JUST COMPENSATION-Continued
and 46244 are entitled to recover.
Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 85, et seq.; Horstman Co. v.
United States, 257 U. S. 138. Gerlach Live Stock
Company, etc., 1.
II. Where it is shown by the evidence that the lands of
plaintiffs were riparian to the San Joaquin River or
some one or more of its sloughs, subject, however,
to prior appropriative and prescriptive rights of
Miller & Lux, Inc., and its subsidiaries; and where
it is further shown that by overflows and by seepage
the lands of plaintiffs, except for a small portion of
the lands of the Gerlach Live Stock Company, were
moistened in times of high water and made more
productive; it is held that the erection of the Friant
Dam took these rights from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs'
right to compensation is limited to their rights to
have their lands moistened and enriched in times of
high water.
III. Where Miller & Lux, Inc., conveyed, or agreed to con-
vey, to plaintiffs, respectively, the parcels of land
involved in the instant suit by conveyances or
agreements which excepted or reserved certain
water rights; and where, thereafter Miller & Lux,
Inc., and its subsidiaries conveyed to the United
States all of the water rights so excepted or re-
served: Held-
(a) Since the deed to plaintiff Potter was subject
only to the "existing water rights" of Miller & Lux,
who did not have the right to store water at Friant
Dam, plaintiff Potter is entitled to recover from the
defendant the value of the water rights appurtenant
to the Potter lands, of which he was deprived by the
erection of the Friant Dam (Case No. 46245).
(b) In the deed from Miller & Lux to plaintiffs
Martin Erreca, et al., where the reservation went
beyond the existing rights of Miller & Lux and pro-
vided that the rights reserved included the right "to
store, impound, divert and use all or any part of the
waters of the San Joaquin River" and should be an
easement on the lands conveyed and the riparian
rights thereto; the grantor intended to retain not only
the rights it had already acquired but also the right,
as against the grantee, to appropriate additional water
in the river, and plaintiffs are not entitled to recover
(Case No. 46247).
(c) In the deeds to the Gerlach Live Stock Company
and Martin Erreca, sole, which are identical in their
JUST COMPENSATION-Continued
terms, where the grantor intended to reserve its
existing water rights, "including the right to contract
for or to permit storage on the upper reaches of the
San Joaquin River"; the quoted language related to
certain preexisting contracts for storage of water for
hydroelectric power production only, and the right
was not reserved to contract for or to permit diversion
of the waters of the river, and plaintiffs are entitled
to recover (Cases Nos. 46009 and 46244).
Id.
IV. Under the decisions of the courts of California, it is
held that plaintiffs were not deprived of all of their
rights as riparian owners by the amendment to the
California Constitution adopted in 1928 (Article
XIV, Section 3) which preserves in an owner the
right to use the waters of the stream to which his
lands are riparian only to the extent that he can
beneficially use them without unnecessary waste,
since plaintiffs had the right to demand that de-
fendant provide such a physical solution as would
permit plaintiffs to receive so much of the waters
as plaintiffs could beneficially use, or in the alterna-
tive to compensate plaintiffs for the deprivation of
their rights. Id.
V. Where defendant entered into a contract with Miller
& Lux, former owner of plaintiffs' lands, under
which defendant agreed to pay $9 per acre for the
taking of the water rights involved in the instant
cases; and where defendant placed in escrow & sum
to be disbursed upon the determination of the
respective claims herein; it is held that this was
recognition on the part of defendant that plaintiffs'
rights were worth at least that amount. Id.
VI. Under the decisions of the courts, it is held that the
time of taking, as in the erection of a dam, comes
whenever the Government's intention to take has
been definitely asserted and begins to carry out
that intent. Id.
VII. In the case at bar there can be no doubt that the
Government intended to deprive plaintiffs of what-
ever water rights they had in their lands, and upon
the facts and circumstances of the case it is held
that the taking occurred not later than October 20,
1941. Id.
VIII. Where plaintiffs, who had for many years operated
an "automobile graveyard," had on hand in 1942
1,257 units, from which many of the parts had been
removed and sold and other parts had been re-
JUST COMPENSATION-Continued
moved and placed in storage, but still other usable
parts remained; it is held that plaintiffs were
entitled to more than the "scrap" value of their
entire stock of goods when they were requisitioned
for Government use on August 7, 1942, under the
act of October 16, 1941 (55 Stat. 742). Williams,
IX. To treat as scrap automobiles in an "automobile
graveyard," even though they had been highly
used and partially dismantled, when they repre-
sented a substantial portion of the business that
had been operated continuously for a number of
years, is not a reasonable basis for just compensa-
tion. Schaffer v. United States, 104 C. Cls. 229. Id.
X. The value of requisitioned property cannot always be
determined with mathematical precision, and in
such case the court must determine in the light of
the entire record its judgment as to the actual value
of the property, based on the testimony and docu-
ments in the case. Id.
