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while about 60 percent of them are carried by our bombers and 25 percent by our ICBJS.

If we permit our ICBM and bomber forces to become highly vulnerable to a surprise attack by the mid-to-late 1970's, we would be faced with the prospect of relying on the submarines at sea and on alert-carrying even less than 15 Ierent of our strategic weapons-for retaliation with high confidence.

We are fully confident that the SLBM force at sea is in vulnerable to surprise attack today and should remain so for the next five to seven years and hopefully longer. But is that fraction of the force which is at sea and on alert Enough-is that posture sufficient–to insure that the Soviet Union would be deierred? I do not believe that we can afford to take this kind of a risk with our national security. The MIRV deployments provide an essential increase in tarPting flexibility to offset the growing vulnerability of our land-based retaliatory forces, which is one of the major reasons for continuing these previously sbeduled MIRV deployments.

Compounding this problem is the Soviet Union's activities in the anti-ballistie missile field. In order to be confident in our deterrent, we must insure not only chat enough retaliatory weapons are left after a Soviet first strike, but also that they are able to reach their target. An extensive ABM capability on the part of the Soviet Union could greatly reduce our confidence in our penetration capability.

By the mid-to-late 1970's Soviet strategic air defenses and missile defenses could be quite formidable. In addition to the extensive air defense capability they already possess, the Soviets are pursuing a vigorous anti-ballistic missile research and development program designed to improve the present operational system or to develop substantially better second-generation ABM components.

You all know that with regard to ABM defenses, long-lead items are the acquisition and tracking radars. For a decade now, the Soviets have been deploying a system of such radars. As I noted in my Defense Report, “The Soviets probably have a number of these early warning radars either operating or under construction, and as such are expanding their surveillance coverage to include most of the areas that are of concern to them.” In addition to the Moscow ABM system, the Soviets have deployed a very extensive, sophisticated air defense system across the approaches to Western Russia. We cannot rule cat the possibility that the Soviets have given or will give this system, called the SA-5 or TALLINN system, an ABM role. We believe such a role is techDically feasible for this system. This is a problem of particular concern because of the extent of the TALLINN deployment-over 1,000 interceptor missile launchers.

Turning now to possible arms limitation agreements, if a SALT agreement were concluded which banned MIRV's, we would, of course, be prepa red to honor it. I think we can all agree that such an agreement would have to include acceptable verification provisions.

If no SALT agreement were reached, and we do not deploy MIRVs on schedale, we will have lost the lead times necessary to counter potential Soviet defepses and the future threats to the survivability of our offensive forces.

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note that, in the past fifteen months:

We have not accelerated the planned deployment of offensive systems, but have actually slowed it down.

We have slowed down the previously approved ABM deployment plan, keyed it to the emerging threat, and reoriented this system to

provide more timely protection for our land-based deterrent forces. In short, Mr. Chairman, as I pointed out in my Defense Report, we are seeking every opportunity to enhance the possibility of achieving an agreement an avoid exacerbating the arms race--by deferring decisions, taking minimal steps, and deliberately accepting some increased risk. We could have recommended a considerably expanded strategic forces program for the forthcoming year. I heliere there are many who would view such a recommendation as appropriate, in light of the Soviet and Chinese Communist programs.

We have not done so. Neither have we recommended that the United States unilaterally defer or abandon those programs that are deemed appropriate, in the absence of a safeguarded agreement, to preserve our future security.

We strongly believe that the proper place to deliberate these complex issues is at the conference table with the Soviet Union. These talks are in progress.

We cannot foresee the outcome, but let me reiterate that we hope for success for an agreement that preserves our security and permits a continued deferral of those hard choices that we face with regard to new strategic programs.

Mr. Chairman, we are concerned about the momentum evident in the strategic programs of the Soviet Union, and the implications of that momentum for the strategic balance in the future. We are also quite conscious of the Communist Chinese strategic weapons program--and of the recent demonstration of Chinese competence.

These strategic issues are complex, and are not susceptible to simple, easily agreed solutions. We cannot guarantee that our approach is precisely rightthat the modest program we are recommending will not be too little or too much for the future. But I believe that it is a responsible program, consistent with our security, and entirely appropriate to preserve our options in this transitional year, pending further developments in the strategic situation.

