On June 10, 1968, a resolution commending the treaty draft was approved in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 92-4 (with 22 abstentions). On June 12, 1968, the General Assembly in plenary session approved the same resolution by a vote of 95-4 (with 21 abstentions).

On July 1, 1968, the treaty was signed in Washington by 56 states.

The treaty consists of a preamble and eleven articles, the first seven of which contain its principal substantive provisions.

In broadest outline, the treaty is designed to (a) prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (Articles I and II); (b) provide assurance, through international safeguards, that the peaceful nuclear activities of states which have not already developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making such weapons (Article III); (c) promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the maximum extent consistent with the treaty's other purposes and provisions (Articles IV and V); and (d) give recognition to the determination of the parties that the treaty should lead to further progress toward arms control and disarmament (Articles VI and VII).

The preamble has twelve paragraphs expressing the consensus of the parties. The first three reflect the importance and urgency of preventing nuclear proliferation; the next two express support for international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities and for improvements in safeguards techniques; the next two deal with the principle of sharing the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and of making technological by-products of work on nuclear explosives available for peaceful purposes; the next four express the urgent need for further progress toward disarmanent and limitations on the nuclear arms race; and the last reaffirms the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of force and threats of force in international relations. It should be noted that Article VIII of the treaty provides for review conferences, the first of which is to be held five years after the treaty enters into force, to review the operation of the treaty "with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized."

Articles I and II contain the basic undertakings to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Article I deals with the obligations of parties that are nuclear-weapon states, which are limited to those that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967 (Article IX, paragraph 3). First, such states undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them, to any recipient whatsoever. This provision deliberately parallels United States atomic energy legislation, which has always prohibited such transfers. Second, nuclear-weapon states must not assist non-nuclear-weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Third, these prohibitions apply not only to nuclear weapons but also to other nuclear explosive devices. Inclusion of the latter was necessary because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use, and because the technology for making such devices is essentially indistinguishable from that of making nuclear weapons. But while Article I covers all such devices, it will not deprive non-nuclear-weapon parties of the potential benefits from many peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, which are dealt with in Article V.

Article II deals with the obligations of all parties that are not nuclearweapon states as defined above. Such non-nuclear-weapon states undertake first, not to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over them, from any transferor whatsoever. Second, they must not manufacture or otherwise acquire such weapons or devices or seek to receive assistance in such manufacture.

Articles I and II were the first substantive articles to be included in their present form in the treaty text. Before any of the other substantive aticles had been added, these two articles prompted several questions from our NATO allies. The questions, and the answers given by the United States, are enclosed.

Article III provides for verification of compliance with the treaty by means of international safeguards designed to insure that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The first paragraph of Article III provides that such safeguards shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory, jurisdiction or control of non-nuclear-weapon parties. Such parties undertake to accept safeguards on such material for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty. The safeguards are to be as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and

concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system.

The second paragraph of Article III prohibits the provision by any of the parties of (a) source or special fissionable material or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by Article III.

The third paragraph of Article III prescribes that the safeguards be implemented so as to comply with Article IV of the treaty-which deals with furthering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy-and to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

The fourth paragraph of Article III permits the agreements with the IAEA to be concluded by non-nuclear-weapon parties either individually or together with other states in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA. The remainder of the paragraph provides schedules for commencing negotiations of safeguards agreements, as well as for their entry into force. In effect, they provide a transition period after the treaty's entry into force within which the detailed arrangements for the safeguards required by the treaty can be worked out and put into operation

An integral part of the negotiating history of Article III is the statement of principles enumerated by the United States Co-Chairman of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee when the Article was first publicly presented on January 18, 1968, and reiterated by Ambassador Goldberg when the treaty was presented to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on May 31, 1968. These principles regarding the safeguards, and the safeguards agreements, called for by Article III, are as follows:

"1. There should be safeguards for all non-nuclear-weapon parties of such a nature that all parties can have confidence in their effectiveness. Therefore safeguards established by an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system must enable the IAEA to carry out its responsibility of providing assurance that no diversion is taking place.

"2. In discharging their obligations under Article III, non-nuclear-weapon parties may negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA individually or together with other parties; and, specifically, an agreement covering such obligations may be entered into between the IAEA and another international organization the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned.

"3. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, provided that under such mutually agreed arrangements the IAEA can satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

Adherence to these principles should facilitate the timely conclusion of safeguards agreements meeting the requirements of the treaty by all non-nuclearweapon parties, including those which are subect to Euratom safeguards.

