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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

The section numbers and headlines of the Revised Statutes of 1914 are maintained herein and new laws are numbered by an alphabetical extension of that system.

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Cl. 3. Neither under the Sixteenth Amendment nor otherwise has congress power to tax, without apportionment, a true stock dividend made lawfully and in good faith, or the accumulated profits behind it, as income of the stockholder. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. ed. 521.

Cl. 3. The profit received by a trustee on the sale of capital stock is "income" under the Sixteenth Amendment and taxable without apportionment. Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, U. S. 41 Sup. Ct. 386.

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Cl. 3. The Revenue Act of 1916, in so far as it imposes a tax upon a stockholder of a stock dividend made lawfully and in good faith, violates article 1, section 2, cl. 3, and article 1, section 9, cl. 4 of the Constitution and to this extent is invalid notwithstanding the Sixteenth Amendment. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. ed. 521.

5. Membership—Quorum.

Cl. 1. The Webb-Kenyon Law is not invalid because after its veto it received in the senate only a two-thirds vote of a quorum, which was less than two-thirds of all the members elected and entitled to sit in that body. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. State of Kansas, 248 U. S. 276, 39 Sup. Ct. 93, 63 L. ed. 239.

7. Bills and veto.

The words "that house" in clause 2 of section 7, article 1 of the Constitution, relate to both houses as organized and entitled to exert legislative power as in the case of the presence of a quorum. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. State of Kansas, 248 U. S. 276, 39 Sup. Ct. 93, 65 L. ed. 239.

The Webb-Kenyon Law is not invalid because after its veto it received in the senate only a two-thirds vote of a quorum which was less than two-thirds of all the members. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. State of Kansas, 248 U. S. 276, 39 Sup. Ct. 93, 63 L. ed. 239.

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Commerce among the states consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens and includes the transportation of persons as well as property; and the act of congress known as the White Slave Act, prohibiting the transportation of females from one state to another for immoral purposes, is constitutional. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, 57 L. ed. 523; Bennett v. United States, 227 U. S. 333, 33 Sup. Ct. 288, 57 L. ed. 531; Harris v. United States, 227 U. S. 340, 33 Sup. Ct. 289, 57 L. ed. 534; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L. ed. 442.

Congress has power under the commerce clause of the Constitution to regulate the liability of interstate carriers to their employes for injuries; but until congress acts the subject is within the police power of the states, but an act of congress on the subject is paramount to state laws. Michigan etc. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192, 57 L. ed. 417.

The federal statute regulating the liability of carriers engaged in interstate commerce for injuries to employes is applicable until the act of transportation is fully completed, and such transportation is not completed when a railroad train reaches its terminal when anything further is to be done in reference to the moving of the cars containing the commerce that is carried. St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651, 57 L. ed. 1129.

Construction of the act of congress regulating the liability of persons engaged in interstate commerce for injuries to their employes. Robinson v. Baltimore etc. R. Co., 237 U. S. 84, 35 Sup. Ct. 491, 59 L. ed. 849; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Tilghman, 237 U. S. 499, 35 Sup. Ct. 653, 59 L. ed. 1069; St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct. 704, 59 L. ed. 1160; New York Cent, etc. R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 260, 35 Sup. Ct. 780, 59 L. ed. 1298; Delaware etc. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 35 Sup. Ct. 902, 59 L. ed. 1397; Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865, 59 L. ed 1433; Kansas City etc. R. Co. v. Leslie, 238 U. S. 599, 35 Sup. Ct. 844, 59 L. ed. 1478; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U. S. 352, 36 Sup. Ct. 126, 60 L. ed. 324; Shanks v. Delaware etc. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556, 36 Sup. Ct. 188, 60 L. ed. 436; Seaboard Air Line v. Horton, 239 U. S. 595, 36 Sup. Ct. 180, 60 L. ed. 458; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, 58 L. ed. 1062; Grand Trunk etc. R. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S. 42, 34 Sup. Ct. 581, 58 L. ed. 838; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 34 Sup. Ct. 646, 58 L. ed. 1051; Kansas City R. Co. v. McAdow, 240 U. S. 51, 36 Sup. Ct. 252, 60 L. ed. 520; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Skaggs, 240 U. S. 66, 36 Sup. Ct. 249, 60 L. ed. 528; Great Northern R. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U. S. 444, 36 Sup. Ct. 406, 60 L. ed. 732; Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Bond, 240 U. S. 449, 36 Sup. Ct. 403, 60 L. ed. 735; Pecos etc. R. Co. v. Rosenbloom, 240 U. S. 439, 36 Sup. Ct. 390, 60 L. ed. 730; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Kenney, 240 U. S. 489, 36 Sup. Ct. 458, 60 L. ed. 762; Osborne v. Gray, 241 U. S. 16, 36 Sup. Ct. 486, 60 L. ed. 865; Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177, 36 Sup. Ct. 517, 60 L. ed. 942; Minneapolis etc. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, 36 Sup. Ct. 595, 60 L. ed. 961; Chesapeake etc. R. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 36 Sup. Ct. 630, 60 L. ed. 1117; Baltimore etc. R. Co. v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 295, 37 Sup. Ct. 123, 61 L. ed. 312.

