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later, it was in effect being stored and handled by
the plaintiffs on the Government's account, during
that period, and the plaintiffs are therefore entitled
to recover the amounts expended for storage and
handling after October 16. Id.
XXV. Where the United States, by the War Shipping Ad-
ministration, pursuant to Section 902 (a) of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended (53
Stat. 1255), on March 25, 1943, requisitioned the
excursion steamship State of Delaware, and made
certain payments to the owner on the basis of value-
tions fixed by the defendant for the vessel, together
with all appurtenances, equipment, and consumable
stores aboard the vessel at the time; it is held that
the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Wilson Line,
XXVI. In fixing a valuation which represents just compense-
tion to the owner of a vessel requisitioned by the
Government, as a general proposition it is not a
matter of formulas but there must be a reasonable
judgment having its basis in a proper consideration
of all relevant facts. In the instant case the court
has taken into consideration cost of reproduction,
cost of construction, acquisition costs so far as
relevant, improvements, replacement costs, depre-
ciation, earnings, physical condition, appraisals for
insurance and other purposes, and other facts.
Due to war conditions the use of excursion boats
was so popular and their operation so profitable
that there were no sales which might serve as an
indication of market value. Id.
XXVII. The Court of Claims, as well as other Federal courts
and authorities, is in accord with the rule that
reproduction cost less depreciation is one of the
principal gauges of value when market price is
XXVIII. In the instant case there is altogether lacking any
evidence to show that at the time of its taking the
vessel in suit might be requisitioned as a part of
any program of the Government then in contem-
plation (Cors v. United States, 110 C. Cls. 66).
Further, any enhancement in reproduction value,
as disclosed by the record, resulted from the in-
creased cost of labor and materials due to the war
conditions, both of which factors were at the time
under the controls imposed by the Government.
XXIX. Where it is found, on the evidence adduced, that the
fair value of the vessel at the time of taking, repre-
senting the cost of replacement plus capital im-
provements, was $880,000; and where it is found,
further, that the vessel by reason of its careful
preservation and use had a total useful life of 45
years, of which 25 years remained, and that depre-
ciation should be calculated at the rate of 242 percent
on a diminishing balance; it is concluded that 55
percent of the fair valuation at the time of taking
was $488,400, which amount the plaintiff is entitled
to recover, to which is to be added the value of
consumable stores and expendable equipment,
amounting to $5,534.57, making a total of $493,-
934.57; against which the defendant is entitled to
credit for the sums of $119,702.25 paid on October
28, 1943, and $86,547.75 on June 21, 1945; to which
is to be added compensation measured by interest
at 4 percent for delay in payment of the several
I. Where the United States District Court, pursuant
to the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversing the conviction of plaintiff, entered an
order containing recitals and findings that the
conduct of the defendant (plaintiff in the instant
case) did not constitute an offense against the
United States or the State in which he had been
convicted and that he had not contributed to bring
about his arrest or conviction; it is held that the
Court of Claims must accept such findings as ground
for recovery for erroneous conviction under the
Act of May 24, 1938, and the Court of Claims could
not go behind such findings nor inquire into the
record of the District Court or the Circuit Court of
Appeals to determine that reversal of the trial
court was on grounds not relating to plaintiff's
guilt or innocence, Andolschek, 567.
II. Where the District Court, on the ground that it had
lost jurisdiction to modify its final order, two years
after entering that order refused to modify such
order by striking out recitals that plaintiff's con-
duct did not constitute an offense and that he had
not contributed to his own arrest and conviction;
it is held that the fact that the District Court then
considered such recitals erroneous did not affect
plaintiff's right to sue the United States for erro-
neous conviction under the statute. Id.
III. The evidence adduced establishes that plaintiff,
because of his conviction and im onm t,
sustained damages in excess of $5,000, and he is
entitled to recover the statutory maximum of
See Taxes IV, V, VI.
See Federal Judge, Rights of, IV.
See Contracts XLIV.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 8832.
See Eminent Domain XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII,
EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 9301.
See Contracts L, LI, LII, LIII.
EXTENSION OF TIME.
See Contracts LVII, LVIII.
FAILURE TO DELIVER.
See Contracts LIV, LV, LVI.
I. The right of a Federal Judge under Section 260 of the
Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. 250) providing for the
resignation of a judge under certain circumstances
and the payment of his salary for the balance of his
life, is a contractual right and the Court of Claims
has jurisdiction of a suit for salary under said
section. Johnson, 750.
