posal consideration. It apparently gave it none, judging from its report. We think it is a good idea, sir, and would like to see something done about it. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Bennett. STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. BENNETT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA The CHAIRMAN. I want to welcome you. Mr. BENNETT. I deeply appreciate this opportunity to testify on Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, relating to the Department of Defense. After studying Reorganization Plan No. 6 carefully, I am sure that most of its provisions can and probably will lead to the manifest purpose of this legislation to secure greater national security, efficiency, and economy. For the purpose of brevity, I will address myself only to specific objections to specific sections, these being only subsections (c) and (d) of section 1 of the plan. Subsection (c), as you know, takes away from the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority and responsibility for the selection of members of the Joint Staff to the significant degree that the tenure of the members of the Joint Staff would hereafter "be subject to the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and subsection (d) as now written would decree that "the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to managing the Joint Staff and the Director thereof" would be hereafter "transferred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Under these provisions as now written, therefore, we are looking squarely upon a proposal which would impose upon our Nation a single Chief of a General Staff. This contrasts with the present situation where we have a Joint Staff composed of officers from the several services and managed by direction of the heads of the various branches of the services, acting in concert as the organization entitled the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The proposal to have a single Chief of a General Staff is not new in principle. It has been conscientiously advanced in the past by a number of professional soldiers, men who honestly and without ulterior motives feel that authoritative military direction on a national level by a single man in uniform is necessary to the efficiency of our national military organization. Such proposals have always been rejected by our country in the past. The most recent outstanding rejection of such a proposal came about in the Hoover Commission study and decision. In the work of that Commission, Mr. Dean Acheson and other minority members recommended the creation of a Chief of Staff of the Armed Services. minority report is found in the Hoover Commission report, pages 28, 29, and 30. That Mr. Hoover indicated in 1949 in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that his view of the Chairman was as a general presiding officer, to preside over meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to be their intermediary with the President and the Secretary of Defense, basic decisions being made by the Joint Chiefs, rather than by the Chairman. The minority recommendation in the Hoover Commission findings stated with respect to the status and authority of their proposed Chief of Staff for the Armed Services that "the Joint Staff would be subordinate to him." The majority view, which then prevailed, made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a mere presiding officer and left the power and authority for decision and action in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group. Subsections (c) and (d) of section 1 of the proposed Reorganization Plan No. 6, as now written, would follow the minority view, rather than the majority view in the Hoover Commission findings because those subsections transfer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the management of the Joint Staff, instead of leaving that power and authority in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This policy is made certain by specifically providing that the selection of the members of the Joint Staff shall be subject to the approval of the Chairman. The proposal as it now stands in subsections (c) and (d) would give all of the military planning of our country to the single man, who would be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This probably would bring about greater efficiency, but it might endanger our security. The Chairman will control the planning and anyone who controls the planning will also control to a very great degree the findings and decisions at the end, regardless of how well motivated he might be and how impartial he might try and attempt to be in his decisions. The danger of putting all of this power into one person should not be overlooked. It would be far safer to leave the management of the Joint Staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before I close my testimony I would like to point out that, as now written, subsections (c) and (d) of section 1, in my opinion, violate the spirit of the United States Constitution. Our forefathers in the drafting of our Constitution tried in every way possible to prevent tyranny and the centralization of power in the hands of a few. They knew of military tyrants then; and present day history throughout many sections of the world shows that military tyranny can exist in the 20th century and does. Our wise forefathers in article II of our Constitution, after providing in general terms that the President shall be the Chief Executive, specifically provided in paragraph 1 of section II that- the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into actual service of the United States. The drafters of the Constitution in specifically providing these responsibilities in the President insured that an elected civilian official, the highest in the land, to wit, the President, would have the responsibility and the authority to be Commander in Chief. There are not many specific powers given to the President in the Constitution. This is one of the few powers which is specifically given to him. It seems clear that the drafters of the Constitution felt that it was very important that this power should rest in the President and not in a member of the military services. Subsections (c) and (d), in attempting to give such paramount authority as is given therein to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seem to me to be in violation of the spirit, if not the words, of the Constitution of the United States. It is important now in 1953 that we heed the judgment of our forefathers in the drafting of the Constitution and that we turn out backs upon any pathway which might lead to military domination in our country. This is so not only because it is important that we evade military tryanny, but also because the pathways of military tyranny have never been very secure pathways. They are precarious; they are dangerous; they are subject to the individual fallibilities of the person who may have the dominant military role at any particular time. By way of summary, I ask this committee to reject subsections (c) and (d) as they are presently drawn because they are in violation of the spirit of the Constitution of the United States; because they may open doors to military tyranny; and because they may unnecessarily endanger the security of our country, as presently written. I would prefer to see subsections (c) and (d) entirely stricken from the reorganization plan, but the good objectives which are sought by subsections (c) and (d) could probably be secured without objections if the subsections were rewritten as follows: (c) The selection of the members of the Joint Staff by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their tenure, shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense. (d) The functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to managing the Joint Staff and the Director thereof shall be exercised through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It seems to me that revising the language as shown in the above paragraphs would tend to minimize the absolute power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, at the same time, would allow him to act as the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a manner consistent with the apparent desire expressed in Reorganization Plan No. 6, eliminating, nevertheless, some of the objectionable grants of power inherent in the language as it now stands in the proposed Reorganization Plan No. 6. I deeply appreciate this committee allowing me to appear. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) The CHAIRMAN. We will recess until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 4:50 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 9 a. m, the following day.) REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 6 OF 1953 (Department of Defense) FRIDAY, JUNE 19, 1953 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 9:15 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 362, caucus room, Old House Office Building, Hon. Clare E. Hoffman (chairman of the committee) presiding. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. STATEMENT OF NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I have submitted, as per your request, a statement for today. In view of the opportunity which I had to listen to the testimony yesterday, I wonder if I might deviate some from this statement instead of reading it in its full form. The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Follow whatever course you wish. Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much. I would like to follow, if I could, somewhat the following_outline to give a little background: First, on the Committee on Defense Department Organization, and then a little background on the committee's thinking, then move from there to the organization, functions, and procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish this statement put in the record, or do you intend to read part of it? You may do whatever suits you. Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I will read part of it and perhaps afterward if the Secretary wants to include those parts I didn't read it would be all right with me. I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you in connection with the Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 relating to the Department of Defense. As background for the discussion of the reorganization plan, perhaps it would be helpful if I said first a word about the reorganization study undertaken by the Committee on Department of Defense Organization, of which I had the honor of being chairman. This report of the Committee was made available to Congress by the Secretary of Defense at the time the President sent his message and reorganization plan to the Congress. 34999-53-10 139 |