for the fiscal year which begins July 1 next, can't see right now whether or when the budget can be balanced.

All sorts of plans are being made to tackle this part of the Washington mess from a new approach-trying to cut out waste in existing commitments and trying to get better quality and less quantity in military weapons. Also the peak-year idea has been discarded in favor of a stretchout or gradual buildup of military strength-something that may, incidentally, avoid a sharp readjustment in business due to a drastically curtailed spending by the Government in any 1 year. Naturally, General Eisenhower would like to prevent a continuance of irresponsible procurement of military supplies. He has offered to Congress a plan to reorganize the whole Defense Department. Unfortunately, the subject is of such a complex nature and involves so directly the exercise of the legislative power by Congress that the President would have been better advised to submit a draft of a new national-defense law revising the present setup from top to bottom.

Congress is likely to turn thumbs down on the proposed reorganization plan because it is too vague and is unconstitutional. Congress has the duty under the Constitution to make laws regulating the armed services. This power cannot be delegated to a Secretary of Defense. Nor can the President, who is elected by the people, delegate to an appointed Cabinet member his duties of a Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, as prescribed in the Constitution.

The text of the reorganization plan permits the complete delegation of power also at any moment by the Secretary of Defense to any one of his six assistants, even though General Eisenhower in his foreword of explanation says that, "without imposing themselves in the direct lines of responsibility and authority between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the three military departments, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense will provide the Secretary with a continuing review of the programs of the Defense Establishment and help him institute major improvements in their execution."

The exact language of the bill proposed by the President reads as follows: "Performance of functions: The Secretary of Defense may from time to time make such provisions as he shall deem appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, or by any agency or employee, of the Department of Defense of any function of the Secretary, including any function transferred to the Secretary by the provisions of this reorganization plan."

It is contrary to the entire spirit of the defense laws of the past to delegate to any Cabinet member authority over all the armed services and to let him delegate it to any subordinate he pleases whenever he pleases. Such a delegation of authority has never before been suggested in the history of America's armed services. Instead of concentrating responsibility, it will tend to diffuse authority and render still less important the posts of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

What has happened is that originally the Air Force wanted to be separated from the Army. Out of 2 departments, 3 were created. Then came the drive for unification. The Defense Department was established in response to a crusade for an overall department that would coordinate all three armed services. Now, instead of triplication, the result has been quadruplication. As set forth in the new plan, the Defense Department is to become a bigger and broader bureaucracy than any of the 3 departments.

There are other weaknesses in the reorganization plan which the Armed Services Committees of both houses of Congress will surely detect. In the sense that General Eisenhower puts on the doorstep of Congress for debate a new plan, the document is a welcome addition to the literature of military controversy. But any idea that legislation can be written in the broad and unspecific terms suggested in the reorganization plan assumes an indifference to, if not an unfamiliarity by Congress with, its obligations under the Constitution to write the laws needed to regulate the armed forces.

[From the Evening Star, May 4, 1953]

IS DEFENSE PLAN CONSTITUTIONAL?-CONSTITUTION GIVES CONGRESS POWER OVER ARMY AND NAVY; CAN SUCH AUTHORITY BE DELEGATED TO SOME ONE PERSON?

(By David Lawrence)

Wide differences of opinion are emerging inside all three of the armed services concerning the merits of the plan submitted to Congress last week by the President under which the Department of Defense is to be reorganized.

Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, formerly Chief of Naval Operations, for instance, who was one of the consultants in drawing up the plan, has told this correspondent that he thinks it is a big improvement on the existing system. He has no fears of a man on horseback"" or a single military boss because of the increased powers that would be given the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thomas K. Finletter, formerly Secretary of the Air Force, however, fears the trend indicated is toward a sinlge service with one uniform and an obliteration of service identities and spirit. Rather than have this happen, he prefers to see two departments, one embracing the Army and the other combining the Navy and the Air Force. He gives his ideas in Collier's.

Inside the Government there is a substantial amount of feeling among military and naval and air officers of top rank that the new plan spells trouble and that, instead of strengthening the military power on the command and planning side, it could actually mean a weakening of it.

