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planning. By the end of the year the record was to be even more impressive. It included a contract with Portland General Electric worth $500,000 in revenues and enough contracts pending to enable the agency to sell the entire output of two generators yet to be installed. Forest Grove already was being called the Tupelo of the Northwest.26
These positive accomplishments, unfortunately, went unheralded because of the controversy centering on the PUDs. Raver unwittingly fed the dispute by calling the attention of Bonneville's advisory committee to their allegedly dismal performance. He attributed their deficiencies to the absence of aggressive leadership, originating in the relatively poor caliber of the commissioners. Like his predecessor Banks, Raver fought in vain to keep the BPA from becoming entangled in the conflict between public and private power groups. His decision not to proceed beyond encouraging abler men to stand for district elections alienated many who expected him to campaign actively against the private utilities. Neuberger, for example, in an anonymous editorial in the Nation accused Raver of subverting the Bonneville legislation. To Norris's private secretary, he wrote: “It shows that I was wrong about the Bonneville Administrator, Raver, and that he is not going to help the public power movement. This is a great tragedy." Neither Lilienthal nor Roosevelt had been neutral in PUD elections, he added, "but this Bonneville Administrator is.” 27
As the controversy persisted, Raver replied vaguely that he would be guided “by the wishes of the people and Congress.” Left to their own devices, the public power
forces in Oregon experienced a crushing defeat in the PUD elections of May 1940. In retrospect, the factors accounting for the defeat were more complex than Raver's lack of positive assistance. The issue of municipal versus district ownership in Portland, the effective use of propaganda against the district concept, and two rate reductions shrewdly timed to go into effect shortly before the elections played a role in the victory of the private utilities. Raver, nonetheless, received the onus of blame, and from that moment his standing among public power enthusiasts in the region diminished. 28
The administrator's aloofness also sustained the efforts of those who were opting for a modification of Bonneville's administrative status. Between 1940 and 1942 Congress debated but never enacted bills governing the disposition of the project. Representing the preferences of their sponsors, the various bills proposed a comprehensive valley authority, a power agency alone, and the incorporation of the agency into the Department of the Interior. Apart from opposing the loss of autonomy to Interior-in which he was joined by Norris, Lilienthal, Leland Olds, and regional opponents of Ickes-Raver continued to declare that he would abide by the will of the people and Congress. 29
Meanwhile, the European conflict overshadowed the bureaucratic divisions within the BPA, the antagonism between Raver and Ickes, and the war of attrition between PUD enthusiasts and the private power companies. As a member of the National
26 "History of the BPA,” vol. 2, intro., pp. 1ff.; Raver to King, Dec. 4, 1939, Box 22, King Papers, LC.
27 See, for example, Raver's comments in the “Minutes of the Meeting of Jan. 17, 1940," Box 21, NPPC Records, CF, RG 48, NA; [Richard L. Neuberger), Nation, Apr. 20, 1940, p. 499; Neuberger to John P. Robertson, Apr. 11, 1940, Tray 70, Box 1, Norris Papers, LC.
28 “What the Administrator Says About Bonneville: An Interview with Dr. Paul J. Raver,” Electrical World 84 (1940) :28; Ogden, “Power Policy in the Northwest,” pp. 324-328; Oregonian, Apr. 10, May 2, 1940.
29 For the details see Herman C. Voeltz, "Genesis and Development of a Regional Power Agency in the Pacific Northwest, 1933-1943," Pacific Northwest Quarterly 53 (1962) :69-74; Norris to King, Dec. 3, 1940, Tray 69, Box 3, Norris to Lilienthal, Jan. 6, 1941, and Lilienthal to Norris, Dec. 30, 1940, Box 4, Norris Papers, LC.
Power Policy and Defense Committee, Raver in 1940 asserted vital leadership in preparing Bonneville and Grand Coulee power to be the cornerstones of an integrated defense network in the Pacific Northwest. In July 1942, under the impetus of the War Production Board, Order L-94 interconnected the federal system of Bonneville and all other major electrical utility systems in the area. The advocates of public power in the Pacific Northwest regarded the interconnections as a serious threat to all prospective regional power authority legislation. And in Washington, D. C., Ickes perceived in the order evidence that the private utilities would use the emergency to subvert the national power policy. But what Roosevelt had resisted in peacetime, as scholars have noted, the war accomplished, initiating in the Pacific Northwest a new, often stormy, relationship between public and private power.30
It is not feasible to develop here all the ramifications of federal power policy in the 1930s, but certain observations based on the Bonneville story are worth recording. First, despite the persistence of internal administrative problems, the BPA was evolving into a Seattle City Lighting writ large by 1941. The resale rate structure was paying out as early as November 1940, and consumers responded immediately to the rate reductions by increasing power usage as Ross had predicted. Commercial and residential consumers in Cascade Locks, Forest Grove, Canby, and Skamania greatly increased their use of electric energy. Like
wise, the publicly owned distributing systems did succeed in proving that customers need not earn their reductions before receiving them.
