There is a problem with upward mobility, for one thing. You can give them the job, but are they going anywhere? It is like a revolving door. They are the last ones in and the first ones out. And some of the EOS's cannot find a problem like that. Mr. CANFIELD. Well, you can often not find a problem and know something is wrong, but I think training in investigative techniques would be very vital to the structure, background, and education of the equal opportunity specialists. Normally, whether there is a problem there or not, is one of the most important things. Next, is how to prove that there is a problem and that's another matter. Mr. Mosse. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HAWKINS. Just one final question. Who determines the compliance with good faith efforts? Is that determined in the office or does someone higher up determine that? Mrs. MCINTOSH. Well, we recommend when they are out of compliance for lack of good-faith effort. Then it goes to the operations chief, who, in turn, takes it to the chief, who, in turn, takes it to the commander. Mr. CANFIELD. You are talking about date compliance. If the recommendation, if it is at the equal opportunity specialists level, is the only time that there would be the only time there would be a real question about it, is if someone is out of compliance. Mr. HAWKINS. Is there any specific regulations determining what good faith efforts really means? Mr. COLE. No, sir. Mr. CANFIELD. In my own opinion, the biggest bulk of the time spent in doing reviews by the people in the office is in trying to get a responsive, affirmative action program that does include each individual item in order 4 or 60-2. And 41-C of 60-2, making sure that the affirmative action programs follow all of these things and has everything in it. To determine good faith effort you really don't need what happened in the last year, did the guy meet his goals, looking at the opportunities he had, and not enough time is spent on that. Mr. COLE. And did he really try. Mr. CANFIELD. Yes. Mr. COLE. In about 75 percent of the cases, they don't try. Mr. KALISH. Unfortunately, some of the problems are caused because our guidance and our implementation of order 14 tells us that we have to get certain things that order 4 does not require. Mr. HAWKINS. Such things as what? Mr. KALISH. For instance, order 4 says that they have to know— what does the promotable thing say? Mr. CANFIELD. That they have to analyze it. Mr. KALISH. They have to analyze the list of promotables. Our manual tells us that we have to get a list, either by name or by number. And order 4 does not require him to give us that. Mr. HAWKINS. So, what do you do? You don't have a basis on which to make a determination, do you? How can you make a determination if you don't have that information? Mr. KALISH. Usually, we can get the information. Many times the company is perhaps understandably reluctant to put it in writing in their affirmative action program, but what I mean is a lot of the time is spent haggling in our own office with our reviewers, saying you have got to have this and this and this, and I will say, but the order does not say that. And the reviewere will say, go out and sell the company on it. That is not really what I should be doing. I should be going out there and making sure he is hiring people. And once hired, promoting. Mr. COLE. May I add just one thing? Mr. HAWKINS. Yes. Mr. COLE. I think what he is saying is we are told to get the list. But, if he doesn't promote anybody, there is nothing done, just get a list. But, if we go out and find out that really there have been all kinds of opportunities to promote, but they haven't promoted no one, nothing happens. But, we can sell that, but we cannot sell if we don't have a list. Mr. CANFIELD. Whether the list means anything or not, it is a piece of paper that is in the file. We are not saying you cannot get the job done or saying that you have got to work within the restricted Mr. HAWKINS. Has either one of you ever been told that you should get the job done, that not enough is being done to enforce the order, or that you should be more diligent in trying to get minorities and women into the employment of the different contractors? Mr. COLE. Never. Mr. KALISH. Nothing. Mr. CANFIELD. The emphasis has not been there. At one point in the staff meetings, we were told if you want to go out and do the job, do the job. But, there was no indication of what would happen if you did not go out and do the job. This is what I was hoping to get at. It was a one-sided thing. If you want to go out and do it, do it. But there was not the push to do it. Mr. KALISH. An example of this occurred about a month ago to me. I had a regularly scheduled review, and when I got the data from the company, I found out that they were over 80 