In summary, let me recall that two of the three principles President Nixon deems essential for peace are strength and a willingness to negotiate. We are serious in searching for a stable and lasting peace. We are serious in our willing. ness to negotiate. We are negotiating now in Vienna. As the President noted last Friday night, he believes we will be successful in negotiating an agreement.

But we are also serious about maintaining our strength. Without this element, without preserving our strength, there would be no need-no incentive for the other side to negotiate. And I do not believe that prospect would enhance the possibilities for achieving the durable peace that we all desire. That is why we feel it is essential to continue those programs and options designed to preserve our strength, while at the same time pursuing at the negotiating table our search for an early and effective strategic arms limitation agreement.

[Complete English translation of a letter by Academician Andrey D. Sakharov, physicist Valentin F. Turchin, and historian Roy A. Medvedev to Soviet Communist Party Secretary General Leonid I. Brezhnev, Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers Aleksey N. Kosygin, and Chairman of USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Nikolay V. Podgorny.)

LETTER OF A. D. SAKIIAROV, V. F. TURCHIN AND R. A. MEDVEDEV TO THE LEADERS

OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT *

March 19, 1970
Deeply esteemed Leonid Ilyich
Deeply esteemed Aleksey Nikolayevich
Deeply esteemed Nikolay Viktorovich

We address ourselves to you on a matter of great importance. Our country has achieved much in the development of production, in the realm of education and culture, in the radical improvement of the living conditions of the workers and in the formation of new socialist relations between people. These achievements have worldwide historical importance. They have most profoundly influenced events throughout the world and have laid a solid foundation for further successes in the cause of communism. But also there are obviously serious difficulties and shortcomings.

In this letter a point of view is discussed and developed which in abbreviated form can be formulated in the following theses :

1. At the present time it is of great importance to carry out a series of meastires directed towards the further democratization of public life in the country. This necessity emerges from the existence of a close link between

ems of

*Since January 1970 a letter to L. I. Brezhnev has circulated widely in Moscow under the name of "Sakharov" or "Academician Sakharov". This “letter" in many variations was subsequently published in the foreign press. In the anti-Soviet emigrant journal Posey (No. 1, 1970) an article was published under the pretentious title "The Truth About Contemporary Times" over the signature of R. Medveilev. This article, broadcast suhsequently in the Russian language by Radio Liberty (FRG), is a complete fabrication. We declare that we are not the authors of the aforementioned letter and article. These documents are flagrant falsifications and were evidently distributed with provocative aims. (signed) Medvedev and Sakharov.

technical-economic progress, scientific methods of management and questions of information, publicity and competition. This necessity emerges also from internal and external political problems.

2. Democratization must facilitate the maintenance and strengthening of the Soviet socialist system, of the socialist economic structure, of our social and cultural achierements, and socialist ideology.

3. Democratization carried out under the direction of the CPSU in cooperation with all layers of society must retain and strengthen the leading role of the Party in the economic, political and cultural life of society.

4. Democratization must be gradual in order to avoid possible complications and turmoil. At the same time it must be deep, must be carried out consistently and on the basis of a carefully worked out program. Without deep rooted democratization our society will not be able to solve the problems it faces and will Dot be able to develop normally.

There is reason to suppose that the point of view expressed in these theses is shared to a greater or lesser extent by a considerable portion of the Soviet intelligentsia and the advanced part of the working class. This point of view reflects ilm the views of students and working youth and numerous discussions in a Darrow circle.

Howerer, we consider it appropriate to set forth this point of view in written form to facilitate wide and open consideration of important problems. We are striving for a positive and constructive approach acceptable to the Party-State leadership of the country. We seek to explain several misunderstandings and gronndless dangers.

In the course of the past decade menacing signs of breakdown and stagnation have been discovered in the economy of our country. The roots of these difficulties originate from an earlier period and go very deep. The growth rate of the national income is steadily dropping. The gap is growing between the actual commissioning of new production capacity and that necessary for normal development.

There are patently many cases of error in the determination of technical and economic policy in industry and agriculture and intolerable red tape in the solution of pressing problems. Defects in the system of planning, accounting and incentives often lead to a contradiction between local and departmental interests, on the one hand, and popular and state nationwide interests on the other. As a result, production-development reserves are not uncovered as they should be and are not used. Technical progress is sharply reduced.

