented on this point: "I can assure you, however, that the charges were not brought in retaliation for Mr. Otepka's testimony before the subcommittee, nor do they mark any attempt by the Department to interfere with the work of the subcommittee." 3

*State Department Security hearings, pt. 5, pp. 264-266. State Department Security hearings. pt. 5, p. 268.