authorized to bestow upon such police reserve officers such of the powers and duties of regular officers and members of the Metropolitan Police Department as he may deem necessary and proper. The bill also provides that reserve officers shall serve without compensation, but otherwise shall be considered employees of the Government of the District of Columbia and members of the Metropolitan Police force for all purposes and under all provisions of law, with certain specified exceptions. The bill would effectively broaden and improve present law, contained in section 4-133, D.C. Code, concerning reserve police activities in the District of Columbia. Section 601 (b) of title VI authorizes the District of Columbia Council to make rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of the title, including rules and regulations governing suspension or dismissal of reserve officers, with or without trial, and regulations governing the possession, carrying and use of weapons (including firearms) by reserve officers. Pursuant to section 402 (93) of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967 the District of Columbia Council has been vested with the function of "(m)aking and modifying rules and regulations for the proper government, conduct, discipline, and good name of the Metropolitan Police force . . .". In conjunction with this authority, the Commissioner believes it to be appropriate that the function of making rules and regulations governing the police reserves also be vested in the Council. Section 602(a) provides that the provisions of law commonly referred to as the "Federal Employees' Compensation Act" (5 U.S.C. § 8101, et seq.) shall apply in cases of injury or death of reserve officers. Since the reserve officers are not compensated under the bill, they are deemed to have a monthly pay of onetwelfth of the current annual rate of basic compensation for a police private, class 1, subclass (a), in the Metropolitan Police Department, modified according to length of service, for the purposes of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Section 602(b) makes applicable to reserve officers the provisions of section 8116 (c) of title 5, providing that "the liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof" under the so-called Federal Employees' Compensation Act shall be exclusive. Further, in view of the fact that employees of the District of Columbia are subject to the provisions of the Act, in like manner and to the same extent as Federal employees (5 U.S.C. § 8101), the limiting language in section 8116(c), making, as it does, a distinction between the United States and the District of Columbia, appears to be an inadvertence. Accordingly, in order to provide for the equal treatment of Federal and District employees, insofar as the liability of both governments under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act is concerned, section 602(b) provides that the term "United States" as used in the above-quoted phrase from section 8116(c) shall be deemed to include the District of Columbia. The Commissioner believes that the objective of title VI in permitting trained volunteers to assume certain active police duties with the Metropolitan Police Department, and in freeing regular police officers for more comprehensive protection of the District, is a desirable one. The use of police reserves in this fashion can be expected to contribute greatly to the District's fight against crime and to provide an effective tool in this effort. It is not, however, contemplated by the District that the reserve officers will be utilized in such manner as to require them to deal directly with persons committing the more serious criminal acts. Nor will the reserve officers engage in actions which require highly professional performance on the part of a regular member of the Metropolitan Police force. The reserve officers will supplement, but will not be a substitute for, the regular members of the force, and, while such reserve officers may accompany the regular members of the force in the performance of the duties of such regular members, the reserve officers will be used only for those duties for which they are trained and qualified. It is anticipated that reserve police would not be used for patrol duty in the high crime areas of the District; utilized for any police duty requiring a high level of qualified police performance. Notwithstanding the foregoing limitations on the anticipated use of the reserve officers, it can nevertheless be expected that they will make a substantial contribution toward the solution of the crime problem in the District, by freeing from the performance of routine police duties the regular members of the Metropolitan Police force, thereby allowing their use in high crime areas or in police activities requiring the use of highly qualified personnel. Of equal and perhaps even greater importance, the establishment of a police reserve corps comprised of persons who may be assigned to perform their duties in those areas of the city in which may be located their residences or places of employment or business, of necessity will bring the community into a closer relationship with the Metropolitan Police force and promote better community-police relations. The Commissioner believes that the benefits to be derived from title VI, as set forth above, will exceed considerably the cost of establishing such a program, estimated at $226,000 for the first year, based on providing uniforms and