to do, either with the Neceflity, or Freedom, the certainty, or uncertainty, of Actions and Events, but only to view them as they are. in themselves, without having any influence upon them. For a thing is the fame after it is known, as it was before; and the fame before, as it is after. If the actions of men then, are proved to be free, the bare certainty of the divine fore-knowledge, cannot poffibly destroy that freedom; because fore-knowledge can have no influence on the things fore-known.-It follows, then, that no argument can be drawn from the divine fore-knowledge againft human liberty, and confequently, the divine prefcience is befide the prefent queftion.

"Again. It feems to me against all the rules of juft reasoning, and little less than a contradiction, to infer the neceflity of human actions from the certainty of divine prefcience. Tis evident, from what has already been faid, that knowledge alters not the nature of the things known, but only views them as they are in themselves; and it has been proved above, that human actions are free, confequently they must be foreknown AS FREE, i. e. as they are in their own nature. But it would be a contradiction to fay, that an action foreknown as free, is therefore neceffary. For, to know an action as neceffary, which is in its own nature contingent, would not be knowledge, but mistake.

But it will be asked, How God can foreknow actions, which depend on the will of free-agents? or, How that which is contingent, can be certainly foreknown?

Buc

"I anfwer. God can know every thing according to its nature. And I can as well explain, how God can fore-know the actions of free-agents, as I can explain any other act of divine knowledge; for every act of divine knowledge is incomprehenfible to us. And it is juft as improper to afk, how God can foreknow the actions of freeagents, as it is to afk, how God could create the world. For the divine Power is no more explicable than the divine knowledge. no one would look upon it as found reafoning, to conclude against the existence of the world, becaufe we cannot explain how God could create it: neither is it good reafoning, to conclude against human liberty, because we cannot conceive how God can foreknow the actions of free-ageuts. 'Tis, therefore, certain, that all arguments against human liberty must be drawn from other premifes than the inexplicable fore-knowledge of God.

"But ftill,' perhaps it will be faid, If knowledge be founded on the nature of things, as they are in themselves, then the certain fore-knowledge of an event will imply the neceffity of that event, in the nature of things; and 'tis not contended, that things are ne-. cffary becaufe foreknown, but that they are foreknown, because they ⚫ are in themselves necessary.'-But this is a full acknowledgment that fore-knowledge can be no certain proof of neceffity: but that things must be proved to be neceffary, by arguments antecedent to any that can be drawn from fore-knowledge

"But however, in answer to this, I fay, that the certain fore-, knowledge of an event, does by no means imply the phyfical neceffity of that event; for certainty and neceffity are not neceffarily involved in each other. I have undeniably fhewed above, that an infallible cer

tainty

tainty may well ftand independent of a phyfical neceffity. Thus I am infallibly certain, that God will not again deftroy the world by water but 'tis manifeft there is no phyfical impoffibility of this coming to pafs. If then, man may have an infallible certainty of an event which is not phyfically neceffary: how much more may the glorious and omniscient GOD, know the actions of men, though there be no abfolute neceffity laid upon them ?-For we may eafily conceive, that the Almighty, Omnifcient Gop, who perfectly knows the na ture and powers of every creature? Who understands their mutual influence and dependance on each other, who fees at one comprehen five view every fituation, with every concomitant circumstance, of every creature that ever did, or will exift; I fay, we may eafily conceive, that fuch a being may infallibly foreknow how a free-agent, who acts with defign, and determines itfelf by apparent motives, will act, in every fituation and circumftance of its existence."

We cannot refrain here from making a remark or two in reply to the above argument, without entering formally on its refutation.This is, that, admitting all the writer fays of the poffibility of God's foreseeing the actions of a perfectly and abfolutely free-agent, fuppo fing fuch a one to exift; fuch free-agent could not stand in the dependant relation to God, as the creature does to the Creator, without the former's wilfully permitting, at leaft, that to be, which he forefaw would come to pafs. Without fuch permiffion, indeed, it could not come to pafs; and if fuch foreseen events were abfolutely contrary to the will of the creator, would not the prevention of them have taken place in the original conftitution of things; unlefs that original contitution be attributed to fome other caufe than the will of the Deity. Either man, therefore,, is ultimately a neceffary agent, or God is fo. From this dilemma let our ingenious cafuift clear himself if he can it appears evident from this argument, that, as the apoftle fays, "What God foreknew, that alfo he did predeftinate." In Chap. V. the eflayift declaims agair.ft neceffity as a horrible, and in fa vour of free-agency as a comfortable, doctrine:-Neceflity and fin, he fays, are incompatible. But whatever difficulties attend the doc trine of neceffity, on account of moral turpitude, or religious fin, they are referable to the trite enquiry into the fource of phyfical and moral evil; the difputes about which, however feemingly im portant, are as little edifying and uninterefting as the most trifling of other enigmatical difquifitions. Quid opus eft verbis? Rixus eft de laná caprina.

