But what is to become of the rights of private judgment, and the honour and honefty of acting according to it? They cannot be acted upon in any fociety that ever exifted, or perhaps ever will exist, in this world. I fpeak from knowledge, obfervation, and experience, when I fay, that I know of no fituation in any fociety; no employment, no trade, no profeflion, in which a man of genuine moral principles, must not warp thofe principles to his convenience, or his peace. If any man, of any bufinefs, fhould have either the audacity, or infincerity to deny this, I will take my credit with the world again his, and prove it after one hour's attention to his affairs. I look upon it, therefore, as an indifputable truth, that no man can act in fociety from his own principles. The fituation of every man is appointed him by his parents, or by the public, and another confcience is, as it were, fubftituted to his own; lefs excellent (at leaft in his opinion) but more ufeful. His moral character depends on his fidelity to this confcience; and his own private opinions and principles are of ufe only in thofe cafes where his focial obligations leave him at liberty.

"This may be exclaimed againft, as opening a door to the most fervile compliances. I am not opening it; it ever was open, and probably ever will be. I can have no objection to a better moral fyftem, if it could be had; but it cannot, and men must either fly fociety, or submit to it,"

The preacher applies this time-ferving fyftem to the religious and political difputes at prefent fubfitting. Refpecting the former, he fays, "I have had a long and fincere friendship with a man, who may be faid to have gone through all the experiments of reformation, on the principle of honour, and the right of private judgment. He ftarted first from orthodoxy to a confiderable aflociation, for reforming the whole church of England. He foon found as many objections to the fociety as to the church itself. He tried the diffenters; and among them, instead of once fubmitting to the laws against his opi nion, he was every day to fubmit to every fubfcriber in his flock; and was the flave of a thoufand abfurd cuftoms, modes, and opinions. He fet up for himself, and projected fchemes of apoflcfhip. He began to form affociations, and to lay down principles and forms. He found himself involved in confiderations and expedients, before he could advance one material step. Every man in his affociation was fingular in his opinion; and no union could have taken place, but by every man making fome ficrifice; which was the very objection he had to the establishment. In fhort, after ruining his fortune, dift reffing his friends, and deftroying his own conflitution, the refult was this declaration: that with the firmeft and pureft moral principles, he could obey the established cuftoms and laws of the land, and affift in promoting the public happiness, with less expence to his integrity, and lefs pain to his mind, than he could keep together, and conduct the fmalleft community, formed nearly on his own principles.'

But it may be faid, how are beneficial revolutions to take place, if every man is to fubmit to the laws? You will obferve, I do not controvert the right of private judgment. My pofition is, that private opinion, like private liberty, cannot always be acted upon, and must

be

be given up in part, to public convenience. I would fubmit, when I could not help it, to the laws of a ftate which I did not approve; and if a revolution arofe, as at the Reformation, and introduced principles more agreeable to me, I fhould rejoice in it. But I would not project a reformation; because I think it above any man's abilities and influence; and no reformation or revolution was ever brought about by one man. There are millions of Calvins, and Luthers, and Cromwells. It is the event produces the man, and not the man the event. Human affairs are in a conftant fluctuation; and they are very little retarded, or haftened, in their changes, by the conduct of any individuals. Some men must take the lead in every great tranfaction, when all circumftances have made it ready for execution; and thofe men may have the glory or dishonour of it; while the various reasons, and causes which have effected it, are unknown, and incomprehenfible to the world. I have therefore thought that men have been impelled to create great events and revolutions in kingdoms, by the fame kind of folly as would tempt a man to interrupt the courfe of Nature, or difappoint the views of Providence.

"I beg I may not be mifunderstood, as meaning to caft any illiberal reflections on those who have lately diftinguished themselves as reformers in the church. I greatly honour the characters of many of them; at the fame time, I think them clearly mistaken in their duties. The principles of the people of England are in general thofe of the Thirty-nine articles. While that in this cafe, it is folly to think of an alteration when it is not, an alteration will take place of course, as at the reformation.

