important to it. Even in these areas we have arrived at substantial agreement, and so our present waiting before signing the contract is to see how these areas of agreement work out in practice. Mr. GURNEY. Would you say then that your goal is that you expect to sign the agreement when the present one expires? Dr. NEWELL. Yes, and I would say probably substantially before it expires. Mr. GURNEY. That is all, thank you. Mr. KARTH. Are there any further questions? Dr. Newell, do you care to proceed? Dr. NEWELL. We were on page 19, I believe, under "Management." I would like now briefly to review the manner in which we manage the Ranger program. Responsibility for this program within NASA Headquarters is assigned to the Office of Space Science and Applications. The organization chart for this Office is attached to this material as figure 14. Individuals are identified down to the program manager level. I am the Director of this Office and Mr. Cortright is the Deputy Director and General Manager. We have both carried major responsibility for the Ranger since its inception in 1959. At that time I was Deputy Director to Abe Silverstein in the Office of Space Flight Programs, and Mr. Cortright was organizing the Office of Lunar and Planetary Programs, which he later headed for us. Mr. Nicks, who now heads the Lunar and Planetary Programs Office, was brought into NASA from industry by Mr. Cortright to head up his lunar flight systems early in 1960. Mr. Cunningham, the current Ranger program manager, was assigned to lunar sciences at that time. Mr. Cunningham has a staff of two professionals, plus secretarial help, and has the indirect support of several scientists and financial managers. My Office performs the following functions in connection with the Ranger program: Program initiation and definition; approval of the project development plan which covers technical, management, schedule, and funding aspects; technical and management monitoring and broad program direction; direction or approval of program changes; selection of scientific experiments; and budgeting and fiscal control. Those functions are performed in a close working relationship with JPL, and with staff support from functional management elements within NASA headquarters. Execution of the Ranger project is assigned to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. JPL designed, manufactured or procured subsystems, assembled and tested Ranger, and conductd the flight operations. Mr. William Pickering has been Director of JPL since before it became a part of the NASA organization. Mr. Robert Parks is Assistant Director of Lunar and Planetary Projects and reports to Dr. Pickering. The Ranger project manager at JPL, Mr. Harris Schurmeier, reports to Mr. Parks. Mr. Schurmeier has been project manager since the Ranger V flight, and formerly was head of the Systems Division which designed the Ranger system. Mr. KARTH. Dr. Newell, may I interrupt for a question at that point? Is there any special significance to that sentence? Dr. NEWELL. That Mr. Schurmeier has been project manager since the Ranger V flight? Mr. KARTH. Yes. Dr. NEWELL. This was the time following careful review of the Ranger program when the lines of responsibility were tightened up, and in essence the project was thoroughly "projectized" to use modern management language. Mr. KARTH. Who was project manager prior to the Ranger V flight? Dr. NEWELL. Mr. Burke was. Mr. KARTH. Do you know in what position? Dr. NEWELL. He is still a member of the Project Office at JPL. Mr. KARTH. Is there any relationship between the Ranger V failure and his leaving as project manager? Dr. NEWELL. In effect, what happened there was that Schurmeier, with a broader systems type responsibility, was brought in to head a systems organized project structure. Instead of having the more completely matrix-type operation in which Mr. Burke called upon individual areas for assistance, the Ranger project was more tightly projectized, and the man who had had systems division experience was pulled in as the head. Mr. KARTH. This we found to be one of the faults of the Centaur program back in the early days, is that not correct, Dr. Newell? Dr. NEWELL. That is correct; yes. Mr. KARTH. When was the Ranger V flight? Dr. NEWELL. October of 1962. Mr. KARTH. Now that we have projectized the program, how many people do you have working directly on the Ranger program? Dr. NEWELL. There are 350 technical people in the Ranger projects, now. Mr. KARTH. And they work exclusively on Ranger, of course, within the framework of the project? Dr. NEWELL. That is correct. Mr. KARTH. How many did you have working in the program under the matrix plan? Dr. NEWELL. I didn't want to imply that the project has been completely projectized. There