Virtually all of the plans negotiated by the United Automobile Workers provide pension benefits which do not depend upon the level of earnings of the employee, but only upon the employee's length of service. Nearly all specify a maximum amount of service which may be credited in computing benefits, generally either 25 or 30 years. Some of the plans are known as "integrated plans,' because the pension benefits are expressed in such a way as to include the primary Federal social security benefit. The plan itself then pays the difference between the stated amount and the amount paid by social security. A definite trend toward nonintegrated plans is evident: 71 of the 132 plans in force at the beginning of 1951 were integrated, but by mid-1953 the proportion was only 82 of 205.

The level of retirement benefits provided under plans negotiated prior to January 1, 1951, and under those in effect on July 1, 1953, is shown in table 1. Benefits are shown for an employee retiring with 27 years' service since it was found that the various plans are placed on an approximately

comparable basis when this period of service is used.

The data on level of benefits for the 1951 plans were computed on the basis of what these plans would have yielded in July 1953 if the plans had not been changed in the interim. For the plans integrated with social security, this means that the amount of the social security payments was considered at the July 1953 level rather than at the lower January 1, 1951, level. Primary social security benefits were assumed to average $80 for both 1951 and 1953 plans, although social security benefits in effect on January 1, 1951, could not have been as high as $80.

The data show that the number of plans providing benefits, exclusive of social security, of less than $25 actually declined during the 30-month period. The great majority of plans negotiated during the period provided benefits of between $39 and $54 monthly. No significant variation of benefit level with size of company is apparent.

Most of the pension plans do not compel retirement at the normal retirement age, which is 65 in virtually all cases. However, many provide for compulsory retirement at some specific later age, which provides a "cushion period" following normal retirement age. The following statement shows provisions for compulsory retirement age contained in the various plans.

* Of the Social Security Department, UAW-CIO.

1 Many multiplant corporations are involved in these plans. Usually, a single plan covers all plants of a corporation, as does the General Motors Corp. plan, for example. In cases where separate plans are set up for individual plants or divisions of a corporation, if all the plans provide identical benefits, they have been counted as one plan.

"Size," as used throughout this article, refers to the number of employees in the bargaining unit or units represented by the UAW-CIO at the time the plan was negotiated.

1

Plans in effect July 1, 1953

Number of workers in bargaining unit 1

of benefits and, in addition, fund the initial pastservice liability over a period not exceeding a stated number of years. A few plans provide for "terminal funding" (funding at retirement age); are unfunded; or contain no specific funding provision. These plans-which stand out because they do not conform to the union's policy relative to funding arose generally in situations where the pension agreement was, in effect, dictated by action outside the control of the local managements and unions.

The vast majority of the plans are of the trusteed, "self-administered" type. However, a small proportion are insured plans, with an insurance company acting as the funding medium. The various types of funding provided for in these plans are shown in table 1.

Extent of Negotiations

The incidence of plans in various sizes of companies having bargaining relations with the UAW is interesting. Size distributions are shown in table 2, for 1951 and 1953, of (1) plans negotiated by the UAW, (2) plans not negotiated by the UAW, and (3) companies not having a pension plan for hourly rated employees. The second group includes plans initiated unilaterally, those negotiated by other unions which were the principal bargaining agents in companies where the UAW represented perhaps a small group of workers, and those covering workers now represented by UAW but formerly organized by another union. The third group excludes companies with less than 100 employees.

Analysis of these distributions discloses a marked tendency for pension plans to be nego

tiated with the larger companies before the smaller companies are approached. On July 1, 1953, pension plans had been negotiated in 80 percent of the companies where the UAW represented more than 5,000 employees, in 40 percent of those where the union represented between 1,000 and 5,000 employees, but in only about 10 percent of the companies with fewer than 1,000 hourly rated employees. As a matter of fact, approximately 20 percent of all companies with 100 employees or more which had bargaining relations with the UAW-CIO had pension plans; however, the employees covered by these plans included about three-fourths of the total membership of the United Automobile Workers.

International Harvester's Nondiscrimination Policy

DELIBERATE HIRING of a significant Negro minority when operations first began was a key element in the International Harvester Co.'s program to carry out its nondiscrimination policy in its three southern plants, according to a National Planning Association (NPA) study made by John Hope II of Fisk University in 1951-52.1 Another was the company's policy of promoting from within, on the basis of merit. Both policies were incorporated in collective agreements and were thus subject to the normal grievance channels provided for contract violation a useful means for achieving Negroes' integration with a minimum of tension. During the plants' first 4 or 5 years of operation, the proportion of Negroes employed rose sharply and they were firmly established above the unskilled level traditionally designated for them elsewhere in the communities. Virtually none had, however, entered skilled jobs.

Company and Union Policy

The company's nondiscrimination policy was standard throughout its installations (most of which were in the Middle West) well before the three large plants studied were opened after World War II. The pattern of Negro-white relations did not differ noticeably among the three communities where these plants were located, although the border cities of Evansville (Ind.) and Louisville (Ky.) contained both northern and southern influences and racial separation appeared to be somewhat more rigid in Memphis (Tenn.). The two international unions subsequently recognized as representing the vast majority of the plants' workers have also actively opposed discrimination for over a decade, and none of the others involved officially condoned discrimination as of 1952.

