evaluation of the investigation, the Office of Security recommended to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration in September of 1961 that Mr. Wieland should not be made the subject of separation proceedings under Executive Order 10450 but that a finding that his continued employment is clearly consistent with the national security should be deferred until a complete review of his case is made at a higher level. This recommendation was made by Mr. Otepka and Mr. Hite, who were the evaluators in this case. The file indicates that the CSC was notified by letter dated January 29, 1962, that a favorable determination had been made in Wieland's case. This letter was signed by Mr. Otto Otepka. Mr. SOURWINE. Is it true that Mr. Wieland's full and unqualified clearance under Executive Order 10450 was reaffirmed?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. However, I would like to state for the record that Mr. Wieland's clearance was never removed.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who reaffirmed it?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do you know?

Mr. CROCKETT. The CSC was notified by letter from the Office of Security dated January 29, 1962, attaching SF-73, that a favorable determination had been made in Wieland's case. This letter was signed by Mr. Otto F. Otepka.

Mr. SOURWINE. Has there been no further question about Mr. Wieland's "full and unqualified clearance" since August 1961?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. There was continued question about Mr. Wieland's status. Additional information in the Wieland case was furnished to the Department under cover of a memorandum from the Civil Service Commission dated January 10, 1963. This information consisted of copies of various hearings held by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in the Wieland case. In June 1963 the Wieland case was referred to the Department of Justice for consideration of possible prosecution for perjury. In July 1963, Justice declined prosecution. An evaluation of all the new material was made under the provisions of 3 FAM 162.2 a (1), "any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy," and 3 FAM 162.2 (2), "any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts." No reason was found to remove Mr. Wieland's clearance under Executive Order 10450.

Mr. SOURWINE. When was the reaffirmance of Mr. Wieland's clearance entered in the files of the Department?

Mr. CROCKETT. The Personnel Advisory Board considered all the information available in the Wieland case and recommended in March 1964 that Wieland be fully utilized as an active senior Foreign Service officer. In January 1965 the Personnel Review Panel concurred with the findings and recommendations of the Personnel Advisory Review Board. I would like to state for the record, Mr. Sourwine, that Mr. Wieland's security clearance had never been withdrawn during this entire period so it was not a matter of reaffirmance. It was a matter of deciding whether or not it should be withdrawn, rather than reaffirmed. Mr. SOURWINE. Where, in what files?

Mr. CROCKETT. In the employee's security file.

Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it true that Mr. Wieland's security case was reopened in 1963 on the basis of additional evidence?

Mr. CROCKETT. Readjudication of the case was made in 1963 on the basis of additional information received. However, the recommendation was favorable. Mr. SOURWINE. Has the case been finally decided and closed as of the present date?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the quotation attributed by Mr. Rush to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee accurate and in context?

Mr. CROCKETT. Substantially accurate and in context although Mr. Rush did not attempt to cover the case in full nor was it appropriate for him to do so in this case.

Mr. SOURWINE. With reference to the third paragraph of the Rush letter, do you think it was fair to refer to President Kennedy's statement without explaining that at that time Mr. Wieland had been transferred away from the Caribbean desk and was shuffling papers upstairs?

Mr. CROCKETT. I certainly do think it was fair because the Secretary and the President reviewed the case personally and the President himself made the statement that is attributed to him and Mr. Wieland's assignment had nothing to do with the remarks made by the President.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think the State Department should take the position that the late President Kennedy defended Mr. Wieland in all respects?

65-860-67-pt. 1-4

Mr. CROCKETT. The Department's position is that the late President Kennedy said that "he [Kennedy] was familiar with Mr. Wieland and his duties, and that he believed Mr. Wieland could carry out his duties without detriment to the interests of the United States."

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know who the spokesman for the Department was who said Wieland was not a "security risk, loyalty risk," and so forth?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. This statement was made by Mr. Roger Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, in a press interview following the President's press conference at which time the President was asked by one of the reporters the status of the Wieland case or whether Wieland was a security risk.

Mr. SOURWINE. His name has never been made public, has it?