:

In applying his principles to politics, and particularly the American difpute, he fays, "I mean not to countenance the common cry of diffatisfaction with public meafures. The very nature of the Englifh government is either not understood, or there are some reasons which make men pretend not to understand it. We fee in the writings of a Montefquieu, a Sidney, a Locke, a Black stone, pleafing defcriptions of what has never exifted. The English conftitution, as it is generally defcribed and declaimed upon, never had an existence. I appeal to every page of hiftory for the truth of what I fay; where the most fagacious republican will find it extremely difficult to point out one public meafure that has been conducted on the boafted principles of the conftitution. I have been my felf happy under the Englith government, in the most fplendid period of its liberty and glory. I have attentively obferved its general movements. They have proceeded from principles, that were not even analogous to those which were fuppofed to form the English conftitution, Once in feven years there has been a Pretended election; in which it has been an established Whig principle, ever fince the revolution, that adminiftration fhould have a majority. I do not fpeak this from a diflike of Whigs; most of whom I fuppofe to be among the best friends to the liberty of this country. I only mention a truth which is neceffary to my purpofe; and I take it even from the patriots. It has been a maxim uncontroverted by them (till they loft their places) that the butinefs of government could not go on, unless it had a majority at its devotion in both houfes of parliament. It has accordingly ever fe

cur.d

cured that majority; and all laws have been made, and all business · done, by adminiftration thus attended.-The English government, therefore, is, and has been, as fimple a monarchy as can be conceived; if we apply the term monarch to the king, his minifters, and their dependants. Look into any of the monarchies of Europe, and you will find that the fupreme power is in none of them more fimple, or confifting of fewer parts. The diftin&tion of the English government is, that it rules by influence, not by fear. Other powers effect their purposes by an army of foldiers; the English fupreme power by one of placemen, penfioners, dependants, and expectants. The ftate of government being fuch as I defcribe it; not fuch as it is pretended to be, either here or in America, it fhould feem that our dif pates arofe in the natural and neceffary measures of administration.

*

"The English are ruled, and polibly can be ruled only in this way. It is the eftablished government of our country. By extending it to the Americans, we offer to them, what they pretend to be defirous of all the rights and privileges of Englifhmen; by refufing the offer, the Americans refufe to become fellow-citizens with us. They will fay, that the conftitution is altered, and not what it was.”When, and where? In the writings of Locke and Sidney. But they have formed their own conftitution on thofe writings, and they will not adjust them to ours, but adhere to thofe of their own forming.' This feems to me to be the real state of the difpute; and I fee no poffibility of deciding it, unless the very governments are altered either here or in the colonies."

DIVINITY.

ART. XIV. An Efay on Liberty and Neceffity: In Anfier to Auguftus Toplady's Tract, (on what he calls) Chriftian and Philofophical Neceffity afferted. In which John Wesley's Thoughts on Neceffity' are examined and defended; the Difficulties of thefe Subjects rendered plain and easy to common Readers, and Human Liberty fully proved. By Philaretus. 12mo. 1s. Hawes, London.

In the Introduction to this Effay, the reader is told, that " The first day of the month called Auguft, the London Review (for the preceding month) brought me an account of a work, entitled The Scheme of Christian and Philofophical Neceffity afferted: By Auguftus Toplady. Upon reading the quotations from this work, in the Review, and the obfervations of the Reviewers on the Stile and Subject of it, I found my mind much concerned, that an opinion, which feemed to me, fubverfive of all moral obligation, and destructive of all religion, fhould be afferted with fuch confidence; and the Truth not argued, but baniered out of countenance, in fupport of that, which every man, as foon as he understands, muft deteft as horrible. I did not, however, immediately determine to concern myself about it in any public manner, but finding my mind ftill con

I am told there are near forty thousand people who have places and penfions, and in whom it would not be prudent to difobey the minifter.

tinue

tinue exercised on the fubject, I at length procured his book, and fet myself to examine it: the refult of which examination, the reader will find in the following pages, which I hope will plainly fhew him whether the doctrine of Abfolute Neceffity, or that of Free Agency, be most conformable to found Reafon, and to Scripture." For concealing his real name, under that of Philaretus, our Effayift apologizes as follows:

"The Critics each adventʼrous author scan,

"And praife or cenfure, as they love the man."

"For this reafon I have thought it beft, on this occafion, to conceal my name from the publick, that my arguments may stand or fall by their own merit. That no one may believe them true, thro' a regard for their author, nor any one deem them inconclufive, thro' prejudice to a name, without duly confidering them.

"In the following remarks, I have ufed great plainnefs of fpeech; 'tis confiftent with my character and profeffion. But I hope the reader will find nothing low, or inconfiftent with decency and good manners. I therefore think, I may adopt what Horace fays of himfelf, with much more propriety than this writer has done,

*

Quod VERUM atque DECENS, curo, et rogo, et omnis in hoc fum. "He has, it is true, been applauded for his attachment to the VERUM; but for what reafon it would puzzle a man to find out : and I believe, the candid, attentive reader, will think with me, that our author's conclufions have no more to do with the VERUM, than his language has with the DECENS."