are more than 352 who contribute to the Ranger project, but the essential lines of responsibility and different project areas that have to receive individual attention are now pulled in under the project office. Mr. KARTH. Is this normal under a projectized system? Dr. NEWELL. This is normal. In fact, I would say that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has gone further toward projectizing its spacecraft projects than the Goddard Space Flight Center has, for example. You have to tread the straight and narrow path between going so far toward complete projectization that you don't retain the ability to spread the learning process to other projects, and yet not going so far toward the purely disciplined type organization that you don't get the hard-hitting, day-to-day hammering at the project. Mr. KARTH. Did you recommend the projectized system, Dr. Newell? Dr. NEWELL. I did. Mr. KARTH. When did you do that? My question is really how far in advance of the system really becoming projectized did you recommend that it be so projectized? Dr. NEWELL. We have been pushing on the Laboratory for a stronger projectized type of approach to things since very early in the program. Mr. KARTH. Could you give us a little better idea of just when you began pushing? Dr. NEWELL. Since late 1960 or early 1961. Mr. KARTH. So it took approximately 2 years or more to reach this agreement? Dr. NEWELL. Well, I would say it took 2 years to get to the present state of the projectization. Mr. KARTH. Do you experience this same lengthy delay in going from one system of management to another in the other centers? Dr. NEWELL. It is a difficult question to answer, because the other centers haven't projectized to this degree-that is, the one under my charge, Goddard Space Flight Center. Mr. KARTH. If and when management, or you in this instance, decide that a program should be projectized, approximately how long does it take you to encourage the center to so projectize to whatever degree you feel is necessary? Dr. NEWELL. I can order my NASA centers to do it right away. I don't normally do that, however, because that is not a good way of building up good relations. Mr. KARTH. But when you do, it is done, is that correct? Dr. NEWELL. That is correct. Mr. KARTH. And when you don't order it, how long generally does it take to consummate this new management rule? Dr. NEWELL. It is a long process. I would say when I don't order it, it sometimes takes about the same length of time to do something of this magnitude. Mr. KARTH. When you strongly suggest it, does it take just a little longer than immediately? Dr. NEWELL. Depending on the strength of suggestion, it shortens things. Mr. KARTH. Thank you. One more question: Did you strongly suggest the projectized system on Project Ranger? Dr. NEWELL. Mr. Cortright, do you want to answer that one? Mr. CORTRIGHT. We suggested relatively strongly that a further projectization will be beneficial in executing the project, and in fact steps were taken as a result. It was following this rather strong suggestion that all individuals working on the Ranger project were identified, and these individuals can't be moved from the project over the objection of the project manager, so even though they do not institutionally report to the project manager, that is they are not in his personal organization, they are under that much control that they can't be put on other jobs without his concurrence which is a form of projectization within what is basically a matrix laboratory. Mr. KARTH. And this is what has transpired over the 2- or 22-year period? Mr. CORTRIGHT. That particular step was made after the Ranger V review by both NASA and JPL. Mr. KARTH. This is a matter of designating the people who work exclusively on the Ranger program. Mr. CORTRIGHT. That is correct. Mr. KARTH. For your information more than anything else, I suppose? Mr. CORTRIGHT. No, for control by the project manager, so that he can know on any given day just who is working on his job. Mr. KARTH. This did not in effect projectize the system. This gave someone information that they felt was necessary. Mr. CORTRIGHT. It is a form of projectization, short of institutionally forming a single group under the direct management of one man. Mr. Schurmeier has a project office, and then he has groups within all of the technical divisions and support divisions at JPL that are Ranger project groups. Now, these men are hired and fired and job-rated by their bosses, but they are exclusively working for Mr. Schurmeier. He even is consulted in their professional advancement. Mr. KARTH. But of the 300 people who are now projectized, how long did it take from the time that you rather strongly suggested projectization-how long did it take