Dr. SEABORG. In the last 2 or 3 years.

Chairman STENNIS. So one out of every two powerplants now is nuclear.

Dr. SEABORG. In terms of total nuclear electric generating capacity. In terms of number of plants, because the conventional plants are smaller and more numerous, the percentage of plants would be lower for nuclear.

Chairman STENNIS. Would everything else then be excluded from these inspections?

Dr. SEABORG. Yes.

Chairman STENNIS. So you draw the line where you have already enumerated as being open to inspection

Dr. SEABORG. That is right.

Chairman STENNIS (continuing). And all else is closed?

Dr. SEABORG. That is right.

Chairman STENNIS. I am really surprised at that. As I understand it, it is more limited than I thought. You gave only the power units and then these experimental units at the universities, as I recall.

Dr. SEABORG. I gave the power reactors and the experimental power reactors, and these experimental facilities, test and research reactors, not all at universities, and university reactors, and what we call critical assembly facilities. Then there are approximately 10 in the other category, or group, of fabrication, scrap recovery, and chemical processing facilities currently handling the fuel associated with the facilities I have identified. Yes, I think that list is complete. If we think of any other we would add them to the record.

Chairman STENNIS. Well now, that is something we do have absolute control over?

Dr. SEABORG. Yes, we do. We have absolute control over the definition of where we draw the line between peaceful facilities and those that have some national security implications. That is under our control. We make that determination.

Chairman STENNIS. And you are speaking with the authority that goes with your position here in giving us this list as to where the dividing line is as of now?

Dr. SEABORG. Yes, sir.

Chairman STENNIS. Now, I call your attention to the word "direct" in President Johnson's statement. He said, "Excluding only those with direct national security significance."

Does that word "direct" have a special meaning?

Dr. SEABORG. I would think by that that he means those that are related to weapons capabilities and things of that sort. These that I named have national security significance in that they strengthen our economy and things of that sort. But I believe the "direct" refers to the military and classified applications, such as secret ones.

Chairman STENNIS. Everything would be classified that would be an indirect contribution to security, I suppose, all creative, all things that create power.

Dr. SEABORG. Yes. I think that the list I identified earlier would make contributions to our overall national strength.

Chairman STENNIS. Excuse me just a minute here. I was going to ask that some of these go into the record, but I wanted to ask this; I

direct vour attention to this: This proposed treaty prohibits transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices to any nation regardless of whether they are nonnuclear or nuclear-weapons states. What becomes then of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United Kingdom under which the nuclear design, development, and technology is currently exchanged?

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, may I take it and try to answer that? Chairman STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Under the present arrangement with the United Kingdom we have no authority to transfer nuclear weapons. We have had congressional authority to transfer nuclear material and design information, and I understand that arrangement would not be affected by any of the terms of this treaty.

Chairman STENNIS. Well, this question says nuclear design, development, and technology. I am not talking about weapons, and I understand we do not actually transfer any weapons to anyone.

Dr. SEABORG. That is right.

Mr. SMITH. The British arrangement would not be affected by this treaty. I think one can state that as a general proposition.

Chairman STENNIS. Are you gentlemen in agreement on that?
Dr. SEABORG. Oh, yes, very definitely.

Chairman STENNIS. What is the extent now of the obligation of the United States to supply peaceful uses nuclear service to nonnuclear states? What discretion do we have in determining the extent of our participation in that program? I am talking peaceful uses now.

Dr. SEABORG. As I indicated in my statement, we do not interpret the treaty, and it is article IV that is pertinent here, as compelling the United States to embark on any costly new programs or as obliging the United States to meet all requests and demands, and we do not construe article IV as overriding the provision of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act or that it would remove the discretion we have in determining the nature of our cooperative relations with other countries on a case-by-case basis.

The words "fullest possible exchange" clearly imply that the parties will be expected to cooperate only to the extent that they are in a position to do so, and we are already doing this.