II. While Section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution,
forbidding the passage of laws impairing the obliga-
tions of contracts, applies to the States alone and
not to the Federal Congress, it nevertheless states
the general policy of the United States on the matter
of the impairment of the obligations of contracts by
legislative action. Id.
III. The right of a judge who resigned under the provisions
of the Act of April 10, 1869 (Section 260 of the
Judicial Code), is a property right and comes within
the protection of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
IV. In the instant case plaintiff, then a Federal District
Judge, who was eligible for retirement, was under
investigation by the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House for alleged official misconduct and was
threatened with impeachment. On June 29, 1945,
he submitted to the President his resignation. On
July 14, 1945, he addressed to the Judiciary Com-
mittee a letter reciting that he had resigned and
stating that he now further renounced and relin-
quished any right, including financial benefits,
which he might have under the retirement provision
of Section 260. Whereupon the Judiciary Com-
mittee, in a report to the House, stated that in view
of plaintiff's renunciation of his retirement rights,
it was withholding a recommendation for the
impeachment of plaintiff. The court concludes
that since plaintiff offered his resignation and
renounced all further rights to his office, including
financial benefits, in order to induce the committee
not to recommend impeachment, and further that
his resignation and renunciation caused the com-
mittee to decide not to recommend impeachment,
plaintiff is estopped in equity and good conscience
to assert any claim to those benefits which he
renounced in order to prevent impeachment,
provided, however, that plaintiff was not mentally
incapacitated at the time. Id.
V. The court holds that it is immaterial whether or not
the House Judiciary Committee had the power to
accept plaintiff's renunciation of his rights under
Section 260 of the Judicial Code, since the letter of
renunciation was written to induce that committee
to take the desired action in a matter over which
it did have jurisdiction and because of the letter
the committee acted in the way plaintiff sought;
and the letter of renunciation, having accomplished
its purpose, plaintiff was then without power to
revoke it, as he later attempted to do. Id.
VI. The court does not decide what, if anything, the Act
of June 24, 1946 (60 Stat. 304) adds to the case.
VII. Where the plaintiff in his petition avers that at the
time his letter of renunciation was written he was
mentally incapacitated; and where the Govern-
ment admits that his allegation of mental inca-
pacity, if true, is sufficient to vitiate his renuncia-
tion; the defendant's demurrer is overruled and the
case is referred to a commissioner to take testimony
on the question of mental incapacity and on such
other questions as may appear to be relevant to
plaintiff's right to recover. Id.
See Rental of Space II.
See Eminent Domain VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV.
See Citizenship I, II, III.
See Contracts XXXIX, XL, XLI, XLII, XLIII, XLIV, XLV,
XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX.
I. The Court of Claims has held that an employee of the
Government cannot be legally discharged from his
position and deprived of the emoluments thereof
unless the procedure prescribed by the Act of
August 24, 1912, has been complied with, but on
the other hand the Court of Claims and the Su-
preme Court have held that if the procedural re-
quirements are complied with, the Court of Claims
has no jurisdiction to review the cause of removal.
II. The determination of whether or not a person's dis-
charge would promote the efficiency of the Gov.
ernment service is vested by the statute in the
administrative officer, and if his action is taken in
good faith no court has the power to review his
action. But if the employee's discharge was moti-
vated by malice or prejudice or other ulterior
motives, then, in that case, the employee's dis-
charge was wrongful and illegal, and he would be
entitled to sue for whatever loss he might have
suffered thereby, and the Court of Claims would
have jurisdiction. Id.
See also Citizenship III; Federal Judge, Rights of, I;
Patents IV, V, VI, VII.
I. In a suit to recover just compensation for the taking
of water rights which plaintiffs claim they had as
the owners of land riparian to the San Joaquin
River or one of its sloughs, where such rights were
taken by the construction of the Friant Dam on the
San Joaquin River upstream from plaintiffs' lands,
for the purpose of diversion of the waters of the
San Joaquin River; and where it is shown that when
the project is completed the lands of plaintiffs will
be wholly deprived of the water of the river which
they now enjoy to a limited extent; and where it is
shown by the proof that the purpose of the project
was to irrigate certain nonriparian lands and was
not in aid of navigation; it is held the defendant is
not immune, by reason of the river's navigability,
from liability for property taken in carrying out the
project and plaintiffs in cases Nos. 46009, 46245,