to effectuate that? Mr. CORTRIGHT. I am not certain exactly, but I think it was within 3 to 6 months while they worked out the details at the laboratory. Mr. KARTH. Could you check that out, Mr. Cortright, and make it a part of the record? Mr. CORTRIGHT. Yes, sir. (Material requested for the record is as follows:) On December 17, 1962, a meeting between headquarters and JPL was held in Washington to discuss the implementation of certain changes in the Ranger project. One of these changes involved a headquarters request for the preparation of a Ranger project organization chart which clearly identified key personnel attached to all four systems. This chart was completed in rough draft by December 24, 1962, and was formally signed off by the Laboratory Division Chiefs on January 4, 1963. A total of 18 days had elapsed from the initial request to the submission of an organization chart. Mr. KARTH. All right, Doctor. Dr. NEWELL. We were at the top of page 21. Mr. Schurmeier is supported by a project staff, plus personnel within the technical and support divisions. These personnel cannot be moved from Ranger activities without Mr. Schurmeier's concurrence. The total Ranger personnel peaked at over 900 in 1963. Under the overall direction of the Ranger project manager are a spacecraft systems manager, a deep space instrumentation facility systems manager, a space flight operations systems manager, and a launch vehicle systems manager. All but the last are JPL personnel. The NASA Lewis Research Center is assigned systems management for the launch vehicle. Launch vehicle activity is monitored in my office by Dr. Richard Morrison, Office of Launch Vehicle and Propulsion programs. Mr. KARTH. Dr. Newell, could I ask a question at this point? The one sentence near the top of the page: These personnel cannot be moved from Ranger activities without Mr. Schurmeier's concurrence not even at Dr. Newell's direction? Dr. NEWELL. Well, I assume that if Dr. Newell insisted, Mr. Schurmeier would concur. Mr. KARTH. What does the contract say? Dr. NEWELL. The contract, as I indicated, does not reach into and make specific statements about assignment of people. Mr. CORTRIGHT. It does only to one extent, that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory can't move key personnel from projects without NASA Headquarter's concurrence. This is a permissive-type thing, and we are referring specifically to a division chief or a section head taking a man off the job because he thinks he should be on another job. This is what we are trying to prevent here, and this is effective in preventing it. Dr. NEWELL. This gives Mr. Schurmeier the stability in his organizational support that he needs. He knows that if Mr. X over here has been assigned to his Ranger project, he is going to stay on that Ranger project. Mr. KARTH. And really what this does, in your opinion, is strengthen the Ranger project and prevents people other than yourself or Mr. Schurmeier from indiscriminately transferring people from Ranger to some other program, is that right? Dr. NEWELL. That is correct. Mr. KARTH. For example, it would prevent JPL management from doing this? Dr. NEWELL. Well, no. Dr. Pickering, of course, could also do it, but Dr. Pickering is the one who set up this arrangement so that Schurmeier will have the stability of support that he needs. This is the arrangement that Dr. Pickering has established in order to assure that Ranger gets the attention and continuous attention that it needs. Mr. KARTH. Thank you. Dr. NEWELL. The working relationships, functions, and authorities of all these groups are broadly defined in NASA Management Manual Instruction 4-1-1, which applies to both NASA centers and JPL. The project development plan defines the specifics. The plan is prepared by JPL, concurred in by all systems managers and my program office, and approved by me. This document is available to all who have need of it. It defines the ground rules under which the project and systems managers carry out their responsibilities in the Ranger project. Other major elements in the Ranger project are the RCA AstroElectronics Division, headed by Mr. Barton Kruezer, with Mr. Bernard Miller as project manager of the television system for Ranger. The Atlas booster is procured from General Dynamics Astronautics, while the Agena upper stage is procured from Lockheed Missile System Co. Initial procurement is through the Air Force with special modification, checkout, and launch under direct NASA contracts to the suppliers. Many subcontractors play smaller but important roles. One, Northrop Space Laboratories, was contracted to fabricate the canceled block V and to provide technical support to blocks III and IV. Over 100 Northrop personnel are now working at JPL. |