Europe among the various terrorist groups, the linkages that have even existed between the groups in Europe and those in Latin America, the links between the Japanese groups and the Palestinian groups, do not appear to have been duplicated at least in that strength in the United States.

My focus has been outside the United States totally. The links have developed there.

Chairman RIBICOFF. What does that say about world society and American society in comparison? You find these linkages between these diverse groups-Japanese, South Americans, Germans, Arabs, Yemenites, Iraqis-from all over, yet you don't find linkages within the United States?

I am fascinated by that.

Dr. RUSSELL. I am, too, frankly. I have expected to see American individuals turn up in some of the these operations and they have

not.

Chairman RIBICOFF. As I looked at the list, I didn't see any.

Dr. RUSSELL. No, sir, you did not. This has always been something of particular interest to me. I don't have explanation for it. Whether it is a different culture, greater severity of the student movement in Europe in the 1960's vis-a-vis the United States, I don't know. I don't have an answer for that.

Chairman RIBICOFF. Everybody talks about the weaknesses in American society. Would this indicate our society is a lot stronger than we give ourselves credit for?

Dr. RUSSELL. I think so, personally. This is my personal opinion. Chairman RIBICOFF. What do you gentlemen see are the problems or biggest problems we face in the United States in terms of the threat of terrorist actions?

Mr. HASSEL. Sir, the preesnt level threat of terrorist action in the United States is not a significant one criminologically, when you look at other crimes committed in this country. Dr. Jenkins made the point that more people are injured in this country by dog bite than they are by terrorism. As a significant criminological phenomenon, so far it's not one. It's certainly one we have to stay close to. We have to monitor this movement. Is it going to increase significantly? So far it has not. It has been unsophisticated. Certainly if we get indications that the linkages you were discussing are enforced to a certain extent or if the sophisticated foreign groups operating in Europe and the Far East operate in this country, then we have a whole different ballgame.

Now it's not a significant threat and it's well handled by our law enforcement agencies.

Chairman RIBICOFF. You're keeping your channels open with other governments?

Mr. HASSEL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RIBICOFF. Is the cooperation close and strong between governments in dealing with terrorism?

Mr. HASSEL. Yes, sir.

Chairman RIBICOFF. Do other governments make the information on terrorists available?

Mr. HASSEL. It flows freely between us and the Western European enforcement agencies and military agencies.

Dr. OCHBERG. I would like to add a little bit. There are two major things to be concerned about. One is a level of violence perpetrated by these terrorists. So far, it has not been mass destruction and has not involved mass sabotage of vital industries.

Dr. Robert Kupperman has joined the group and will be testifying. We need people like Dr. Kupperman examining the ways in which such groups could strike at large masses of people who are at vulnerable points in our interconnected society. That has not been their tactic so far, but it could be.

That's one expansion of things to be concerned about. The second thing to be concerned about relates to that chart we put up. It's the responsiveness of our own police forces, our own Government. If we are not prepared to handle even a minor incident in a way that the people feel has been as effective and efficient as possible, then we could have this spiral which brought down Uruguay.

Chairman RIBICOFF. What should our policy and organization be to be prepared? Is there something we should be doing as a nation that we are not?

Dr. OCHBERG. That's the $64,000 question; isn't it? That's what the hearings are about. I do think from my own perspective really as an outsider to law enforcement or to State Departmnet operations, that we need to give the law enforcement community a better crack at this.

As far as any violence which would occur domestically, it's the police who are charged with peacekeeping and it's they who have the experience of balancing concern for the victim, the populace, the perpetrator, balancing that against the demands made and the need to use force. I am not sure at the highest levels of Government domestically enforcement has been put in the lead in thinking about this and getting us prepared for it.

Chairman RIBICOFF. The question of the National Security Council and the State Department having the lead responsibility internanationally, if you're hijacking an American plane in a foreign country is a logical one.

But if you have the problem of domestic terrorism it would seem to me that the lead responsibility should be in the Justice Department or the police, and I think that's very valuable.

