York. The two congressmen persuaded Cole to offer instead an amendment later when the bill would come up for debate on the House floor. Crawford, it was agreed, would introduce the amendment on Cole's behalf to eliminate the internal revenue taxes on Puerto Rican rum sales on the mainland, which had been reverting to the insular treasury by special fiscal arrangement.

Fernós-Isern, Taylor, and Crawford consulted the House parliamentarian and planned a strategy to defeat the amendment. When the bill came up for debate on the House floor on June 16, Crawford duly offered the amendment as agreed; Congressman Antonio M. Fernandez asked the speaker of the House to rule the amendment inadmissible because it was not germane to the bill; and the speaker supported Fernandez. The bill was passed with only the amendment recommended by the Public Lands Committee. Except perhaps for Cole, no other congressman opposed the measure seriously enough to block its passage. Vito Marcantonio of New York, an ardent advocate of Puerto Rican independence, called the bill "an embellishing façade of an ugly and rotten colonial structure," but he supported it because he did "not want to deprive the People of Puerto Rico of even this gesture after we have deprived them of so much and so often." 29 "The entire course of the bill" in the House, Chapman explained, "was noteworthy for the cooperation and understanding of the issues and of the broad significance of the bill shown by representatives of the executive and legislative branches." 30 Passage of the elective governor measure in the Senate was marked by similar cooperation and understanding, although the more cautious senators offered more amendments.

A day after the House passed the bill, it

29 Fernós-Isern to author, Aug., Nov. 1972; Congressional Record, 80 Cong., sess., June 16, 1947, pp. 7076-7079.

30 Chapman to Muñoz Marín, June 20, 1947, 9-8-68, RG 126, NA.

was referred to the Senate Committee on Public Lands. Butler had not planned to hold hearings but had been persuaded to do so, Chapman told Muñoz Marín, by several communications from Puerto Rican

independentistas. No hearing, however, was held on the scheduled day of June 21, 1947. Instead, the committee requested clarification on certain aspects concerning the relationship of continental United States citizens and the Puerto Rican court system. Silverman responded by stating that insular laws would not discriminate against mainland citizens and in subsequent memorandums explained that cases. involving mainland citizens and begun in the courts of Puerto Rico might be removed to federal district and circuit courts and the United States Supreme Court. Even in cases where the United States was not a party to the action originally brought in the Puerto Rican courts, it could become a party "by intervention and thus eligible to remove the cause to the Federal Court." 31

Assurances notwithstanding, the Senate Committee on Public Lands reported the Butler-Crawford bill out on July 2 with two new sections designed to clarify federal authority on the island. Section 7 provided for a "Coordinator of Federal Agencies" responsible for correlating the activities of federal bodies on the island and for requesting from the governor reports concerning insular affairs. Section 8 added the following: "The rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United States shall be respected in Puerto Rico to the same extent as though Puerto Rico were a State of the Union and subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States." 32

31 Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 sess., June 17, 1947, p. 7120; Chapman to Muñoz Marín, June 20, 1947, Silverman to Orville Watkins, June 25, 1947, Silverman to Watkins and Crawford, June 27, July 1, 2, 1947, 9-8-68, RG 126, NA.

32 Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 sess., July 2, 1947, p. 8084; Amending the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Senate Report 422, pp. 1-2, 80 Cong., 1 sess., Serial 11116.

Puerto Ricans had no objection to Section 8, but they were unhappy about the federal coordinator. Piñero and FernósIsern both hoped that the amendment would be dropped in a House-Senate conference. Fernós-Isern preferred the Department of Interior to continue in the role of a federal coordinating agency. Indeed, Executive Order 9383 had empowered the Interior Department to do just that, and the special position provided by the amend ment, Chapman believed, would be duplication. Opposition to the amendment, Fernós-Isern recalls, would have placed the bill in jeopardy, especially because the idea of a federal coordinator came from Senator Robert A. Taft, who had considerable influence in the Senate. Muñoz Marín did not believe the amendment important enough to risk failure of the bill, since only three days remained in the session. Chapman agreed but believed that opposition. to it should be registered, and Silverman duly expressed the Interior Department's disapproval.33