This writer has discussed the plan with members of the commission which recommended it and with some of the consultants who were called in and with high officers of the Pentagon, all of whom insist that it was never contemplated that a "German general staff" concept should ever be given recognition. But the difference nevertheless between those who fear the concept is being given new momentum and those who scoff at such fears is simply the extent that one's worded phrases of a proposed statute do mean or can be made to mean by those who hold office.

But

Nobody, for example, ever dreamed that when Congress passed a law in 1949 creating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs without even the right to vote in the Joint Chiefs' sessions that he would be anything else but a sort of secretary general who did the "housekeeping" and kept the agenda for the Joint Chiefs. actually he became and asserted the right to become the "military spokesman" of the Government. He briefed the President almost daily on the military situation. He spoke in behalf of the Joint Chiefs before congressional committees. He even made public speeches on military and political policy at the time of General MacArthur's return from the Far East. A few weeks ago in a public speech, the present chairman gave the "military viewpoint" on the Korean war and called it "personal." It was not the viewpoint of all the Joint Chiefs.

There are those who believe that all this is the proper function of a "chairman" and there are others who think he is merely a "coordinator" and will remain so. But now under the new plan the Chairman is given control over the selection and tenure of 200 officers of the so-called joint staff who used to be responsible to all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman is to be placed at the right hand of the Secretary of Defense and with a military staff almost entirely his own he can, if he chooses, make himself through public prestige and private influence the most powerful single military chief the United States ever had.

Since General Bradley was the only military member of the commission who wrote the report it is being called the Bradley plan. It cannot be viewed, however, as in any sense personal, for General Bradley himself retires in August of this year. But it does reflect a school of thought here which has constantly urged more and more power for a single chieftain and this is what critics have sensed as the incipient stages of the "German general staff" concept.

While it is easy to say that everything depends on the man who is appointed, the American people have been taught to believe that the greatest safety is to be found in a government of laws and not of men. There are some good features of the proposed reorganization plan, especially those which give flexibility in administration to civilian officials and those which introduce scientific and economic analysts at high levels to assist in overall planning. But the effort to relieve the Joint Chiefs of Staff or some of their duties on the ground that they are overworked really looks more like a plan to relegate them into the background so that a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs may take over the main job of furnishing military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

There may be a serious constitutional question involved. The President is named in the Constitution as the "Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States." While the constitution does not mention the Department of State or the Interior Department or any of the departments since created by Congress as executive agencies, it does specifically mention the Army and the Navy as constitutional departments. Just how much power over these constitutional departments can Congress delegate in blanket fashion? For the Constitution says: "Congress shall have power to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces."

With the specific duty resting on Congress to write laws governing the defense establishments, can Congress constitutionally acquiesce in a plan that permits the President to delegate almost complete authority to a Secretary of Defense who in turn is now to be given authority under the new plan to delegate whatever he pleases by way of authority to a "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs"?

That's the question Congress will have to settle in the next 60 days because, unless either House rejects the plan and calls for a revamping of the whole thing so as to safeguard it against military absolutism, the "reorganization" will take effect and the die will have been cast toward the single-military-chief concept. This was the one Goering and Hitler had, and it lost the war for them. This is the plan, moreover, that has been repudiated by most military men in America themselves. Certainly there should be no objection, therefore, to the insertion of legislative safeguards to prevent in the future abuse by any one of the powers now so vaguely described as a simple "reorganization."

[From the Evening Star, May 8, 1953]

LEGISLATION BY THE EXECUTIVE MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MIFFED OVER ATTEMPTS TO AMEND SECURITY ACT WITH REORGANIZATION PLAN

(By David Lawrence)

The proposed plan to reorganize the Defense Department and increase substantially the power and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is causing considerable concern in Congress, particularly among those Members who previously have been deeply interested in the advance of air power in the military services.

Criticism of the proposal is coming, however, from men in all three armed services who regard it as a step backward in military organization and as a move toward what has been called the Prussian general staff plan.

