were constrained or compelled to go with, and remain in, the expedition, because of violence, or threats of violence, offered to them by men engaged in the enterprise, — that is, if they did not join and remain with the expedition voluntarily, but were compelled to do so by men engaged therein, then they would not be regarded, in law, as accomplices; for an accomplice is a voluntary assistant in a crime." U. S. v. Ybanez, (1892) 53 Fed. Rep. 536.

Statute strictly construed. The statute must be strictly construed and not so extended in its scope as to include cases not clearly within its terms. U. S. v. Lumsden, (1856) 1 Bond (U. S.) 5, 26 Fed. Cas. No.

15.641.

Nor can it be enlarged by construction beyond the fair import of its terms. U. S. v. Hughes, (1895) 70 Fed. Rep. 972.

Reasonable construction. Although the statute is a penal statute defining certain offenses against the United States and announcing the punishment therefor, it is also designed to secure neutrality in wars between other nations or between contending parties, and must be reasonably construed in such a way as not to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. Wiborg v. U. S., (1896) 163 U. S. 632.

Construction of terms. This statute is to be construed as other domestic legislation is, and its meaning is to be found in the ordinary meaning of the terms used. Wiborg v. U. S., (1896) 163 U. S. 632.

Offenses alternative. "It is not necessary that both of these distinct provisions shall be violated to constitute the offense. The proof of either one of them will be deemed sufficient. They are put in the alternative. It is not essential to the case that the expedition should start, much less that it should be accomplished. To begin' is not to finish; to 'set on foot' is not to accomplish." U. S. v. Ybanez, (1892) 53 Fed. Rep. 536; U. S. v. O'Sullivan, (1851) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,975.

The statute defines the offense thereunder disjunctively as committed by every person who is within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, "begins, or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence." Wiborg v. U. S., (1896)

163 U. S. 632.

The statute creates two offenses: the one setting on foot within the United States a military expedition; the other providing means for it, as, for instance, means for transportation. U. S. v. Hart, (1897) 78 Fed. Rep. 868.

Ingredients of offenses. rated acts which constitute the offense are all in the disjunctive. To begin the military expedition spoken of is an offense within the statute. To begin it is to do the first act which may lead to the enterprise. The offense is consummated by any overt act which shall be a commencement of the expedition, though it should not be prosecuted. Or if an individual shall set the expedition on foot, which is scarcely distinguishable from beginning it. To set it on foot may

imply some progress beyond that of beginning it. Any combination of individuals to carry on the expedition is 'setting it on foot,' and the contribution of money or anything else which shall induce such combination may be a beginning of the enterprise. To provide the means for such an enterprise,' is within the statute. To constitute this offense, the individual need not engage personally in the expedition. If he furnish the munitions of war, provisions, transportation, clothing, or any other necessaries, to men engaged in the expedition, he is guilty, for he provides the means to carry on the expedition. It must be against a nation or people with whom we are at peace." Charge to Grand Jury, (1851) 5 McLean (U. S.) 306, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,267. by statute.

Offenses contemplated "There are four acts which are declared to be unlawful, and which are prohibited by the statute: to begin' an expedition; to 'set on foot' an expedition; to provide the means for an enterprise; and lastly to 'procure' those means.' U. S. v. O'Sullivan, (1851) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,975.

The statute is several and comprehensive in its term, and any contribution which tends to form, or assistance given to those engaged in, a military expedition or enterprise of the character prohibited by it must be considered within its purview. U. S. v. Hughes, (1895) 70 Fed. Rep. 972.

Approval of President no justification.— That an expedition within the prohibition of this statute was commenced with the knowledge and approval of the President of the United States is no justification. U. S. v. Smith, (1806) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,342a.

"Begins," "sets on foot," "provides," etc.

666

'Begin' is to do the first act; to enter upon. We may say, with all propriety, that to begin an enterprise is to take the first step; the initiatory movement of an enterprise, the very formation and commencement of an expedition. To set on foot' is to arrange, to place in order, to set forward, to put in way of being ready. Then to provide' is to furnish and supply; and to procure the means' is to obtain, bring together, put on board, to collect. After all these proofs are made out, the prosecution must further show that the beginning, the setting on foot, or the providing or procuring materials for such an expedition or enterprise, were within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, and to be carried on from thence, against the territory or dominions of some foreign prince or state, colony or district or people, with whom the United States were at peace." U. S. v. O'Sullivan, (1851) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,975; U. S. v. Ybanez, (1892) 53 Fed. Rep. 536.

