The Self in Time: Developmental PerspectivesChris Moore, Karen Lemmon, Karen Skene Human reasoning is marked by an ability to remember one's personal past and to imagine one's future. Together these capacities rely on the notion of a temporally extended self or the self in time. Recent evidence suggests that it is during the preschool period that children first construct this form of self. By about four years of age, children can remember events from their pasts and reconstruct a personal narrative integrating these events. They know that past events in which they participated affect present circumstances. They can also imagine the future and make decisions designed to bring about desirable future events even in the face of competing immediate gratification. This book brings together the leading researchers on these issues and for the first time in literature, illustrates how a unified approach based on the idea of a temporally extended self can integrate these topics. |
Contents
Section 19 | |
Section 20 | |
Section 21 | |
Section 22 | |
Section 23 | |
Section 24 | |
Section 25 | |
Section 26 | |
Section 9 | |
Section 10 | |
Section 11 | |
Section 12 | |
Section 13 | |
Section 14 | |
Section 15 | |
Section 16 | |
Section 17 | |
Section 18 | |
Section 27 | |
Section 28 | |
Section 29 | |
Section 30 | |
Section 31 | |
Section 32 | |
Section 33 | |
Section 34 | |
Section 35 | |
Section 36 | |
Other editions - View all
The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives Chris Moore,Karen Lemmon,Karen Skene Limited preview - 2001 |
The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives Chris Moore,Karen Lemmon,Karen Skene No preview available - 2013 |