But, aside from the merits of the scheme, the submission of the reorganization plan has awakened in both houses of Congress a resentment over the method being used to amend the National Security Act. Instead of submitting legislative proposals to amend existing laws in the regular course, the technique of wrapping up the changes under the procedures of the reorganization Act is being attacked. Thus, the executive branch of the Government now writes a proposed law and sends it to both Houses and, unless one House or the other vetoes the proposal, it becomes law. This means that neither House can amend the proposal and must take it or leave it. As one Member of the House said: "This gives Congress only the power of veto but gives the Executive the right to make the laws. There are grave doubts as to whether this is constitutional."

A fundamental defect in this procedure, too, is that, before the plan is submitted to Congress, the members do not have a chance to express themselves. So far as is known, none of the members of the Armed Services Committees of the Senate or the House saw the text of the plan before it was submitted by the President. Also, it is known that the text was not even submitted in advance for criticism to the heads of the three armed services in the Defense Department-namely, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-who are to be affected fundamentally by the reorganization. Now, if these Chiefs are called to testify in Congress, they will feel muzzled because to oppose the measure in any way will subject them to the charge of "insubordination." Already mischief makers are trying to make it appear that these Joint Chiefs are fighting the proposed reorganization plan, when, as a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether they have made their viewpoint known to anybody, for the reason that until this week they never had a chance to examine it.

The plan has developed support and opposition among high officers in each of the three armed services, and it is a misrepresentation of the truth to say that any department is either for or against it. Opinion is divided.

Embarrassment would never have been created if the plan had been submitted to each of the members of the Joint Chiefs for study and criticism before it was embodied in a report by a commission of civilians plus General Bradley, who is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but does not reflect the views of all its members.

Representative Dewey Short of Missouri, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has told this correspondent that he plans to hold hearings soon on the proposed reorganization plan.

"Even though the plan," he said, "has been referred to the Committee on Government Operations, I have spoken to Chairman Hoffman and to Speaker Martin, and they both are agreeable for hearings to be held by our committee. The subject touches vitally the whole Department of Defense and all the armed services, and this, of course, is the primary job of the House Armed Services Committee. We intend to call witnesses to explain fully their views on the measure before any vote is taken in the House."

In the Senate, by agreement with Senator McCarthy, chairman of the Committee on Government Operations, the proposal had been referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee, but now there is some question as to whether this violates the reorganization law, which specifies that all proposals must be referred to the Committees on Government Operations in both Houses.

The whole episode and its collateral controversies may bring a test of the wisdom of the reorganization law itself. For here is a basic statute, known as the National Security Act, which it took many months in 1947 and 1949 to write and get through both Houses. Now, by a few provisions called "Reorganization Plan No. 6," the law is to be emasculated in many of its principal features. All this was to be done without giving a legal opportunity to the Armed Services Committees of both Houses to consider and formally report upon legislation that amends the laws they are supposed to write.

The new plan might be made workable by amendments, but first it would have to be voted down as an entity by either House and then new legislation written. It is regrettable that the President's commission didn't sit down with all the Members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees before recommending the plan to someone as busy as the President for his approval of a highly technical matter and then submitting it to Congress on a take-it-orleave-it basis.

[From the Evening Star, May 14, 1953]

MILITARY TAKES STEP BACKWARD-PROPOSED DEFENSE REORGANIZATION BAD IN PRINCIPLE, THOUGH PERSONNEL SELECTIONS ARE WISE ONES (By David Lawrence)

Selection of a new set of members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a new Chairman does not lessen but rather intensifies the growing opposition to the proposed reorganization plan for the Defense Department. It is the principle rather than the personnel which is important in the problem.

This plan, which Thomas K. Finletter, formerly Secretary of the Air Force, says he regards as a move toward a "German general staff" system, would enhance the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and make him a military boss over all three armed services.

