Hanna prepared a list of minor tariff reductions, the most the United States could hope to obtain, and the department accepted his recommendations. He stressed the Guatemalan government's willingness to cooperate but said, "the authorities here think there is great disparity between what they consider a trifling advantage to our commerce and a serious reduction in their revenues." The United States, the minister concluded, would have to settle for guarantees against Guatemalan tariff increases rather than reductions. He added: "I believe an agreement can be reached which while it may not give us any considerable immediate benefit will insure us against undesirable changes in tariffs and possibly give us a preferential position during the life of the agreement should the tariffs be raised for other countries." After considering this memorandum and conferring with Hanna in Washington, Hull directed Sidney E. O'Donoghue, the chargé in Guatemala, to resume negotiations and conclude an agreement on the best obtainable terms. The United States now sought only "a satisfactory agreement consisting of the general provisions, some duty reductions and assurances that rates on certain important American exports to Guatemala will not be raised during the life of the agreement." 14

Negotiations reopened in July, both sides seeking minimum concessions. Foreign Minister Skinner Klee said that "Guatemala would conclude a trade agreement with the United States, if only along the broad lines thereof; namely that Guatemala would guarantee not to increase duties on American products... and that some small tariff concessions might be made." Guatemala limited counterproposals to pledges of minor tariff reductions on twelve commodities and the mutual binding of tariffs at existing levels. O'Donoghue and Consul

14 Hanna to Hull, June 7, 1935, 611.1431/111; Hull to Sidney E. O'Donoghue, July 3, 1935, 611.1431 /115A.

General O. Gaylord Marsh felt "the concessions granted represent a praiseworthy effort on the part of the Guatemalan authorities" and recommended acceptance.15

The Guatemalan counterproposals served as the new basis for discussions and eventually constituted the framework of the agreement. O'Donoghue and Marsh informed the State Department that "the Government of Guatemala has granted all of the concessions which it will consider at the present time in view of the, to them, apparent lack of any direct compensating advantages." The State Department rejected Guatemalan requests to include cocoa, sisal, and several other products in the list of concessions on the grounds that Guatemala exported only small quantities of these commodites and that reductions of duties on them had to be negotiated with the principal producers. Department officials did reluctantly agree to include pineapples, the only duty reduction granted to Guatemala. Agreement on the basic terms of the treaty was reached during early October 1935, once it became apparent that neither country was willing to consider further concessions.16

Minor details, however, stalled the final settlement. Guatemala resurrected its request for protection against chicle smuggling, but the United States refused to incorporate the clause into the trade agreement. President Ubico then suggested a supplementary exchange of notes pledging cooperation against liquor and chicle smuggling without agreeing to any specific measures. Despite American consent the Guatemalan government later dropped the issue. A Guatemalan law requiring that certifi

15 O'Donoghue to Hull, July 9, 1935, 611.1431/117, July 26, 1935, 611.1431/120, Aug. 8, 1935, 611.1431 /121, and Aug. 10, 1935, 611.1431/123.

16 Hull to O'Donoghue, Aug. 22, 1935, 611.1431/123; O'Donoghue to Hull, Sept. 6, 1935, 611.1431/129; Hull to O'Donoghue, Sept. 19, 1935, 611.1431/133A; O'Donoghue to Hull, Sept. 21, 1935, 611.1431/135, and Oct. 7, 1935, 611.1431/137; Hull to O'Donoghue, Oct. 14, 1935, 611.1431/137.

cates of good condition accompany food imports caused another momentary delay. The United States sought a modification of the stipulation, because no federal agency was empowered to issue the certificates. The Guatemalans had difficulty comprehending the request, for in their country such certification was a function of the central government, but they eventually agreed to waive this stipulation. Discussions about the phraseology of the agreement also caused a delay until negotiators reconciled the Spanish and English texts, a process finally completed in April 1936.17

O'Donoghue and Skinner Klee signed the agreement April 24. Hull telegraphed O'Donoghue "hearty congratulations" for "the effective way in which you have handled the trade agreement negotiations." The Guatemalan legislature approved the accord April 29, and President Roosevelt issued a proclamation May 16 declaring the agreement, to last three years but renewable indefinitely, would take effect June 15, 1936.18

In a quarterly trade report July 2, 1937, Consul General Walter F. Boyle summarized the effects of the trade agreement. "In the making of this agreement there was but little opportunity for mutual tariff reductions," since, Boyle noted, "the outstanding exportable products of Guatemala were

17 O'Donoghue to Hull, Nov. 16, 1935, 611.1431 /145; Hanna to Hull, Dec. 6, 1935, 611.1431/146, and Dec. 7, 1935, 611.1431/147; Hull to Hanna, Dec. 13, 1935, 611.1431/147; Hanna to Hull, Dec. 19, 1935, 611.1431/149; O'Donoghue to Hull, Mar. 11, 1936, 611.1431/163; Sayre to O'Donoghue, Oct. 23, 935, 611.1431/143A; Hanna to Hull, Jan. 15, 1936, 611.1431/153; Hull to Hanna, Feb. 4, 1936, 611.1431 /153; O'Donoghue to Hull, Mar. 10, 1936, 611.1431 /161; William Phillips, acting secretary of state, to O'Donoghue, Mar. 17, 1936, 611.1431/161; O'Donoghue to Hull, Mar. 18, 1936, 611.1431/164; Sayre to O'Donoghue, Apr. 13, 1936, 611.1431/176A.

