ably along the road of militarism toward a general staff state, and the ultimate disaster that will follow.

Those who support this proposal deny that it is intended to create a Supreme Chief of Staff, but the fact stands that the proposals before you offer a wide-open opportunity for centralized, single command authority to dominate, control, and direct the military, economic, and social conduct of the United States. When military appropriations represent an insignificant proportion of our national income it is one thing, but when military appropriations and expenditures represent an astronomical debt already incurred, and an annual expenditure of unmanageable proportions, we face a threat to freedom. I hold that the danger to freedom within the territorial limits of the United States is greater than any foreseeable threat outside the United States.

We must not pass laws on the assumption that the powers so granted will not be used. We can not assume that all our future generals will be immune to the temptations of power.

Mankind has produced too few military victors who, in their hour of glory, have willingly removed the laurel wreath from their brows. I have a few quotes in substantiation of what I have presented to

you.

This is from Mr. Arthur Salzberger's paper, Concept for Catastrophe, before the United States Naval Institute proceedings, page 401:

During the war the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified its existence is an excellent mechanism for strategic planning and for carrying strategic plans into effect. I refer there to the present concept and organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I would like to quote from George Fielding Elliott, a man accepted for a generation as an author and expert in the field of military affairs, a pamphlet, How to Lose a War, again from the United States Naval Institute, page 741.

No one can fail to realize how dangerously near Germany might have come to winning the war if in its planning and conduct of its operations the Army, Navy, and Air Chiefs, had stood on an equal footing, and if the head of the state had listened to their advice with an open mind, but he remained the prisoner of the single concept.

To continue quoting:

It is grimly amusing in the light of the outcome to read the words of Colonel Blau written in the German Military Yearbook for 1939. Even in times of peace a single military authority is preferable. In total war which requires the complete cooperation of the separate resources it is absolutely essential. With the examination of Germany before them it is rather difficult to understand how the democracies can fail to perceive the overwhelming importance of this military truism. With the examination of Germany before them it is to be hoped that the democracies will continue to perceive the demonstrated superiority of their own tried and proven system.

I have, finally, Mr. Shafer's remarks in the Congressional Record, 83d Congress, first session, Wednesday, March 11, 1953, quoting: Back on some of the things that the great Mr. Forrestal said-and I would like to say, as a personal friend, he never became a captive of anyone-Secretary Forrestal's statement was contained in a confidential Chief of Naval Operations letter of February 19, 1947, which was read into the Congressional Record by Congressman Wardell of California, April 3, 1951. That is the background of what has always seemed to me the two violently opposed sets of thinking about the military organizations. It was expressed in the Collins plan, which, as you know, did have a single civilian Secretary, had a Chief of Staff and, in my opinion, would result in the isolation of the civilian charged with the responsibility for running of the organization, which I also think was the Army's intent; in fact, Marshall quite frankly said so.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not state, as I recall, the length of your service with the armed services.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I said that my contact had been over a period of 30 years. I think it goes, maybe in the Reserve-officer capacity, with some interruptions, perhaps 35 years.

I went to War College; helped to prepare the M-day plan as a Reserve officer, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. And have been an officer in the service?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I am retired now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I know, but previously?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I didn't wish to interrupt you; but in your statement, on page 6, I will add in the record there this statement: That a substantial number of the members of the committee expressed a like thought. That was with reference to what might happen. Mr. Poff?

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will be under the 5-minute rule today.

Mr. POFF. General Johnson, you seemed to direct your criticism at the Army as distinguished from the other services. Would you care to comment further as to why you feel that it is the Army which is struggling for the supreme control and trying to create this Prussian type of General Staff rather than the other services?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I don't think I have quite done adequate service to the other services, but I do think that the General Staff concept in my lifetime has been primarily a product of the Army. Now, there are some "men on horseback" of the other services, too, and they have frequently aided and abetted that cause.

Mr. POFF. Of course, General, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to be a Navy man?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, and that is subject to a lot of things. That man could die tomorrow.

Mr. POFF. It is also true, isn't it, that only 70 of the 210 members of the Joint Staff are Army personnel?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I wouldn't know, but I was very much interested yesterday to note the emphasis that your committee gave to the size of the Joint Staff. To my mind it is a matter of little or no importance. It can be big; it can be little; it could be almost tiny, and the same end could be accomplished. I don't think size has anything to do with it.

Mr. POFF. Now, would you agree, General, that usually the success or the failure of the unification of services rests in this Joint Staff? Mr. JOHNSON. No; I certainly do not. Mr. Eisenhower has done a magnificent job in clarifying the line of command, and sometimes it would seem to me it would simplify this discussion if we bad a simple chart showing the line of command and this advisory group known as the JCS, on the one hand. In my experience with advisory groups, I want independent advice. The last thing in the world. I would want is that they have to channel that advice through anybody. That is what they are there for. I want their free thinking, their independent thinking as experts in their particular field.

Mr. POFF. General, it is true, isn't it, that neither the Chairman of the JCS nor the JCS themselves, individually or collectively, have any command over the separate services?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you know, I have drawn charts in the Pentagon and out of it. There is no such thing as the perfect chart. After you get through with everything, you have to add appendages on it. These fellows wear two hats. They are Chiefs of their services, and that is good. They are in direct line of command under, as the President has made so clear, the civilian Secretary.

Now, over here they move into a group where they can sit around the same table and offer us advice and plans, and that is all right.

Mr. POFF. Now, with respect to the Chairman himself, and the feature of civilian control, the Chairman is subject to immediate removal by the President?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, but I have noticed that power of removalit is a delay; it might take a little while. If he commits some act of indiscretion, it is open, but it can also be delayed anywhere from 20 to 25 years. I am not impressed with that, except as a power that should be there.