percent minority, better than 50 percent officials and managers, 50 percent professionals, from craftsmen on down, they were 100 percent minority, and I went to the division chief and I said we oughtn't to have to do this company. Here they are, they are 80 percent now and their goals are to go to 91 percent. Why should I waste my time doing it? I felt the emphasis was supposed to be getting people on the job. He said, well, you think the same way I think, but unfortunately, what we have to do is get reviews in. So, go out and do it. So, I had to spend 40 hours that were wasted. Mr. HAWKINS. Well, I think your testimony has been very revealing. Mr. Knox. Mr. KNOX. Several of you mentioned that in the past because of your aggressive approach to doing your job, that you have been victims of retaliation. Do you feel as a result of your being here today that you may be exposed to that same kind of retaliatory treatment? Mr. COLE. Yes. Mr. KNOX. A similar type of retaliation from the company? Mr. COLE. Yes, sir. I think what happened when the phone call you gave me last night is an example of that. Mr. KNOX. What do you anticipate happening? Mr. COLE. Well, I had a feeling particularly these two, they will start being wrote up, and their reports will be nitpicked, and come time for promotion, everybody in the unit will be promoted. And, you know, their performance will be bad and indifferent. We are already at the journeyman level. I don't know what they are going to do to us. But I am scared for these two. Mr. HAWKINS. I don't think we should discuss that too much at this point, or even suggest it. . I can only say that we hope that you will keep in touch with the subcommittee subsequent to this, so that we may know what happens, if anything does. I think you should feel confident in calling on the subcommittee for any assistance that the subcommittee can give to you, because it is a very serious matter in public service to have any retaliation for testimony being given to a congressional committee. These committees are equipped with very broad powers, and certainly we will be very vigilant in defending any rights that you have, and you certainly do have rights, as a result of any testimony before this committee. It is a very serious matter, and we will only impress on those that might do so, that it is a very serious matter. And this committee will not tolerate it. May I thank each of you for very excellent testimony. It has been very helpful to the committee, and we hope that you will continue to show the same dedication as Federal employees, that you have demonstrated this morning. Thank you very much. [Whereupon, the panel was excused.] Mr. HAWKINS. The next group of witnesses which is the panel of employees, Rockwell International, Mr. Eddie J. Ball and Gus Costellon. I want to express our appreciation for your willingness to participate in these hearings on a subject that has certainly troubled all of us. We notice that there are more than just the two which I have called. Let us first identify, beginning to the right, who are seated at the witness table. Mr. BUTTNER. Oscar Buttner. I am here for Mr. Gus Costellon. Mr. HAWKINS. Mr. Buttner, you are representing Mr. Costellon? Mr. BUTTNER. In place of him. Mr. HAWKINS. I see, you are in place of Mr. Gus Costellon. Mr. BUTTNER. Yes. Mr. HAWKINS. The next witness. Mr. BALL. Eddie Ball. Mr. HAWKINS. All right. And the final witness? Mr. LEURA. Lorenzo Leura, L-e-u-r-a. Mr. HAWKINS. L-e-u-r-a? Mr. LEURA. Yes. Mr. HAWKINS. Fine. Is there a spokesman or will each of you make a statement? Mr. HAWKINS. That is fine. You will then lead off, Mr. Ball, with your statement. Mr. BALL. All right. STATEMENT OF EDDIE BALL, EMPLOYEE, ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL, ACCOMPANIED BY CLIFTON BURRIS, CLAUD WILLIS, OSCAR BUTTNER, AND JIMMIE G. JARRETT Mr. BALL. Mr. Chairman, members of the congressional committee, friends, I have the honor of representing a group of employees who are fighting racism, sexism, and discrimination at the Rockwell International Corp. My presentation will take the following form. First, I will give a brief history of the efforts of minorities at Rockwell to bring about an end to discrimination. Next, I will give a summary of the problems encountered by current minority employees of Rockwell. I will then talk about some of the implications for the future. of minorities at Rockwell and will conclude with some suggested actions which might be able to provide us some relief. As early as 1963, a group of employees which had grown tired of racism at the North American Aviation facilities, mobilized for self-preservation. The group dubbed themselves the Society To Urge Racial Equality, later abbreviated to the SURE committee. Leaders of this group were Rev. E. R. Heard, Monroe Smith, Steve