now enables it to present to the enemy a proud front of de fiance. But the root of all this power was to be found in the agriculture and the commerce of the country. Now, with respect to the agriculture, what was its situation Why, Parliament had been called upon to establish a system which must ruin or at least depress its interests, in order to save the colonial system from utter destruction. As to the commerce of the country, what conclusion was to be drawn with regard to its state, when a loan of six millions to the Inerchants and manufacturers was proposed on the ground of its absolute necessity, in order to preserve your commerce and manufactures from complete subversion? He had adverted to the subject of agriculture and commerce merely because they formed the resources to which the country was to look for supplying its financial drains. He had always doubted the policy of the mercantile loan in 1793; but there was this difference between that case and the present, that the former arose from a want of due confidence, but now the difficulty consisted in the stagnation of commerce itself. His sole object in noticing these things, was, to remark the singular period chosen to make this great addition to the Portuguese subsidy. The House had been told, that it was called for, not only by policy, but by the good faith and antient amity which had subsisted between the two countries. But there was another country more near and dear to us-a country to which our attention was infinitely more due, with which, in fact, our interests were identified-and that was Ireland. The noble Lord had spoken of financial exertions; but what if we should happen to be called upon to pay two millions also to Ireland? I would ask what means Ministers propose to adopt, in order to fill up the deficiencies in the revenue of that country? Look first at the Ways and Means, and the taxes of the year; the revenue of Ireland was more than half a million below the charge of its debt, leaving nothing for the current charges of the government. In such cir cumstances, I should be well assured that no financial aid was necessary for that country, before I gave my consent to the present motion. These were the grounds on which he should give the measure his decided negative-because he entertained no hopes of effectually defending the Peninsula-because this system of increasing expenditure was fast sinking the country in the gulf of inextricable ruinand because the measure, even if fit at another time, was VOL. 11.-1811. 3 E

utterly unfit at present, when he was ignorant whether the resources of the kingdom could bear the extraordinary expenditure.

The Earl of Liverpool said, he felt some difficulty in replying to the noble Baron, as the principal points of his argument were derived from subjects which were not before the House. He was aware that the noble Baron had lately adopted it as a principle of policy, not to afford any military or even pecuniary aid to the nations of the Continent. The noble Baron also opposed the grant to the Peninsula, last session, upon, as he stated, his deep conviction of the utter hopelessness of the contest. The noble Baron, and other noble lords who thought with him, maintained that the time for assisting Spain and Portugal had gone by-that nothing could be expected from any efforts in their service. The experiment, however, had been made, and had succeeded beyond the most sanguine expectations of those who recommended it. The vote, therefore, to which the House was called upon to agree, rested upon the grounds of the exertions already made, exertions which some noble lords at the other side considered as visionary and impracticable. and which even himself did not believe would be productive of those great advantages that had been derived from them. Upon the general principle of subsidizing foreign powers, it was not now necessary for him to address their lordships. The practice had its advantages and disadvantages. If it sometimes prevented nations from exerting their own energies, it fully answered on other occasions all the purposes that were expected from it. But the argument of its preventing national exertion, was wholly inapplicable to Portugal. The government of that country had made exertions, greater, perhaps, than had ever been displayed by any government under similar circumstances. They had assembled a military force, including regulars and militia, which amounted to between eighty and ninety thousand men. This was exclusive of the Ordenanza, another most useful description of force. With respect to the quality of the Portuguese regulars and militia, he would appeal to many eminent officers now in London, who had witnessed their bravery in the field, and some of whom had led on their battalions at Busaco, and other places. They would tell the noble Baron, and other noble lords, who might be as incredulous, in this respect, as he professes himself to be, that their conduct on these occasions would have done credit ́to

any military whatever. They realized that which many believed to be impossible, and which even the most sanguine supposed to be doubtful. The noble Baron had expressed some doubts respecting the application of this subsidy. He was happy to have it in his power to remove any fears that might be entertained on that head. The two millions were to be applied to military purposes, and to military purposes only. He wished also to remove the erroneous impression, that this great sum was to be remitted to Portugal in specie or bills. Far from it; a very large proportion of it would be sent out in articles necessary to enable the Portuguese troops to keep the field; clothing, ammuni tion, provisions, &c. Some part of it would also be applied to the payment of such debts as the Portuguese government had contracted above their revenue. Four-fifths of the income of that country had been applied to raise and maintain the respectable military force of which he had just spoken. A small part of the subsidy, in addition to the supplies that might be expected from the Portuguese settle ments, would cover this defalcation, and give additional vigour to the credit of the Government. It was not, however, in this view, though he could not help thinking it entitled to some consideration, that be called upon the House to support the Address, but upon the grounds of the exertions that have been made. He would ask no person to vote for it, if he did not think that the future exertions of the Portuguese Government would exceed what they had already been. Without following the noble Baron in his observations on general politics, he would say, that the contest on the Peninsula was not more the cause of Spain and Portugal than of Great Britain herself, taken even in the dryest view of it. Upon reference to the polities of their ancestors, it would be found, that the Peninsula was always an object of particular interest with them. Some of the best blood of the country had been shed in its support and defence. Their Lordships would even find a resolution upon their journals (a most imprudent one, however, in his opinion) declaring that no peace should be made with France, so long as Spain should be in the hands of one of the family then seated on the French throne. But though the practice of subsidizing foreign powers might be liable to great objections, if it were to be judged of from the recent examples of some of the Continental governments, he would notwithstanding maintain, that these objections were inap

