matter what the OAS and its master decide in Washington. Fatherland or death! We shall win! CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA.

(Signed)

1st. Lt. Antonio BRIONES Montoto, the Cuban Army Officer killed by a Venezuelan Army patrol while landing on the beach at Machurucuto (Miranda) the night of May 8, 1967. Briones Montoto, 27, had spent several months in New York and Miami as a pro-Castro exile. He left Miami for Havana in January of 1959. In April 1963 he accompanied the Cuban delegation to the Pan American games in São Paulo, Brazil. His duties were to prevent defections among the athletes and/or establish contacts among Latin American sympathizers. The caption in the photograph states: "*** a new struggle begins and it is the struggle against imperialism, an open, frontal attack without quarter."

DECLARATIONS OF C.P. OF Venezuela

Montevideo prensa latina in Spanish to presa latina Havana, 1500 GMT, May 23, 1967-E

(Resolutions of the Eithth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist Party PCV.)

VENEZUELA, May 23.-In its May 17, issue, the Caracas newspaper Ultimas Noticias published the "Resolutions of the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the PCV," presumably as a paid advertisement. The document, which covers more than two pages of the Tabloid-size newspaper, is entitled: "Neither continuity nor caldron, change;" adding: "change favoring the democratic freedoms, national sovereignty, and independent development of Venezuela: depose the reactionary leadership of AD (Democratic Action Party-Ed.)" The document is datelined "in Venezuela, April-May 1967," signed by Guillermo Garcia Ponce, on behalf of the PCV political bureau, and illustrated with six photographs of Gustavo Machado, Teodro Petkoff, Jesus Faria, Eduardo Machado, Guillermo Garcia Ponce, and Pompeyo Mraquez.

The resolutions are preceded by a note saying: "The Political Bureau of the PCV informs the membership and organizations of the party, the Communist youth, and the Venezuelan people, in general, of the resolutions adopted by the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee. (Signed—Ed.) The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PCV; Pompeyo Marquez, Guillermo Garcia Ponce, Alonso Ojeda Olachea, Pedro Ortega Diaz, Eduardo Gallegos Mancera, Teodoro Petkoff, and German Lairet." The following is the text of the aforementioned document. The subtitles are those of the publication:

1. Significance of the plenum: The central committee has met to reaffirm the Leninist principles of organization and leadership of the party; to defend internal unity; to initiate a process of criticism and self-criticism to analyze the process experienced since the third congress; an to formulate a policy of recovery and of unity of the people's forces in the struggle to defeat Betancourtism and prevent the continuity of the reactionary leadership of the AD along the road to a nationalist change that will restore complete respect or democratic freedoms, improve the living conditions of the popular masses, and establish the bases for the independent development of Venezuela.

2. Redouble the defense of unity: The party has successfully endured one of the hardest tests to which its unity and its very existence as an independent Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class has been subjected. Disguising itself with ultraradical language, acting as alleged defenders of the third congress, spreading slanderous statements to distort our policy and discredit the leadering cadres, a splinter group has been organized encouraged from abroad-which set itself the task of assaulting the organizations of leadership and imposing a policy of anarchy and terror and of liquidation of the party. For a time they lied, concealing their divisionist maneuvers and justifying themselves in the name of the "armed struggle." When their plans were revealed and 'the party tried to reestablish its discipline and authority, the splinter group rebelled openly and took the road of antiparty activity. The concepts contrary to Marxism-Leninism and the typically terrorist-type actions have made manifest the adventurist nature of the antiparty group. Its conduct serves, objectively, the reactionary and Betancourtist ruling clique of the government, not-repeat-not only against our party and the Venezuelan people, but also against the international Communist movement and, especially, against the Cuban revolution.

Playing the guerrillaist game has once again confirmed the Leninist truth that the path of the ultraleftist deviations coincides with the positions of the right. Unwitting or not-repeat-not, the action of the anarchy-terrorist group today serves guerrillaism and the imperialist interest in extending reactionary hegemony and isolating and destroying the revolutionary movement.