Mr. POFF. And, of course, the Congress always retains power to take direct action by legislation in such a sphere?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I happen to be one who believes that Congress has saved this country about once a week for several years; but, on the other hand, the Congress is a very busy institution and is becoming increasingly so. The load has become almost overwhelming, and I don't think Congress can be expected to be aware of the day-to-day details of this. If some big explosion comes, they are on to it; otherwise, they are not.

Mr. POFF. Now, the Chairman of JCS at present has no vote within the JCS structure; he has no vote by a positive enactment under the NSA. What, then, do you fear he might do with reference to overall strategic planning that would jeopardize the interest of the United States?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am very glad you asked that question becauselet's look at the recent record. Despite the fact that the Chairman has had no vote and the situation is as you describe it, and all of you understand it, the status and prestige of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the war ended has increased consistently He has become spokesman for the military. Frequently he represents the military as a single person. It is a minor incident, but we didn't send all the Joint Chiefs to the coronation. We sent one. I read in the paper every day that a single individual, the Chairman, reports for the situation. In other words, we have created outside the rules a situation of outranking authority for the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The CHAIRMAN. The 5 minutes has expired, Mr. Poff. Mr. Fountain.

I realize that no one member gets all of his thoughts on the record. I guess we will just have to listen to each other and pick up where one leaves off.

Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. General Johnson, I will direct your attention specifically to subsections (c) and (d). I notice in subsection (c) the selection of the members of the Joint Staffs is subject to the ap

proval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would like to have your opinion as to what the effect of that provision is. Just what does that mean?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, in terms of such administrative experience as I have had, however you write the rules and draw the chart, there is always one fellow that is considered the boss, and I will tell you who he is. He is the man that hires and fires.

Now, you can write all the fancy resolutions you want but that is the man; and, as I see this resolution, it gives that power over the Joint Staff to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Now, just before the meeting, I was in a discussion with one of the members of this committee who made the statement that we should have no fears for the reason that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be removed without any difficulty. What would be your answer to that statement?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, very much as the statement over here. I think it is absolutely essential that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress at all times have the right of removal; but, as a practical administrative matter, it is a rare, rare event and usually greatly delayed, short of the commission of some act of such major proportion that usually it is not to be expected. I do not think that is an adequate protection.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I would like to ask you if it isn't true that the President and the Secretary of Defense would in all probability be far removed from many of the activities and decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't think you can generalize there. On certain matters I would expect the Secretary of Defense, and particularly the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and possibly the service Secretary most involved in that particular discussion, would be quite close, but in other matters very much removed. I don't think you can say always removed or always intimate.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Well, maybe I can be specific. How close do you think their relationship would be as to military control and command?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I don't know, except I do know this: that the burden is naturally placed on the Secretary of Defense, plus his official duties, and necessary absences from his desk make it very difficult for him to be intimately aware of this situation.

I think an easy way to get a mental picture of it is that it is just about as hard to understand all the Pentagon, as to go over there and try to get your arms around it. Now, that is a pretty big building. Mr. FOUNTAIN. I would also like to direct your attention to subsection (d) and ask you what your opinion is as to the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when it says, with respect to his managing of the Joint Staff, and the director, the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are transferred to the Chairman. Just what will his authority be under that provision?

Mr. JOHNSON. As a practical administrative matter, if you give the chairman of anything the control of his working staff, you have contributed very largely to his domination of the board over which he presides, whether it be a board of directors or whatnot.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I would like to ask you this question which I think you have covered and which you might like to elaborate upon:

How can this plan, as you see it, result in the erection of a Supreme General Staff and the development of a single Chief of Staff in this country?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would think this way, that the status of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under this plan will constantly diminish; that the status of the Joint Staff, namely, the men selected by the chairman, will constantly increase until you will develop a removed, elite staff organization, increasingly operating in the field of command, rather than the field of advice.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hillelson. Mrs. St. George.

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. General

Mr. JOHNSON. Would you call me "mister"?

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. First of all, do you consider that the Unification Act has worked efficiently so far? That is the act that we passed a few years ago. Would you say that it achieved its purpose?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I am going to have a 2-minute rule instead of your 5 minute. That is a $64 question. I am sure that it has contributed much good, but if the result of the Unification Act is to be largely or primarily the adding of administrative levels to the operating departments, I would say it is less than hoped for.

Now, it has done that. I don't see how we can operate total war and almost total preparation in peacetimes without a unified approach. I do think there are many, many fields that it will take years to adjust and make workable.

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Well, then, let me ask you if you do not think— I happen to think so that this present reorganization plan will strengthen and streamline the Unification Act and that it is the natural result that we could look for in the Unification Act to tie the thing together and to make it work?

Mr. JOHNSON. I heartily endorse what you have said with great enthusiasm, except for that one portion of it which deals with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Well, I take it you heard Mr. Kyes' testimony yesterday?

Mr. JOHNSON. I did.

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Weren't you impressed by the fact that he rather broke down the idea that this Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would be as powerful as we had been led to believe? He certainly didn't agree that it was to be anything like the Prussian General Staff. In fact, I began to wonder why we were having it at all if it was going to be watered down.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, ma'am, I heard it.

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. But you still don't agree? You think this is going to be a very strong position, this chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs, as I understand your testimony?

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me answer your first question. No, I was not impressed. That is No. 1.

And last night I was going over some portion of this. Mr. Kyes said, is the Chairman getting a new appointive power, and the answer, he said, was "No."

Actually

to quote