By virtue of these reasons the natural wealth of the country is destroyed without control or punishment: Forests are cut down, water reservoirs are polluted, Faluable farming lands are trampled, soil is eroded and turned salt-ridden.

It is common knowledge that there is a chronically grave situation in agriculture, especially in cattle breeding. Real income of the population in Tetent years has hardly risen at all. Nutrition, medical service and everyday services have improved very slowly and geographically unequally.

The number of goods in short supply grows-there are obvious signs of inflation. Especially alarming for the future of the country is the slowdown in the derelopment of education. In fact our general expenditures on education of all types are less than those of the United States and are growing at a slower rate. Alcoholism is growing tragically, and narcotics addiction is beginning to make itself felt. In many regions of the country crime is rising steadily, even anong teenagers and youth. Bureaucracy, a formalistic attitude toward the fish and lack of initiative are growing in the work of scientific and sciencetechnological organizations. A decisive factor in the comparison of economic systems is labor productivity, and here the situation is worst of all. Our productivity of labor, as before, remains many times lower than in the developed capitalist countries, and its [Tonth has drastically slowed. Our situation is seen to be especially serious when compared with leading capitalist countries, in particular the United States. By introducing into the national economy elements of state regulation and planning, these countries have rid themselves of the destructive crises which earlier plagued capitalist economies. The widespread introduction into the honomy of automation and computer technology assures a rapid growth of the productivity of labor, which in turn enables certain social difficulties and contradictions to be partially overcome (as for example establishing unemployment benefits, shortening the working day).

Comparing our economy with the economy of the United States, we see that our economy lags not only in quantitative but also-which is saddest of all-in qualitative respects.

The newer and more revolutionary an aspect of an economy is, the greater is the gap between the United States and ourselves. We surpass America in the mining of bal, but we lag behind in oil drilling, lag very much behind in gas drilling and in the production of electric power, hopelessly behind in chemistry and infinitely behind in computer technology.

The latter is particularly pertinent, for the introduction of computers in the national economy is of crucial importance for fundamentally changing the entire face of the production system and of the whole culture. This phenomenon has deservedly been called the second industrial revolution. Incidentally, our total inventory of computers is hundreds of times smaller than that of the United States, and as regards the use of computers in the economy, here the gap is so wide that it is impossible to measure it.

We simply live in another epoch.

Things are no better in the field of scientific and engineering discoveries. No one feels that the importance of our role is growing. On the contrary. At the end of the 1950's our country was the first to launch a sputnik, and it sent a man into space. But at the end of the 1960's we lost our lead, and the first men to land on the moon were American.

This fact is just one of many that shows the fundamental and growing scientific and technology gap between our country and the developed countries of the West.

In the 1920's and 1930's the capitalist world was hit by crises and depressions. At that time, using the enthusiasm of the nation released by the revolution, we were creating industry at an unprecedented pace. The slogan, "Catch up with and surpass America" was launched, and we really were catching up for several decades. Then the situation changed. The second industrial revolution began, and now at the beginning of the 1970's we can see that rather than catching up with America, we are falling ever farther behind.

What is the matter? Why was it that our country not only did not take the lead in the second industrial revolution but failed even to move ahead at par with the most developed capitalist countries? Does the socialist system really provide no better possibilities than the capitalist one for the development of productive forces? In the economic competition between capitalism and socialism is capitalism actually winning?

No, it is not so. The source of our difficulties is not the socialist system. But on the contrary it lies in those peculiarities and conditions of our life which run contrary to socialism and are hostile to it. This source is the anti-democratic traditions and norms of public life which appeared during Stalin's period and have not been completely liquidated down to the present time. Suppression of and limitations on the exchange of information in fields outside economics, re. striction of intellectual freedom, and other manifestations of anti-democratic distortions of socialism which took place in Stalin's time are still looked upon here as costs of the industrialization process. These are deemed not to have seriously affected the country's economy, even though they had extremely serious consequences in the political and military fields and for the fate of wide strata of the population and even entire nationality groups. We leave aside the question of whether this view is justified regarding the early stages of the development of the socialist economy, although the reduced rate of industrial de velopment in the prewar years testifies that it is not. There is no doubt, how. ever, that with the beginning of the second industrial revolution these phe nomena have become a decisive economic factor and a major obstacle to the development of productive forces of the country.