Mr. CROCKETT. In the press statement that came out subsequent to this interview he was referred to by title only but it was no secret that Mr. Jones was the official who occupied the position.

Mr. SOURWINE. Should the State Department hide behind an unidentified spokesman?

Mr. CROCKETT. The personality is not the important thing in Government as you know, but the position that the person occupies and certainly the position of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration was identified in the press. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it is proper to consider this quotation from the "spokesman," by Mr. Rush, as a departmental endorsement of the statement quoted?

Mr. CROCKETT. Certainly statements emanating from high officials of the Department in their official capacities must be considered to be departmental policy and in this case the Department's endorsement.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know the identity of the State Department "spokesman" mentioned by Mr. Rush who said after President Kennedy's press conference January 24, 1962, that Mr. Wieland is not "a security risk, a loyalty risk, a suitability risk, or any other kind of a risk ***"?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. I was present when this statement was made by Mr. Roger Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

Mr. SOURWINE. Was it Roger Jones?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read Mr. Wieland's security file?

Mr. CROCKETT. No, sir; not in its entirety. I have read pertinent portions of it and pertinent portions of his testimony.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you read the evaluation report on this case?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Have you formed an opinion with respect to the case?
Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think it was proper for Mr. Rush to state that Wieland had been given a "full and unqualified clearance" without revealing that Wieland's security case had been reopened and disclosing the status of the case at the current time?

Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Wieland's clearance was never withdrawn and, therefore, it was appropriate for Mr. Rush to state that he had been given full and unqualified clearance. I think it would have been most inappropriate for Mr. Rush to have mentioned in public correspondence that there was any further investigation or consideration of the case going on within the Department at the time of this correspondence.

Mr. SOURWINE. Note the fourth paragraph of Mr. Rush's letter. How could Mr. Rush or anyone else know what discussion had taken place in the Department of State? There are a thousand matters being discussed there this moment, and no one official can know about all of them.

Mr. CROCKETT. I certainly agree that no one can state this categorically. However, in the context of Mr. Rush's reply and in the context of the question, I think his reply was appropriate. Certainly there is a difference between the top officialdom who have the authority and responsibility, and the lowest clerk in the Department. Mr. Rush's reply refers to responsible officers in the Department of State and in that context there had been no consideration of the reemployment of Mr. Hiss and in that context the fourth paragraph of Mr. Rush is accurate. Mr. SOURWINE. Do you think a question by a State Department official to a subordinate about the security regulations and practices which would apply in case the Department wanted to bring Alger Hiss back, comes under the heading "Discussion About Using the Services of Alger Hiss"?

Mr. CROCKETT. I have no knowledge that anyone ever asked such a question but I certainly do not believe that the asking of this kind of question, if it were

asked, comes under the heading "Discussion About Using the Services of Alger Hiss."

Mr. SOURWINE. Rush's letter quotes from the Internal Security Subcommittee report issued in December 1962. Do you know that what has been quoted here is not all the committee had to say about Mr. Wieland?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOURWINE. Will you read what the committee said about Mr. Wieland on pages 2 and 3 of its report of October 4, 1962, and tell us if Mr. Rush's use of quotes was justified?

Mr. CROCKETT. Yes, sir. I believe they were justified in connection with the question of loyalty.

(EDITOR'S NOTE.-Following is the committee's statement from its report of October 4, 1962:)

WILLIAM WIELAND-EXAMPLE

Mr. William Wieland plays a large part in this report.

The case of William Wieland, like the majority of security cases, does not involve loyalty. It involves such factors as integrity and general suitability.

Mr. Wieland should be viewed (perhaps not primarily, but certainly most importantly), as an example: his record and conduct and the handling of his security case combine to provide a case history which illustrates much of what is wrong with the State Department from a security standpoint.

Mr. Wieland was not "responsible" for the Communists' Cuban takeover in the sense that he alone brought it about. Neither can he escape a share of the responsibility.