ART. XV. Refignation no Proof. A Letter to Mr. Jebb; with occa→ fional Remarks on his Spirit of Proteftantifm. By a Member of the University of Cambridge. 8vo. 18. 6d. White, London; Merrill Cambridge.

In our Review of Mr. Jebb's pamphlet, refpecting his refigna tion, we obferved that, though we allowed his diffent from the artis cles of the established church to be a good reafon for his resignation of his church-livings, we could not acquiefce in the validity of his reafons for that diffent. The author, of the pamphlet before us,

See London Review for December, page 500.

appears

appears to be perfectly of the fame opinion, That he fhould, to us, therefore, appear to have much reafon on his fide, is no wonder; we fhall of confequence be the lefs lavish of our encomiums on this head, as any compliment, we should pay him, would of courfe be complimenting our own opinion. But, as we have not forborn cafting our feveret cenfures on the file and compofition of writers, even of our, own way of thinking, we may be permitted to indulge our paffion. for panegyric" in bestowing the highest encomiums on thofe of the present writer. To confefs that, there is hardly a propofition or fertiment throughout the work, to which we do not heartily fubfcribe; and at the fame time to declare that, we could not have displayed them with fo much accuracy, and to fo great advantage; if it be not the greatest encomium, we have in our budget, it is the best that at prelent offers itself. Seriously, as it is on a ferious fubject, the prefent, is in our opinion, and in every fenfe, a most excellent pamphlet. In paying a due compliment to the writer, therefore, to make a copious extract from it, will be paying the best compliment we can. to our readers.

The writer begins his letter with a very pertinent and proper queftion, refpecting the criterion of the Chriftian Faith, or that kind of belief, which should entitle a man to the denomination of a Chriftian.

"It has been often afked, and it is a queftion of great importance, "What makes a man a Chritian, and what profeffion of Faith is fufficient for that purpofe?" And it has been generally acknowledged, that what alone can entitle any one to this appellation, is, a belief that Jefus is the Son of God, the Meffiah; hereby affenting to whatever is recorded of him in the Scriptures, refpecting his Perfon and office, his human nature and divine. If therefore the authority of the Scriptures be acknowledged, it is only neceffary to fhew that this doctrine is contained in them; and this will appear evidently to thofe who confider at large the whole tenor of the Gospel. History. For partial reafonings on detached portions of it are not to be regarded in argument; nothing in the Scriptures is to be explain-. ed, but as it ftands in context, with the whole. The union of the divine and human nature in the perfon of Jefus Chrift is undoubtedly the object of the New Teftament. This being admitted, every, pofition falls into fenfe, and the farther you advance, the weight of argument is increased. In any other fenfe it cannot poffibly be explained: it is full of infuperable difficulties and irreconcileable contradictions.

"It should feem therefore unreasonable, that any one who rejects this most effential article of the Chriftian Faith should still claim the right of being confidered as a Chriftian. This privilege, however, you ftill affert in its utmost extent, tho' in the ftate of your opinions given to the public, you feem to want the primary and most necef fary qualification. The doctrine of the divinity of Jefus, Chrift is of the atmoft confequence: and, if there were the leaft room to fuppofe it could reasonably be denied, might justly give the alarm to every ferious Chriftian: for it will not admit of the leaft accommodation; it muft either be firmly established, or Christianity must fall with it"

After

After fome fenfible as moderate reprehenfions of the arguments in favour of unlimited freedom in the public oppofition lately made to religious establishment, our author proceeds to their perfonal application to Mr. Webb.

"The only argument you have offered that deferves attention, and which you was well aware would be of more service to your cause than all the fineffe of Sophiftry, is, the refignation of your preferment. How far this ought to operate, will be confidered hereafter. At prefent I fhall only obferve, that in former times, when many were ready to lay down not only their fortunes, but their lives alfo, in defence of principles however erroneous, this circumftance would have had no effect. But, fuch inftances of conftancy and self-denial being now uncommon, we build with much greater advantage than our Predeceffors even on the fame foundation. In thefe felf-interefted times, an act of this nature will be confidered by many, as one of thofe wonders which they will scarce believe though a man declare it unto them. With others, who take up their opinions on trust and the au-> thority of their Teacher, it will pafs for demonftration of truth. And with moft, if it be not an argument of the goodness of your cause, will, at leaft, afford a prelumptive proof of your fincerity. And though fome few might be inclined to think that you forefaw in what manner you could easily indemnify yourself; yet for the prefent at leaft are we all bound to believe, that you have acted from motives altogether difinterefted, and the most zealous regard for Truth.