XI. Where during the year 1941 various agencies of the
Government acting under Executive Order No.
8832, terminating all commercial transactions with
Japan, including purchase of silk, forbade the
processing of raw silk and authorized the delivery
of raw silk to, or pursuant to the instructions of,
the Defense Supplies Corporation; and where, sub-
sequently, on October 16, 1941, an order of the
War Production Board provided that the order of
contractors having contracts with the Government
for the manufacture of parachutes or the orders of
the Defense Supplies Corporation had to be accepted
and filled by owners of silk; it is held that the silk
acquired from the respective plaintiffs by the Gov-
ernment, under the various orders referred to, was
requisitioned for public use, in the constitutional
sense, as of October 16. Stahel, et al., 682.
XII. Where the respective plaintiffs were paid for their
silk on the basis of the ceiling price which had been
fixed for silk on August 2, 1941, by the Office of
Price Administration immediately after the issuance
of Executive Order No. 8832 and where, in the
conditions then existing, this ceiling price was set for
the normal purpose of protecting the public economy
against inflation and of protecting users of silk,
including the Government, from being charged
unduly high prices; it is held that in the circum-
JUST COMPENSATION-Continued
stances and in the absence of a free market, the
ceiling price of $3.08 per pound paid to the plaintiffs
constituted just compensation. See Walker v.
United States, 105 C. Cls. 553. Id.
XIII. To say that when the Government forbids an owner
of property to make any other use of it, and re-
quires him to sell it, upon request, to the Govern-
ment or its designee who will use it for a Govern-
ment purpose, is not a taking of the property for
public use, would be to make the constitutional
right to just compensation contingent upon the form
by which the Government chose to acquire f
of the property.
XIV. The taking of property by the sovereign for public
use, though unquestionably an act of sovereignty,
does not, under the Constitution, leave the sover-
eign immune from payment of compensation for
the taking. The Fifth Amendment expressly im-
poses liability. Id.
XV. On the basis of the plaintiffs' practically unsupported
suggestion, and in the absence of briefing and argu-
ment upon the question, the court does not decide
whether or not the fixing of prices by the Office of
Price Administration and Civilian Supply, at the
time in question, was authorized by existing legis-
lation.
XVI. Where it is found that the Government took the
plaintiffs' silk on October 16, 1941, the court con-
Icludes that the plaintiffs are entitled to interest,
not as interest, but as a part of just compensation,
for the period from that date until they were, re-
spectively, paid for their silk, since during that
period they had neither the use of the silk nor the
money value of it. Id.
XVII. The Government having legally requisitioned the silk
on October 16, 1941, but not having actually taken
it out of the plaintiffs' possession until some months
later, it was in effect being stored and handled by
the plaintiffs on the Government's account, during
that period, and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled
to recover the amounts expended for storage and
handling after October 16. Id.
See also Eminent Domain XXV, XXVI, XXVII,
XXVIII, XXIX; Patents I, II, III; Requisition of
Vessel I, II, III.
LABOR CLAIMS.
See Contracts XXXVIII.
See Suit for Salary IV.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
See Contracts XVI, XXXVII, LIV, LV, LVI.
MENTAL INCAPACITY.
See Federal Judge, Rights of, VII.
NAVIGABILITY OF STREAM.
See Eminent Domain I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII.
OFFICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRATION.
See Eminent Domain XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII,
XXIV.
I. Where plaintiff had no license agreement with anyone
for the payment of a royalty for the use of his alleged
invention in connection with the manufacture of
articles for the United States, there could not be an
order of a department or agency of the Government,
which is a condition upon which the right to sue the
United States is based under the Royalty Adjust-
ment Act (35 U. S. C. 89–96) and the mere allega-
tion in plaintiff's petition that the United States had
used plaintiff's unpatented device was not sufficient
to bring plaintiff's claim within the terms of that
Act. See Ivor B. Yassin v. United States, 110 C. Cls.
211.
II. The facts alleged in the petition show that the alleged
invention is not a component of aircraft within the
meaning of Section 10 (i) of the Air Corps Act of
July 2, 1926 (10 U. S. C. 310 (į)), which was enacted
to cover aircraft and constituent elements or parts
thereof, designs for which were considered rarely, if
ever, patentable under R. S. 4929, by reason of the
provision therein that a design must have certain
features of ornamentation. Id.
III. The petition sets forth that the alleged invention in
suit consisted of a "plan, means or method or system
for camouflaging parachutes." The invention was,
therefore, for a process or method rather than a
design. At most it related to an accessory for air-
craft rather than a component part thereof. Id.
IV. Since plaintiff has not alleged facts to show that he
had a contract with the Government within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, a use by the
Government of his unpatented device or method
would not constitute the basis for a suit under the
provisions of U. S. Code, Title 35, Sections 68, 90
or 94, or under the provisions and limitations of the
Air Corps Act of 1926, as amended, and defendant's
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