EXTRACT OF TESTIMONY OF GENERAL EISENHOWER BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED FORCES, UNITED STATES SENATE, S. 758, UNIFICATION OF THE ÅRMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 25, 1947. Senator SALTONSTALL. General, one of the questions that will come directly within your province, if this bill should become law, is the administration of section 111, which is the establishment of Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, in my memory, 1 of the great arguments last year was whether there should be 1 Chief of Staff, or a Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, I would like to ask you: How did it work out? What was your experience, and how did it work out to have Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war when you were in Europe? And do you think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff is efficient and will work if this bill becomes law?

General EISENHOWER. Well, sir, in very great extent, I had the same organization that is here envisioned. Because I was the senior, or, in effect, the Secretary of National Defense in Europe, if I may put it that way. Then I had the commanders of 3 services, air, land, and sea, and only when our land operations got so large as to demand several Army groups, did I have more than 1 Army commander. So that, in effect, I occupied the position that in this bill you give to the Secretary of National Defense.

Now, distinguishing my personal conviction as opposed to what I now believe we should recommend. I did recommend and I believe in the single professional Chief of Staff. But in my own defense, I must say that I recommended also that the first one should be a naval officer, because I believed in it from a matter of principle.

But I have come to the conclusion that it is one of those argumentative points that should be eliminated from the bill, as not being of great importance. Time may bring it about, and it may show that this is better system.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, do you think that a Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the point of view of national security, will work sufficiently fast, will work sufficiently cooperatively, with three people, that it is a perfectly good unit to establish in a bill of this kind?

General EISENHOWER. Of course, there is this great difference between the new organization and what we have now. You will have directly superior to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a man who can put his whole time to these things in a decisive position. He can made the decision, you see. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not

agree on a matter of principle or methods or scheme of operation, or anything else, he can make the decision. So that it is because of that basis that I agree with the opinion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will work.

Mr. EBERSTADT. May I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. EBERSTADT. Further to the point that I mentioned that the Rockefeller committee had indicated in their opinion that their suggestions were consistent with the principles of the Hoover Commission, I have read you the extracts from the minority report. I would like to read to you from the Hoover Commission Report on the National Security Organization, recommendation No. 2, subparagraph (f):

That there shall be Joint Chiefs of Staff representing the three services, appointed by the President and subject to confirmation by the Senate and that the Secretary of Defense, with the President's approval, shall appoint a Chairman to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to represent, and report to, the Secretary of Defense.

That was the Hoover Commission's recommendation. Now, in discussing the recommendations before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on June 29, 1949, ex-President Hoover, referring to this particular recommendation said:

Our recommendations were that there be an independent chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he was to serve only as a presiding officer and report decisions or disagreements to the Secretary of Defense. But that he was to have no decision powers and not vote or any other authority.

Again, in reply to questions, and one of the questions was by Mr. Hardy as follows:

If differences of opinion arise between the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should not those differences be resolved by the President acting through the Secretary of Defense or by the Congress?

To which President Hoover replied:

That was our proposal, that the Chairman was nothing but a presiding officer. He has no powers to recommend or resolve. If there were differences of opinion, it is the responsibility of the civilian end of the Government to determine. That is the reason I assume that the President was set up as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in the Constitution.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard anything to the contrary from Mr. Hoover since that testimony was given?

Mr. EBERSTADT. Nothing. I have no reason to believe that his views in that respect have changed in any particular.

The CHAIRMAN. On what do you base that conclusion?

Mr. EBERSTADT. Numerous conversations that I have had with him. The CHAIRMAN. The latest of which was when?

Mr. EBERSTADT. Perhaps a week or 10 days ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Haven't you had any more recent ones with him? Mr. EBERSTADT. Not with him directly; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a statement made this morning as to some views which it was said had been expressed very recently, that is within a day or two, by Mr. Hoover.

Mr. EBERSTADT. I think that there is some confusion in connection with that.

The CHAIRMAN. What leads you to that opinion? Did you hear the statement?

Mr. EBERSTADT. I heard the statement that Mr. Brown made that Mr. Hoover had endorsed and given his approval to these proposals, but that is rather confusing to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. EBERSTADT. Because it doesn't seem likely.