"This language is very comprehensive and peremptory. It brands as a national offense the first effort or proposal by individuals to get up a military enterprise within this .country against a friendly one. It does not wait for the project to be consummated by any formal array, or organization of forces, or declaration of war; but strikes at the inception of the purpose, in the first incipient step taken,

with a view to the enterprise, by either engaging men, munitions of war, or means of transportation, or funds for its maintenance; and even further, it is not necessary that the means shall be actually provided and procured. The statute makes it a crime to procure those means. This would clearly comprehend the making ready, and the tender or offer of such means to encourage or induce the expedition; and may probably include also any plan or arrangements, having in view the aid and furtherance of the enterprise." U. S. v. O'Sullivan, (1851) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,975; U. S. v. Ybanez, (1892) 53 Rep. 536.

What constitutes beginning.

Probably a previously concerted movement or arrangement, with a distinct reference to the recruitment of men, would be sufficient to constitute such a beginning. And if this was followed up by the designation of a plan for an enlistment or enrollment, though there should be no proof that any were actually enlisted or enrolled, it would bring the parties implicated within the operation of the section referred to." U. S. v. Lumsden, (1856) 1 Bond (U. S.) 5, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,641.

"To begin to set on foot a military expedition,' is not actually setting on foot such expedition; but it is making such preparation for it as shall show the intent to set it on foot. To provide or prepare the means for any military expedition or enterprise,' within the law, such preparation must be made as shall aid the expedition. The contribution of money, clothing for the troops, provisions, arms, or any other contribution which shall tend to forward the expedition, or add to the comfort or maintenance of those who are engaged in it, is considered to be in violation of the law. These acts must all be done under such circumstances as to show the criminal intent, unless such intent shall be avowed." Charge to Grand Jury, (1838) 2 McLean (U. S.) 1, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,265.

Collection of men not essential. An expedition is begun or set on foot within the meaning of the statute where one takes part in collecting a body of men and in collecting arms and equipment with the intent that the two shall be combined afterwards so as to form a complete expedition. U. S. v. Nunez, (1896) 82 Fed. Rep. 599.

Enlistment of men. - -"The actual enlistment or enrollment of men, with the purpose of engaging in an unlawful military expedition or enterprise, is clearly within the scope of the first alternative of section 6. This constitutes a substantive fact susceptible of proof; and being proved, would justify the conclusion of legal guilt." U. S. v. Lumsden, (1856) 1 Bond (U. S.) 5, 26 Fed. cas. No. 15,641.

Actual starting not essential. "It is not essential to the case that the expedition should start, much less that it should have been accomplished. To begin' is not to finish. To set on foot' is not to accomplish. To provide and procure powder is not to put to it the match or the percussion,

It

is not necessary that the vessel should ac tually sail, nor is it necessary that war should exist between the nation on which the descent is to be made, with another nation." U. S. v. O'Sullivan, (1851) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,975.

--

Proof of overt act required. -"No authority can be necessary to sustain the position that the conclusion of guilt, in reference to any of the four alternative acts forbidden by section 6, follows only from proof of some distinctive, substantive fact looking to, and having for its object, a military expedition or enterprise against a country with which our relations are peaceful. Even as to the first and lowest form of offense designated by the statute- that of beginning a military expedition or enterprise-it must be signalized by some overt act. It is true, as to this offense, the statute is very comprehensive in its terms, and was evidently intended to strike at the first inception of any movement which, in its development, might endanger the peace of the country. Still, the beginning to do a thing imports that there must be an act which marks such beginning. It is difficult to form a clear conception of what will constitute such inceptive act. As before intimated, it requires something beyond a mere declaration of an intention to do it." U. S. v. Lumsden, (1856) 1 Bond (U. S.) 5, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,641.

To constitute the offense of violating section 5286, some overt act must be proved: first, either the beginning or setting on foot a military expedition or enterprise; or, second, the procuring or providing the means for such expedition or enterprise." U. S. t. Hughes, (1895) 70 Fed. Rep. 972.

Proof of words insufficient."Some defi nite act or acts, of which the mind can take cognizance, must be proved to sustain the charges against these defendants. Mere words, written or spoken, though indicative of the strongest desire and the most determined purpose to do the forbidden act, will not constitute the offense. It is true that proof of declarations of this nature, previously made, is admissible to explain or determine the character of acts, otherwise ambiguous or unintelligible; but for any other purpose they have no pertinency." U. S. r. Lumsden, (1856) 1 Bond (U. S.) 5, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15.641.

Providing or procuring means. Any pro viding or procurement of means, to bring the party within the penal sanction of the law. must have reference to the use of such means, under circumstances that would render such use criminal in the eye of the law. If, therefore, the proof shows that means were procured, to be used on the occurrence of a future contingent event, no liability is in curred under the statute. The test of the criminality of the act is the intention; but if the intention is that the means provided or procured shall only be used at a time, and under circumstances in which they could be used, without a violation of any law, no criminality attaches to the act." U. S. r. Lumsden, (1856) 1 Bond (U. S.) 5, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,641.

