CHAPTER II.

THE MAN AT THE HELM.

Negotiations with Austria.-Circular of the 24th of January, 1863.-Conversation with Count Karolyi.-Prusso-Russian Convention.-The Party of Progress.-Congress of Princes.-Conditions of Prussia.-War in the Distance.-The Danish Campaign.-Treaty of Gastein, 14th August, 1865.-Bismarck elevated to the Rank of Count.-Bismarck and Pauline Lucca.-Correspondence with his Family. -Hunting at Schönbrunn.-Biarritz.

THE action of history would not fail to solve the conflict, but this was only possible if Prussia entered energetically on this action; and thus we see Bismarck, the man at the helm, steering the Prussian vessel of State, undismayed by the daily attacks of the Progressists, through shallows and rocks, firmly and safely towards open water, on which, driven by the breath of God into history, it was to fly in full sail towards the sunrise of victory.

Immediately after assuming the Ministry, in December, 1862, Bismarck entered upon negotiations with Austria. If Austria

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NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA.

could decide upon the dismissal of that enemy of Prussian policy, Schwarzenberg, and give Prussia her proper position in Germany and thus insure the same to Germany as her right. Bismarck was prepared to enter into a coalition with Austria; but if Austria could not rise to such a policy, Prussia was determined alone to give the coup de grace to the unhealthy, troubled state of things which lay like an Alp on German life, thus ter minate the unnatural hesitation, and create for Germany a new and healthy body corporate.

With perfect frankness, as was his peculiar wont, Bismarck explained himself to Austria. The latter was at this time engaged with the project of the so-called delegations to the Bund, i. e., with a reform which was no reform, but an entirely meaningless absurdity, not even an apparent something.

In the famous circular dispatch of the 24th of January, 1863, Bismarck says:

"In order to bring about a better understanding of the two Courts, I took the initiative in the form of negotiations with Count Karolyi, in which I brought the following considerations under the notice of the Imperial Ambassador. According to my convictions, our relations to Austria must unavoidably change for the better or the worse. It is the sincere wish of the Royal Government that the former alternative should arise; but if we should not be met by the Imperial Cabinet with the necessary advances as we could desire, it will be necessary for us to contemplate the other alternative, and prepare for it accordingly.

"I have reminded Count Karolyi that, during the decennial ⚫ period preceding the events of 1848, there had been a tacit understanding between the two high Powers, by virtue of which Austria was insured the support of Prussia on European questions, and, on the other hand, allowed us to exercise an influence in Germany, unfettered by the opposition of Austria, as manifested by the formation of the Customs Union. By these arrangements the German Diet rejoiced in a degree of internal unity and outward dignity, which has not since then been reached. I have not alluded to the question as to whose error it was that analogous relations were not re-established on the reconstitution of the Diet, as I was concerned, not with recriminations for the past, but with a practical development of the present time. In

CIRCULAR DISPATCH OF JANUARY, 1863.

345 the latter we find, in those very States with which Prussia, by her geographical position, is interested in maintaining special friendly relations, an opposing influence, promoted by the Imperial Cabinet, with signal results. I put it strongly to Count Karolyi, that Austria in this maluer might, perhaps, win the sympathies of the governments of those States, but would estrange from herself those of Prussia, to the detriment of the common interests of the Diet. The Imperial Ambassador con soled himself with the certainty that, in the event of any war dangerous to Austria, the two greater powers would, under any circumstances, be found together again as allies.

"In this assumption, according to my view, there exists a dangerous error, which may, perhaps, not become apparent until the decisive moment, with a fatal clearness for both Cabinets, and I therefore besought Count Karolyi urgently to use all his powers to contradict this in Vienna. I pointed out that already, in the last Italian war, the alliance had not been so valuable to Austria as it might have been if the two powers had not, during the preceding eight years, contended with each other in the field of German politics, in a manner only conclusively advantageous to a third party, and so undermined all mutual confidence. Nevertheless, the fact that Prussia did not seek for any advantage in consequence of the difficulties of Austria in 1859, but rather armed to assist Austria in need, clearly shows the results of the former more intimate relations. But should these last not be renewed and revivified, Prussia would, under similar circumstances, be as little debarred from contracting an alliance with an antagonist of Austria, as, under opposite circumstances, from forming a faithful and firm alliance with Austria, against common enemies. I, at least, as I did not conceal from Count Karolyi, under such circumstances could never advise my gracious Sovereign to neutrality. Austria is free to choose whether she prefers to continue her present anti-Prussian policy, with the leverage of the coalition of the Central States, or would seek an honest union with Prussia. That the latter may be the result, is my most sincere desire. This can, however, only be obtained by the abandonment of Austria's inimical policy at the German Courts.