Chairman STENNIS. And if we have some reason satisfactory to us now about the conduct of a country or if one is under suspicion, where does that leave us?

Dr. SEABORG. Well, I think it would have to be determined on a caseby-case basis, much as we would do it now in the absence of the treaty. Chairman STENNIS. We would have the right, you would reserve judgment then, and pass on it case by case?

Dr. SEABORG. Yes.

Chairman STENNIS. Is that right?

Dr. SEABORG. If we had a situation like that which you have identified.

Chairman STENNIS. And if we reached a conclusion there that conditions were such that it was against our interest or it was a hazard to peace or anything of that kind we would, of course, withhold it; is that correct?

Dr. SEABORG. Yes, if we could identify clearly a situation like that.

Chairman STENNIS. You say clearly. It seems to me, Doctor, sometimes those things can be rather strong but not clear. If we have a reasonable doubt as to the good faith and good uses, wouldn't we be required to exclude them?

Dr. SEABORG. We would have to use some sort of rule of reason in a situation like that, sir.

Chairman STENNIS. Yesterday we had a discussion here about this U.N. security resolution, Council resolution, I believe it was No. 255, and the U.S. declaration in support of the resolution. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Chairman STENNIS. We are interested in learning what commitments the United States would be undertaking, and would ratification of the treaty also include the declaration. What is your response to that?

Mr. SMITH. The United States under the treaty would take on no additional commitment, no substantial commitment, and this is the position of two Secretaries of State which they have made.

As I read it, the only thing we would do, we would be obliged to do, would be that we weren't before under the United Nations Charter— would be to call a meeting of the Security Council, which is what I would call a ministerial or adjective act. But there is no extension of any American commitment, any security guarantee or commitment of any sort.

Chairman STENNIS. There is some mighty strong language here. We had that up fully yesterday. Your statement is now that there is no additional commitment by virtue of this language on the part of the United States?

Mr. SMITH. That is correct, and that is the interpretation of two Secretaries of State, and I would assume any country reading this record would have no doubt about it.

Chairman STENNIS. How can you say things and then take them back? It appears to me like you were taking back some things here that were said before this resolution passed.

Mr. SMITH. Well, I suspect that statement was very carefully prepared, Senator, and I do not think the present interpretation constitutes a taking back. I think it is an interpretation of the original intent of the declaration.

Chairman STENNIS. All right. Senator Smith, may I call on you, please.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, my questions are for Mr. Smith and Mr. Fisher, and I am sure probably they agree on them.

Would the treaty restrict the United States from supplying nuclear weapons to a United Nations peacekeeping force?

Mr. SMITH. Do you want to designate whether you want Mr. Fisher or me?

Senator SMITH. No; I will ask you, Mr. Smith, and if you want Mr. Fisher to answer it, you ask him.

Mr. SMITH. It is my understanding that we have no such authority under present law, and we would have no such authority under this treaty.

Senator SMITH. Is that your understanding, Mr. Fisher?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Would you agree that the success of the treaty depends in large measure on the cooperation of the Soviet Union?

Mr. SMITH. I would think that if most of the countries of the world signed and ratified this treaty, the cooperation of the Soviet Union, except to the extent that it joins in the operation of the IAEA, would not be essential. But if the Soviet Union said, "We will block any work of the IAEA," to the extent that they have this power-and I do not recall how many votes they have-I suppose they could cause some trouble. But the situation then, I suggest, would be no worse than it is without the treaty. In other words, I do not think we would be putting ourselves in a more dangerous position.

Senator SMITH. Would you agree with that?

Mr. FISHER. I agree with that; yes, Senator.

Senator SMITH. Since there is no provision in the treaty which will insure that the Soviets will abide by the treaty and live up to their part of the bargain, how can we be sure of their cooperation?

Mr. SMITH. I think, Senator Smith, as Senator Murphy said, you cannot be sure of their cooperation unless it continues to be in their interest as they see it.