Worthy of note is the loyalty of the members of the central committee and almost all of the cadres and members of the party, as well as the fidelity of the Communist youth.

The central committee approves the measures taken in order to defend the unity of the party and Marxist-Leninist principles.

3. For the faithful observation of principles: The exercise of the Leninist principles of party organization and leadership adopted during the first congress has been the Venezuelan Communists' patrimony. Democracy, the obedience of the minority and the lower organizations to the higher ones, the unity of action and will, which is incompatible with the existence of factions, equal discipline for all, the fraternal nature of the struggle of views, and the concept of the party as the

vanguard and high command of the working class and the revolution—all these have guaranteed an atmosphere of confidence in our internal lives and strengthened the party uninterruptedly. The errors committed in the recent period have caused a dangerous situation in which the Leninist principles of organization and leadership have been violated frequently. There have been violations of democratic centralism, disobedience to higher bodies, careerism, bad cadre policies, and there has been an attempt to harm mutual revolutionary confidence and Communist fraternity.

Under the present difficult conditions, in view of the complex national situations and the problems confronted within the international Communist movement, the faithful observance of the Leninist principles of organization is more necessary than ever, in order to harmoniously direct the activities of the party and guarantee the fulfillment of its historic mission as a party of the working class and leader of the Venezuelan revolution. The government measures of brutal repression necessarily require the strengthening of centralism and discipline in the party, of revolutionary vigilance, of the defense of unity, and of the preservation of the 'eadership organizations and cadres.

The central committee calls on all Communists to close ranks and reaffirm the the Leninist principles of organization, from top to bottom, and from bottom to top; to participate in the discussion process preparatory to the fourth congress; to rally around the central committee; and to defend and apply the policies adopted by the Eighth Plenum. All revolutionaries who share these principles will find the doors of the party open to them. As for the central committee, it has adopted a special regulation to safeguard our leadership functions under the present conditions.

4. The richest historical period in the life of the party the period between 1958 through 1966 has been the richest period of activities and experience in the history of the party and the Communist youth (JC). To the PCV and the JC, which performed with honor the mission of leading the popular insurrection of January 23, fell the role of vanguard in the great struggles waged in defense of democratic achievements and to win a nationalist and revolutionary policy. The rise to power of Romulo Betancourt and the reactionary clique of the AD leader was a harsh blow to the popular movement. The Betancourtist government adhered to the United States policy requiring anticommunist measures, the breakup of the unity of January 23, and the alinement of Venezuela against the Cuban revolution, thus opposing the democratic majority of our country.

The acute antagonism between Betancourtist policy and the sentiments and interests of the Venezuelan people, in addition to the grave economic problems faced by the masses, created an inevitable political and social conflict between the popular sectors of the government, a conflict which reached all national levels, especially the working class, the urban middle class, the youth, the patriotic sectors of the armed forces, and so forth, when this antagonism grew as a result of the provocative and repressive Betancourtist line, the conditions were created for the overthrow of Romulo Betancourt. These conditions manifested themselves, principally, in the degree of combativeness of the popular masses, the rejection of official leaders by the majority of the workers, the uninterrupted student actions, the breakup of the government coalition, the departure of the URD from the cabinet, the division in the ranks of the AD, the organization of the MIR and the opposition AD, the movement of important AFRED forces units to the nationalist camp, the increase support for the PCV and the JC among the workers and the middle classes, the loss of the government majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the spontaneous insurrectional actions in important cities, the national transportation strike, and other things.

5. It was just to take up weapons: In adopting as its principal task the overthrow of Romulo Betancourt, the PCV was interpreting the aspiration of the majority of the Venezuelan people and was acting in accordance with the correlation of forces, which favored that decision at that time. The violence unleashed by the government against the popular masses had closed the peaceful road toward achieving the changes demanded by the majority of the people. Betancourtism attacked the popular movement with every weapons, massacred demonstrators, murdered students and workers, closes press offices, raided and trample on entire districts, and imposed persecution and police terror. The decision to defend the achievements of January 23, by resorting all forms of struggle, including armed struggle, and to promote the overthrow of Romulo Betancourt was just.