A state statute requiring a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce to give consignees notice of the arrival of shipments, and imposing a penalty for a failure, is unconstitutional. St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Edwards, 227 U. S. 265, 33 Sup. Ct. 262, 57 L. ed. 506.

A state regulation requiring a railroad company to deliver cars containing interstate shipments at an accessible place for the consignee within a designated time,

without providing for unavoidable delay, held to be unconstitutional. Yazoo etc. R. Co. v. Greenwood Grocery Co., 227 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 213, 57 L. ed. 389. States can not impose a license tax upon persons who solicit sales of goods in one state that are to be shipped from another state for delivery to the purchasers. Crenshaw v. State of Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389, 33 Sup. Ct. 294, 57 L. ed. 565.

The power of congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the regulation of the transportation of persons and property from one state to another by ferries. Port Richmond etc. Ferry Co. v. Board etc. of Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317, 34 Sup. Ct. 821, 58 L. ed. 1330.

Street cars engaged in interstate commerce, power of states to regulate the number of passengers on cars and the heating of the cars. South Covington etc. R. Co. v. City of Covington, 235 U. S. 537, 35 Sup. Ct. 158, 59 L. ed. 350.

States may levy a tax on oleomargarine that is sold, or may prohibit its manufacture altogether. Hammond Pack. Co. v. State of Montana, 233 U. S. 331, 34 Sup. Ct. 596, 58 L. ed. 985.

Consideration of the power of states to tax corporations that are engaged in interstate commerce. St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. State of Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 99, 59 L. ed. 265.

States may require foreign insurance companies doing business in the state to pay a tax on an excess of premiums received over losses and expenses on business done within the state. New York etc. Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, 34 Sup. Ct. 167, 58 L. ed. 332.

Inspection fees, consideration of the right of states to charge fees for the inspection of property that is used in interstate commerce. Foote Co. v. State of Maryland, 232 U. S. 494, 34 Sup. Ct. 377, 58 L. ed. 698.

Consideration of the power of a city to require express companies engaged in interstate commerce to take out licenses and pay fees therefor. Adams Express Co. v. City of New York, 232 U. S. 14, 34 Sup. Ct. 203, 58 L. ed. 483.

Construction of the acts of congress regulating the liability of carriers that act in connection with each other in transporting interstate commerce, and where suits may be instituted against such carriers. St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 57 L. ed. 486; Kansas City etc. R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 57 L. ed. 683; Missouri etc. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup. Ct. 397, 57 L. ed. 690; Norfolk etc. R. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593, 33 Sup. Ct. 609, 57 L. ed. 980.

States can not regulate the equipment of railroad cars that are used in interstate commerce, the act of congress on the subject being exclusive. Southern R. Co. v. Indiana R. R. Comm., 236 U. S. 439, 35 Sup. Ct. 304, 59 L. ed. 661.

The validity of the act of 1909, requiring railroad locomotives to be equipped with automatic bell-ringers because it conflicts with the federal constitution, is not called in question when it is not shown that the locomotives are used in interstate commerce. Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. State, 178 Ind. 498, 99 N. E. 801.

The act of 1909, requiring railroad locomotives to be equipped with headlights is not in conflict with the federal constitution. Vandalia R. Co. v. Railroad Com., 182 Ind. 382, 101 N. E. 85, 242 U. S. 255, 37 Sup. Ct. 93, 61 L. ed. 276.

State courts have no jurisdiction to investigate overcharges made by a carrier engaged in interstate commerce. St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Patterson Const. Co., 181 Ind. 304, 104 N. E. 512.

Switching crews on railroad trains, power of states as to railroads used in interstate commerce. St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. State of Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 36 Sup. Ct. 274, 60 L. ed. 776.

States can not regulate and control the switching of cars by railroad companies

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