AT&T Consent Decree: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, August 1 and 2, 1989
United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991 - Antitrust law - 493 pages
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ability able activities affiliates allowed American antitrust Association AT&T believe Bell companies Bell operating companies Bell System benefits BOCs bottleneck BROOKS cable carriers Chairman Commission Communications compete competition competitors concerns Congress consent decree consumers continue costs Court create customers decision Department discrimination divestiture effect electronic electronic publishing enter equipment example exchange facilities fact Federal firms going important incentive industry information services integration interest interexchange involved issue Judge Greene Justice laws limited long distance look manufacturing matter MAZZOLI modified monopoly NARUC offer Pacific permitted position prevent problem prohibited proposed question rates Regional regulated regulatory Report requirements restrictions result rules safeguards served statement subcommittee subsidiaries switch telecommunications telephone companies Thank Trade United
Page 154 - telephone" has too many shortcomings to be seriously considered as a means of communication. The device is inherently of no value to us.
Page 17 - January 10. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 980 (DC Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 US 1005 (1985); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 464 US 891 (1983); Data Transmission Corp. v. AT&T. No. 76-1544 (DDC); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, No. 79-1182 (DDC); Southern Pacific Communications Corp. v. AT&T. No. 83-0094 & MDL 550 (ND Cal.); United States Transmission Systems v. AT&T, No. 82 Civ. 1986 (SDNY).
Page 21 - ... no matter who won the pending cases. First, the dual control of the local exchange bottlenecks and competitive businesses created inherent antitrust exposure — and the certainty of enormous litigation costs. No single verdict could ever end the controversies. No matter who won United States v. AT&T and the other pending cases, exposure to these antitrust charges was inherent in the integrated structure of the Bell System. Under the Department's leveraging theory, virtually any competitive success...
Page 16 - ... price squeezes" by charging inflated rates for local access while simultaneously lowering interexchange rates; delaying release of the interface information that long distance carriers need to develop new services; and continually "shifting from one anticompetitive activity to another.
Page 78 - ... data transmission, address translation, protocol conversion, billing management, introductory information content, and navigational systems that enable users to access...
Page 228 - As you may know, the NARUC is a quasi-governmental, non-profit organization founded in 1889. Within our membership are the governmental agencies of the fifty States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands which are engaged in the regulation of utilities and carriers.
Page 55 - Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.
Page 21 - Court rejected arguments that the creation of seven independent BOCs or the existence of state and federal regulations could eliminate the need for the line of business injunctions in the Decree. The court held that insofar as these injunctions and the threatened injuries to "competition, competitors, and ratepayers" are concerned, it is a "distinction . . . without a difference...
Page 21 - The developments and consumer benefits in the interexchange markets could scarcely be more dramatic. New long distance companies have entered this market "in reliance upon the competitive safeguards and industry structures provided in the Consent Decree," and especially on the fact that the Decree assures that owners of essential local exchange facilities may not compete in this market. Comments of National Communications Network, United States v. Western Electric. No. 82-0192, p. 4 (March 13, 1987)....
Page 8 - The Modification of Final Judgment (or "Decree") granted the United States the structural anti-trust relief that the Justice' Department had sought in over three decades of antitrust litigation with the formerly integrated Bell System. The January 1, 1984, divestiture split the Bell System between its monopoly local exchange businesses (assigned to the BOCs) and its competitive long distance and manufacturing businesses -(assigned to AT&T). The Decree originally contained four line of business injunctions...