Third book of his PRINCIPIA, "Quod radii folis non agitant media quæ permeant, nifi in reflectione et refractione." It has, indeed, been proved by experiment that the portion of air, lying in the focus of the most potent fpeculum, is not at all af fected with heat by the paffage of fight through it, but continues of the fame temperature with the ambient air, although any opaque body, or even any tranfparent body, denfer than air, when put in the fame place, would be intenfely heated in an instant †.

Can there be any doubt, then, that the air, or atmosphere, may be made the means of cominunicating to and from denfer folid bodies, a greater degree of heat than itself can poffefs?· It is a matter of foine difficulty with this philofopher to reconcile our affertion with what followed; viz. "that the beat "of bodies ftands exactly in the fame predicament with their "motion: the quantity communicated from one to another "follows the fame general ratio: what the one lofes the other "gains, &c."

"What kind of motion that is, fays he, which can be communicated from a body without having been first imparted to it, niuft Be left to the London Reviewers to determine."

If he had ever heard of the inteftine motion of bodies, (and it is no novel doctrine) one would think, he would have found no difficulty in reconciling the paffages in queftion; which he is pleased to term (though they are ftrictly mechanical and mathematical) metaphysical, and if not wholly nonfenfical, foreign to the purpose. But we fhall here take leave of this pretended Ariftarchus, with a return of the compliment, he pays to the Reviewers; "he does not feem to be acquainted with the very elements of this part of Natural Philofophy." Having run this article to a fufficient length, alfo, we muft defer our intended Obfervations on the tranfactionsabove-mentioned, and the purposes, defigned to be answered by the experiments, recorded in them, to another opportunity.

An Enquiry into the Nature and Caufes of the Wealth of Nations. By Adam Smith, LL. D. and F. R. S. Formerly Profeffor of Moral Philofophy in the University of Glasgow. 2 vols. 4to. 11. 16s. 6. Cadell.

Continued from page 187.

Indebted

sencies, attending the inconceivable velocity, rarity and tenuity of light, confider ed as a moving body, bring that doctrine, in our opinion, very near to a reductio ad abfurdum.

+Vide, Efiays and Obfervations, Phyfical and Literary. Read before a fociety in Edinburgh. Vol. II. page 22, et feq.

Indebted as the political writers of the prefent age, are thofe of the laft, for the inveftigation of firft principles, we cannot help thinking the best of our former writers on fubjects of civil polity, rather too abftracted and fpeculative for prefent edification. It is to the credit of feveral of thee times that, after the example of other experimental philofophers, they begin to found their principles more on experience and lefs on ipeculation. Hence it is that the doctrines they advance, frequently furprize the bookifh theorift with the appearance of fallacious novelty. The fact, however, is that the innovation, effected by the difcoveries and improvements of modern times, hath not only given a new face to the feience of politics, but hath effentially varied the fundamental parts of the hitherto prevailing fyftems of civil government. To this it may be added, that political adminiftration is become infinitely more complicated and difficult, than it was in ages and countries, whole commercial connections were few and confined, and whole manners were unrefined and fimple. It is no wonder, therefore, that our political difquifitions fhould take a new caft, and the principles, now neceffary to be affumed, fhould appear confiderably enlarged and improved. As the luxury of an age or two ago, is oeconomy, and even penury, in this, maxims muft vary with manners, and even first principles change, at leaft in capacity and extent, with the times.

This reflection may poffibly be neceflary to conciliate the very liberal manner, in which our ingenious author appears to have accommodated his political principles to the preient fituation of things.

The fecond volume of this work, containing Book the fourth and fifth, treats Of Syftems of Political Economy" and "Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Common-wealth."

In a very thort Introduction to the first of thefe objects, being the fubject of the fourth book, our author obferves that

"Political economy, confidered as a branch of the science of a ftatesman or legiflator, propofes two diftinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful revenue or fubfiftence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide fuch a revenue or fubfiftence for themfelves; and fecondly, to fupply the state or commonwealth with a revenue fufficient for the publick fervices. It propofes to enricht both the people and the fovereign.

"The different progrefs of opulence in different ages and nations, has given occafion to two different fyitems of political economy: with regard to enriching the people. The one may be called the fyftem of commerce, the other that of agriculture. I fail endeavour to explain both as fully and distinctly as I can, and fhall begin with the fyttem of commerce. It is the modern system, and is best understood in our own country and in our own times."

24

In

In chap. I. he lays down, accordingly," the principle of the commercial or mercantile fyftem; beginning with a display of the popular notion, hitherto conceived of it: which he expoles and explodes.

"That wealth confifts in money, or in gold and filver, is a popular notion which naturally arifes from the double function of money, as the inftrument of commerce, and as the meafure of value. In confequence of its being the inftrument of commerce, when we have money we can more readily obtain whatever elfe we have occafion for, than by means of any other commodity, The great affair, we always find, is to get money. When that is obtained, there is no difficulty in making any fubfequent purchase. In confequence of its being the measure of value, we estimate that of all other commodities by the quantity of money which they will exchange for. We fay of a rich man that he is worth a great deal, and of a poor man that he is worth very little money. A frugal man, or a man eager to be rich, is faid to love money; and a careless, a generous, or a profuse man,' is faid to be indifferent about it. To grow rich is to get money; and wealth and money, in fhort, are in common language confidered as in every refpect fynonymous.