plicable to the case of the Peninsula. The campaign of 1805, against Austria, was decided in three months; that of 1806, against Prussia, reckoned one of the most formidable military powers of the Continent, lasted only six weeks. The campaign which succeeded it against the Russian army was terminated in seven months by the peace of Tilsit. Nay, the campaign of 1809, in which Austria brought all her strength into the field, was decided in three months, excluding the duration of the armistice. But it was not so in the Peninsula. The contest had now continued for three years in Spain, and (even inadequate as the exertions of the Spaniards were) there was not a single province of it under the entire subjugation of the enemy. The spirit of the people was unsubdued, the country was unconquered, and the spirit of the country was unconquerable. The noble Baron had said, that the allied army had possession of no part of Portugal but the ground they stood on: now this was so far from being the case, that out of six provinces of which that kingdom was composed, in four of them a single French soldier was not to be found. When the noble Baron talked of the defence of Portugal being a hopeless struggle, did he consider the moral effects which the resistance already made had upon the French army? Did he not per ceive the consequences of this resistance, in the altered tone and language of the enemy? They no longer spoke of driving the "leopard into the sea," but expatiated upon the great advantages of protracting the contest, and finding employment for so large a portion of our military force and resources. With respect to the objection on account of the time selected for voting the subsidy, he would meet it by by referring to the practice on former occasions of the same nature; such grants not being usually proposed until after the Army Estimates had been voted in the other House. The best policy of this country, he was persuaded, would be found in occupying the armies of France abroad. The defence of Spain and Portugal involved the dearest interests of this country. We were bound to support them, as well from motives of present advantage as every principle of antient policy. The honour of the country was pledged to support them. The feelings of the nation were engaged on their side. If the question could be fairly put to the people of this country, whether they would submit to farther privations rather than abandon the contest in Portugal, he was persuaded that nine out of ten of them would answer,

397 "Continue the contest." This he knew was not the sentiment of the noble Baron, and a few others; but being the almost general sentiment, he would say, "Make your exertion effectual." The noble Baron had adverted to the security of Ireland. He trusted that the security of that most valuable part of the empire was fully provided for; and a main provision for that security was, that the whole of the west of the Peninsula was clear of the enemy. His opinion was, that the longer the contest was protracted, the better. The longer it was removed from their own doors, the better for the country. He would therefore call upon them to persevere in the contest as long as they could. It was to all intents and purposes a British contest. It was their chief hope, and it was the only hope for the restoration of the continent of Europe.

Earl Grosvenor observed, that notwithstanding the able speech he had just beard, he was not perfectly convinced of the propriety of granting so large a sum of money to Portugal. As it was probable, however, that the noble Secretary of State, who proposed the Address, might have other reasons besides those he had stated, for recommending additional support, he should not oppose the proposition. He would agree to the motion, leaving to the noble Lord (Wellesley) and his colleagues the entire responsibility of the measure. There were some points, however, upon which he differed with noble lords on the other side. He could not perceive, in the situation of the British army in Portugal, those proofs of the complete success they spoke of. He agreed with the noble Baron near him, (Grenville,) that before so much of our national resources were applied to the support and defence of foreign powers, we should consider whether we were capable of affording them. Much would depend upon the state of affairs in Ireland, and of the ability of that country to meet the acknowledged deficiency in her revenues. Much would depend upon the capacity of this part of the United Kingdom to meet the pressure of the difficulties by which it was surrounded. Much would depend upon the restoration of commerce, and of the effect of the measures for affording it temporary support. It would also be proper to consider, whether the revenues were likely to be more productive in the ensuing year than they had been in the last. He would, again repeat, that he would not oppose the motion, but leave the responsibility of this vote to Ministers. They possibly might have reasons to justify it, with which h