existence of covert sources of information at specific institutions must be protected by the Director of Central Intelligence from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with his responsibilities under section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3) and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. 403g and is, thus, exempt from required disclosure under the FOIA pursuant to exemption (b)(3). 14. Where, as here, a request is made for documents which could include documents evidencing a covert CIA relationship at a particular academic institution, the CIA can respond only by refusing to confirm or deny the existence of any information which would concern or even imply the existence of such a relationship: Any other response would have the effect of divulging the very secrets the CIA is directed to protect. To confirm the existence of covert CIA contacts at a particular college or university would thus constitute the revelation of classified information, lead to the exposure of intelligence sources and methods and undermine the structure of a valuable intelligence collection program. To deny the existence of covert CIA contacts at a particular college or university could, through FOIA requests by the plaintiffs and others, result in the ultimate identification, by a process of elimination, of those colleges or universities where CIA has covert relationships. Accordingly, pursuant to exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the Freedom of Information Act, CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence of such documents. financial information contained in the approximately 18,000 pages of documents located in CIA's files which pertain to identified contracts between CIA and the Syracuse University Research Center and Institute to perform research for the Agency [see affidavit of Charles E. Savige, paragraphs 8 and 10]. To release this information to plaintiffs would be in violation of the statute protecting CIA financial matters from disclosure [50 U.S.C. §403jl. 16. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 clearly demonstrate Congressional intent to keep from public disclosure certain matters pertaining to CIA and its activities, particularly the receipt and expenditure of funds by the CIA in connection with intelligence activities. 17. The current Director. of Central Intelligence, as well as all his predecessors, has repeatedly emphasized the need to keep confidential the CIA budget. This position has been consistently affirmed by the Congress by its repeated rejection of legislation to make the CIA budget public as well as by its practice of always conducting hearings concerning the CIA budget in executive session. Such protection is afforded the CIA budget because its public disclosure would be a valuable tool in the hands of hostile intelligence services. Disclosure would permit deductions and estimates concerning the capabilities of this Agency and the extent of its activities. Such information would be extremely useful as those hostile intelligence services attempt to compromise and nullify the essential intelligence activities of this Agency. i.e the amounts paid to specific area of CIA activities - universities and researchers to prepare analyses and reports concerning specific intelligence projects--the danger accruing from release of such information would be even greater. There are certain matters which require research at the highest academic levels which dictates, by necessity, The sums made available to the 19. For the reasons stated above, I have concluded that the sums of money paid to universities to conduct research on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency are Order 12065 and are protected from public disclosure by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 and are thus exempt from disclosure under exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA. Cite as 3 GDS 182,352 Sweatt's lawsuit as of February 15, 1980. and the release of the Ho File. We cannot agree with the dissent's suggestion that Sweat! "substantially prevailed" on the Privacy Act claims he purportedly attempted to state in his March 1978 amended complaint. Even upon the closest scrutiny of the 1978 pleading, only the best of hindsight permits the reader to discm a Privacy Act claim praying for re lease of the Ho File. As we stated above; it is true that the "Invasion of Privacy" claim contained an allegation_concerning the denial of access to the Ho File, but the ranedy requested was again damages for wrongful withholding. Indeed, even considering the Memorandum authored by counsel that valiantly attempted to spell out in detail the allegations made by Sweatt, the Privacy Act claims were laid out only in the barest of forms; moreover, it is not even clear that those claims relate to the Ho File. The Memorandum mentions "Privacy Act claims" without specifying to which of the three counts under Sweatt's "Invasion of Privacy" heading or the two counts styled Privacy Act violations he was referring. Again, liberal construction is not synonymous with wishful thinking. In sum, unlike our dissenting colleague, we are unable to say that the district judge made a clear, reversible error in ruling that the complaint and papers pending in February of 1980 didn't provoke release of the Ho File. Although we do not dismiss as mere coincidence appellant's representation of Sweatt and the release of the Ho File. analysis of the relevant trial materials prompts us to conclude that the district judge acted within a permissible zone of discretion in discerning an inadequate causal connection between the lawsuit and the surrender of the Ho File. We accordingly affirm the finding of the trial judge that Sweatt did not substantially prevail for the purposes of the Privacy Act attorneys' fees provision. III Lest our decision be read as condoning the Navy's recalcitrance in releasing the Ho File, we wish to express in no uncertain terms our disapproval of the conduct of appelle prior to the surrender of the file. Even a cursory examination of the record reveals the appallingly cavalier tone adopted by the Navy in its dealings with [Foomote 182.352 continued] Sweall. Sweatt asked the Navy to supply the Ho File to him on two occasions in 1976; be requested the file again in connec tion with his 1978 amended pro se complaint. As the dissent rightly notes, the Navy had plain notice of the information sought by Sweatt, yet four years passed before the Ho File was released. This sort of behavior is, quite simply, unacceptable. Mr. Sweatt's sister made the initial request for the Ho File on May 24, 1976; on June 4, 1976, she was informed by the Navy that the file has been ro tumed" to NARU. Yet the file was re turned to NARU only on that some day. It is thus apparent that Navy officials had in their possession both Ms. Cleveland's request and the Ho File. As we have chronicled above, the file was not released for four more years. We could further express our disapproval of the Navy's demonstration of the finest in bureaucratic mazes.15 We conclude with the observation that the FOIA and the Privacy Act do not exist so that gov ernment officials can construct new proce dural hurdles and issue new regulations to complicate the process of information provision. Agencies, including the Navy, have a duty under the two statutes to release promptly nonexempt materials. The Navy's "hide the file" game played so effectively in the instant case is manifestly at odds with that duty. Affirmed. 182,353 Sidney M. PECK▾ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al. (ND Ohio 1981) Civ. No. C79-486, 11-25-81. Court let government file representative Vaughn index (110.063] as to one out of every 50 documents, from large volumes of documents since requester hadn't raised any reason for requiring full index counterbalancing government's burden; requester's motion for in camera inspection premature [110,083). Memorandum and Order THOMAS, Senior Judge Defendants move this court for an order permitting them to file a representative Vaughn index in this Freedom of Information Act case. Defendants "seek to resolve... [what] is essentially a logistical prob 15. We note with some discomfort the argument made by the Navy that, as netha Mr. Swatt nor his sister complied with Navy regulations governing the release of documents, the Navy never became obligated under the Privacy Act to rdase the Ho File Brief for Appelloc at 18. Although it is true that the Privacy Act does autho rize government agencies to make rulɑ governing the release of information, we take a dim view of using those rules as a shield in Privacy Act litigation. Where a request for identifiable nonexɑmpt information is made, it is the responsibility of the addressed agency to facilitate the release of the information—not to play "bude the file" 1982 P-H Inc. — GDS — See Cross Reference Table for latest developments ATTACHMENT F 1182,353 |