The PCV and the JC fought with exemplary courage in the Carupano and Puerto Cabello rebellions, in the heroic guerrilla actions participated in by many contingents of the popular masses throughout Venezuela. During this period, the

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party and the JC-independent of the errors and failures, which will receive special analysis-acted as true revolutionary organizations, took up weapons, and defied all dangers to resist the Betancourtist aggression and achieve a nationalist change.

6. We have committed errors in this struggle: without denying the great struggles waged, it is necessary, however, to make a sincere critical and selfcritical analysis in order to root out the errors which led to the defeat of the insurrectional movement against the Romulo Betancourt government and the subsequent setbacks suffered by the revolutionary sectors.

Aware of the fact that there is no struggle without errors, the criticism and self-criticism should note the most important aspects, from the analysis of which the revolutionary movement can extract lessons. We must not-repeat-not permit the revolutionary forces to be confused by personal, petty, destructive, and unprincipled criticism, nor by criticisms that may impose on them a pessimistic or conservative vision which will fill the popular forces with distrust or demoralize them at a time in which it is necessary to raise their combat spirit in order to perform the great tasks pending.

At present, this examination cannot be complete, for the historic period being analyzed has not-repeat-not yet ended. However, the central committee feels it is correct to initiate the discussion concerning the actions of each and every one party organization, with the spirit of justice and the courage that must be the norm of Communists. The central committee calls on all the military men to contribute to the discussion process, review the most positive experiences, correct the errors in practice, draft a correct policy, and strengthen the party and the JC. 7. The principal errors: The following errors have been noted in this plenum: (1) We did not-repeat-not understand the true nature of the insurrectional movement against Betancourtist hegemony. We attempted to immediately attribute the characteristics of "Revolutionary National Liberation War" to a movement which had not-repeat-not yet reached that point. The principal aim of which was to remove the Betancourt government and replace it with a broadbased government which would respect democratic rights. This confusion over the initial nature of the movement led us to a sectarian position in the drafting of slogans and the manner in which some of the methods of struggle were developed. In this phase, on repeated occasions, practice did not-repeat-not corresspond to the general guidance of the united organizations and the thesis of the third congress, which were broad and flexible.

(2) When the conditions existed for the achievement of important changes by means of a correct combination of the forms of struggle, especially the use of armed struggle, the party did not-repeat-not act coherently, in depth, and with all its forces in the insurrectional action. This error prevented the sufficient exploitation of the favorable situations that presented themselves during the period we are analyzing.

(3) We committed serious errors of subjectivism in the application of the forms of struggle. These were expressed in the tendencies to adventurism and in the misadministration of our forces. Some of those errors affected the policy of alliances, the participation of the broad popular masses in the struggle, and they led, subsequently, especially after the December 1963 elections, to the isolation of the party and serious defeats. Owing to the situation created within the party by the work of the splinter group, sectarianism went deeper, provoking new reversals which could have been avoided.

(4) We did not-repeat-not know how to make maximum use of the 1963 election process and its incidents in making more acute the political crisis in the struggle against Betancourtism and the reactionary leadership of the AD. We should have participated in the elections, suspended the armed operations, and laid principle stress on a policy of broad alliances to regroup the opposition (words indistinct) this policy (word indistinct) the possibility of an electorial defeat of Betancourtism or, in any case, create a broad leftist movement, expanding the field of insurrectional support and establishing the bases for the prolongation of the struggle under better conditions after the elections. The party leadership did not-repeat-not realize in time that the political scene was being dominated by the electoral question, which was one of the most important factors in the political crisis. The party, in not-repeat-not drafting a correct tactic with regard to these problems, isolated itself and weakened popular unity, and the continuity plans of guerrillaism-Betancourtism were benefited.