Although Philaretus might be puzzled to find out why we applauded Mr. Toplady's attachment to the verum, while we cenfured his difregard to the decens, we were in hopes that our impartiality on his fubject, would have prevented any of our readers from claffing us with fuch critics as praise or cenfure WRITERS, in proportion as we refpect thein as men. Having no perfonal acquaintance with Mr. Toplady, we can affure Philaretus we fhewed no more favour to his tenets on that account, than we did to his ftile. That we were of a fimilar opinion with him, in regard to the doctrines of Liberty and Neceffity, was before well known; and it would have ill become us to have concealed that opinion, in giving an account of his book. At the fame time, we fhall do the prefent author the fame juftice, as a writer, though we differ in opinion from him as to the validity of his arguments. Not that we think it incumbent upon us to undertake to refute him; let his profeffed antagonist, Mr. Toplady, co this, if he thinks proper. It is our bufinefs only to proclaim the chalenge, name the weapons, and afford a fair field for the comba

tants.

This effay is divided into five chapters. In the first of which, the author refutes, as he terms it, Mr. Toplady's definition of FreeAgency. We own we do not rightly understand what is meant by the refutation of a definition. If difputants differ in their definitions, it is no wonder they difagree in the profecution of their argument; and it is poffible, Mr. Toplady will as little approve of Philaretus's

Vid. London Review for July 1775 P-53

definition,

definition, as Philaretus does that of Mr. Toplady. Be this as it may, the latter gives a definition of Free-Agency, which he proves to be totally inconfiftent with abfolute neceflity; a proof, in our opinion, that it is not what Mr. Toplady means, who declares his notions of human liberty and abfolute neceffity to be compatible.-In Chap. II. The author treats of the connexion fubfifting between foul and body; of ideas; and of the connexion between motives and actions. In difcuffing thefe points, the writer makes ufe of feveral advantages which Mr. Toplady had given him, in admitting the total difference between matter and jpirit, and their dividing the universe between them; and in fome little inaccuracy attending his reprefentation of the nature of our ideas, and of the Arminian doctrine of felf. determination, felf-motion, and the contingency of future events. In Chap. III. the effayift examines and fupports the feveral popular objections to the fcheme of neceffity; in doing which, he appears to. be a fenfible, fhrewd, and keen controverfialist.-In Chap. IV. he endeavours to prove that the fcriptures give no countenance to the doctrine of neceflity.* This is faying a great deal indeed. Granting for a moment, that they do not clearly and explicitly declare it; to fay they give no countenance to it, would be apt to make me fufpect the writer never candidly read St. Paul's epiftle to the Romans. In this chapter, our Effayil examines the argument Mr. Toplady brings, for the necefity of any event, from the certainty of divine foreknowledge. Our readers will accept this as an example of his talents for argumentation.

To infer, (fays he) the neceffity of the event, from the certainty of fore-knowledge, seems to me quite befide the point. For it there are no other arguments, a priori, to prove the neceffity of human actions, 'tis certain they can never be proved to be neceffary, a pofteriori, from fore-knowledge. For knowledge, whether fore or after, alters not the nature of things, but fimply views them as they are in themfelves. Let any one carefully confider this, and he will foon be convinced, that things are the fame in themselves, whether we fuppofe them known or not known. Knowledge has nothing at all

By neceffity, fays this writer, I always mean "The abfolute neceffity of all buman actions, i. e. that man is under an abfolute neceifity of acting just as he does, in every action of his life; and that it is not, nor ever was, in his own power to alter the leaft part of his conduct." It is a pity, when this author objected to Mr. Toplady's definitions, he did not think it requifite to be more precife in his own. It is a pity, that, instead of repeating the word abfolute, he did not, the fecond time, tell us whether he meant a mechanical, a phyfical, or metaphyfical neceffity. In fpeaking of a man's actions being in bis oron power, he should also have specified what kind of power a man might properly call his own. The fcriptures repeatedly tell us, man has no abfolute power of his run to do any thing; that it is by the Creator that he even lives, moves, and has his being. That man is relatively and comparatively a free-agent, is moft certain. He is at liberty to move from place to place, while an inanimate body is under the neceffity of being moved. Is he not a free-agent unless he moves without a motive for moving? And yet phyfical, or even metaphyfical motives may be as neceffarily efficient as mechanical powers. We would recommend to our ingenious effayift the perufal of Mr. Edwards' treatife on this fubject, by which, if he be not convinced of the compatibility between human liberty and natural neceffity, we fhall defpair of its being in the power of any thing, either we, or Mr. Toplady can fay, to effect his conviction.

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