biological weapons. Furthermore, the process of searching for further limitations continues, including serious current efforts in the CCD.

The United States attaches great importance to the existing agreements and negotiations applicable to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. We are strongly of the view that discussions of the very broad proposal of the Soviet Union should not in any way, directly or indirectly, suggest dilution of the integrity or scope of application of existing treaties or negotiations concerned with specific kinds of weapons of mass destruction.

Any international agreement on arms limitation or disarmament should be subject to appropriate modernization in light of new scientific findings and other new facts. However, my Government would find it difficult to accept statements that appear to call into question the scope of already existing agreements. These statements could be very harmful to the general cause of arms control and disarmament, by casting unwarranted doubt on the effectiveness of such agreements.

As to current negotiations, I point to intensive efforts in the CCD at this time on a prospective convention concerning environmental modification.

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We can also take note of continuing and active discussions of limitations on chemical warfare.

AA O agreements already in existence, a particularly important example is the Biological Weapons Convention.

In this connection, I would like to draw the attention of e Committee to some statements made in December 1974, during the ratification process of the BW Convention in my country. The Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate inquired whether the Biological Weapons Convention would prohibit future types of biological warfare which might employ techniques beyond the current "state of the art". The Executive Branch responded

that:

"The Biological Weapons Convention would prohibit any future type of warfare which employed biological agents or toxins, regardless of when the agent was first developed or discovered. This also applies to weapons, equipment and means of delivery. In other words, the Convention prohibits not only existing means of biological and toxin warfare but also any that might come into existence in the future."

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distinguished biologist, Dr. Joshua Lederberg, pointed out to the CCD the advances being made in molecular biology and expressed his concern that newly developed techniques in this field might eventually be used to create infective agents against which no credible defense is possible. The most widelydiscussed techniques are often referred to as "genetic

engineering" but technically are properly known as

"recombinant DNA techniques".

These are techniques for joining

two different p "s of DNA in the laboratory to produce new DNA sequences, known as recombinant DNA molecules. In principle, such techniques could be used to design radically new viruses for biological warfare purposes.

When advances in science and technology are made, it is natural to ask about their possible use for hostile purposes and whether or not such uses are prohibited or restricted by existing international agreements. In the case of potential use of recombinant DNA molecules for weapons purposes it is our view that such use clearly falls within the scope of the Convention's prohibition. This interpretation is based upon the negotiating history as well as the explicit language of the Convention, and we believe that it is shared by the other

signatories.

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Weapons Convention and come to any other conclusion. The Preamble states that the States Parties are "determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons." The intent of Article I which begins, Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances ." is equally forceful and clear. To take a more restricted view of the Convention's scope would rob the Convention of much of its value and could even lead States to call into question the continued viability of the Biological Weapons Convention.

These were the views of the United States when the Convention was negotiated and ratified. They are still its views today. This is a matter of great importance to my Government and one on which doubt cannot be permitted to exist.

Mr. Chairman, the United States took note of many significa points raised by various delegations in the informal ineetings. We will give all of them careful study.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I must repeat that the Proposal of the USSR presents us with a very complex subject. The subject is not only complex. It also remains conceptually clusive because it has not yet been placed on a stable

Foundation of clear and generally accepted understandings.

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establish such a foundation and, at the same time, assure a harmonious relationship with existing agreements and negotiations. Within the confines of these complementary requirements, the United States will continue to view the proposal of the Soviet Union as an initiative to be given careful and constructively critical attention.

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