The evolution of a national power policy exposed fundamental ideological differences within the New Deal, but the conflict, particularly in the Bonneville project, was primarily between those whose approach reflected more generalized principles of planning and those whose approach reflected more narrow concerns for power and resource development. The debate between the protagonists of public and private power development in the Pacific Northwest paralleled that conflict. Other sources of controversy were human and bureaucratic. Problems of interprogram conflict emerged as the work of one agency impeded or broadened the mission of another.
Furthermore, controversy among those who made national power policy often arose over emphases, priorities, strategies, and choices of time and circumstance in implementing programs. But New Dealers were men also, as one scholar has observed, and so personal competitiveness, personality clashes, and status rivalries were significant sources of conflict. In these respects, the Bonneville Power Administration differed little from other power programs and other agencies in the bureaucracy of the 1930s. 31
31 See the author's forthcoming study, Toward a National Power Policy: The New Deal and the Electric Utility Industry, 1933-1941 (Pittsburgh, 1973), and Charles E. Jacobs, Leadership in the New Deal (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967), pp. 22-25, whose conclusions about the bureaucracy were tested and confirmed in the author's research.
30 Voeltz, “Genesis of a Regional Power Agency," pp. 74-76; Funigiello, “Kilowatts for Defense,”
BLACK-WHITE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION
IN MIAMI DURING WORLD WAR I
An important source of untapped data that can be applied in urban and other historical research is available at the Federal Records Center in Atlanta, Georgia. World War I Selective Service registration records, which are organized by county for each state, provide significant information whose value is enhanced by current restrictions on federal census files. In addition to the registrant's name, nativity, and age, each registration card indicates race, residence, occupation, and place of employment.1
These draft records are especially valuable in analyzing and comparing Miami's native-born and immigrant occupational structure during World War I. Not only can a distinction be made between foreignborn and native blacks in Miami, which is impossible to make in census material, but it is also possible to quantify immigrants and natives of both races and to make more refined occupational comparisons than census reports allow. Finally, these Selective Service files permit an examination of the occupational structure of a twentieth-century city during a brief but crucial period in its history.
Between 1910 and 1920 Miami's population experienced unparalleled growth, rising from 5,471 to 29,571, an increase of over 400 percent. The white population grew by 500 percent, expanding from 3,213 to 20,301; the black population increased from 2,258 to 9,270, a rise of 300 percent. The black proportion of the total city population in 1920, however, was actually 10 percent lower than a decade earlier. In 1910 black Miamians comprised 41.3 percent of the city's total population; in 1920 they comprised 31.3 percent.3
Besides unparalleled growth in population, another condition peculiar to Miami during this period was the presence of large numbers of black Bahamian residents. Indeed, from 1870 through 1890 most blacks on the lower east coast of Florida had come from the Bahamas in search of work. Many black migrants from islands like Eleuthera and Exuma, however, retained their status as British subjects in hopes of eventually returning to their homelands. Moreover, the dramatic increase in the city's black population between 1910 and 1920 is partly attributable to an influx of roughly 5,000 Bahamians brought to Miami during World War I to work in the vegetable fields of Dade County.
1 Registration cards, Dade County, Fla., 1917-18, Records of the Selective Service System (World War I), Record Group 163, Federal Records Center, Atlanta, Ga.
2 U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1920 (Washington, D.C., 1922), vol. 3, Population, p. 195.
3 U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States, 1920-32 (Washington, D.C., 1935), p. 57.
4 George E. Merrick, “Pre-Flagler Influences on the Lower Florida East Coast,” Tequesta 1 (1941) : 1-10.
The total number of white immigrants in Miami between 1910 and 1920 was negligible. In 1910 only 358, or 6.5 percent, of the city's population were foreign-born whites. Ten years later the 2,563 foreignborn whites in the city constituted 8.7 percent of Miami's population. The major groups of white immigrants in Miami by 1920 were 244 Germans, 351 Canadians, 373 Englishmen, and 479 West Indians. Clearly, then, with respect to the relative size of its white immigrant population between 1910 and 1920, Miami was overwhelmingly a city of native Americans.
