III. Claim No. 2. Where plaintiff produced and placed
concrete in constructing reinforced beams and
made claim therefor at the unit price specified in
the contract, and where it is shown that the cost
of these payments was not included in the lump
sum bid price for the buildings; it is held that
plaintiff is entitled to recover.
IV. Claim No. 3. Where it is shown that the cost of
furnishing wash racks and booster pumps was
included in plaintiff's bid price but that the cost
of excavation and concrete in connection with the
installation of the wash racks and booster pumps
was not included by the contract documents in the
cost of such wash racks; and where plaintiff sublet
part of the work for the wash racks and booster
pumps to its plumbing subcontractor; and where
the cost of installation is shown; it is held that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover, at the unit price for
such excavation and concrete. Id.
V. Claim No. 4. Where plaintiff bid a "unit price" for
one pump complete with housing, wiring, connec-
tions, etc., on the basis of the work it would do and
on the bid of its subcontractor, who was to furnish
the pumps and plumbing; and where plaintiff in-
advertently and unintentionally entered the amount
of its bid price for one pump in the total column,
instead of entering therein the total for the two
pumps complete in place; and where plaintiff's
error was caused by defendant's failure to indicate
the number of pumps; it is held that plaintiff is
entitled to recover.
Id.
VI. Claim No. 5. Where plaintiff claims it was entitled
to be paid twice for 1,163 cubic yards of material,
first, as excavation for foundations and, second, as
material used for the purpose of grading under
buildings; and where it is shown that the contract
documents required that any surplus excavated
material once paid for should, if suitable, be used,
among other purposes, for space grading without
additional payment; it is held that plaintiff is not
entitled to recover. Id.
VII. Claim No. 6. Where plaintiff made claim for pay-
ment at $2 a cubic yard for 750 cubic yards of
"space grading" adjacent to certain buildings prior
to the date when defendant took over this work;
and where claim was denied on the ground that no
work was performed in this area for which plaintiff
was entitled to payment under the contract; it is
held that the proof is not sufficient to show that
the findings and decisions of the area engineer and
the contracting officer, which were approved on
appeal, were erroneous and plaintiff is not entitled
to recover. Id.
VIII. Claim No. 7.. Where, about the time plaintiff com-
menced performance of the work, defendant decided
to make a change in the drawings for certain
buildings; and where it was not necessary under
this change to prepare new floor plan drawings, but
the change made it necessary for plaintiff to per-
form this portion of the work in reverse of the
manner shown on the drawings; it is held that on
the facts presented there is no proper basis for a
finding that increased costs were thereby incurred
and plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Id.
IX. Article 15 of the Standard Construction Contract
limits the finality of the contracting officer's deci-
sions to questions of fact or factual issues "except
as otherwise specifically provided in this contract."
Article 15 of the Standard Construction Contract
limits the finality of the contracting officer's deci-
sion to questions of fact or factual issues "except
as otherwise provided in this contract."
The pro-
vision in paragraph 1-07 of the specifications that
the contractor should furnish all plant, material, and
labor and perform the work in accordance with the
true intent and meaning of the drawings and speci-
fications, of which intent and meaning the contract-
ing officer should be the interpreter, was not a
provision "in this contract" which "otherwise speci-
fically provided" within the meaning of Article 15.
A provision in a specification cannot override an
article in the formal contract even though the speci-
fications are made a part of the contract by Article
1. Loftis v. United States, 110 C. Cls. 551. The
specifications and drawings were made a part of the
contract for the purpose of detailing the work to
be performed and the materials to be furnished.
See Harwood-Nebel Construction Co., Inc. v. United
States, 105 C. Cls. 116. Id.
X. The court takes notice, from the many contract cases
brought in the Court of Claims, that the Standard
Form of Construction Contract (Form 23) was first
adopted and approved by the President in 1926,
and that form contained Article 15, as it is written
in the contract in suit; Article 15 states a rule of
policy. It is only under Article 22 of the contract
in suit that the Government, acting through the
contracting agency or the head of the department
may, as a matter of policy, add additional articles
as "Alterations". Without any other aid than the
contract form itself, it is manifest to the court that
the Government intended that the provisions of the
standard form, and the policies stated therein,
would be paramount to the specifications and would
govern in case of inconsistency or conflict. Loftis v.
United States, 110 C. Cls. 551. Id.
XI. Without relying upon the general rule of implied in-
tention, it is evident from the express provisions of
the standard printed "Directions for Preparation of
Contract," that the "Interpretation of Contract"
contained in the specifications (paragraph 1-07)
related only, and was intended to relate only, as its
provisions show, to the furnishing by the contractor
of materials, plant, supplies, equipment, labor, etc.,
necessary to complete the work in conformity with
the drawings and specifications, and according to
the directions of the contracting officer. The ulti-
mate settlement and decision of disputes arising
under the contract is another matter, to be governed
by Article 15. Id.