Mr. McCORMACK. Don't you think the best thing to do is to get Mr. Hoover's opinion? Why should we get testimony on another man's understanding when we can get it ourselves? I think Mr. Hoover's views should be ascertained.

The CHAIRMAN. You have talked with him, haven't you, within the last hour?

Mr. EBERSTADT. Not with Mr. Hoover.

The CHAIRMAN. With his secretary?

Mr. EBERSTADT. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCORMACK. We can get the former president's opinion, which would be the best evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. I, personally, over the telephone, requested Mr. Hoover to come down and testify on this plan. He expressed his views and in view of the statements made by another member of the committee, and I do not feel free to express it, he declined for a reason which I can understand. I would be very glad to have him come. Mr. McCORMACK. His views could be transmitted, if he desires to give them.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked him to come and he declined.

Mr. McCORMACK. I think, with his busy life and other conditions, I wouldn't say declined, probably there were certain compelling con

ditions confronting him that he probably felt that he couldn't come. I don't think he would decline.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, maybe I didn't use the right word. I will substitute whatever word you suggest. He just didn't come, and his reason given to me was sufficient, I thought.

Mr. McCORMACK. I am sure it was. My only position is that we could ascertain his views, not in person. I wouldn't expect the former President necessarily to appear before us. His views would certainly be worthy of consideration, or those of any President, past or present. The CHAIRMAN. Or future.

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes, or future, and if he is the President, he is my President. I have been supporting the present President of the United States pretty well too.

The CHAIRMAN. That indicates you are always high in your constant desire to do the best for the country.

Mr. McCORMACK. I try to live with my own conscience.

Mr. HOLTZMAN. Is it possible to get the statement from him in lieu of his personal appearance?

The CHAIRMAN. Several members of the minority suggested today with respect to this report of the Rockefeller Commission here that we have a report which is a summation of their conclusions from the testimony, and we do not get the testimony. So it is about the same to me as having a jury render a verdict and then ask a judge whether it was based on the evidence and let the judge hear the evidence or see it.

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Wouldn't it be possible to send a telegram to President Hoover and ask him to reply?

The CHAIRMAN. I have already asked him by telephone and apparently he did not consider it advisable to come. I don't want to

accept a man's conclusions unless he knew what he based it on, no matter who he was. We have heard through our hearings and have heard it on the floor that Mr. Hoover is in favor of this and Mr. Hoover endorsed that, and pretty soon some other Member would get up and say, "My information is to the contrary." That is the situation today and unless Mr. Hoover would want to come or give his reasons why, I can't see why we would accept conclusions and opinions.

Mr. HOLTZMAN. I am not concerned about his reasons for not coming, but I am concerned about his feeling with respect to this plan and I think it would be helpful to this committee and to the Congress later on if we had that opinion.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I notice he did make a statement with respect to Reorganization Plan No. 2, which was different from the statement he had made previously.

Mr. McCORMACK. The reason I raised the question was not to have former President Hoover here, if he wants to express his views we would welcome it and, if not, I would respect his reasons. I do not want to sit here and have any witnesses undertake to testify as to what somebody else, no matter who he is, whether a humble citizen of the land or, in this case, the former President of our country, said.

The CHAIRMAN. A member of the committee expressed his opinion as to what Mr. Hoover's opinions were and this witness is expressing his own.

Mr. McCORMACK. I think the best evidence to us is to get an expression of the views of the former President himself.

Mr. EBERSTADT. My remarks with regard to Mr. Hoover's views were in response to questions by the chairman. I did not volunteer that.

Mr. McCORMACK. Your answers were responsive and the chairman's question was prefectly proper, but I think you see my point. Mr. EBERSTADT. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you continue?

Mr. EBERSTADT. I shall attempt to point out that the assumption by the Rockefeller committee that their recommendations were in line with the principles of the recommendations of the Hoover Commission are really not borne out on examination. The Rockefeller report stated that they were in line with recommendations of the Hoover Commission Task Force on National Security. I think it would be impossible to substantiate that as well.