18 O'Donoghue to Hull, Apr. 24, 1936, 611.1431 /183, Apr. 30, 1936, 611.1431/186, and May 5, 1936, 611.1431/195; Hull to O'Donoghue, Apr. 24, 1936, 611.1431/184A, and May 19, 1936, 611.1431/203c.

already on the free list." However, he concluded, "the reciprocal binding of many articles on the free list or at existing tariff rates" was "of great value" for continued expansion of trade between the two nations.19

In fact, the agreement fell far short of the original American proposals and certainly did not comport with the objectives of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Both nations made only minimal concessions. Duties were not materially altered. Instead of promoting a new tariff pattern, the terms merely preserved the existing structure. This stabilization of rates did serve to promote trade, but the overall effects on Guatemalan-American commerce were meager.

The terms disappointed the economic idealists who viewed reciprocity as a means to a new world trade order, but the limited nature of the agreement was inevitable from the outset. Trade patterns between the United States and Guatemala were firmly established before the negotiations, and there was scant prospect of altering them. The industrial nation had little to offer its underdeveloped counterpart since it already accepted the latter's agricultural products duty free. In this situation, the United States could not grant concessions commensurate with those desired for its own products. Even if counterconcessions had been possible, the dependence of the Guatemalan government on tariff revenues precluded significant reductions of duties. Only a willingness to extend credits sufficient to compensate the Guatemalan government for loss of revenue could have produced a broad agreement. The theoretical objectives of the program were doomed by the realities of trade patterns and economic needs.

19 Walter F. Boyle to Hull, July 2, 1937, 611.1431 /216.

HEINRICH HOFFMANN:

PHILIP E. MANCHA

Scholars and laymen have considered National Socialism historically unique. Certainly the wealth of documentary evidence about Nazi Germany, most of it textual records in the National Archives and numerous other state and private collections throughout the world, is unparalleled. One consequence of this bulk of documentation has been the flood of monographs, articles, and doctoral dissertations about Nazi Germany. This abundance of documentation also demonstrates, as never before, the complexities of motivations and events at work on the participants of history. Simple explanations of men and events do not stand the test of evidence in any study of Hitler's regime.

Historical complexity can be clearly seen in the person of Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler's private photographer. Hoffmann was known as Reichsbildberichterstatter (official Reich photographer) yet no such official position existed. Hoffmann became wealthy through his close association with Hitler, yet he received no salary from the Reich treasury. The Heinrich Hoffmann Publishing House was a private firm, yet it quarreled successfully with the powerful Propaganda Ministry of Joseph Goebbels.1

1 Affidavits of Fhr. von Doernberg, July 28, 1948, Franz X. Schwartz, May 23, 1947, and Hugo Fischer, Oct. 31, 1948, Hoffmann File, Audiovisual Archives Division Reference File, National Archives Building. The Hoffmann File consists of photocopies of docu

Hoffmann himself was known as a photographer of talent in Europe by the end of the First World War, yet in 1922 he chose to marry his fortunes to an obscure Bavarian politician whose influence was then limited primarily to Munich.

Historical research has been enriched by the complex personality of Hitler's court photographer. The Hoffmann collection is visual evidence of the Nazi phenomenon from a gifted eyewitness who was, at the same time, an active participant in the upper leadership of the regime.

Heinrich Hoffmann was born on September 12, 1885, in Fürth, Bavaria. His father had an avid interest in photography, and when the family moved to Regensburg in 1912, he opened a photography studio. Early in life young Hoffmann demonstrated an interest in his father's profession and began his career as an apprentice in his father's studio.

ments created during the years of the Third Reich, postwar sworn affidavits of Nazis who had been tried by Allied courts or who were scheduled for trial at a future date, opinions of the Allied court that tried Hoffmann, and miscellaneous correspondence and memorandums of persons who had an interest in Heinrich Hoffmann's case or his collection. The postwar creation of the Hoffmann File suggests the possibility that the documents contained in the file reflect the thoughts and assumptions of its creator. The author was acutely aware of the possibility of an inherent bias of the file while writing this article and has sought to avoid reflecting a built-in point of view.

Hoffmann met with astounding success when he moved out on his own. He photographed many of the sovereigns of Europe, including Nicholas II of Russia and Kaiser Wilhelm II. Successful portraits of Edward VII of England and Enrico Caruso added luster to Hoffmann's reputation, and his photographs appeared in most of the illustrated papers of Europe. He became a society photographer during a stay in Paris; in London he was the assistant of E. O. Hoppe, then a well-known photographer.

Hoffmann's reputation was based largely on his success with individual portraits and with pictures of crowds, items eagerly sought by many European newspapers. World War I and its conclusion provided young Hoffmann with an abundance of subject matter. In 1919 he donned a red armband and entered Munich, then controlled by the first communist government on German soil.2 Many unique photographs of the Red Republic can be found in the Hoffmann collection at the National Archives.

Like many of his contemporaries, Heinrich Hoffmann was shaken by the aftermath

2 Baldur von Schirach, "Ich glaubte an Hitler," Der Stern, June 26, 1967, p. 103.

of World War I. His political stance became intensely conservative, so much so that he joined the National Socialist Workers Party (N.S.D.A.P.) on April 20, 1920.3 Thus, the respect and honor properly due an Alten Kämpfer or "old fighter" further adorned the position he later assumed in the National Socialist regime.

Hoffmann failed to see the financial profit to be derived from the National Socialist movement until 1922. According to Baldur von Schirach, who later became Hoffmann's son-in-law and leader of the Hitler Youth, an American agency offered $100 for a single photograph of the "wild man from Bavaria." The satirical weekly Simplicissimus, well known for its slashing caricatures, sponsored a contest entitled "What does Hitler look like?" No artist on the Simplicissimus staff had ever seen a photograph of Hitler. Later, an American agency offered $20,000 for the exclusive rights to all photographs of Hitler. Through Dietrich Eckart, a poet and an early patron of Hitler, Hoffmann discovered that Hitler did not like to be photographed.

3 Spruchkammer Decision, May 31, 1950, Annex p. 2, Hoffmann File.