The bill was placed on the Senate calendar for July 26, 1947, the last day of the legislative session. Apparently its success or failure at this stage depended almost entirely on Taft. Fernós-Isern knew that Taft opposed the governor's appointing the insular Supreme Court justices. He did not learn until a few hours before the legislative session that the senator's intention was not to kill the bill outright but to offer an amendment concerning the justices at the

33 La Prensa, July 4, 7, 1947; Chapman to Muñoz Marín, July 8, 1947, Box 107, Chapman Papers; Muñoz Marín to Chapman, July 3, 1947; Silverman to H. J. Slaughter, July 8, 1947, 9-8-68, RG 126, NA. Fernós-Isern writes further: "At Secretary Chapman's office, the officials expressed their views. So did Governor Piñero. Rather abandon the bill than to have a Coordinator. Commissioner FernósIsern expressed a contrary view. At this moment a cable from Puerto Rico arrived and was brought in and handed over to the Secretary. It was Muñoz Marín's cable as requested by the Commissioner. Secretary Chapman allowed everyone present to read it. He said: 'There is nothing else to do.'" Fernós-Isern to author, Aug. 1972.

last minute and thus force the House to accept the amended bill without a conference of the two chambers.34

Crawford, Butler, and Fernós-Isern could only accept the Taft amendment. When the bill was called up the second time for debate at 11:45 P.M. on July 26, fifteen minutes before the end of the legislative session, it was passed in the Senate without debate. Crawford got the Senate president to sign the bill, and at 11:55 he and FernósIsern rushed the bill back to the House. Fortunately, three minutes before midnight the House decided to prolong the session so that all the Senate amendments could be considered. The amendments were accepted and the bill was passed-the last measure to be cleared by the House.35

The administration and the insular leaders accepted the three major amendments: the presidentially appointed auditor, the presidentially appointed justices of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court, and the post of federal coordinator. Puerto Ricans could enjoy in the elections of 1948 the longsought right of choosing their governor. President Truman lamented the fact that the islanders had not won complete auton

34 H. Rex Lee, an official of the Division of Territories and Insular Possessions, said that he discovered on July 25 Taft wished only to amend the bill and that he obtained Crawford's and Butler's approval of Taft's amendment. FernósIsern's recollection is different: "That Mr. Rex Lee may have consulted Crawford and Butler in order to elicit their approval to the amendment is news to me. At no time did Senator Butler during the day and night session of July the 26 intimate any such thing to Commissioner Fernós-Isern. Crawford did not seem to know of Taft's purpose until Fernós-Isern told him of his hunch about it. Senator Taft could not know of Crawford's acceptance of amendment until he read Crawford's note." The note was to the effect that Taft should make the amendment immediately if he wanted to do so. To this Taft agreed. Lee to Piñero, July 28, 1947, 9-8-68, RG 126, NA; Fernós-Isern to author,

Aug. 1972.

35 Fernós-Isern to Butler, Aug. 1, 1969, Box 153, and "Statements of Senator Butler on HR 3309," July 27, 1947, Hugh Butler Papers, Nebraska State Historical Society; La Prensa, Aug. 6, 7, 9, 1947; Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 sess., July 26, 1947, pp. 10389, 10402.

omy, but still he considered the measure "a great step toward complete selfgovernment" when he signed the ButlerCrawford bill into Public Law 362 on August 15, 1947.36

The striking fact about the elective governor measure is the relative ease with which it sailed through Congress, a sharp contrast with the fate of the similar measure in 1943 that suffered from conservatism and caution, political bickering and misunderstanding, and the Tydings-Piñero referendum bill in 1945 that hardly generated more than a casual interest among congressmen and senators in Puerto Rico's right to self-government. Congress had reacted unfavorably in large measure because of the absence of a properly articulated policy and program for Puerto Rico's autonomy. To be sure, the Truman administration did not appear to have one either until about the time Piñero was appointed governor. But by January 1947, a major feature of its policy was the separation for practical purposes of the issues of autonomy and the final political status of Puerto Rico, to the extent to which these inextricably intertwined questions could be separated. Herein lies the reason for the elective governor measure's success.

In fact, Congress was in a conservative mood and acted with extreme caution. The act did not introduce drastic changes in Puerto Rico's political, constitutional, and fiscal status. The United States retained the power of the purse in the appointive auditor and final responsibility in the insular legal machinery.