I hope our staff can be in touch with you gentlemen in the days ahead as we try to prepare this. I am most appreciative. There is a vote on, so we will recess for seven or 8 minutes.

I do appreciate your coming here and we will take the next series. of witnesses as soon as I return from the vote.

Thank you very, very much.

Dr. OCHBERG. Thank you, sir.
Dr. RUSSELL. Thank you.

Mr. HASSEL. Thank you.
[Recess.]

Chairman RIBICOFF. Mr. Jenkins, your statement is a valuable one. I would like to be able to ask you a few questions and also have an opportunity to listen to Mr. Kupperman.

I wonder if we could ask you to summarize your statement. The entire statement will go into the record at the conclusion of your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF BRIAN M. JENKINS, RAND CORP.

Mr. JENKINS. I have already submitted my written testimony. I will try to briefly summarize it.

The point I have made in my prepared testimony is whether the U.S. Government is adequately prepared to deal with terrorism depends on one's perception of future trends, which in turn depends on one's view of the historical origins of the problems.

Some see today's terrorism as exclusively a result of the political circumstances prevailing in the late 1960's:

The Israelis defeat of the Arabs, which caused the Palestinians to abandon their dependence on Arab military power and turn to terrorism tactics; increasing emphasis on urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America, and with it, the resort to terrorist tactics; and the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States, which ultimately spawned terrorism groups such as the Japanese Red Army and the Baader-Meinhof gang.

According to this view, terrorism will decline as circumstances change, as the original conflicts are resolved. Present organizational arrangements are considered therefore adequate.

If, on the other hand, the current wave of terrorism is seen as a result not only of unique political circumstances, but also of recent technological developments to include international travel giving terrorists worldwide mobility, improved mass communications providing them access to a worldwide audience, increasing availability of weapons and explosives, and new vulnerabilities in a society increasingly dependent on fragil technology, or if terrorism is seen as a new set of tactics, then terrorism will continue.

Those who see terrorism continuing criticize the lack of preparedness.

My own view is terrorism will persist as a mode of political expression, of gaining international attention and of attaining limited political goals. Our research would confirm some of the trends described previously by Dr. Russell. Terrorists are mobile, they can strike targets anywhere in the world, they appear to be more sophisticated, and they are strengthening their links with each other.

It is possible that some nations in the future may employ terrorist groups as a means of surrogate warfare.

Although we may look forward to an era of formal peace, at least between nations, we may be entering an era of increased political violence at lower levels.

I pointed out in my testimony that combating terrorism poses unique problems. Terrorists do not operate according to any established rules of warfare or diplomacy. Terrorists operate in the cracks, between organizational boundaries and missions, making coordination difficult.

Each terrorist incident is unique; there are no fixed solutions. Terrorism is sporadic. It may be regarded as a relative nuisance, but suddenly it may become an issue of national importance. Terrorism receives spasmodic attention; attempts to formalize efforts to combat it have been hampered.

Terrorism can no more easily be eradicated than murder or war. Improved security can prevent certain kinds of terrorist attacks. We

can try to anticipate, however, terrorist attacks through intelligence and information systems. Such techniques as crisis management might improve the Government's ability to respond effectively to those terrorist incidents that occur. We must not dismiss military action dealing with terrorism as a measure of last resort.

It will be difficult, in my view, to fully develop capabilities and coordinate activities in all of these areas without an organizational structure to provide some impetus. A common organizational solution to problems that cut across the responsibilities of several agencies has been to create interagency committees. All such groups tend to share the same weaknesses. The chairman often has no real power between dissuasion over the other representatives who report to their own bosses. They may meet infrequently. They often lack staff backup. Given the lack of lateral incentives, the vertical parochialism of the line agencies and departments dominates.

The Council to Combat Terrorism proposed in the bill might generate a higher level of concern in the executive branch, although I'm not sure to what extent concern can be legislated. But without staff backup. I'm not sure it can do more than the now defunct Cabinet Committees to Combat Terrorism or the present interagency working group.

