usefulness to humanity rests on our combining power with high purpose. Power undirected by high purpose spells calamity; and high purpose by itself is utterly useless if the power to put it into effect is lacking. In the history of our country the peace advocates who treat peace as more than righteousness will never be, and never have been, of service, either to it or to mankind. The true lovers of peace, the men who have really helped onward the movement for peace, have been those who followed, even though afar off, in the footsteps of Washington and Lincoln, and stood for righteousness as the supreme end of National life. Only by acting on these principles, only by following in the footsteps of these great Americans of the past, can we of the present generation effectively work for and secure the peace of righteousness.

North American Review. 179: 659-70. November, 1904.

International Arbitration. Sir Robert Finlay.

In truth, no International Authority with power to enforce the decrees of the tribunal of arbitration is either necessary or desirable. The list of international arbitrations during the nineteenth century is a very long one; and yet there is hardly a single case in which there has been any difficulty as to compliance with the award. In the Alabama Arbitration, a sum was awarded to the United States so enormous that it is reported that to the present day the American Government has not been able to find claimants for all of it. Sir Alexander Cockburn, the distinguished representative of Great Britain upon the Geneva Tribunal, dissented in the strongest terms from that award. But Great Britain never dreamt of refusing to comply with it. The enforcement of awards may safely be left to the good faith of the parties, and the honor of nations. There is no necessityfor any International Sheriff's Officer.

Submission to arbitration must rest upon the free consent of the nations concerned. The establishment of an International Tribunal before which any State might sue another, would be

a measure of very doubtful utility. Litigation of this sort between nations would probably cause more friction than it would prevent. As between individuals, there must be power to take one another to law: but the process, however necessary, is not one which is usually found to conduce to friendly feeling between the litigants. A compulsory tribunal, before which any nation might be haled by any other to answer claims which it might consider unfounded and frivolous, would, indeed, be a dangerous experiment. But a tribunal whose jurisdiction rests entirely upon consent stands on a different footing altogether, and experience has shown that nations which meet in the amicable contest of voluntary arbitration are all the better friends for it.

But, beneficial as is the rôle of Arbitration, there are some questions which no country will consent to leave to the judgment of any Court or any arbitrator. Every nation must be the guardian of its own honor. Every nation must decide for itself questions vitally affecting its independence or its essential interests. Some stakes are too big for arbitration. Some issues are too tremendous to be submitted to any but the dread ordeal of battle. It has been said that there hardly ever was a good war, and hardly ever a bad peace. But there are sometimes greater evils than war. There are some conclusions to which no nation ought to submit until everything has been staked and lost.

The United States are a Federation of a peculiarly intimate type, and have always possessed, in their magnificent institution of the Supreme Court, a tribunal, described by John Stuart Mill as international, for the decision of questions arising between the different States. Yet, when the great question of the rights of these States as against the Central Government arose, it could be settled only by the gigantic War of the Secession. In the sublime language of Bacon, "Wars are suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's Justice, where there are no superiors on earth to determine the case."

Fortnightly Review. 92: 119-32. December, 1912.

Great Delusion. Archibald Hurd.

It is a Danish proverb that "To God's council chamber we have no key." In spite of all the factors which we have been told, with tireless reiteration, make for peace, wars occur not less persistently in the twentieth century than they did in the past, when they were regarded as normal incidents in the evolution of nations.

To-day in the Balkan peninsula over a million men "with clenched teeth and hell-fire eyes" are "hacking one another's flesh, converting precious living bodies with priceless living souls into nameless putrescence." On the perimiter of war other great armies stand at attention, ready instantly to fling themselves into the turmoil if national honour or national ambition demands action.

Down to the very date when this struggle opened we were told that the millenium was at hand. Men had become political economists: war did not pay either victor or vanquished, and, therefore, battles might be regarded as things of the past. There were a hundred and one bloodless reasons why war should be no more, and yet war is in our midst. In spite of all the factors of a political and economic character which it was asserted made peace inevitable, Montenegro brushed aside all the fine spun theories of the pacifists, and, regarding not the frowns of the foreign ministers of the great powers flung her army across the Turkish frontier. Within a few days Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece had also invaded Turkish territory, and the impossible had happened-Europe was faced not with the possibility, but with the actuality of war.

The war was still continuing its monotonous course when the Balkan states reached the conclusion that the embarassment of Turkey provided them with a golden chance of driving the Golden crescent out of Europe. The Ottomans apparently believed to the last that the Concert of Europe would screen them. The Allies proved to be right; Turkey proved to be wrong.

Once more the world was given a demonstration of the friendless state of a nation which has neglected to maintain its strength. If Turkey had possessed any considerable measure of naval power, Italy could not have moved a soldier until the Turkish fleet had been defeated, and the probability is that there would have been no war. In the history of every people there comes a boiling point when some sense of wrong or a long-nurtured ambition seeks expression, and then, if the chances of success are thought to be good, and the opponent has neglected his means of defence there is war.

A study of history reveals the fact that of all politicians those who preach retrenchments on British armaments are the most ruinously extravagant in the charges which they throw upon the state. Periodically they capture the ear of the nation, and the votes for the defensive services are cut down, whatever may be the advice of experts and however menacing the preparations of rivals. The result is that as soon as the veriest shadow of war appears, those economists are thrust aside with scant courtesy of the nation and the navy and the army are examined in the light of the navies and armies of other countries, and a panic ensues-and a panic almost invariably means dramatic war grants and wasteful expenditure.

In the lurid light which the war in the Balkans has shed over Europe, in the admission of the growth of foreign fleets, in the knowledge of recent panics which the mere shadow of complications caused on the bourses, and in the recollection of the slender ties by which the equilibrium is maintained in Europe, the economist-pacifist may well remain dumb. Every reason which he has advanced in proof of the improbability of war has been exposed as resting on no foundation. War only becomes inevitable when the guardians of prestige and wealth encourage aggression by the feebleness of their preparations for defending what they hold, and therefore if an Anglo-German war ever occurs it will be because the British navy is too weak to keep the peace.

In political life to-day there is nothing more sordid than the new peace movement which urges the British people to neg

lect the only means by which their freedom and their bread can be defended, and by which they can continue to throw a protecing arm over the hundreds of millions of kindred peoples and subject races under the British flag. Year after year in the House of Commons working men are urged to economize on the navy and on the army, not because war in hideous and barbaric, and leaves homes desolate and women and children widows and orphans; not because other nations are willing to join in the movement for the limitation of armaments; not because we, in this unmilitary land, have nothing to fear owing to the jealousy of neighbors-nothing to hold which they desire to have-but because by reducing the defensive services a few pieces of silver may be saved to be distributed among fortyfive million of people in doles.

North American Review. 193: 641-52. May, 1911.

Armaments and Arbitration. Alfred T. Mahan.

A word may be said upon the onerousness of armaments, so much insisted upon and so present to popular consciousness to-day. Undoubtedly armaments are costly, but the means to bear them have increased to a degree little realized if known at all.

In 1809 Great Britain was at the height of her single-handed struggle against Napoleon. During that year Austria was again crushed at Essling and Wagram. Prussia remained in the utter subjection to France to which Jena, Eylau, and Friedland had reduced her in 1806 and 1807. Russia was the ally of France. The Spanish peninsula was flooded with French armies; a French King ruled in Madrid, another in Holland, while the royal family of Portugal was fugitive in Brazil. The Peninsular War was still in its beginnings, but in full blast. During that year the revenue collected in the United Kingdom was £63,719,400, supplemented by loans to the amount of £12,298,379; total, £76,017,779. The total expenditure was £76,566,013, of which the actual current expenses were £52,352,146; the re