Article III does not require nuclear-weapon states to subject their peaceful nuclear activities to international safeguards. This fact led to criticism of the treaty as being discriminatory, and charges that it gave the nuclear-weapon states an unfair commercial advantage unrelated to the basic purpose of the treaty. It was in this context that you stated on December 2, 1967 that the United States was not asking any country to accept safeguards that we were unwilling to accept ourselves. Thus you announced that "when such safeguards are applied under the treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States-excluding only those with direct national security significance.” A parallel announcement was made by the United Kingdom.

Article IV insures that nothing in the treaty will be interpreted as affecting the rights of all parties, without discrimination, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with Articles I and II. It also contains an undertaking by all parties to facilitate, and affirms their right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally it requires those parties in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing to the further development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, especially in the terri

tories of non-nuclear-weapon states and with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V is designed to compensate for the undertaking by non-nuclear-weapon parties in Article II not to acquire nuclear explosive devices even for peaceful purposes. It provides assurance to such parties that they will not lose, by such renunciation, the potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. It is also designed to assure them there would be no economic incentive for them to try to develop their own nuclear explosive devices for such purposes. Specifically, the parties to the treaty undertake to take appropriate measures to insure that the potential benefits of such peaceful applications will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon parties on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. The article requires that such benefits shall be made available in accordance with the treaty-which would preclude non-nuclear-weapon states from acquiring the nuclear explosive devices themselves or control over them. Thus the devices would remain under the custody and control of a nuclear-weapon state, which would in effect provide a nuclear explosion service. The Article requires that such explosions be carried out under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures. It contemplates that non-nuclear-weapon states will be able to obtain such services pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon states. It provides that negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the treaty enters into force. But it preserves the option of obtaining nuclear explosion services pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI is an undertaking by all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII makes clear that nothing in the treaty affects the right to conclude regional treaties establishing nuclear-free zones.

Article VIII establishes the procedures for amending the treaty. Paragraph 1 is derived from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It requires the Depositary Governments to convene a conference to consider a proposed amendment if requested to do so by one-third or more of the parties to the treaty. Paragraph 2 provides that for an amendment to enter into force it must be ratified by a majority of all parties to the treaty, including all nuclear-weapon parties and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. No amendment will enter into force for any party that does not ratify it.

Article VIII also provides for a conference, five years after the treaty enters into force, to review the operation of the treaty. Further review conferences, at five year intervals thereafter, will be held if requested by a majority of the parties.

Article IX designates the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as Depositary Governments and provides that the treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by those states and forty other signatory states. It specifies how other states may become parties and contains provisions of a formal nature relating to ratification, accession, and registration with the United Nations, all derived from the corresponding provisions of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The provisions for signature and accession have been designed to permit the widest possible application of the treaty. At the same time adherence to the treaty will in no way imply recognition or change in status of regimes the United States does not now recognize. Nor will it in any way result in according recognition or change in status to any regime not now recognized by any other party.

Article X provides a right of withdrawal upon three months notice if a party finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. This provision is the same as the withdrawal provision in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty except that it requires notice of such withdrawal to be given to the United Nations Security Council as well as to the other treaty parties and requires the notice to include a statement of the extraor dinary events involved.

In addition, Article X provides for a conference, to be held twenty-five years after the treaty enters into force, at which a majority of the parties will decide

whether the treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

Article XI provides that the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of the treaty are equally authentic, and deals with the deposit of the original treaty instruments and transmittal of certified copies to signatory and acceding states.

In the course of the negotiation of the treaty, a number of non-nuclear-weapon states, including especially non-aligned states, expressed the need for some form of assurance with respect to their security that would be appropriate in light of their renunciation of the right to acquire nuclear weapons. While there is no provision on this subject in the treaty, a resolution on this subject was adopted by the United Nations Security Council on June 19, 1968 by a vote of 10-0 (with 5 abstentions). The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union each issued substantially identical declarations in explanation of their votes for such resolution. Copies of the resolution, and of the declaration by the United States are enclosed.

The signing of this treaty is, I believe, an event of unique significance. Wide adherence to it will greatly reduce the threat of an increasing number of states with nuclear weapons at their disposal, and will thus enhance the security of the United States, its allies, and the rest of he world. At the same time, it will give new impetus to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further efforts toward disarmament.

Because of the great interest shown by so many nations in this historic effort as well as its significance to world peace, I sincerely hope that the United States will be in a position to ratify this treaty as soon as possible.

Respectfully submitted.

DEAN RUSK.

(Enclosures: (1) Certified copy of treaty; (2) questions asked by U.S. allies and answers given by the United States; (3) United Nations Security Council Resolution 255 (1968); and (4) declaration of the Government of the United States of America.)

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considerating the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclearweapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under water in its

Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Aomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after