equipment for 700 members of the reserve, while the subsequent annual cost may approximate $80,000. TITLE VII-ISSUANCE OF MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS' PERMITS, WITHOUT COST, TO POLICE OFFICERS DRIVING POLICE VEHICLES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Officers in the Metropolitan Police Department residing in Maryland and Virginia have motor vehicle operators' licenses issued by such jurisdictions authorizing them to drive passenger vehicles. Many of these officers are assigned to drive motorcycles and motor scooters in the District of Columbia and must obtain a special license from either Maryland or Virginia to operate such vehicles. To obtain these special licenses for motorcycles and motor scooters, the officers must pay additional fees and take written examinations and road tests administered by either the Maryland or Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles. The problem is complicated even more by the fact that motor scooter officers, unlike officers operating motorcycles, are not permanently assigned to a particular motor scooter. Each Department-owned motor scooter is operated 24 hours a day by a different officer during each 8-hour shift. Consequently, after a group of officers have completed their motor scooter training, the Department has had to load a number of motor scooters on a van and transport the scooters and the officers to an appropriate testing station in Maryland or Virginia. Virginia officials recently agreed to send testing officers into the District to administer the written examination and the road test to police officers. Although Maryland officials will administer the road test in the District, the police officers must take the written test in Maryland. This procedure keeps officers from their more important law enforcement duties for as much as a full day. The above procedures were informally agreed to by officials in Maryland and Virginia as a courtesy to the Metropolitan Police Department. However, at any time the Department may have to revert to the more cumbersome procedure of transporting vehicles and men to Virginia and Maryland for written examinations and road tests. Officers secure such operators' licenses and pay the requisite fees solely in order to operate official police vehicles while on duty in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, it is proposed that existing law be amended to provide for licensing police officers operating official vehicles within the District in a manner similar to that authorized under section 40-301 (a) (5) of the D.C. Code for members of the Armed Forces who operate official vehicles in the District of Columbia. The proposed amendment would provide for the issuance of licenses without fee to police officers by the District's Department of Motor Vehicles and would authorize these officers to operate official vehicles of the Metropolitan Police Department while on duty in the District. Such licenses would be issued only after appropriate certification by the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department or his designated agent. TITLE VIII-AUTHORIZE PAYMENT FOR LABOR OF IMPRISONED PERSONS The Commissioner is now empowered to authorize retention of accumulated profits from the Correctional Industries Fund for payments to inmates other than those employed in industrial operations, or for payments to their dependents of such amounts as the Commissioner deems proper. (78 Stat. 1000; Pub. L. 88-622; D.C. Code, sec. 24-454.) The Department of Corrections currently employs inmates in various positions within its facilities utilizing profits from the Correctional Industries Fund as payments for their labor. However, these profits have declined, and may not be adequate to continue these worthwhile, highly desirable and necessary applications of proper rehabilitative treatment. The cost of additional personnel required by the Department to properly func tion if the utilization of inmate labor in certain specified areas were no longer possible, would greatly exceed the cost of inmate pay and incentive pay. TITLE IX-AUTHORITY TO ADHERE TO INTERSTATE PAROLE AND PROBATION COMPACT Title IX of the bill would authorize the District of Columbia to become a signatory member of the Interstate Parole and Probation Compact, thereby enabling the District to participate in a nation-wide program in which the States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands cooperate and serve as each other's agent in the supervision of persons on probation or parole. The compact is applicable to all adult probationers and parolees. It would enable the District of Columbia to place its potential parolees, mandatory releasees, and probationers in their resident jurisdictions in a more orderly and effective manner. It would also provide for the more orderly placement, return, and control of adult probationers and parolees who come from other jurisdictions to live in the District of Columbia. Adherence to the compact, as authorized by this title, would also enable law enforcement agencies in the District of Columbia to remove fugitives and violators from the District of Columbia with greater speed and less cost than at the present time. Authorities in other jurisdictions would also be better able to return parolees and probationers from other jurisdictions to the District of Columbia when such persons have been declared to be violators. The District of Columbia is the only remaining jurisdiction eligible to become a signator to the pact that has not done so. Enactment of this title and signing of the compact will provide for the more uniform administration of parole and probation procedures throughout the United States. TITLE X-INCREASE AUTHORITY OF PAROLE BOARD Section 6 of the Act of July 15, 1932 (D.C. Code, sec. 24-206) has been consistently construed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to deny a parole violator credit against his original sentence for "street time" on parole prior to revocation. See for instance, Bates v. Rivers, 116 U.S. App. D.C. 306, 323 Fed. 2d 311 (1963), where the majority opinion stated that "The language of the statute is clear and the import of similar language under the general federal parole statute has been acknowledged in numerous cases." 