The Company. The company's strategy in applying the nondiscrimination policy was "realistic and flexible to the extent that the impatient. might interpret it as a sign of weakness," according to Mr. Hope, yet "definitely not one of temporizing." In terms of scope, management officials neither "made an aggressive frontal attack on all of the customary areas of Negro exclusion" nor "systematically avoided the more difficult problems"; they began at the points most vulnerable to change and tried to widen this vulnerable sector "as fast as it was prudent as a business practice." Where integration involved the enforcement of the contract, Negroes were granted the rights due them regardless of the consequences; where the company was taking the initiative, management tried to do so gradually without directly challenging tradition-by adopting the "most advanced practices" in the community involved. In terms of method, management used "a mixture of persuasion, education, and some judiciously applied coercion."

The wide publicity and strong top-management support given the policy provided the "keystone" on which action by the local managerial staff depended. Local management had final responsibility for positive results and they knew that progress on the program would be reviewed by the company's executive council through the periodic detailed reports required of each plant. The company was aware of the local problems involved, however, and local management had full access to top personnel for aid in handling problems. Further, the company's industrial relations department provided guidance on ways of bringing about the necessary changes, particularly in units that were lagging behind.

Success depended, however, on "the projection of the spirit, as well as the letter of this 'law'

1 Selected Studies of Negro Employment in the South-3 Southern Plants of International Harvester Co., by John Hope II, Report No. 6:1, Committee of the South, National Planning Association, Washington, D. C., September 1953. This was the first of a series of 6 studies of biracial employment practices in southern industry.

through all levels of the managerial staff." The company's practice of upgrading within the ranks at the administrative and executive level as well as on the production line helped in this regard. By the time an employee had risen to the level concerned with industrial relations, he was not only fully aware of the policy and techniques for applying it but was likely to be "emotionally fortified" to deal with it.

This development in attitude was due partly to the company's formal training program. Each new employee received a short orientation course in which the major company policies were described-including, but not singling out for special treatment, the nondiscrimination policy. Both the policies and methods for effecting them were discussed in the company's special leadership training courses for developing supervisory personnel and in its continuous program of foremen conferences.

Also important was the informal education resulting from daily application of company policy, which served to educate not only management but also union representatives and, indirectly, rank-and-file employees. When the prospect of a significant change in the number or status of Negro employees arose-whether from the normal processing of a grievance or from a management decision-its merits were usually discussed in meetings of union and management leaders. This in turn caused much informal discussion among those officials and among rank-and-file workers. In this way, Mr. Hope stated, many people considered rationally the attitudes which they had habitually held without question or thought. The results of such "education"-in combination with the company's taking a firm position-are illustrated by the experience of the Memphis plant in dealing with wildcat stoppages over minority problems. As soon as such a stoppage occurred, staff and supervisory personnel met and discussed the issue on the basis of a clear written report which was also passed on to foremen. (On occasion, letters explaining the issue were mailed to all employees.) The policy met less and less resistance with each crisis. After three such wildcat strikes, foremen became sufficiently convinced the company meant business that they even began to volunteer suggestions for effecting integration.

Mr. Hope reported that, according to competent State officials, this was customary but not required by law.

In such situations, Mr. Hope pointed out, education was not the sole key to success. The prospect of "coercion" was also a factor, for the plant "law"-the contract-backed up (and in fact was frequently the basis for) the educational process, formal and informal.

Sometimes the company took advantage of circumstances existing at a given moment to make a change appear obviously desirable for majority and minority alike, or created conditions which would gradually make changes inevitable. For example, in building the locker rooms and toilet facilities at the Louisville plant, management consciously supplied only sufficient segregated facilities the community practice for the Negroes employed at that time; as employment expanded and Negroes were scattered more widely through the plant, such segregation was demonstrated by sheer inconvenience to be impractical and was progressively disappearing.

Such facilities ran the gamut, in the three plants, from complete separation to complete integration. This illustrated the difference between plant practices controlled by the surrounding community and those determined solely by company policy: according to officials at the Memphis plant, Tennessee law required that all the essential internal plant services-food, toilets, locker rooms, and drinking fountains-be completely segregated.2 The community's influence was also apparent in such services as recreational programs. No racial overtones were noted in the medical and insurance benefits provided, as was also true of wage rates, which were set according to the job classification without reference to the jobholder. (According to company studies, wages were high relative to those of other plants in the community.)

The Unions. The local unions recognized at these plants had not taken the initiative in promoting changes within their jurisdiction in line with the nondiscrimination policy, Mr. Hope stated, and sometimes had counseled management to "go slow" or to make a "strategic compromise." In part, this reflected the differences between "military" and "political" type organizations: local management officials were appointed, were responsible for carrying out top management's policy almost without question, and had virtually a "captive audience" for educational efforts; local union officials had responsibility for supporting the