I have suggested in my testimony providing the Council with its own small permanent staff within the Executive Office of the President. As a permanent body with a White House perspective, such a staff could moniter and coordinate activities of the line agency and departments; identify needed capabilities; identify special resources that might be mobilized if an international incident occurs; pull together current intelligence and ongoing analysis and research efforts; identify terrorist incidents; develop scenarios and formulate plans. It would see to it that the necessary resources and capabilities are there when they are needed. In an actual crisis, it could function as a small battle staff for decisionmakers.

The staff would not duplicate work of offices in the Cabinet Departments. Its task should be to encourage the development of needed capabilities within the line agencies and departments with the staff in the Executive Office playing a catalytic and coordinating role.

With regard to the proposed sanctions against countries aiding terrorists, caution should be exercised so that the issue of terrorism itself does not become the sole determinant of American foreign policy. Neither should requirement to impose sanctions which would foreclose options that might be utilized to conclude a terrorist incident. Sanctions should be imposed but ought not to be mandatory. Publication of a list of countries that aid terrorists and dangerous foreign airports may have some effect. It could discourage tourists from visiting them, and businesses from operating in them.

None of these measures will solve the problem of terrorism. Terrorism is not a problem that can be solved. We ought not to think of it that way. There will be no ultimate victory in the war against terrorism. In dealing with this enduring and often emotional problem, governments must above all demonstrate competence. Governments must show that they, and not the terrorists, are in charge. If governments appear helpless or incompetent in dealing with

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terrorism, public alarm will increase and so will the clamor for draconian measures. Therein lies the real threat of terrorism.

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman RIBICOFF. You state that the U.S. handling of terrorist incidents has been deficient. Could you detail these deficiencies, for example, in coordination, communication, response capability and media relationships of which you are aware? What was the cause of these deficiencies? How do you think we ought to eliminate them in the future?

Mr. JENKINS. Let me say first that the shortcomings that I mentioned in my testimony refer specifically to some of the more serious incidents of terrorism that have occurred, those, which for reasons of multiple jurisdiction and foreign involvement, were by their very nature complex episodes. Problems have arisen in the area of organization, often matters relating to the jurisdictional disputes, discussions during an incident as to who has the action, who will be in charge, and so on.

Chairman RIBICOFF. Could you give us some examples of this shared crisis management, which has caused problems? Any specific problems of any incidents?

Mr. JENKINS. A recent example of these sorts of problems, would be the hijacking of the TWA airliner by Croatioan extremists in September 1976, when according to one Government official who was involved in the handling of the episode, the responsibility for the action "bounced around the Government like a floating crap game." It was not certain who would maintain full jurisdiction over the episode. The FAA claimed jurisdiction. Because it was an American airliner hijacked in the United States, the FBI became involved. Once the airline crossed the national frontiers and flew to Canada and ultimately France, there was a definite State Department involvement. There was, I understand some difficulty in deciding at the moment who precisely was making the decisions that had to be made.

A further shortcoming that would show up in many of these incidents would be the lack of an institutional memory which could provide the basis for contingency planning. Although, again I emphasize that each episode tends to be unique. The only thing you can predict with certainty is that the next episode would not be quite like previous episodes. When I say "contingency planning," therefore, I mean it in the broadest sense, something more along the lines of "contingency thinking."

Chairman RIBICOFF. Were you here when Dr. Ochberg and Mr. Russell and Mr. Hassel testified?

Mr. JENKINS. Yes, sir.

Chairman RIBICOFF. It's obvious they are as concerned as you are. They are reaching for an operational way of handling this. They are trying to get more education, more knowledge, more involvement. Do you think we are ready to have a permanent staff? I question just having the bureaucracy. Or do you think they are just feeling their way toward a solution? How do you think it ought to be handled?

Mr. JENKINS. I must say I share your concerns about creating even The embryo of some minibureaucratic empire in the Office of the