An undated, anonymous report entitled, "Work of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs," suggests further that the revocability of the Elective Governor Act was an important factor in some

36 Truman to Piñero, Aug. 5, 1947, 9-8-68, RG 126, NA; Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 sess., Aug. 5, 1947, p. 10584. No coordinator was appointed by the Department of the Interior, so matters continued as before. The 1950 Constitution Act eliminated the post. Fernós-Isern to author, Aug. 1972.

of the lawmakers' supporting it. The generally paternalistic report argued that a decision was not being made on the final status of the island, which meant that Congress was still in a position to take action if the need arose. "The elective governor bill for Puerto Rico . . .," it stated, "can be repealed if Communists should gain control of the Island government, or for any other reason." 37

Nor did the act impair Puerto Rico's strategic value to the United States. The Departments of the Navy and the Army held large amounts of land as naval and military bases and had the power to acquire more.38 Thus military holdings and operations would remain unaffected on an island that guarded the entrance to the Caribbean.

This is not to deny that Congress recognized its duty in terms of United States obligations toward the advancement of self-government. Many members of Congress felt that the Puerto Ricans had earned the right to self-government by their loyalty to the United States through times of war and peace. Furthermore, the new breed of administrators as exemplified by Piñero and Muñoz Marín would prove worthy because they had shown what Gordon K. Lewis calls a new "sense of public duty” and "massive incorruptibility." 39 Indeed, Congress could not easily reverse the trend toward greater self-rule in Puerto Rico it had established in enacting the law. Its action was morally binding. In this sense the act paved the way for the successful implementation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico between 1950 and 1952.

37 "Work of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs," Box 126, Butler Papers.

38 Puerto Rico Planning Board, "Need for a Study of Land Holdings of Armed Forces in Puerto Rico," Box 74, Krug Papers. For some disputes over land transfer see Krug to James Forrestal, May 3, 1947, Forrestal to Krug, May 27, 1947, Silverman to Piñero, Aug. 8, 1947, W. John Kenney to Krug, Sept. 17, 1947, Chapman to Piñero, Nov. 18, 1947, 62-A-401, RG 126, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.

39 Lewis, Puerto Rico, pp. 72, 346.

DENNIS H. PHILLIPS

The first issue of Prologue in the spring of

1969 announced the accession of fourteen feet of records of the deanship of the Tangier, Morocco, diplomatic corps. These valuable files, stored in some twenty-eight boxes containing over three hundred separate folders of documents, deal almost exclusively with the activities of the Public Sanitation Commission of Tangier. They offer one of the richest new sources available to scholars of Morocco and North Africa.1

Originating in 1792 as an outgrowth of meetings of the consular corps to discuss common problems, the Conseil Sanitaire expanded its interests and powers throughout the nineteenth century until it became the recognized city council for Tangier. The sultan thus tacitly relinquished the city to collective foreign control in the vain hope of limiting infidel penetration to one isolated corner of his crumbling empire. Although the international character of Tangier was not officially recognized until the establishment of the French and Spanish protectorates over Morocco in 1912, city government was functioning as a smoothly running international machine long before

1 The author is indebted to Cleveland E. Collier, former member of the National Archives staff, who compiled an indispensable box list for the deanship files, and to Milton O. Gustafson, chief of the Diplomatic Branch at the National Archives, for corrections and suggestions about this article.

then. During that time the Conseil Sanitaire became a showcase of international cooperation in one of the world's most strategically vital areas. Eventually the experience of the council in Tangier proved so successful that during the 1890s the idea spread down the Moroccan coast. Consular agents at other key Moroccan ports began meeting on an irregular basis to confront specific crises, particularly the recurring threat of plague carried by Moroccans returning from the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Students of the history of Tangier have relied on Graham Stuart's durable work, The International City of Tangier, published first in 1931 and in a second edition in 1955. In a few compact pages, Stuart outlined the development of the Conseil Sanitaire and allied organizations. He was primarily dependent, however, on the consular despatches in the records of the State Department for his material on the council. The deanship records were not available to him, and the documents are part of the archives of the United States virtually by accident. Portugal, Italy, and the United States refused to recognize the statute of 1923, signed the following year by Great Britain, France, and Spain, that made Tangier part of a permanently neutralized international zone. The act, which took effect June 1, 1925, eliminated the diplomatic corps and reduced the representation of the signatory powers to the consular