'The District of Columbia Board of Parole has stated that this provision of law, prohibiting the deduction of the time that the parole violator spent under supervision from the unexpired term of his imprisonment, is "most restrictive and oppressive and prohibits them from deciding a violator's case on a realistic individual basis." The D.C. Parole Board has further stated: "There are many cases where men under the jurisdiction of the Board have responded excellently to supervision for a number of years, yet, for a variety of reasons and circumstances, have been returned to custody for violation of the conditions of their release. In these cases, if the violations are serious enough to warrant revocation, and in many cases they are, the Board has no alternative but to revoke and require the individual to start serving the balance of the sentence remaining. Quite often these men are returned to Lorton feeling resentful, hostile and with an attitude that prevents affirmative response to the rehabilitative process, and their chances for successful reentry into society upon their eventual release are considerably lessened. Too, the Board feels that legislation to allow credit for all or any part of the time spent under supervision would be a most valuable correctional tool and would provide continuity in parole procedures." Parole procedures in the District of Columbia are contained in title 24 of the D.C. Code, sections 201-209. Section 204 states that: "While on parole, a prisoner shall remain in the legal custody and under the control of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative until the expiration of the maximum of the term or terms specified in his sentence without regard to good time allowance." Parole may be regarded as just one segment of the overall spectrum of custody 71-472 O-72-8 which may include solitary confinement with reduced diet, "normal" imprisonment, trusteeship, work release, parole, probation examination in a mental hospital and variations of the foregoing. The courts have recognized that the restraints imposed on a parolee are real and substantial. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that ". . . in fact, as well as in theory, the custody and control of the Parole Board involve significant restraints on petitioner's liberty because of his conviction . . .". The court noted htat the parolee was "confined to a particular. . . house and job, . . . admonished to keep good company and . . . live a clean, honest and temperate life." When a prisoner fails to receive credit for the period he was on parole, he remains in custody for a period of time greater than that specified in his original sentence. The unfairness in a particular situation is apparent from a hypothetical example of two prisoners paroled after 5 years of a 10-year sentence. One spends four years on parole with no violations, then loses his job, begins drinking and has his parole revoked. He returns to jail for five years. The other spends one week on parole, loses his job and begins drinking. He returns to jail for five years and has lost only the one week on parole. It is evident under the present law, the penalty for a parole violation increases each day the parolee is on parole. Both committed the same act, yet one had to not only serve his entire prison term, but also spend four years in the custody and under the control of the Parole Board. As had been demonstrated above, revocation of parole accompanied by the denial of credit for time spent on parole results in the imposition of additional imprisonment. The Commissioner favors the enactment of title X because, as stated by the Parole Board, the statutory provision contained in section 206 of title 24 of the D.C. Code, in its present form, is most restrictive and oppressive and prohibits the Board from deciding a violator's case on a realistic individual basis. TITLE XI-PROHIBIT POSSESSION OF A KNIFE WITH UNLAWFUL INTENT Existing law (D.C. Code, sec. 22-3214 (b)), prohibits possession, with intent to use unlawfully against another, of a knife with a blade longer than three inches. Title XI deletes the three-inch requirement in existing law so as to provide that possession of a knife of any length, when coupled with the intent to use unlawfully against another person, shall constitute an offense. The proposed deletion will overcome the ambiguity in existing law since, in the case of a knife less than three inches in length, it is now necessary to prosecute the offense under section 22-3204 of the D.C. Code, which does not expressly refer to an intent to use a knife unlawfully. TITLE XII-TECHNICAL AMENDMENT This title substitutes the word "Commissioner" for the word "Commissioners" in section 22-702 of the District of Columbia Code. relating to bribery. This amendment is necessary because of a decision by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the case of United States v. Bishton, D.C. App., No. 5081. decided April 13. 