XII. Where the plaintiff, in 1942, entered into an Army con-
tract for the delivery of canned blackberries; and
where on account of crop failures, due to unfavor-
able weather in the States in which the plaintiff
could reasonably secure its supply of berries for
canning, plaintiff was unable to complete the per-
formance of the contract; it is held that the findings
of the contracting officer, to the effect that the fail-
ure to complete performance of the contract was due
to an unforeseeable cause without fault or negli-
gence of the contractor, were correct and binding
and that under the terms of the contract the con-
tractor was thereby relieved of any liability for
excess costs incurred by the defendant because of
contractor's inability to complete the contract, and
plaintiff is entitled to recover. Mitchell Canneries,
Inc., 228.
XIII. Under the decisions of the Court of Claims and the
Supreme Court, the findings of fact of a contracting
officer are binding upon both the Government and
the contractor if there is no showing of fraud, gross
error or arbitrary action by the contracting officer
amounting to bad faith. Id.
XIV. Where the contracting officer acted fairly and im-
partially and there is substantial evidence to sup-
port his findings, they should not be reversed by
the court. In the instant case, upon the evidence
adduced, the court finds no evidence of fraud, gross
error or arbitrariness on the part of the contracting
officer but, on the contrary, it is found that he acted
fairly and impartially and that the evidence upon
which he based his findings was substantial. Id.
XV. Under the provisions of the contract in suit it was
the responsibility of the contracting officer to find
as a fact whether unforeseeable and unusually
severe weather resulted in the contractor's inability
to deliver on the date specified in the contract.
Whether there existed unforeseeable and unusually
severe weather was a question of fact, not of law. Id.
XVI. Under the provisions of the liquidated damages clause
of the contract in suit, it is held that "delay" as
used in this provision was intended to cover both
the concepts of delay and failure to perform. Id.
XVII. It has been specifically held by the courts (Seaboard
Air Line Railway v. United States, 256 U. S. 655)
that transfers of a claim by operation of law or in
conjunction with changes of corporation structure
are not assignments prohibited by the statute (31
U. S. 203), which is therefore not applicable in the
instant case; and the Government in making set-
offs against the instant claim under other contracts
by the same parties in interest has itself acknowl-
edged the identity of the parties. Id.
XVIII. In a Government construction contract where the
specifications (Section 10) provided that no com-
plaint by the contractor as to extra work or as to
an order of the contracting officer would be con-
sidered unless a protect was submitted to the con-
tracting officer within 10 days; it is held that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover on its claim for
expense of a survey of foundations made at the
Government's request, since the claim was not
made within the time limit specified. Anthony
P. Miller, Incorporated, 252.
XIX. Where there was an unreasonable delay on the part
of the Government in the consideration of proposed
changes in plans which had been incorporated in the
contract already negotiated; and where this delay
prevented the orderly procedure laid out by the
contractor for the economical use of its working
force on the project; it is held that this delay, in
the circumstances, was a breach of the contract,
and plaintiff is entitled to recover. Id.
XX. Where the contracting officer's decision with reference
to the delay in the consideration of proposed
changes in plans denied the contractor's claim and
where this decision was affirmed on appeal to the
head of the Department; it is held that the provi-
sions of the contract in suit (Articles 9 and 15) did
not give to the contracting officer the power to
decide the contractor's claim for delay in such a
case. The power of the contracting officer, under
the provisions of the contract (Article 9), was to
determine whether liquidated damages should be
assessed against the contractor for late completion
of his work and not whether unliquidated damages
shall be assessed against the Government for its
breach of an express or implied obligation under
the contract. See B-W Construction Co. v. United
States, 101 C. Cls. 748. See also Langevin v. United
States, 100 C. Cls. 15. Id.
XXI. Plaintiff's claim as to increased costs of screen doors
is denied, since the indefiniteness of the specifica-
tions as to the screen doors was as obvious to the
plaintiff as to the Government at the time the con-
tract was negotiated, and plaintiff was dilatory in
making a written request concerning the matter. Id.
XXII. It was a breach of the contract for the Government
to write the specifications relating to electrical work
not in conformity with applicable regulations under
the National Electric Code and Utility Company
requirements, and plaintiff is entitled to recover for
the ensuing delay. Id.
XXIII. No recovery is allowed for alleged delay caused by
relocation of radiators, necessitated by the Govern-
ment's mistaken planning, since the completion of
the contract work as a whole was not delayed and
the plaintiff was not damaged thereby. Id.
XXIV. No recovery is allowed for alleged delay caused by
failure to furnish color schedules promptly, since
the contract work as a whole was not delayed and
plaintiff was not damaged.
XXV. Where the plaintiff's contract included the construc-
tion of the central heating plant; and where the
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