Princess of Wales; but his friend replied, "Oh! never mind them, only let them come to a proper height, and in time the evil will cure itself; meaning thereby, that its licentiousness would at last come to such a pitch that its liberty must be checked in order to restrain it."

Lord Erskine had laboured for many years in the profession with the noble and learned Lord opposite; and most undoubtedly, if he thought that the present motion brought into question either his integrity or his honour, he should vote against it. On former questions, when he had painfully differed from many of his friends, he had done so on the ground of the law and the Constitution. He was convinced that his noble friend had not the least idea of disparaging the administration of justice, or reflecting in any degree upon the purity either of the law or its officers. All he had asked for was, the number of informations filed within a certain time. In this he did not call into question the legality of informations ex officio. By no means; they were as old as the Constitution of the country, and had come down to us with the ancient statutes and institutions of the realm. It was an indisputed and indisputable right of the Crown, to enter a suggestion on the commission of a misdemeanour by an individual: the reason of this was, that there were some cases so peculiar and pressing in their nature, as to call for an instantaneous proceeding. His noble friend's motion went to suppose nothing-he only asked for the number of informations, and this did not necessarily anticipate any abuse. No, even though on the grant of the motion, that number should, within a given time, be ten times as great as the number within a former given time, still it might happen that the cause of these multiplied informations was the increase of publications; and he believed it was a known fact, that for one newspaper published ten years ago, there were ten published at present. In private cases of felony, the criminal knew nothing till accused in court-he never saw the witnesses till he heard the fatal sound of their evidence against him-he never knew his jury till they were arrayed out before him from the extensive pannel. In stating this, he did not mean to arraign, the custom : no, unless this was so, the criminal would become too strong for the law. But in cases where the Crown was a party, that same law, contemplating the terrific champion with whom the accused had to combat, generously encircled him with all its protection. In cases

of treason, for instance, a man must be indicted within three years after the act is committed; he must have a copy of his indictment; must have the names of his jurors, with a capricious rejection of thirty-five of them; he must have the names and abode of the witnesses against him; and his crime must be substantiated at least by two. As to the prosecutions against the press, perhaps a limitation of time also, as in treason, might here be beneficially proposed: but then to be sure a difficulty must arise with respect to periodical publications. He did not pledge himself as to how he should vote on the subject which might arise in case this motion was granted; but the question now was, would they reject that which went merely to seek information and ascertain truth? With respect to the question of special jurics, the right of rejection was here withheld, and from the very nature of the case some prejudice must naturally exist. He did not mean to accuse the Master of the Crown office; no doubt he was a very honest man; but still he must select that special jury from those who may be supposed to be in some degree connected with the revenue. He did not wish to see ex-officio informations done away; but still he should wish to see the administration of justice popular; and he here quoted the case of Hatfield, which he said impressed his mind with an exemplication of it that he could never forget. He had early struggled for the attainment of that popular justice by obtaining the trial by jury; a struggle of which he was at that moment reaping the fruits, and to which he had to attribute the favours of his Sovereign.

The Lord Chancellor said, that he would endeavour to discuss the question with all the temperance that the important nature of it required. The circumstances under which he had been formerly placed obliged him to take a line of conduct different from that adopted by the learned Lord; and were that line to be taken again, he should not, acting upon his judgment, depart in any material degree from it. The proceeding by the Attorney-General was as old as any other part of the law. If that proceeding was conceived unfit to remain a practical part of the Constitution, why did not the noble Baron, or those who were of that opinion, submit a proposition to the House on the subject? Why did they not argue the question upon its general principle, and not resort to what had passed in the King's Bench during the last ten years? Let the whole of

