of Hackney might as well rely upon the tower of London to fecure them againft highwaymen and. housebreakers.-As to the third kind of fecurity, that we shall not, in a few years, have all we have now done, to do over again in America; and be obliged to employ the fame number of troops, and fhips, at the fame immenfe expence to defend our poffeffions there, while we are in proportion weakened here: fuch forts I think cannot prevent this. During a peace, it is not to be doubted the French, who are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect forts in the most advantageous places of the coun try we leave them; which will make it more difficult than ever to be reduced in case of another war. We know by the experience of this war, how extremely difficult it is to march an army through the American woods, with its neceffary cannon and

ceive that they can at any time make an attack upon, and conftantly annoy as many of the expofed English fettlements as they please, and thofe at any distance from each other. The effects of fuch incurfions have been too feverely felt by many of the British colonies, not to be very well known. The entire breaking up • places that had been for a confiderable time fettled at a great ex-pence, both of labour and money; burning the houses, destroy6 ing the ftock, killing and making prifoners great numbers of ⚫the inhabitants, with all the cruel ufage they meet with in their captivity, is only a part of the scene. All other places that are exposed are kept in continual terror; the lands lie wafte and uncultivated, from the danger that attends thofe that shall presume to work upon them: befides the immenfe charge the governments must be at in a very ineffectual manner to defend their extended frontiers; and all this from the influence the French have had over, but comparatively, a few of the Indians.-To the fame or greater evils ftill will every one of the colonies be exposed, whenever the fame influence fhall be extended to the whole body of. • them. Ibid. p. 20.

ftores,

ftores, fufficient to reduce a very flight fort. The accounts at the treafury will tell you what amazing fums we have neceffarily spent in the expeditions against two very trifling forts, Duquesne and Crown Point. While the French retain their influence over the Indians, they can eafily keep our long extended frontier in continual alarm, by a very few of those people; and with a small number of regulars and militia, in fuch a country, we find they can keep an army of ours in full employ for feveral years. We therefore fhall not need to be told by our colonies, that if we leave Canada, however circumfcribed, to the French, we have done nothing* *;' we shall foon be made fenfible ourselves of this truth, and to our

coft.

I would not be understood to deny that even if we fubdue and retain Canada, fome few forts may be of use to secure the goods of the traders, and protect the commerce, in cafe of any fudden mifunderstanding with any tribe of Indians: but these forts will be beft under the care of the colonies interested in the Indian trade, and garrisoned by their provincial forces, and at their own expence. Their own intereft will then induce the American governments to take care of fuch forts in proportion to their importance; and fee that the officers keep their corps full, and mind their duty. But any troops of ours placed there, and accountable here; would, in fuch remote and obfcure places, and at so great a distance from the eye and inRemarks, p. 26.

spection

spection of fuperiors, foon become of little confequence, even though the French were left in poffeffion of Canada. If the four independent companies, maintained by the Crown in New York more than forty years, at a great expence, confifted, for moft part of the time, of faggots chiefly; if their officers enjoyed their places as fine cures, and were only, as a writer of that country stiles them, a kind of military monks; if this was the state of troops posted in a populous country, where the impofition could not be fo well concealed; what may we expect will be the case of those that shall be pofted two, three, or four hundred miles from the inhabitants, in fuch obfcure and remote places as Crown Point, Ofwego, Duquesne, or Niagara? they would scarce be even faggots; they would dwindle to meer names upon paper, and appear no where but the mufter-rolls.

upon

Now all the kinds of fecurity we have mentioned, are obtained by fubduing and retaining Canada. Our prefent poffeffions in America, are fecured; our planters will no longer be maffacred by the Indians; who depending abfolutely on us for what are now become the neceffaries of life to them, (guns, powder, hatchets, knives, and clothing) and having no other Europeans near, that can either fupply them, or inftigate them against us ; there is no doubt of their being always difpofed, if we treat them with common juftice, to live in perpetual peace with us. And with regard to • Douglafs.

France,

France, fhe cannot, in cafe of another war, put us to the immenfe expence of defending that long extended frontier; we fhall then, as it were, have our backs against a wall in America; the fea coaft will be eafily protected by our fuperior naval power and here "our own watchfulness and our own ftrength" will be properly, and cannot but be fuccefsfully employed. In this fituation, the force now employed in that part of the world, may be fpared for any other fervice here or elfewhere; fo that both the offenfive and defenfive strength of the British empire, on the whole, will be greatly increased.

But to leave the French in poffeffion of Canada when it is in our power to remove them, and depend, (as the Remarker proposes,) on our own “ ftrength

and watchfulness" to prevent the mischiefs that may attend it, feems neither fafe nor prudent. Happy as we now are, under the best of kings, and in the profpect of a fucceffion promifing every felicity a nation was ever bleffed with; happy too in the wisdom and vigour of every part of the administration; we cannot, we ought not to promise ourselves the uninterrupted continuance of those bleffings. The safety of a confiderable part of the ftate, and the intereft of the whole, are not to be trufted to the wisdom and vigour of future admiwiftrations; when a fecurity is to be had more effectual, more conftant, and much less expensive. They who can be moved by the apprehenfion of dangers fo remote, as that of the future indepen

• Page 25.

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dence

dence of our colonies (a point I fhall hereafter confider) feem fcarcely confiftent with themselves, when they fuppofe we may rely on the wisdom and vigour of an adminiftration for their safety. I should indeed think it lefs material whether Canada were ceded to us or not, if I had in view only the security of poffeffion in our colonies. I entirely agree with the Remarker, that we are in North America "a far greater continental as well 66 as naval power;" and that only cowardice or ignorance can fubject our colonies there to a French conqueft. But for the fame reason I difagree with him widely upon another point.

3. [The blood and treafure spent in the American wars, not spent in the caufe of the colonies alone.]

I do not think that our "blood and treasure has been expended," as he intimates, "in the σε caufe of the colonies," and that we are "mak"ing conquefts for them*:" yet I believe this is too common an error.-I do not fay they are altogether unconcerned in the event. The inhabitants of them are, in common with the other fubjects of Great Britain, anxious for the glory of her crown, the extent of her power and commerce, the welfare and future repofe, of the whole British people. They could not therefore but take a large share in the affronts offered to Britain; and have been animated with a truly British fpirit to exert themfelves beyond their strength, Remarks, p. 26.

and