While such calculations do not reflect as much accuracy as one might wish, the fact that they are relatively close gives one confidence in their general validity. It is also significant that, so far as one can judge from the limited information available, the countries that rank ahead of Russia today also ranked ahead of it in 1900 and 1917. To conclude from this that Russia's position relative to other countries, has not changed, however, would be to overlook the fact that many gaps have been significantly narrowed and that with respect to individual indicators the USSR has moved ahead in some cases.

More specifically, one may estimate the balance of achievements and costs in the Soviet pattern of development by noting the indicators with respect to which it ranks relatively high or relatively low. In economic growth; in the shift of the labor force from agriculture to industry, and from manual to nonmanual and elite strata; in enrollments in secondary and higher education; in expenditures for research in science and technology; and in life expectancy and the ratio of physicians to population, for instance, the USSR ranks higher per capita than some of the West-European countries.

In other respects, such as the proportion of the labor force remaining in agriculture, the growth of purchasing power in hourly wages in terms of food, the burden of taxation borne by the lower income groups, and enrollment in primary schools, the USSR ranks relatively low by West-European standards. The pattern reflected by these rankings is one of relatively heavy investments in selected aspects of development, such as heavy industry, higher education, and public health, essentially at the expense of the level of income of peasants and workers. Whether one views such a pattern of development in positive or negative terms, and how one weighs the human costs represented by purges and deprivation that must be entered into the balance sheet, depends upon one's evaluation of the alternatives available to Soviet leaders and of the pressures of the international environment, as well as on the value one places on individual human beings.

In their efforts to maintain the national security of the USSR, Soviet leaders have pursued a policy that reflects considerable stability when viewed in the perspective of the pre-revolutionary record. From a territorial standpoint, it has secured its position in the Baltic through a bilateral treaty with Finland, and by reannexing the Baltic states which had formed a part of European Russia from 1721 to 1917. Its frontier with Europe is substantially further to the East than it was before the revolution, and it is about as close to the ethnic line between the Eastern Slavs and the Western Slavs, Hungarians, and Rumanians, as is possible given the mixed character of the region. In the Caucasus and in Central Asia the frontier remains unchanged, and in East Asia the USSR annexed Tannu Tuva (1944) from Mongolia, and in 1945 regained Southern Sakhalin lost to Japan in 1905 and also annexed the South Kuriles as well. In the Arctic region, the USSR has been more active than the empire in developing the northern sea route and in taking possession of the islands that fall within the portion of the Arctic region embraced by a frontier that extends to the North Pole.

The USSR is also in a stronger position than the empire with respect to the important security interests represented by its relations with its immediate neighbors: Norway, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China, Mongolia, Korea, and Japan. A number of factors contribute to this increased security. The defeat of Germany, and to a lesser extent that of Japan, has greatly increased the relative security of Russia in areas of great importance to it. Of the non-Slavic nationalities, which now represent 20 percent of the population, probably only the Baltic peoples represent minorities that would, if it were possible, vote for secession with a reasonable prospect of establishing viable independent states.

It is also significant that since 1945 the USSR has received general recognition as an industrial state of the first order, with the capability of achieving parity with the United States in the new military technology. It now commands a respect for its knowledge as well as for its power that is unprecedented in Russian history. This new position lends authority to the security system represented by the Warsaw Pact, and permits the USSR to play an influential role in the affairs of the United Nations.

These developments, that tend to enhance the security of the USSR and that might lead other countries to expect it to be more concerned with preserving than with changing the status quo, must nevertheless be evaluated in terms of the theory and practice of world revolution. The rhetoric of world revolution continues to play a vital role in the Soviet view of the world, and will doubtless continue to do so because it is logically an integral part of Marxism-Leninism. Like the law of gravity, Marxist-Leninist theory applies equally to all parts of the world. If the view were accepted that historical materialism was valid only so far and no farther, and stopped at the frontiers of the USSR, or at those between Communist and non-Communist countries, the ideology would become meaningless. The question is to determine what resources the USSR is prepared to allocate to world revolution and what risks to Soviet security it is likely to take to promote the expansion of Communism.