the practice fairly be brought under consideration; and when they had examined it, they would, or he was much mistaken indeed, be as loth to part-with it as their ancestors had been at the time of the Revolution, and as those who succeeded them had been, down to the year. 1801. There was no person who had filled the office of Attorney-General that instituted more prosecutions for libel than himself. It was a disagreeable duty imposed upon him by the extraordinary circumstances of the times. The libels which he had to prosecute were not the instruments employed by a few factious and turbulent men, but a most formidable weapon, wielded with extraordinary force and consummate skill, for the purpose of overturning the Government. These prosecutions produced all the effect he expected from them; and it was a consolation to him that, in instituting them, he had been, in some degree, accessary to the preservation of the Constitution. It was unnecessary for him to reply to the observations of the noble and learned Lord who spoke last, respecting special juries, because there was not one syllable in the motion relating to it. If that was deemed a subject worthy of their Lordships' consideration, let a motion be made, and the whole argued from facts and principles. He did not mean to deny that general subjects might properly become the subject of parliamentary discussion, though it might be very unfair to argue them on the practice of the last ten years. He could not agree with the noble Lord respecting the impropriety of authorising the Attorney-General to hold persons liable to informations to bail. On the contrary, he conceived it to be a power indispensable to the vigorous discharge of his duty. As to the office of Attorney-General, it was one which from its very nature must subject the person filling it to much unmerited odium. The Attorney-General was always the most abused prosecutor in the country, and he hoped he would always continue to be so: he liked to see the people exercise a constitutional jealousy with respect to that office. But it did not follow that the prejudices of the public against this office were founded. On the contrary, if the cases demanding the filing of ex-officio informations for the last twentynine years were laid before the House, they would be astonished at the forbearance of that officer. The House would see that the Attorney-General not only did not, but. that he dares not use that species of oppression imputed to him. The practice of filing these informations was always

most unpopular, and in the course of his professional pursuits he knew many young men who were called to the bar, most eloquent in their condemnation of it. Somehow or other, however, he afterwards found, that when those very men were employed by Government and taken into consultations, that all the odiousness of the practice vanished from before their eyes. As to the solitary case in which the Attorney-General held the person to bail, it appeared from the statement of the noble and learned Lord (Ellenborough), that it was grossly exaggerated. The suspension of the proceedings against the Morning Post, arose from the circumstance of the printer having given up the name of the author. He could not say that he approved of such practice. In the course of his duty as Attorney-General, he made it a point, never to let the Paper escape at the expence of the author, but to prosecute both together, and by doing so he soon found that he got rid of all the authors. He must oppose the motion, because the very adoption of it would in some degree sanction a suspicion that there was something improper in the administration of justice. The substantial interests of the public required that they should give every prima facie presumption that persons who filled offices of trust, particularly those relating to the administration of the laws, discharged them with fidelity and integrity; and no clamours should be excited against them, except in cases of such aggravated misconduct as called for the severest reprobation. As for the general topic of the liberty of the press, he would be judged by his acts what his sentiments were on that subject.

Lord Grosvenor observed, that after the able speech of the noble Baron near him, it was unnecessary for him to obtrude a single word on their Lordships. That speech had remained unanswered and unanswerable; except the misrepresentation of the noble and learned Lord (Ellenborough) could be considered as an answer. He felt the deepest regret at hearing the sentiments that fell from that noble person. He thought that his noble friend had laid before the House good and substantial grounds for his motion, and he would, therefore, support it. Enough had been stated to justify an investigation into the practice of the Attorney-General's office.

Lord Redesdale defended the conduct of the AttorneyGeneral.

The Marquis of Lansdowne felt it his duty to explain his reasons for the vote he should give, and by so doing to guard against any possible misconstruction of them. Yet, after what he had heard that night from a noble and learned Lord (Ellenborough), he was fearful the English language was not sufficiently explicit to furnish him with words which might not be perverted from the meaning he intended they should carry. First, with respect to prosecutions ex officio by the Attorney General, he would admit that they were firmly bottomed in the English Constitution. This was a principle which no man acquainted with the practice of that Constitution could deny; and if any testimony of his could be supposed to weigh in favour of it, he would declare, that during the time he filled an important office, instances daily occurred which convinced him of the indispensable necessity of such a power being vested in the Crown. But, in admitting this, could it be said that he differed from his noble friend? Quite the contrary. His noble friend did not question the legality of the practice of proceeding by information; but it was the application of it to which he objected, and solicited the attention of their Lordships. If Mr. Justice Blackstone was well founded in his observation, that informations ex officio were only to be employed in cases of enormous misdemeanours, it followed that it was the duty of the House to inquire whether the bases which produced such an increase of prosecutions within the last three years were of this aggravated character. His noble friend had stated, that only sixteen informations ex officio had been filed in the six years preceding 1808, and that they had increased to 42 within the last three years. This very increase was a fit subject for investigation. So far from the motion being productive of any mischievous effects, it would be attended with this most beneficial effect, of laying the grounds of the practice before the public, and shewing them that it was a power which was not capriciously exercised. It was incumbent on Parliament to inquire into the causes of the extraordinary increase of informations ex officio, and why it became necessary to resort to a mode of proceeding which put aside that great bulwark of personal liberty, the application to a Grand Jury.

The Earl of Liverpool contended, that some cases of abuse should have been stated to justify the motion. He VOL. II.-1811. 2 F