"Count Karolyi replied that the Imperial House could not relinquish her traditional influences on the German Governments.

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CIRCULAR DISPATCH OF JANUARY, 1863.

I denied the existence of any such tradition by pointing out that Hanover and Hesse had, for a hundred years-from the commencement of the Seven Years' War-been principally guided by Prussian influences; and that, at the epoch of Prince Metternich, the same States had also been guided from Vienna, specially in the interest of the understanding between Prussia and Austria; consequently that the assumed tradition of the Austrian Imperial House dated only from the time of Prince Schwarzenberg, and the system to which it pertained has not hitherto shown itself conducive to the consolidation of the German Confederation. I laid stress upon the fact that, on my arrival in Frankfurt, in 1851, after circumstantial conversations with Prince Metternich, then residing at Johannisberg, I had anticipated that Austria herself would see the wisdom of a policy which would obtain us a position in the German Confederation, consonant with the interest of Prussia to throw all her strength into the common cause. Instead of that, Austria has striven to embitter and impede our position in the German Confederation, and, in point of fact, to force us to seek for allies in other directions. The whole treatment of Prussia on the part of the Vienna Cabinet seems to rest upon the assumption that we, more than any other State, are fully exposed to foreign attacks, against which we need foreign assistance, and that hence we are bound to put up with contemptuous treatment from those States from whom we expect aid. The task of a Prussian Government, having the interests of the Royal House and of the country at heart, would therefore be, to prove the erroneousness of this assumption by deeds, if words and aspirations are neglected.

"Our dissatisfaction with the condition of things in the Confederation has received fresh aliment during the last few months, from the obstinacy with which the German Governments more closely allied with Austria have offensively stood out against Prussia on the delegate question. Before 1848 it had been unheard of that questions of any magnitude should have been introduced in the Confederation, without the concurrence of the two great Powers previously being secured. Even in cases where the opposition had come from the less powerful States, as in the matter of the South German fortresses, it had been preferred to allow objects of such importance and urgency to remain unfulfilled for

CIRCULAR DISPATCH OF JANUARY, 1863.

347 years, rather than seek to overcome opposition by means of a majority. At the present day, however, the opposition of Prussia, not only to a proposal in itself, but in reference to its unconstitutionality, is treated as an incident undeserving of notice, by which no one should be prevented from pursuing a given progress in a deliberately chosen course. I urged upon Count Karolyi to communicate the contents of the preceding conference to Count Rechberg with the utmost accuracy, although in a confidential sense, expressing at the same time my conviction that the wounds sustained by our mutual relations can only be healed by unreserved sincerity.

"The second conversation took place on the 13th of December of last year, a few days after the former, in consequence of a dispatch of the Royal Ambassador at the Federal Diet. I visited Count Karolyi in order to draw his attention to the serious state of things at the Diet, and did not conceal from him that the further advance of the majority in a course regarded by us as unconstitu tional, would bring us into a position we could not accept, and that in the consequences of it we foresaw the violation of the Confederation; that Herr von Usedom had left the Freiherr von Kübeck and Baron von der Pfordten in scarcely any doubt as to the construction which we placed upon the matter, but had received replies to his intimations whence we could draw no inferences as to any wish for a compromise, as Freiherr von der Pfordten pressed strenuously for a speedy delivery of our minority vote.

"Upon this I objected that, under such circumstances, a feeling of our own dignity would not admit of our evading any longer the conflict induced by the other side, and that I had therefore telegraphed the Royal Ambassador to deposit his minority vote. I indicated that the passing over the border of legitimate competency by resolutions of the majority, would be regarded by us as a breach of the federal treaties, and that we should mark our sense of the fact by the withdrawal of the Royal Ambassador to the Diet, without nominating any successor; and I drew attention to the practical consequences likely to ensue upon such a situation in a comparatively short time, as it would naturally occur that the activity of an assembly, in which, from just causes, we no longer took part, would be regarded by us as inauthoritative on the whole business sphere of the Diet.