It is significant in this connection that of the thirteen states in which Communist parties have gained power since the Bolshevik revolution, in only five (Albania, China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and Yugoslavia) have they been successful without direct Soviet military assistance, and of these China and Yugoslavia have become major rivals and potential enemies. Indeed, China is the only one of the many neighbors that Russia has dealt with through the centuries which is today raising serious claims that might lead to prolonged hostilities. In an era in which over a hundred countries have gained their independence under circumstances conducive to revolution, this is not a very impressive record.

This is not of course the whole story. Within the past decade alone, the missile crisis in Cuba, the support provided to North Vietnam, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, indicate that the USSR is prepared to allocate very substantial resources to Communist requirements abroad. There are also a number of effective Communist parties in Europe, Asia, and Latin America that are available to take advantage of opportunities for revolution when they arise. This challenge

to international security by Soviet-backed Communist movements is at the same time limited by the reluctance of the USSR to commit its own armed forces beyond its frontiers, except in the countries of the Warsaw Pact organization which Soviet leaders consider the cornerstone of their defensive system.

In an era in which a dozen or more revolutions are likely to occur each year for the foreseeable future in the less developed countries, the availability of Communist parties with substantial if limited Soviet support is a challenge that must be met at its own level by other countries. Modernizing revolutions represent a significant arena of conflict as a result of which countries and groups of countries can change sides from one alliance system to another without a shot being fired by a major power. It is also an arena in which Communists have not been notably more successful than others in solving the complex problems of modernization.

It is ironic that just at the point in Russian history when the country had recovered from its greatest test in war, and for the first time occupied a leading position in science and technology, a security problem arose that differed from all others in the vast disproportion between the resources it consumed and the nature of the challenge. Unlike the potential menace of a German-led Europe which depends on the complexities of European politics, or the confrontation with a China whose leaders are deeply aggrieved by Russian actions over a period of a century which they perceive as hostile, the nuclear challenge comes from a rival which is not a historical enemy and which has developed its strategic arms primarily to deter the USSR. The components of the problem are remarkably incongruous in the sense that the possibility of the devastation of two great countries arises from an issue which does not have deep roots in history or popular feeling, which may have arisen in considerable measure from an absence of good communications, and which is capable of reasonable discussion between governments that have the authority to keep the danger within bounds.

In evaluating the policies of foreign states, the perspective of history provides a basis for estimating how their leaders are likely to perceive their security and allocate their resources. To the extent that one can tell which precedents are considered to be relevant, history is a better guide than dictionaries to the meaning of official statements, and to theory in the evaluation of motives.

In reviewing the domestic and international factors that constitute the record of Soviet policy, several are particularly impressive: the continuing pace of economic and social development, despite occasional setbacks; the security of its territories by conventional standards, despite the challenge of China; the relatively stable policies of its leaders, even though individual statesmen may come and go for reasons not clear to foreigners; and the limits within which armed force has been employed abroad, despite a number of dramatic incidents.

The change as compared with the record of the empire has not been as radical as one might expect from the half-century of revolutionary upheavals and rhetoric, but neither is the country being driven to desperate measures by domestic and foreign setbacks. The USSR is not likely either to gamble its military forces in reckless aggression, or to

reduce its strength at a sacrifice to security. In a situation such as that prevailing at present, in which vast resources are being expended primarily to deter another power that finds itself in a parallel position, one may anticipate that Soviet leaders will find it in the interest of their country to explore the possibilities of negotiation and compromise.

The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by profound differences in historical experience and in institutions and values, but they both bear the heavy burden of mutual deterrence systems that concern the two of them more than they concern any other state or group of states. At the same time, both have a large backlog of human problems whose solution awaits the availability of adequate resources. Problems of this magnitude call for a most serious consideration of the opportunities offered by the mutual limitation of strategic arms. Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Professor Black, for a very fine

statement.

Now, in accordance with procedure, we will turn to Professor Pipes.

Dr. PIPES. Thank you, Senator Jackson.

STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD PIPES, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DIRECTOR, RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. PIPES. The desire to seek explanation of a country's conduct in its history is a natural and justifiable one, since clearly every nation's outlook and behavior are in some measure influenced by its past experience. But the procedure is always fraught with danger. It is all too easy to fashion an image of another people's national character, to assume that it is eternal and immutable, and from this assumption to draw completely false deductions. In reality, "national character" is an elusive and transient thing. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, the French were generally regarded as the most aggressive nation on the European continent, whereas the Germans were viewed as impractical dreamers, sovereigns of the "realm of clouds," as Voltaire called them. Then, in the second half of the nineteenth century the roles were neatly reversed, and the Germans, descending from their clouds, turned into a nation of Huns. The Japanese who were once thought to have inherited from their samuraí ancestors an unquenchable thirst for blood, have recently become a nation of frenetic businessmen, at the same time that the Jews, whose unfitness for warfare had been proverbial, created in Israel a military machine of unsurpassed efficiency. Such examples could be multiplied many times over.

As every historian knows, that which is loosely called "national character" represents the spirit not of an entire nation, but only of that social group which at a given time happens to control the instruments of power and the organs of opinion, and manifests itself only as long as that group enjoys this control. The problem, therefore, is one of identifying the elite and ascertaining its particular experiences, interests, and expectations. Such knowledge is particularly useful in dealing with countries that have authoritative forms of government because there the ruling elite is relatively immune to public pressures.

In considering the elite which rules today's Russia and its possessions, four facts relevant to its conduct of foreign policy demand emphasis: its cultural background, the nature of its claim to authority, its class interests, and its colonial experience. Only when all four of these factors have been taken into account is it possible to understand something of that peculiar mixture of aggressiveness and caution which has distinguished Soviet foreign policy since 1917.

1. The Cultural Background of the Soviet Elite

The Soviet elite is not the same one that had ruled Russia in the imperial period, that is, from the accession of Peter the Great in 1689 to the Revolution. The imperial elite, composed largely of landed and service gentry, was thoroughly Westernized; it considered itself part of Europe and in its majority emulated European models. This class was overthrown in 1917, and replaced by a new elite formed of elements that had never been much exposed to Westernization: the lower bureaucracy, small tradesmen, provincial intelligentsia, clergy, skilled labor, and peasantry. The cultural roots of these groups lay not in the Westernized Russia of Peter and his successors, but in the prePetrine culture of old Moscow, and even beyond it, in Byzantium and the Turkic tribes of the Steppe.

In imperial Russia, the ancestors of the Soviet elite had been kept out of the chambers of power. They always viewed the Western culture of the St. Petersburg court and of its gentry with distaste and suspicion. Though not averse to borrowing Western technology, especially of a military nature, they rejected the spiritual foundations on which this technology had grown. Their whole attitude toward the external world was decisively influenced by the teachings of the Orthodox Church which more than any other Christian establishment resisted innovation and persecuted heresy. The xenophobia which this Orthodox Church inculcated in its flock impressed itself very deeply on the mind of the Russian lower classes; and so did the belief that the Orthodox alone are pure and fit for salvation. This faith, in a secularized form, has remained very much part of the outlook of the Soviet elite; for although this elite professes militant atheism it has no other culture to fall back on than the xenophobic, anti-Western culture of old Moscow.

The practical consequences of this fact are considerable. The group ruling the Soviet Union is not predisposed by its cultural background to regard itself as part of a broader international community; nor does it tend to think in terms of a stable world order which accords every nation a rightful place. Such an outlook is widespread in communities with a Protestant and a commercial culture, but it is rather rare elsewhere. The Soviet elite tends to think in terms of a perpetual conflict pitting right against wrong, from which only one side can emerge victorious. Needless to elaborate, Communist ideology with its stress on class warfare culminating in a vast revolutionary catacylsm neatly reinforces this inherited religiously-inspired outlook.

2. The Question of Legitimacy

The elite which rules Soviet Russia lacks a legitimate claim to authority and this fact has critical bearing on its conduct of both domestic and foreign policy. Lenin, Trotsky, and their associates seized power by force, overthrowing an ineffective but democratic govern