that have to go to war. It is nothing at all like the course you run in the Canadian cup. The artificialities of the Canadian cup competition and others like that face us with a real problem. It is a difficult choice. We can either train for the competition or we can train for our mission which is combat readiness. As a general rule, we emphasize training our soldiers for war and we take our chances with the cup. I suppose we will keep on doing that. I know there is a temptation to either: One, quit; or two, train for the cup. Most people like me think that either of those is an undesirable choice. But to get at the real thrust of your question I believe, overall we are confident, sir, that our equipment is as good or better than any other equipment presently in the field. Our crews are good. They are well trained. They are trained to do their job which is killing enemy tanks. I know this sounds like an excuse for not winning and it is getting very frustrating, particularly when you talk about the reserves. The last time I had anything to do with this, a few years ago, a crew from the Dutch Army Reserves won the cup. Let me assure you sir, that you are absolutely right in your assessment of the Guard and the Reserves. They are good. They have a great advantage over the Regular Army. They have a degree of stability that we do not have. I think that more than anything else is the difference. The quality of the people, one to the other, is generally the same. Mr. FLIAKAS. If I might inject something, I am reminded from the Air Force incidentally that the F-16 did win the bomb competition in the United Kingdom recently. So we were not outdone there. Again to give the Air Force its due and in this case in a negative way, when I was talking earlier of the deplorable condition of the Army installations I used them as an example. The Air Force also has a companion type of a program that is not in the magnitude of the master restationing plan but certainly the collocated operating bases in the theater are very, very critical to the operation of the reinforcement aircraft for the Air Force. So I do not want to, by using the Army as an example, neglect any of the other service needs. Certainly we commend to you the entire budget which includes the other services as well. General GROVES. May I say one thing, sir, in extension to what Mr. Fliakas just said? Senator SASSER. Yes, sir. General GROVES. Going back to your question, one notion you might derive from exhorting our allies to do more is to do more for us. This is a very dangerous trap which confronts me and others who are working on trying to get to discussing the master restationing plan, because to some Germans it must appear that we are trying in the name of 3 percent or more to pass to them our maintenance deficiencies, trying to pass to them the neglect that we have discussed. The problem is this, sir. Under the Status of Forces Agreement and the supplementary agreements that flow from it we have an agreement that says that we are responsible for maintenance. 85-199 0-81--30 When we talk about them doing more, we have to avoid the temptation of having them do more and pay for things that we have already agreed to do. FORT IRWIN, CALIF., TRAINING CENTER Senator SASSER. Will our units in Europe make use of a new training center at Fort Irwin, Calif.? Mr. FLIAKAS. I will ask General Delbridge of the Army to reply. General DELBRIDGE. Sir, I am General Delbridge, the Assistant Chief of Engineers. No, sir, it is not envisioned that forces in Europe will use the National Training Center. The forces throughout the United States periodically, about once every year to 18 months, by battalion size will be rotated from our tactical divisions into Fort Irwin for a 2week period at a time. SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS TO EXECUTIVE SESSION Senator SASSER. Thank you, gentlemen. This concludes the unclassified portion of the hearing. In order to discuss issues before this committee which are classified, I will now make a motion that the committee move into executive session. Without objection I will declare this hearing closed and ask all unauthorized personnel to please leave the room. [Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in executive session.] [Executive Session] TUESDAY, JULY 14, 1981 The subcommittee proceeded in executive session at 3:53 p.m., in room 1223, Everett McKinley Dirksen Office Building, Hon. James Sasser presiding. Present: Senator Sasser. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND HOUSING STATEMENT OF PERRY J. FLIAKAS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND HOUSING) ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. RICHARD H. GROVES, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR, EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY Senator SASSER. The subcommittee will come to order. On July 10 the Washington Post outlined much of the master restationing efforts in a page 1 article, which you alluded to a moment ago. General, I do not know, sometimes I think we ought to turn all of our intelligence-gathering activities over to the Washington Post. They seem to be really in the know. But I was disturbed to read that the chairman of the West German Joint Chiefs of Staff has recently raised questions with Secretary of Defense Weinberger concerning the advisability of proceeding with the master restationing plan. Tell us, if you will, what the West German objections appear to be and let us know the status of these ongoing negotiations. General GROVES. I hope there [deleted]. My answer to that has been that the German situation does not apply to us because we occupy large numbers of facilities whose economic life has expired. The Germans occupy large numbers of facilities which have a great deal of remaining ecomonic life. It does not make sense to walk away from them. On the other hand, in our case, we must have major rebuilding. We might as well do it at the right location. [Deleted]. Senator SASSER. What is the projected total cost of the proposed master restationing plan? General GROVES. Sir, we have curtailed our [deleted]. We are talking about three associated things. The master restationing plan is the crux of it. [Deleted]. In the end, theoretically, the master restationing plan produces vacant facilities which are available to be disposed of as an offset to the cost of new facilities. So theoretically in the end we should be somewhere close to a wash. We should come out more or less even. [Deleted]. To answer your question then, sir, theoretically the net differential costs to both governments should be about zero. But there will be a period when both of us will probably have to budget considerable sums of money. Senator SASSER. It is going to be a wash because we offset the old facilities when we receive those against the cost of the new facilities? Mr. FLIAKAS. We would turn them back to the Federal Republic. General GROVES. In theory we are vacating basically urban areas, with theoretically high real estate values. We are moving out into the countryside where things are theoretically cheaper. That should produce a wash. Mr. FLIAKAS. A very good, perhaps not direct analogy, but at least a comparison is what the United States received in the Tokyo area when we consolidated at the cost of the Japanese Government into places like Yokota Air Force Base and Okinawa as part of the Okinawa convention, which provided us outstanding new construction at those bases. We in turn then vacated properties that we occupied in the greater Tokyo area that were coveted by the Japanese. [Deleted]. Senator SASSER. [Deleted]. Mr. FLIAKAS. [Deleted]. Senator SASSER. Thank you very much. I want to thank all of our witnesses for providing us today with some very important information. Hopefully our subcommittee will be able to mark up the fiscal year 1982 bill in early to midSeptember. SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS The subcommittee will now stand in recess until Thursday, July 16 at 10 a.m., when we will meet in executive session and receive testimony on the construction program in support of the Rapid Deployment Force. Thank you. [Thereupon, at 4 p.m., Tuesday, July 14, 1981, the subcommittee was recessed to reconvene at the call of the Chair.] LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS Ahearn, Col. Joseph, Directorate of Engineering Services, Department of the Air Aron, Fred W., Chief, Army Installation Division, Army National Guard Page 167 349 1 Barchet, Rear Adm. S., MC, USN, Assistant Chief for Planning and Resources, 247 Bee, Thomas V., Staff Officer, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 345 Prepared statement... 347 Berkman, Maj. Gen. William R., USA, Chief, Army Reserve. 360 Biographical sketch 364 Prepared statement.... 362 Beuby, Cmdr. S. C. CEC, USN, Director, Indian Ocean Projects Office, Naval 247 Bozarth, Lt. Col. Tom, Directorate of Engineering and Services, Department of the Air Force. 167 Bras, Maj. Victor, Special Assistant for M-X Matters, Department of the Air 167 Brown, Cmdr. Jefferey L., USN, European Division, JCS-5.. 421 Brune, Capt. C. M., USN, Assistant Commander for Military Construction Pro- 247 93, 161 Cirillo, Maj. Francis, Directorate of Engineering and Services, Department of the 167 Conaway, Maj. Gen. John B., USAF, Director, Air National Guard. 352 Biographical sketch 358 Prepared statement.. 355 Courter, Maj. Robert, Directorate of Engineering and Services, Department of the Air Force..... 167 Delbridge, Brig. Gen. Norman G., Jr., Assistant Chief of Engineers, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.......... 93, 161, 421 Biographical sketch 105 Prepared statement. 95 Estes, Cmdr. G. B. CES, USN, AOICC Plans and Programs, Trident, Naval |