The reaction from the Air Force to the appointment of a Navy admiral as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has been adverse largely because of the assumption that such a Chairman can wield extraordinary powers over the Air Force. Since Admiral Radford, designated for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is to serve only 2 years, it may be expected that the reaction among naval officers to the designation of an Air Force general as Chairman 2 years hence would also be adverse. The new reorganization plan is excellent in its provisions governing a consolidation of civilian functions and should lead to economies, but it is a step backward on the military side. Undoubtedly the administration, in selecting Admiral Radford to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, believed that this would tend to mollify those opponents of the new reorganization plan who come from the Navy, but actually opposition is coming from all three services because it is not a sound military plan.

It so happens that Admiral Radford is one of the ablest military officers America has ever had and undoubtedly he was chosen by President Eisenhower because of two things: First a commitment publicly made in 1949 before a congressional committee by General Eisenhower that the chairmanship should go by rotation to the different services and that he thought a Navy admiral should be selected next; and second, an admiration for Admiral Radford's work in the Pacific where he has been commander in chief of the fleet.

There is some mischievously expressed opposition to Admiral Radford in certain quarters on the ground that he testified in criticism of the Air Force concepts on weapons in the famous congressional hearings in 1949 concerning the B-36. But, since the Congress sought the testimony, it should not be any

more of a barrier to his advancement than was the testimony of General Bradley. The latter, as Chief of Staff of the Army, testified in the same hearings and called the Navy admirals "fancy Dans" and predicted there would never be another amphibious landing. But he was promoted just the same by President Truman to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The new team selected for the military-advice function which the Joint Chiefs of Staff is supposed to perform for the Secretary of Defense and the President is an excellent one in every respect. General Ridgway, who comes here to become Chief of Staff of the Army, has been commander in chief in the Far East during a large part of the Korean war and also Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Europe. General Twining, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is one of the ablest men in that service, with an excellent command record during the last war. As for Admiral Carney, who becomes Chief of Naval Operations, he has been serving as Commander of the Allied Forces in the South of Europe and has an especial familiarity with the Mediterranean. He made an enviable record as Chief of

Staff to Admiral Halsey in the sea battles of the war against Japan.

This is an all-around team of able men with global experience a much better team on the whole than has been available to the President of the United States since the days of World War II. It is a group competent to give military advice with a world perspective and to operate the armed services effectively if a big war should break out.

But a much more sensible step would have been to have made Admiral Radford Chief of Naval Operations and to have abolished the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, creating in its place a post of Secretary General of the Joint Chiefs, with Admiral Carney in that job. As a former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in charge of logistics and as an experienced staff officer and planner, he would have been ideal as the leader of the joint staff responsible directly to the heads of the three armed services.

The reorganization plan now before Congress has in it so many vulnerable provisions that it cannot be critically examined on the basis simply of what able persons will execute the plan but only with the more important principle in mind that a system is being established for a long period of time. This system could demoralize the spirit of all the armed services by depriving their chiefs of less and less voice in the higher councils of the Government where military policy is to be made by a Secretary of Defense and a military boss with a general staff of his own.

[From the U. S. News & World Report, May 8, 1953]

FIVE DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS

(By David Lawrence)

The word "pentagon"-from the Greek, meaning five sides-is coming into its own. There may now be five departments of defense:

1. The Army-responsible to the Secretary of the Army.

2. The Navy-responsible to the Secretary of the Navy.

3. The Air Force-responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force.

4. The Joint Staff-responsible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. The so-called Department of Defense-responsible to the Secretary of Defense.

Each of these departments, under a new plan just promulgated, is to have a substantial personnel. Six more Assistant Secretaries of Defense are to be created. Authority is to be widely diffused.

The net effect of the proposed changes is to create a hodge-podge of responsibilities and a dangerous confusion.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff-which is supposed to be the principal military advisory body is to be relegated to an unimportant and incidental place in the whole complex structure of the Defense Fstablishment.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is to be made the boss of a big staff of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel divorced from the Chiefs of Staff themselves. The Chairman alone is to fix tenure and approve the selections in the new Department. This means that he becomes the principal military chief of the Government and, unless his subordinate personnel give him the advice he wants, they can be fired. The Joint Chiefs, who are the operating heads of the three services, would have no authority over the men who are to become the real makers of military policy. Under the guise of civilian control, a plan has been hatched which puts America