On page 13 of the report of the task force committee on national security, they deal with the matter of a presiding officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but their recommendation is something quite different. It is not very long and, with the committee's permission, I will read it:

(c) By appointment by the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to section 203 of the National Security Act, of a principal military assistant, or chief staff officer, and of such additional military assistants as the Secretary may require. The principal military assistant should be a general officer of the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps, or a flag officer of the Navy, junior in rank to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief (if there be one). The principal military assistant should perform such duties as the Secretary may assign to him. He should sit with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but without membership, and be responsible, in the Secretary's absence, for presenting and interpreting the Secretary's point of view, and for bringing split decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the attention of the Secretary of Defense for resolution. The principal military assistant should not be authorized to make military decisions on his own responsibility, to exercise military command, or to set up a military staff of his own.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you the head of a Hoover Commission task force?

Mr. EBERSTADT. I was the chairman of the Hoover Commission Task Force on the National Security Organization.

The CHAIRMAN. And the recommendations of your committee were adopted by the whole Hoover Commission?

Mr. EBERSTADT. I think, generally speaking; yes. There were 1 or 2 variations but, in the main; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon the interruptions. Will you please proceed?

Mr. EBERSTADT. For my part, I feel that the President's objectives could be better attained by the elimination from the proposals of paragraphs (c) and (d) of section I, which are the portions that I have characterized as objectionable. I hope that a way may be found, acceptable and creditable to all, for putting the proposals into effect. without these two paragraphs.

I appreciate the attention which you have given to my remarks and will endeavor to respond to any questions which the chairman or members of your committee care to ask me.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have something to add to that statement? Mr. EBERSTADT. Affixed to the statement is a memorandum which is a detailed analysis of all of the proposals. While in the statement I dealt with those portions of the proposals which seemed to me to be

rather dangerous, namely (c) and (d) of section I, I go into further discussion in this memorandum.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to have that included as a part of your remarks?

Mr. EBERSTADT. I would be pleased if the memorandum were included as a part of my remarks, although I wouldn't wish to inflict it on the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be included, unless there are objections. (Memorandum referred to is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM RE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CONTAINED IN REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 6 OF 1953

On April 30, 1953, President Eisenhower sent Congress Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 proposing certain statutory changes in the organization of the Department of Defense, together with a message explaining them and recommending their adoption by Congress. The President's message also dealt with: some administrative changes in the Department of Defense not requiring Congressional action. This is the third time within the past 71⁄2 years that a President has formally addressed Congress on these matters.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first of these messages to Congress was sent by President Truman on December 19, 1945, and was supplemented by a further communication from the President to Congress, dated January 20, 1947. Amongst other things, he recommended the creation of a separate Department of the Air Force and the unification of the three military departments under a new Department of Defense, headed by a Secretary of Defense. President Truman's message followed some years of study and debate, often rather acrimonious, amongst the military services and on the Hill. With the exception of his recommendation of a military Chief of Staff, which Congress did not adopt, his proposals were quite generally concurred in even by those who had advocated opposing positions during the debate.

After extended committee hearings in the Senate and the House, in July, 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 which went into effect in September of that year.

The original conception, as expressed in the preamble to the National Security Act of 1947, was "to provide three military departments, separately administered, for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy *** and the Air Force ***; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge them; ***

Under the guidance and direction of Secretary Forrestal, the Defense Department was established within the spirit and intent of the act. Fitting the feet of the old Army and Navy organizations and of the young Air Force into the new shoes was a bit painful. Forrestal believed in the evolutionary process. It did not lie in his nature to command or to dictate. Whether his authority was inadequate or not employed to its full extent is beside the point. The fact is that many service squabbles and rivalries were publicly aired and caused considerable concern, giving rise to a general feeling that the new unified military organization needed tightening up.

In 1948, the Department of Defense was examined by the Hoover Commission. After study by its task force, the Commission made certain recommendations on the basis of which President Truman sent to Congress his next message on this subject on March 5, 1949. His proposals did no violence to the previous conception of the Defense Department or its structure. They were aimed at curing those defects which had become apparent during the process of putting the unification statute into effect and to which the Hoover Commission and its task force had called attention.

The Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House again held hearings and in due course Congress enacted the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act which conformed by and large, though not in all particulars, to the President's proposals and the recommendations of the Hoover Commission on which they were based.