The increase in size, volume and complexity of economic systems has brought to the fore problems of organization and management. These problems cannot be solved merely by one or several individuals who have power and who "know everything". They require rather the creative participation of millions of people on all levels of the economic system. They require a wide exchange of information and ideas. This is what distinguishes the present-day economy from the economy, say, of the countries of the ancient East.

But in the process of exchange of information and ideas in our country we come up against insurmountable difficulties. Truthful information about our shortcomings and negative phenomena is kept secret lest it be "used by hostile propaganda." Exchange of information with foreign countries is restricted out

!

of fear of "penetration of hostile ideology." Theoretical conceptions and practical proposals which may seem to be too bold to some are suppressed immediately without any discussion because of fear that they may "undermine the foundations.” There is obvious distrust of active persons who think critically and creatively.

Under these conditions, those who verbally profess dedication to the Party but in fact are concerned with only their narrow personal interests and blind obedience move upward, while those who show high professional qualities and the strength of their convictions cannot. Restrictions on the exchange of information not only hamper control over managers and sap popular initiative but also deprive middle-level administrators of rights and information and transform them into mere executors or petty functionaries. High-ranking administrators receive incomplete or falsified information and thus cannot fully exercise their powers.

The economic reforms of 1965 have been an extremely useful and important Deasure in the solution of our economic problems. But we are convinced that in order to fulfill all the tasks of the reforms, economic measures alone appear to be insufficient. Moreover, these economic measures cannot be fully effected without reforms in the sphere of management, information, and publicity. The same concerns such promising undertakings as the setting up of complex production associations with a high degree of independence in solving economic, financial, and personnel questions.

No matter which concrete economic problem is taken up, one soon concludes that to solve it satisfactorily a scientific solution is first required for such general, fundamental problems of the socialist economy as the forms of feedback in the management system, price formation in the absence of a free market, and general principles of planning.

We now hear much talk about the necessity of a scientific approach to the problem of organization and administration. This, of course, is correct. It is only à scientific approach that can overcome the difficulties and exploit those potentialities for economic management and technical-economic advances which the absence of capitalist ownership provides. But the scientific approach requires (omplete information, impartial thinking, and freedom to create. Until these conditions are met (and not only for some individuals but for the masses of people in general), the discussion of scientific management will remain mere idle talk.

Our economy can be compared with traffic entering a crossroads. When cars were few, the traffic police could easily cope with their task, and traffic ran smoothly. But as the number of cars continually increased, traffic jams occurred. What can be done in this situation? The drivers can be fined or the policemen changed. But this will not be the way out.

The only way out is to make the crossroads wider. The obstacles that prevent the development of our economy can be found outside it, in the field of public politics, and any measure that cannot eliminate these obstacles will inevitably

be ineffective. The survivals of the Stalin period still negatively affect the econ1 omy and not only directly because of the lack of a scientific approach to the

problems of organization and management but in no less degree indirectly, through the general reduction of the creative potential of those representing all the professions. But it is creative work which is becoming progressively more important for the national economy under the conditions of the second industrial revolution.

In this connection one must also speak about the problems of relationship between the state and the intelligentsia. Freedom of information and creativity is necessary for the intelligentsia due to the nature of its activity and of its social fonction. The desire of the intelligentsia to have greater freedom is legal and natural. But the state suppresses this desire by introducing various restrictions, administrative pressures, dismissals from employment, and even the holding of trial. This brings about a gap, mutual distrust and deep profound lack of understanding which makes fruitful cooperation difficult between the Party-state strata and the most active (most useful to society) strata of the intelligentsia. Under conditions of present-day industrial society where the role of the intelligentsia is growing continuously, this gap can only be termed suicidal.

The greater part of the intelligentsia and the youth realizes the necessity of democratization and of a cautious and gradual approach to this problem. But it can neither understand nor justify actions of an obviously anti-democratic nature. How can one justify keeping in prisons, camps, and mental asylums persons whose

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