(The exact placement of blame for such faults or offenses as policy impedance, inadequate or incorrect intelligence, withholding of intelligence or information from higher echelons, misinformation of superiors, sabotage of policy papers, misuse or overstepping of authority, unauthorized affixation of the Secretary's name to documents or messages, and various other wrongful actions or failures to act, which can interfere not only with the effectiveness but with the basic security of the Department's operations, can never be established with certitude so long as executive privilege is asserted to prevent successful inquiry respecting individual actions.

(When the head of an agency or one of its units accepts the blame for an error made in the name of the unit, instead of seeking to escape personal blame by blaming an employee, this may be a noble action. But when such a man cries: "Whatever happens in my unit is my responsibility," for the purpose of preventing any investigation of what any of his subordinates did at any time, he is not accepting blame; he is simply hiding wrongdoing. For instance, if the same policy should be followed uniformly to the top, the President of the United States would have to be held personally responsible for every security leak in Government— which is patently absurd.)

William Wieland is, then, to be considered, most importantly, as an example. He is by no means to be regarded as a typical example either of a Foreign Service officer or of a State Department employee.

Mr. Wieland was appointed to a position at the State Department for which his qualifications were highly doubtful. (His starting salary was $7,000; his salary

in private employment at the time was $3,120.)

He was appointed without any security check.

(His appointment actually was effective before he even filled out any form of an application.)

He falsified his job application by omission.

When he later filled out an expanded personal history form, he falsified that by direct misstatement.

Mr. Wieland had a hand in shaping our policy with respect to Cuba both before and after Castro's takeover.

He held a position which by definition made him one of the State Department's experts in Latin American affairs, and Cuban affairs particularly. One of the things the Department paid him for was his expertise his own judgment based on his own experience. Yet he never told his superiors officially or wrote in any Department paper, down to the very day when Fidel Castro stood before the world as a self-proclaimed Marxist, what he told friends privately as early as 1958-or earlier that Castro "is a Communist" and "is surrounded by Commies (and) *** subject to Communist influences."

To Mr. Wieland's desk came, over a period of years, great quantities of solid intelligence respecting the Communist nature and connections of the Castro movement, of Castro himself and his principal lieutenants. The committee was unable to document a single instance in which Mr. Wieland passed any of this material up to his superiors or mentioned it as credible in any report or policy paper.

Mr. Wieland became an active apologist for Fidel Castro, even to the extent of openly contradicting intelligence officers who were attempting to brief Dr. Milton Eisenhower (then on an official trip to Mexico representing his brother, the President) respecting communism in the Castro regime.

Mr. Wieland eventually became the subject of a full-scale security investigation. He was "cleared" improperly (in the name of the Secretary) by an official who made no concurrent written record of either the clearance or the reasons therefor, and who at the time of the clearance had not read either the security file on Wieland, or even the official summary and evaluation of that file. (Or else State Department records were arranged after Mr. Wieland had been mentioned at a Presidential press conference, so as to show that he had been cleared several months before. There is substantial evidence that this may have been the case.)

MANIPULATING THE WATKINS REPORT

Earlier, the subcommittee had discovered another example of quotation-out-of-context in a form letter from the State Department. In his conference with the subcommittee, Secretary Rusk referred to the report of the Select Committee To Study Censure Charges Against Senator McCarthy (popularly known as the Watkins committee) to justify withholding certain information. In what apparently was a form letter, sent out subsequent to Mr. Rusk's appearance, Frederick G. Dutton, then Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, quoted from the Watkins committee report. Mr. Dutton was interrogated about that letter in testimony before the subcommittee on July 29, 1964:

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, I call your attention to a letter which I wish to read. I'll explain why I do this, Mr. Chairman. I am sure that Mr. Dutton will remember the letter. But the Senator who has furnished the letter did not wish his name to be used in the hearing, so I'm not passing the letter itself over to the witness.

Senator DODD. May I see it?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes, of course.

This was a letter in the nature of a form letter, apparently sent out in response to mail on the Otepka case.

Mr. DUTTON. From my office or the Public Affairs Office?

Mr. SOURWINE. From your office, dealing with the right of the Department or the Government to refuse to disclose certain information under an Executive order, and which quoted from the report of the Watkins committee in the McCarthy case.