Until 1917 Miami's prosperity depended heavily upon winter tourists and Henry Flagler's railroad. The vacation season lasted only from January through March, with the rest of the year for most of the permanent population rather haphazard in terms of employment. But with the establishment of flight training centers in the city after the United States entered the war, work became available for virtually everyone, and Miami had its first experience with inflation. Soldiers from the Aero Gunners School at Chapman Field, sailors from Dinner Key Naval Air Station, and marines from Curtiss Field crowded local businesses and spent much-welcomed dollars. Wages
for common laborers rose from $1.50 a day to $1.00 an hour. Carpenters who had been making $5.00 a day now made two to three times as much.8 For many Miamians it was time to be a "boomer," not a "knocker."9
Between June 5, 1917, and September 12, 1918, there were three Selective Service registration periods in the United States. The first, on June 5, 1917, registered men between twenty-one and thirty; the second, between June 5 and August 24, 1918, registered men twenty-one years old; and the third, on September 12, 1918, registered men between eighteen and twenty and between thirty-two and forty-five years of age. In Dade County, Florida, the total registration for the three periods was 9,482, the city of Miami claimed over two-thirds of that figure 10
Using seven broad occupational categories ranging from unskilled to professional,11 the total of 6,435 Miami registrants was divided into four groups: native white, foreign white, native black, and foreign black. As the tables indicate, in terms of membership in the manual and nonmanual categories, the occupational distribution among native whites was the most evenly divided of the four groups. With respect to membership within each category, the majority, 56 percent, of native-white manual workers were skilled, while the largest proportion of nonmanual workers, 34 percent, were proprietors-owners of establishments such as bicycle repair shops, restaurants, tailor shops, and grocery stores.
5 Works Progress Administration, Miami and Dade County, Including Miami Beach and Coral Gables (Northport, N.Y., 1941), p. 4.
6 U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1910), vol. 2, Population, p. 197.
7 Hoyt Frazure, "Memories of Old Miami,” Miami Herald, 1964.
9 This was an expression used in the Official Directory of the City of Miami, 1907, p. 6.
10 Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service System to December 20, 1918 (Washington, D.C., 1919), p. 503.
11 The seven categories shown in the tables are those applied by Richard J. Hopkins in his study, “Occupational and Geographic Mobility in Atlanta, 1870-1896,” Journal of Southern History 34 (1968) : 200-213.
The second most evenly divided group in terms of manual versus nonmanual occupations were foreign whites, who constituted only 10 percent of Miami's total number of registrants. Like the native-white manual workers, the majority of foreign whites in the manual class, 52 percent, were skilled, while the largest proportion of nonmanual workers, 63 percent, were proprietors. Why 63 percent of foreign-white nonmanual workers, were proprietors, as opposed to 34 percent of native-white nonmanual workers, is difficult to determine. The situation in
Miami, however, was neither unique nor even unusual in this respect, since European immigrants in other cities were often merchants, perhaps as the first step toward upward mobility either intra- or inter-generational. According to Richard J. Hopkins, for example, 34 percent of Atlanta's immigrants in 1870 were in the proprietorial class, compared to 22 percent of native whites. Many of these immigrant proprietors, Hopkins suggests, were transient peddlers.12 Whether this suggestion applies to Miami, however, is a question still to be answered, although the limited data analyzed thus far indicate that there were no immigrant peddlers in the city during the 1917-18 period.
When examining black occupational distribution in Miami during World War I, it seems appropriate to discuss the native- and foreign-born together, given the striking similarity between the two groups. The tables show, for instance, that in each aggregation over 90 percent of the members were in the manual class and that the vast majority in each group were unskilled. Of the nonmanual workers in each category, most were proprietors, with the larger percentage found among the foreign-born. Here, according to one source, the tendency among black Bahamians in Miami to own property in greater proportions than native blacks can be explained as one of several cultural differences between the two groups. In the Bahamas, with blacks heavily in the majority, opportunities for the possession of property, no matter how little, were generally available to blacks as well as whites, while in the United States blacks seldom participated in property ownership.13
During World War I the overwhelming majority of both foreign- and native-born blacks in Miami performed most of the un
13 Interview with Rev. Theodore Gibson, Episcopal priest in Miami and former president of the local chapter of the NAACP, Coconut Grove, Aug. 19, 1970.