Now, it appears at the present time that the Soviets look on proliferation about the way we do, as a dangerous phenomenon in the world, dangerous to their security as we see it dangerous to ours.

As long as that mutual perception persists, I think they will continue to cooperate, and I cannot project in my mind, at least, a situation where they would see proliferation is in their advantage.

Senator SMITH. In other words, as long as they benefit we are all right.

Mr. SMITH. As long as we benefit and they benefit, the common interest of the community is all right, or at least is no worse than it is now and, hopefully, a little better.

Senator SMITH. In entering into the treaty without any verification and inspection provisions applicable to the nuclear weapons nations, wouldn't we be signifying our intent to take Soviet promises on faith?

Mr. SMITH. I would think no since the thrust of this treaty is not. primarily to restrain the Soviet Union or the United States from doing things, but to try to stop other countries from acquiring nuclear

weapons.

Now, I think it is perfectly clear in this legislative history that we have no interest in proliferation. We think it is a bad thing. In the Soviet's case there was a little period you will recall back 10 or 12 years ago where they apparently did give some assistance to the Chinese weapons program which they have learned to regret, and I do not see the slightest possibility that the Soviets want to have other countries build nuclear weapons.

So I think it is on the basis of that that one does not see verification provisions in here, either applying to the United States to see that we do not transfer nuclear weapons to country X or on the Soviet Union to see they do not transfer nuclear weapons to country Y.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Fisher, do you have anything to add?

Mr. FISHER. I may add that this treaty itself represents an undertaking by the Soviet Union not to supply peaceful assistance to other

countries or not to enter into arrangements with nonnuclear countries that are not subject to safeguards. That is a step forward. We think we would know about these arrangements if they entered into them. Now, this or any other treaty they might break. But at least we are no worse off and, perhaps, a little better off than we are now.

This treaty, in a sense, has pushed the Iron Curtain of inspection back to the Soviet border, and that is not a minor achievement, Mrs. Smith.

Senator SMITH. It has been a basic concept of our approach to arms control and disarmament problems that all measures in this field must be accompanied by an adequate system of inspection, has it not?

Mr. SMITH. That is correct. But we do not think of this aspect of the treaty, that is the restraint on our exporting nuclear weapons and the Soviets exporting nuclear weapons as a disarmament arrangement. We are free to develop nuclear weapons as we wish under this treaty. So are the Soviets.

It is not a disarmament treaty for the United States and the Soviet Union. It will be a very significant disarmament treaty in prospect if most of the nations of the world undertake a commitment not to build nuclear weapons. That is the significant prospective disarmament aspect of it.

Senator SMITH. Are you saying this treaty does not violate our concept with respect to inspection agreements?

Mr. SMITH. That is correct.

Senator SMITH. Isn't it also true that different agreements could be negotiated with the result that there would be no uniformity in the inspection provisions?

Mr. SMITH. I think that Dr. Seaborg can give us an answer.
Senator SMITH. Doctor, would you answer that.

Dr. SEABORG. Yes, there would be some difference, but it would only be to the extent that there would be varying degrees of necessity to inspect. Some small countries with no nuclear power reactors at all certainly would not require the same degree of inspection as, say, a European country with a large nuclear power program. So I would picture that there would be some differences in these agreements that the IAEA would make with the individual countries as a matter of really common sense.

Senator SMITH. The treaty does leave the verification provisions and terms to be negotiated at a later date, does it not? How late is that date? I do not recall.

Dr. SEABORG. The treaty allows for the working out of the agreements pursuant to article III, allows these agreements to be negotiated, within 180 days from the original entry into force of the treaty, and also states that such agreements shall enter into force not later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. Those are the time limits.

Mr. SMITH, Senator Smith, may I at this point ask if Mr. Fisher may make an explanatory remark about the reason for this delay provision because I noticed there was a good deal of discussion yesterday about this point, and I think it is an important piece of history.

Senator SMITH. I think that would be very helpful, Mr. Fisher. Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith, some of the discussion in the past has gone on the assumption that on the inspection we