(5) After the 1963 elections, the changes in the correlation of political forces became evident, and the insurrectional conditions, which had already been deteriorated by the aforementioned errors, became more precarious until they

reached the conditions with which we are now confronted. We did not-repeatnot realize the need to give priority to a policy that would permit the revolutionary movement to regroup its forces, recover from the defeats suffered, and achieve the creation of a situation favorable to a democratic and nationalist change. The party did not-repeat-not know how to retreat in time and modify and combine the forms of struggle in accordance with the correlation of forces. On the contrary, it adopted an ultraleftist position—as did the other leftist sectors-allowing the policy of the revolutionary movement to be dominated by dogmatism and secretarianism. As a result, new reverasls have been added to previous ones and they, in turn, have generated harmful disputes and division within the leftist movement and fomented the appearance in our party of a splinter group which attempted to lead the party to adventure and failure.

(6) Guerrilla struggle as a form of popular struggle is, under certain political and military conditions, an unrenoun cable resource of great tactical and strategic value. The experience gained by the party in this regard constitutes a wealth of knowledge we must conceive and enrich. However, to rely on the rural guerrillas as the fundamental force for struggle in the present situation in Venezuela constitutes the mechanical transplanting of an experience which as been successful in other countries, but which does not-repeat-not exactly match the peculiarities of Venezuelan reality, in which the principal forces of the revolution and the dominant social antagonisms are found in the cities and the urban areas.

The guerrilla struggle in our country, within the framework of the peculiarities of the Venezuelan revolution, is called upon to play a role which the party values in all its magnitude. The guerrillaist deviations, however, in assigning an exaggerated and decisive role to the guerrilla movement, are leading it to visible failure, as we are observing at present. The guerrillaist deviations under the adequate distribution of revolutionary resources and forces, and they have led to the harmful underestimation of the work in the cities and to the weakening of revolutionary activity in general.

In the period we are analyzing, we did not-repeat-not know how to draft a coherent military policy, responsibly based on the political requirements and the national reality and designed for the overthrow of Betancourtism and the removal of the reactionary leadership of the AD. The problems of the forms of struggle have been broached in a haphazard and fragmentary manner alien to MarxismLeninism. This has led us to commit serious deviations the application of Marxism-Leninism.

(7) The adaptation of the work of the masses to our general line was incorrect. We mistakenly underestimated the mass fronts. In the labor work, especially, we did not understand the requirement imposed by the changes in the political situation, and there was bureaucratism, passiveness, and the application of sectarian guidance by the party.

(8) Initially, the party leadership acted weakly against the maneuvers of the splinter group. The hesitation permitted the antiparty groups to take over certain positions, sow confusion through a campaign of intrigues and slander and to advance a pernicious divisionist work which has harmed the prestige and the authority of the party.

(9) The following is present in all the errors we have committed during this period: The influence of individualism, the vacilation typical of the petit bourgeois mentality, and poor knowledge of Marixt-Leninist ideology and of the national reality. The abandonment of the work of Communist ideology-the basis of the construction of the party-made possible the penetration of ideologies alien to the working class, of liberal and anarchic methods (phrase indistinct). 8. Ratification of the unpeaceful revolutionary road

The central committee ratifies the thesis of the third congress concerning the nonpeaceful nature of the Venezuelan road to national liberation and socialism. Owing to the domination of imperialist interests, especially North American interests, and to repressive procedures, owing to the characteristics of the military and political power of the ruling classes, the historic changes necessary for leading the country under the national liberation revolutionary program toward socialism will have to be achieved by overcoming the armed violence and terror of the ruling clique. The PCV and the JC must master, in theory and in practice, all the forms of struggle. They must know how to combine them flexibly and correctly and always be prepared for all contingencies in order to perform the revolutionary mission of winning power for the workers, which is the only reason for their existence. This is all the more necessary in the light of recent international events, the aggressiveness of the U.S. warmongers, the "Johnson Doctrine," the reactionary military coups in Latin America and Africa, and the imperialist and reactionary provocations against the national liberation movements.