What constitutes providing or preparing. -"To provide or prepare the means for any military expedition or enterprise within the law, such preparation must be made as shall aid the expedition. The contribution of money, clothing for the troops, provisions, arms, or any other contribution which shall tend to forward the expedition, or add to the comfort or maintenance of those who are engaged in it, is considered in violation of the law. These acts must all be done under such circumstances as to show the criminal intent, unless such intent shall be avowed." Charge to Grand Jury, (1859) 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,268.

Providing transportation for a military expedition or enterprise to be carried from the United States is providing the means for it, within the meaning of this section. The Laurada, (1898) 85 Fed. Rep. 760; U. S. v. O'Brien, (1896) 75 Fed. Rep. 900.

Providing the means of transportation for a military enterprise to be carried on from the United States against a foreign government is, within the meaning of this statute, preparing the means for such a military enterprise to be so carried on, and, if done with the knowledge on the part of a person so providing the means of transportation, of the character and purpose of such enterprise, constitutes a violation of the statute. U. S. v. Murphy, (1898) 84 Fed. Rep. 609; U. S. v. Nunez, (1896) 82 Fed. Rep. 599. See also Wiborg v. U. S., (1896) 163 U. S.

632.

If persons supplying or carrying arms and equipments from a place in the United States are in any wise parties to a design that force shall be employed against the authority of a foreign country with which the United States is at peace, or that, either in the United States or elsewhere, before final delivery of the arms and equipments, men with hostile purpose toward the foreign government shall be taken on board and transported in furtherance of this purpose, the enterprise is not commercial but military, and is in violation of the provisions of the statute. International Law, (1895) 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 267.

Providing means for part of journey. - In an indictment for providing means for a military expedition it is not necessary that the defendant should have provided the means for carrying the expedition in question all of the way to its destination, but if he provides the means for any part of its journey, with knowledge of its ultimate destination and of its unlawful character, he is guilty. Hart v. U. S., (C. C. A. 1898) 84 Fed. Rep. 799.

It is

"If the defendant had knowledge that the expedition was unlawful, as charged, and he provided the means, here, in this district, to carry it to Navassa, on its way to Cuba, knowing that the latter was its destination, he is guilty of the offense charged. not necessary that he should provide the means for carrying it to Cuba. If he provided means here for carrying it any part of the journey, with knowledge of its destination. and of its unlawful character, he is 5 F. S. A.-24

guilty." U. S. v. Hart, (1897) 78 Fed. Rep. 868.

Completeness of vessel's equipment immaterial. It is not essential that the vessel should at the time of sailing be in complete readiness for hostile engagement. If in fact she sailed with the intent and the means to carry on such an enterprise, the transaction comes within the prohibition of the statute. U. S. v. Smith, (1806) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,342a.

Place of beginning. "The prosecution is bound to prove that the act of beginning or setting on foot a military expedition or enterprise was within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States; and you are instructed, in this connection, that the western district of Texas is within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States. And the proof must further show that the expedition or enterprise was to be carried on from the territory or jurisdiction of the United States against the republic of Mexico." U. S. v. Ybanez, (1892) 53 Fed. Rep. 536.

Expedition originating in foreign country. When a party of insurgents, already organized and carrying on war against the government of a foreign country, sent a vessel to procure arms and ammunition in the United States, the act of purchasing such arms and ammunition and placing them on board the vessel is not within the scope of this statute, as the expedition or enterprise was begun, provided, and prepared for in a foreign country and was to be carried on from that country, not from the United States. U. S. v. Trumbull, (1891) 48 Fed. Rep. 99.

Place where means provided. Where a person is indicted for providing means, within the prohibition of the statute, to justify a conviction it must be proved that a military expedition was organized in the United States and that the defendant provided means in the district where he is tried for assisting the expedition on its way to the country of its destination, with knowledge that it was such an expedition. U. S. v. Hart, (1897) 78 Fed. Rep. 868.

If the only aid furnished the expedition was furnished outside of the jurisdiction of the United States, and the defendants when starting from the United States to furnish this aid were ignorant of the object of their voyage, they are not guilty of a violation of the statute. If, however, they entered into an arrangement in the United States to provide the means of transportation, and provided it, to an expedition coming within the prohibition of the statute, they are guilty, even though the acts done in aid of the expedition were done outside of the jurisdiction of the United States. U. S. v. Wiborg, (1896) 73 Fed. Rep. 159.

Point from which carried on. - - A hostile expedition dispatched from the ports of the United States is within the words "carried on from thence." Wiborg v. U. S., (1896) 163 U. S. 632.

Averring place from which carried on.The prohibition of the statute applies to expeditions or enterprises intended to be carVolume V.