"A rich country, in the fame manner as a rich man, is fuppofed to be a country abounding in money; and to heap up goid and filver in any country is fuppofed to be the readieft way to enrich it. For fome time after the difcovery of America, the first enquiry of the Spaniards, when they arrived upon any unknown coat, ufed to be, if there was any gold or filver to be found in the neighbourhood. By the information which they received, they judged whether it was worth while to make a fettlement there, or if the country was worth the conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk fent ambaffador from the king of France to one of the fons of the famous Gengis Khan, fays that the Tartars ufed frequently to ask him if there was plenty of sheep and oxen in the kingdom of France. Their enquiry had the fame object with that of the Spaniards. They wanted to know if the country was rich enough to be worth the conquering. Among the Tartars, as among all other nations of thepherds, who are generally ignorant of the ufe of money, cattle are the inftruments of commerce and the meafures of value. Wealth, therefore, according to them, confifted in cattle, as according to the Spaniards it confifted in gold and filver. Of the two, the Tartar notion, perhaps, was the nearest to the truth.

Mr. Locke remarks a diftinction between money and other moveable goods. All other moveable goods, he fays, are of fo confamable a nature that the wealth which confifts in them cannot be much depended on, and a nation which abounds in them one year may without any exportation, but merely by their own wafte and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is a steady friend, which though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the coun VOL. III.

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try is not very liable to be wasted and confumed. Gold and filver, therefore, are, according to him, the most solid and substantial part of the moveable wealth of a nation, and to multiply those metals ought, he thinks, upon that account, to be the great object of poli tical œconomy.

"Others admit that if a nation could be feparated from all the world, it would be of no confequence how much or how little money circulated in it. The confumable goods which were circulated by means of this money, would only be exchanged for a greater or a fmaller number of pieces; but the real wealth or poverty of the country, they allow, would depend altogether upon the abundance or fcarcity of thofe confumable goods. But it is otherwife, they think, with countries which have connections with foreign nations, and which are obliged to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in diftant countries. This they fay, cannot be done, but by fending abroad money to pay them with; and a nation cannot fend much money abroad, unless it has a good deal at home. Every fuch nation, therefore, muft endeavour in time of peace to accumulate gold and filver, that when occafion requires, it may have wherewithal to carry on foreign wars.

"In confequence of these popular notions, all the different nations of Europe have ftudied, though to little purpose, every poffi ble means of accumulating gold and filver in their respective countries. Spain and Portugal, the proprietors of the principal mines which fupply Europe with thofe metals, have either prohibited their exportation under the fevereft penalties, or fubjected it to a confiderable duty. The like prohibition feems antiently to have made a part of the policy of moft other European nations. It is even to be found, where we should expect least of all to find it, in fome old Scotch acts of parliament, which forbid under heavy penalties the carrying gold or filver forth of the kingdom. The like policy antiently took place both in France and England.

"When thofe countries became commercial, the merchants found this prohibition, upon many occafions, extremely inconvenient. They could frequently buy more advantageously with gold and filver than with any other commodity, the foreign goods which they wanted either to import into their own, or to carry to fome other foreign country. They remonftrated, therefore, against this prohibition as hurtful to trade"

The remonftrances, made on this occafion, he proceeds to fhew, were founded partly on fubftantial and partly on fophiftical reasons; illuftrating the real ftate of the cafe in a full, and, in our opinion, a true point of light. The particular fubjects of the feven following chapters into which this book are divided, are as follow.

"Chap. II. Of Restraints upon the Importation of fuch Goods from foreign Countries as can be produced at Home.-Chap. III. Of the extraordinary Reftraints upon the Importation of Goods of almost all Kinds, from thofe Countries with which the Balance is fuppofed to be difadvantageous.-Digreffion concerning Banks of

Depofit,

Depofit, particularly concerning that of Amfterdam.-Chap. IV. Of Drawbacks-Chap. V. Of Bounties.-Digreffion concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws.-Chap. VI. Of Treaties of Commerce-Chap. VII. Of Colonies.-Part I. Of the Motives for eftablishing new Colonies.-Part II. Caufes of the Profperity of new Colonies.-Part. III. Of the Advantages which Europe has derived from the Difcovery of America, and from that of a Paffage to the East-Indies by the Cape of Good Hope.-Chap. VIII. Of the Agricultured Systems, or of thofe Systems of political Oeconomy which reprefent the Produce of Land, as either the fole or the principal Source of the Revenue and Wealth of every Country."

We fhall felect, from the chapter on the colonies, what this writer advances refpecting the Reprefentation of the Ame-. ricans in the British Houfe, of Commons.

The idea of reprefentation was unknown in antient times. When the people of one state were admitted to the right of citizenfhip in another, they had no other means of exercifing that right but by coming in a body to vote and deliberate with the people of that other ftate. The admiffion of the greater part of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of Roman citizens, completely ruined the Roman republic. It was no longer poffible to diftinguish between who was and who was not a Roman citizen. No tribe could know its own members. A rabble of any kind could be introduced into the affemblies of the people, could drive out the real citizens, and decide upon the affairs of the republic as if they themfelves had been fuch. But though America was to fend fifty or fixty new reprefentatives to parliament, the door-keeper of the houfe of commons could not find any great difficulty in diftinguifaing between who was and who was not a member. Though the Roman conflitution, therefore, was neceffarily ruined by the union of Rome with the allied ftates of Italy, there is not the least probability that the British conftitution would be hurt by the union of Great-Britain with her colonies. That conftitution, on the contrary, would be compleated by it, and feems to be imperfect without is The aflembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have reprefentatives from every part of it. That this union, however, could be eafily effectuated, or that difficulties and great difliculties might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear infurmountable. The principal perhaps arife, not from the nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people both on this and the other fide of the Atlantic.

"We, on this fide the water, are afraid left the multitude of American reprefentatives fhould overturn the balance of the conftitution, and increase too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand, or the force of the democracy on the other. But if the number of American reprefentatives was to be in proportion to the produce of American taxation, the number of peopel Bb 2