1970, in which it was held that a prosecution could not be brought under section 22-702 of the D.C. Code because that section referred to "Commissioners" rather than "Commissioner." A BILL Relating to crime and law enforcement in the District of Columbia Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "The District of Columbia Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Act." TITLE I-PROHIBIT THE UNAUTHORIZED USE AND POSSESSION OF CREDIT CARDS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SEC. 101. Short title. This title may be cited as the "District of Columbia Credit Card Crime Act". SEC. 102. Definitions. (a) Cardholder. "Cardholder" means the person or organization named on the face of a credit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card is issued by an issuer. (b) Credit card. "Credit card" means any instrument or device, whether known as a credit card, credit plate, or by any other name, issued with or without fee by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value on credit. (c) Expired credit card. "Expired credit card" means a credit card which is no longer valid because the term shown on it has elapsed. (d) Issuer. "Issuer" means the business organization or financial institution or its duly authorized agent which issues a credit card. (e) Revoked credit card. "Revoked credit card" means a credit cards which is no longer valid because permission to use it has been suspended or terminated by the issuer. (f) Incomplete credit card. A credit card is "incomplete" if part of the matter other than the signature of the cardholder, which an issuer requires to appear on the credit card before it can be used by a cardholder, has not yet been stamped, embossed, imprinted or written on the credit card. SEC. 103. Purchase of credit card of another. A person who buys or rents a credit card from a person other than the insurer shall be fined not more than $500 or be imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. SEC. 104. Obtaining control of credit card as security for debt. A person who obtains possession or exerts control over a credit card as security for a debt shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. SEC. 105. Illegal possession of credit card of another. (a) A person who possesses a credit card without the consent of the cardholder or the issuer shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (b) A person who possesses a credit card issued to another with intent to use the same to defraud the issuer, cardholder or any other person shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. A person in possession of two or more credit cards issued to two or more persons other than himself without the consent of the issuer or the cardholder shall be presumed to have violated this subsection. SEC. 106. Fraudulent use of revoked or expired credit card. A person who, with intent to defraud the issuer, a person or organization providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, uses for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, services or anything else of value a credit card which he knows is expired or revoked shall, if the value of all money, goods, services and other things of value obtained in violation of this section does not exceed $500 in any six-month period, be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, and shall, if such value does exceed $500 in any six-month period, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Knowledge by the cardholder of revocation shall be presumed upon return of a requested receipt. SEC. 107. Fraudulent transfer of credit card. A person other than the issuer who, without the consent of the cardholder, sells, exchanges, transfers or delivers a credit card issued to another, or a person other than the issuer who sells, exchanges, transfers, or delivers an incomplete credit card, or a counterfeit, forged, or falsely made or altered credit card, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. SEC. 108. Fraud by person authorized to provide goods or services. A person who is authorized by an issuer to furnish money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card by the cardholder, or any agent or employee of such person, who, with intent to defraud the issuer or the cardholder, furnishes money, goods, services or anything else of value upon presentation of a credit card which he knows or reasonably should know is expired or revoked shall if the value of all money, goods, services and other things of value furnished in violation of this section does not exceed $500 in any sixmonth period be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, and shall if such value exceeds $500 in any six-month period be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. SEC. 109. Possession of machinery, plates or other devices or counterfeit or incomplete credit cards. A person, other than the cardholder, possessing an incomplete credit card with intent to complete it without the consent of the issuer, or a person possessing, with knowledge of its character, a counterfeit, forged, or falsely made or altered credit card, or machinery, plates or any other device designed to reproduce instruments purporting to be credit cards of an |