Mr. DUTTON. On that statement, I don't recall specifically, but maybe you'll read it.

Mr. SOURWINE. I'll read it to you and see if you do recall it:

"DEAR SENATOR: Thank you for your letter of January-transmitting"and I'll leave out a name "inquiry concerning Mr. Otto F. Otepka. The first question concerned the right of the administration to withhold information from the Senate when requested.

"This administration has made every effort to cooperate fully with all members of the committees of Congress. In the Department of State personnel have been instructed to meet the request of the Congress as completely and promptly as possible. There are, however, some instances in which it is necessary to restrict the dissemination of information. The Select Committee To Study Censure Charges Against Senator McCarthy, for example, stated in its report that the President no doubt has power to safeguard from public dissemination by Executive order or otherwise information affecting, for example, the national defense, notwithstanding that the regulations might indirectly interfere with any secret Ibid., pt. 18, pp. 1482-1483.

transmission line between the executive employees and any individual Member of Congress.' It is this policy that this administration has accepted.

"The second question concerned any instructions that the State Department might have given to its employees to give untrue testimony to the Senate. No such instructions have ever been issued. On the contrary, this is in direct contradiction to the orders of the Secretary of State. As you may know, the Department is continuing its investigation into the Otepka matter, having recently appointed a former ambassador and a retired Army security officer to conduct a survey. We are cooperating with the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in an effort to resolve these matters."

Mr. DUTTON. I must admit I have only a vague general recollection of the letter.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us whether this letter is something that was prepared for your signature or whether you, yourself dictated it?

Mr. DUTTON. I'm sure it was prepared for my signature. By whom, I would not know.

I should say, as I'm sure you know, within the last 3 years, the level of congressional correspondence in the State Department has increased to the point where we now have about 200 to 300 letters a day.

Mr. SOURWINE. I didn't know what the figure was.

Do you feel that a statement made by this particular committee, the Watkins committee that investigated McCarthy and brought in censure charges is, in any sense, a precedent or is binding on either the Senate or on the Congress with respect to the opinions that he expressed?

Mr. DUTTON. No, I do not. I think it merely is an authoritative statement to be taken for such persuasive value or relevance as it has. I was not citing it, let's say, as a statute or something like that.

Mr. SOURWINE. You presented it as merely the most recent authoritative statement of a Senate committee on the point?

Mr. DUTTON. I frankly could not answer that, one way or the other.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sir, what do you think of the practice of quoting something out of context to establish a point which is not made by the full quote in context? 10 Mr. DUTTON. I think as a matter of general principle nobody thinks a thing should be quoted out of context.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did you know that the portion quoted from the Watkins committee report in your letter was not only quoted out of context but was quoted in such a way as to fail to disclose the fact that the committee's actual position was the exact reverse of what is implied by your letter?

Mr. DUTTON. No, I did not, and I would have to study the record to reach - my own conclusions on whether it is or is not.

The report was put in the record. Here is the sentence quoted in the letter (in italics below) and the unquoted sentence which followed in the original report:

11

The President no doubt has power to safeguard from public dissemination, by Executive order or otherwise, information affecting, for example, the national defense, notwithstanding that the regulations might indirectly interfere with any secret transmission line between the executive employees and any individual Member of the Congress. But the President, we think, cannot (nor do we believe he has sought by any order or directive called to our attention) deny to the Congress, or any duly organized committee or subcommittee thereof, and particularly the Committee on Government Operations of the Senate, any information, even though classified, if it discloses corruption or subversion in the executive branch.

The unquoted sentence, it should be noted, begins with a "but." Counsel Sourwine then pointed out to the witness other parts of the Watkins committee report to emphasize the lack of context. He said: 12

The committee then proceeded for three pages to expatiate on the right of Congress to have documents, after discussing the burgeoning of the classification of documents in the executive branch. The committee said:

1 Ibid., pt. 18, p. 1487.

11 Ibid., pt. 18, pp. 1490, 1491.

12 Ibid., pt. 18, pp. 1494, 1495.