There is a certain degree of generofity in a man's profeffing himself an open enemy. To this praife you are justly entitled. But when I have allowed you the merit of not having facrificed to hypocrify and diffimulation, I can grant no more. I feel an honeft indignation at the boldness of the attempt to fubvert the very firft principles of our Religion: I lament the lukewarmnefs and indifference of Chriftians in matters of fuch moment; and begin to apprehend that we shall suffer fuch frequent inroads to be made on our Religious as well as Civil rights, as hereafter to find much difficulty in maintaining that ground, which at firft would have coft us little trouble to defend.

On

"Yet think not I have even a wish that you had acted otherwise. God forbid, that any one profeffing fuch principles fhould have continued in the character of a Teacher in the Church of Christ. the contrary I fhall think you entitled to the fincerest thanks, if your conduct should so far operate on your Brethren of the fame perfuafion, as to induce them to follow your example. We should then be enabled to diftinguish the true friends of the Church from those infidious members, who are fecretly undermining our Establishment, while they profefs to bear up the pillars of it. That the evil has fpread wider than is generally imagined, there is too much reafon to fear. But, be the confequences what they may, no lefs desireable would be the event; nay, though it made our Establishment tremble to its center, and even shook the E-1 Chair itself, under whofe fanction you first broached, and have fince propagated, opinions of fuch dangerous tendency."

Our

Our Letter-writer goes on to confider the nature and confequences of an unlimited freedom of enquiry in religious matters, which, as conducted by Mr. Jebb and his partifans, as certainly lead from Free Enquiry to Scepticifm as from Scepticifm to Infidelity t.

His manner, of attending a free enquirer, after Mr. Jebb's method, from his infant ftate of enquiring to his maturity in irreligion and error, is masterly, and fhews an intimate acquaintance with his fubject.

"The first privilege," fays he, "which he is taught to claim, and which he is to confider as a fundamental principle of Proteftantifm, is "the right not only of judging for himself, but also of avowing that judgment in whatever manner he thinks proper."-A truly confcientious man will be fatisfied with enjoying his opinions in private; it is the furious Zealot and Dogmatift alone, who wish to impofe them on others. For it is abfurd to fuppofe, when a Man gives his Opinions to the world, that he is indifferent about the event; that he neither wishes nor flatters himself that he shall gain a favourable reception for them. With what view they are thus openly avowed, is evident; and however difinterestedly, and without defign, he may pretend to fubmit them to the attention of mankind, he would be cruelly mortified if he did not meet with their applaufe. But if we could even fuppofe, that the Author himfelf was indifferent about gaining profelytes to his Principles, they may have that influence whether he intends it or not. The first part of the claim, therefore, we grant in its fullest extent; but it will be neceffary to know, what thefe Opinions are, what may be their effect both on Society and Individuals, before we confirm the latter.

"Nor is this right of avowing his Principles at all the more admiffible, because it is in the opinion of every one to reject them." -This would, at once, open a door for every kind of blafphemy and licentioufnefs, if mankind had the right of propagating Errors and Folly, as they have the faculty of inventing them. I doubt not but your Proteftant clearly fees the ufe that may be made of this privilege, as he claims more than is ufually demanded by the moft ftrenuous affertors of Christian liberty. The author of the Confeffional himself claims only the right of publishing his opinions "within decent reftrictions."

"I am aware that to the liberty of open controverfy we owe the glorious effects of the Reformation. But whoever fhould confider that æra as a pattern for fucceeding times, would fhew himfelf no judge of these matters. The fpirit of Luther was well adapted to the peculiar circumstances of that age: in these days, fuch violence would be execrated. Mankind had not then been permitted to think for themselves, even on those points which most nearly concerned them; and therefore heard with particular partiality, any one who endeavoured to put them in poffeffion of that defireable privilege. But now they not only claim that right, but another alfo no lefs valuable," that of enjoying it free and unmolested."

With due deference to this ingenious writer, we muft own, we do not admire this ecclefiaftical ufe of the word fcepticifm. A itate of fcepticifm no doubt should precede Free Enquiry, and not follow it, as a fpecies of Infidelity. Who enquires that does not doubt, in a country where ignorance cannot be pleaded ?