method can bring much relief from the burden of armed peace. To accomplish these ends the power of coercion must reside somewhere, and this recognized necessity is the raison d'être of the much-talked-of league of peace. Its fundamental purpose is to enforce peace among states by the use of military force, if failure of pacific methods makes it necessary. The future organization of such a league is as yet inchoate and only dimly discerned. The nearest approach to a definite proposition which has fallen under the writer's observation is contained in a recent pamphlet issued by the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. It makes the concrete suggestion that the league should embrace "all or nearly all" of the progressive states, but not the nonprogressive; that it should be executive in character, leaving the determination of controversies to some form of court, and confining itself to enforcement of the court's decisions and to the maintenance of order; and that its police force (which should be both army and navy) "should be a federal force, supported and controlled by the league . . . and overwhelmingly stronger than the military and naval forces of any one member of the league." What the nature of the compact forming this league is to be, or how its powers, resources, and obligations are to be defined, there is nowhere vouchsafed any suggestion, for the reason, no doubt, that no one has yet succeeded in devising a workable plan. Let us now pass to a consideration of the agency or means by which the League of Peace is to carry its purposes into effect. It is apparent at the outset that the ultimate reliance of such a league must be physical force-coercion. It will, if necessary, make war to maintain peace. Recalcitrant states are to be held in line by military force, if conciliation fails. An international police force is therefore an indispensable agency of the league, and its probable organization becomes interesting to examine. The idea itself is backed by very high authority, and indeed something of this kind appears to be necessary to the existence and efficiency of the league itself. But the moment we descend from generalities to particulars we land in serious difficulty. How would such a force be made up? If of already organized units-vessels of war, regiments, and so forth-contributed by the several states, there would be the complicated question of command, with its fruitful sources of friction; the liability, if not certainty, of defection of any contingent whose state might be the subject of coercion; and other embarrassments which readily suggest themselves. If, on the other hand, the force should be an entirely new and selfcontained organization, "supported and controlled by the league," there would have to be an independent sovereign power in the league itself to bring it into existence at all. This is important, in view of the discussion in the paragraphs immediately preceding, as showing to what lengths the league organization must go before it would have the power to create an international police. Assuming that it had progressed far enough for that purpose, the force would presumably be recruited from all the world, certainly from all the states constituting the league; but even then, differences of language and custom would necessitate organizing the units by nationality, with the risks and uncertainties just pointed out. On whom would such a force rely for munitions of war and all the vast equipment necessary to make it efficient? To whom would it look for funds? If dependent upon contributions and without power to enforce them, its existence would be precarious. Where would be its rendezvous, or base of operations? Surely not scattered among the different states, and no state would consent that it be located in any other. Some independent situation would have to be provided. Would such a force be military and naval? Or naval only? How strong would it be? If "overwhelmingly stronger than the military and naval forces of any one member of the league”— and this is indeed a logical conclusion, if the force is to be really effective—we can imagine what it would mean if Great Britain and Germany, with their normal establishments, were members. Is it not certain that the burden of armed peace would be greatly increased? Such a result must necessarily follow unless a way is found to curtail materially existing military and naval establishments. This brings us directly to that feature of the problem which is the most difficult and complicated of all, yet the most important and the one on which the success of the whole movement depends-a substantial reduction of existing armaments. III It is not surprising, in view of the magnitude of the evil aimed at, that all peace programs demand a reduction of armament and armed forces. It is surprising that none of them is specific as to how it is to be accomplished. The end is obvious enough, the means are not obvious at all. It may be suggested that reduction be upon the basis of equal armaments for all the Great Powers. But A says, "That will not do for me: I rely upon my navy for protection, and I must maintain my superiority on the sea." Should a reduction proportionate to present strength then be suggested, B protests that it is as great a state as A, and that it cannot, in keeping with its own dignity, admit the right of A to a greater control of sea than its own. If A can keep for itself that control, well and good, but no compact can be entered into that will make it secure. Paraphrasing Wordsworth-"Let him take who has the power, and let him keep who can." And there you are: how is the consenting mind to be obtained? The suggestion that land forces be limited to the police necessities of the various states is a precarious one. B would judge its necessities very much by what C was doing; and conversely, C would estimate its requirements very much by the standards maintained by its neighbors. Who would decide, and how would the decision be enforced? It may also be suggested that land forces be established on a basis of a certain percentage of the population. But the small state would protest that that would be to sign and seal its inferiority from the outset. Being a weaker state, it stands more in need of protection than a large one, and must be allowed to meet the situation to the full extent of its ability. Thus, in Switzerland every man is a soldier. This argument is reasonable, nay conclusive, and there is no sufficient answer. Closely related to the question of the reduction of armament is the demand that its manufacture be nationalized. The purpose is to eliminate the element of private profit in such manufacture, and the assumed tendency on the part of the manufacturer to favor military expenditures in order to increase opportunities for gain. Those who advocate this policy are doubtless convinced that it is directed against a real evil. A manufacturer of war material is naturally not displeased at receiving profitable orders from his government, just as other manufacturers welcome orders for dredges, building materials, and so forth. But it would be difficult to establish any political influence of consequence emanating from such a source, and it is scarcely conceivable that public policy is determined by such considerations. Admit for the moment, however, the existence of the evil; is the proposed remedy a practical one? What, in the first place, is it to embrace? Naval vessels, presumably, of all descriptions; likewise ordnance, from the heaviest cannon down; armor plate; aviation material; stores and munitions of war in all their enormous variety, and so forth. If the alleged influence of private profit is to be eliminated, all these things must be included. Now it is undoubtedly an advantage for a state. to have plants for its more important war material sufficient to form a considerable reliance independent of private interests. Besides the advantage of control in time of war, they serve as a check on private contractors. But until general industry is nationalized more than it is likely to be for some time to come, such an extreme measure as that proposed would be very wasteful. Then it would be wholly inadmissible to impose any such requirement upon smaller states; but that probably is not contemplated by its advocates. For both large and small states, therefore, any absolute requirement on these lines would seem unwise. Partial reliance, at least, on the outside, or on private establishments, would probably be considered indispensable by any state. And this brings out very forcibly certain inconsistencies of the various peace programs, particularly of those originating in this country. They all indorse the idea of a League of Peace, and its corollary, an international police force. The United States, being one of the most populous and wealthy of the Great Powers, and an acknowledged leader in the cause of peace, would naturally be expected to have a prominent share in this police force. What would have to be our contribution in men, ships, munitions of war, and money? By any possible consideration not based upon visionary assumptions, it would mean a material increase over our present establishment. Is it not incongruous, almost to the verge of absurdity, that those who oppose the necessary means for self-protection here at home, while our country minds its own business, commit themselves, in theory, at least, to providing a greater force to be used in regulating the affairs of other nations? All peace organizations commend with unstinted praise the time-honored policy of this country in holding aloof from European entanglements; yet by their very advocacy of a League of Peace and an international police force, they avowedly would commit their country to interference in every international controversy on the globe which should assume the character of armed conflict. New Republic. 2: 167-9. March 20, 1915. The League of Peace presents itself to practical men as a dream capable of an early translation into fact. The allies need only agree to join their forces against any power which persisted, after offers of arbitration or mediation (a reservation which no old-fashioned alliance ever made) in attacking any one of them. It would differ from other alliances partly by its insistence on the duty of arbitration, partly by its frank and public constitution, but mainly by the ready welcome which |