Aristotle's Concept of MindIn this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy. |
Contents
preliminaries to aristotles concept | 15 |
The Model of Explanation in Aristotelian Psychology | 33 |
Aristotelian Arguments for Embodiment | 46 |
the activity of aristotelian mind | 71 |
the objects of aristotelian mind | 113 |
A Commentary on APo II 19 | 136 |
A Commentary on Phys | 173 |
The Role of Time in Aristotles Account of Perception | 189 |
Mind and Time in Aristotles Account of Meaning | 217 |
Epilogue | 246 |
| 260 | |
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Common terms and phrases
abstractionist According active mind actual thinking affection Anaxagoras Anaxagorean animals answer aorist argued argument Aristo Aristotelian mind Aristotle claims Aristotle describes Aristotle’s concept Aristotle’s theory Aristotle’s view attributes body causal Chapter concept of mind constituted continuum correlative DA III.5 Democritean Democritus derives determinacy discerning discussion distinction epistemological essences essential eternal example exist explanation fact falsity form and matter formal grasp Hence human identity important indivisible induction inferential structure innate interpretation involved judgment material meaning metaphysical middle term mind and sensation mind qua mind thinks mind’s objects movement nature particular sort passage perception Phys possible posterior potentiality principle of non-contradiction principles prior proposition psychological pupa question reason relation requires seems sense experience separate simply Socrates sorts of objects soul specific suggests Teleology temporal theory of mind thesis things thinkable thought time-perception model tion true truth in thinking understanding unity universals λόγος νοῦς τὸ φαντασία