Oubichon, Chester Holliday, Fletcher Clark, and Leroy Jeffrey. (See Exhibit I.) As the activities of the group subsided, each of these employees were penalized with layoffs and/or termination. Discrimination still ran rampant at North American Aviation and black employees again chose to lay their jobs on the line to try to end it. In September 1966, a group of employees, led by Ben Howard, Monroe Smith, Bob Powe, Kirby Seals, Hollis Armstrong, and Steve Oubichon, mobilized a civil rights strike in an attempt to end Rockwell racism. Again the company retaliated with layoffs and termination. (see exhibit II.) In January 1968, 14 employees of the North American Rockwellnow Rockwell International-filed lawsuits challenging the corporation's policy of racism, sexism, and ethnic discrimination. (See exhibit III.) Among those filing suits were William Bernstein, Claude Durham, Earline Edwards, Rose Hallman, Mary Harper, Leroy Jeffrey, Ceola McClendon, Steven Oubichon, Edward Perez, Charles Simmons, Monroe Smith, and Catherine Warrior. Again the company retaliated with layoffs and terminations. The next event which had a major impact upon employees of the North American Rockwell Corp. was the public hearings held by the EEOC, under Clifford Alexander, in March 1969. At this hearing, George Sherard and Lloyd Napier testified about the discrimination at the plant. (See exhibit IV.) George Sherard has been downgraded, and Lloyd Napier subsequently received a temporary promotion to Manager. From 1965 to early 1970 under the pretense of implementation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, a few minority personnel, mostly in plant services, were promoted to assistant supervisors. Individual efforts by minority personnel still did not cease with the company acceptance of the 5-year ongoing affirmative action program plan for performance of the B-1 program contract. Minority employees were assured a program of upward mobility. Failure of management and the Los Angeles B-1 division staff members to effectively execute the affirmative action program plan continues to disallow the equal distribution of the minority work force within organizational units and occupational categories. The negative attitude of the company regardng implementation of upward mobility policies for minority employees is evidenced by the number of grievances alleged, and the need to seek assistance from outside sources such as Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Fair Employment Practice Commission. This did not prove to be the answer either, since the grievances were not processed to prove their validity. The fight aginst discrimination continued throughout the 1970's. A new organization, the Black Workers Association, was formed under the sustained leadership of such persons as George Baker, Charles Nealy, Robert Pearson, Robert Powe, Lew Kuykendall, Gibbon Brown, Ramon Tyson, Alice Dortch, Francis Payton, Monroe Smith, and Steve Oubichon-to name a few. One of the highlights of the group's activities was a picket line formed at the 1970 stockholder meeting of the Rockwell Corp. (See exhibit V.) Francis Payton was harassed until she had to take a medical leave of absence, just as did Ceola McClendon and Roberta Middleton for similar reasons; Lloyd Napier is now terminated. The company moved against the organization by laying off BWA members. (See exhibit VI.) In February 1971, the company terminated the BWA membership chairperson. When, in February 1972, the company terminated the BWA chairman, Ben Howard, the Black Workers Association demised. For nearly 3 years, there were no organized efforts against the racism and sexism at the Rockwell Corp. But brave men and woman cannot long be shackled. Once again, employees have been presented to the point where they are willing to place their jobs on the line to end discrimination at the Rockwell plant. This bravery and the search for economic freedom and dignity gave birth to the Concerned Minority Employees of Rockwell International. The Organization of the Concerned Minorities of Rockwell International was prompted by the need to collectively combat, through one resounding voice, the many discriminatory practices encountered by minorities in the performance of the B-1 program contract. Retaliatory measures taken by the company against individuals who singularly allege discriminatory employment practices have resulted in emplovee reluctance to exercise their rights under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Continued harassment and acts of discrimination caused aggrieved employees to group together to oppose job discrimination, especially among the black employees, at Rockwell International. The Rockwell Urban Affairs Office has failed to be the representative element intended. This office has not fulfilled its re |